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Summary	
	
 
 
This is an ethnography of Web 2.0 usage by the children of Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles.  
As Web 2.0 applications advance, diversify, and become part of daily life for many, it becomes 
important  to  understand  how  these  developments  shape  the  formation  of  contemporary 
identities.  This  ethnography  hones  in  on  how  people  use  specific  web  applications  in  the 
context  of  their  everyday  lives.  For  migrant  web  users,  advancements  in  communication 
technologies mean  increased channels of staying  in  touch with  their country of origin. This  is 
often  studied  in  terms  of  the  endurance  of  national  homelands  through  the  long‐distance 
attachments  that  internet  communications  help  to  create.  However,  as  new  technologies 
become increasingly commonplace, migrants also come to use internet for a range of purposes 
that also allow them to express their embedded‐ness within their county of settlement. This is 
especially pertinent in the case of second‐generation migrants (or children of migrants) who are 
raised,  if  not  born,  in  the  country  of  settlement,  many  of  whom  are  coming  of  age  in 
conjunction with these communications technologies.  
Although the importance of transnational theoretical perspectives on migrant identities (which 
emphasize both long‐distance and host country attachments) has been established in the social 
sciences, relatively  little  is still known about how migrants  indeed combine, on the one hand, 
the  long‐distance attachments  they  sustain via  their web use, and, on  the other hand, other 
types of internet use that exemplify their societal engagement within the countries where they 
live. Hence, the in‐depth perspective I offer on Iranian Americans in Los Angeles engages with 
and  sheds  light on how  this  long‐distance  communication with  Iran  takes  shape  alongside  a 
variety of other kinds of web use. 
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The research  I conducted  is specifically  interested  in web use by second‐generation migrants. 
How  do  children  of  migrants  from  Iran  to  the  US  fashion  ways  of  being  Iranian  American 
through  their  internet  usage?  The  thesis  addresses  this  question  from  an  anthropological 
perspective. This called  for ethnographic  fieldwork  in  the city of Los Angeles, California  for a 
period of approximately one year, and consisted of conducting formal and informal interviews 
with  a  set  of  young  adults  of  the  second‐generation,  as  well  as  conducting  participant 
observation  at  a  range  of  group  events.  It  also  consisted  of  observing  some  respondents 
interfacing  with  certain  websites,  following  certain  websites  myself,  documenting  and 
producing  certain  web  content,  and  communicating  with  people  online.  That  is,  I  used 
conventional  ethnographic  methods  to  study  the  varied  uses  of  internet  through  web 
applications such as social media platforms, websites, mobile web apps, and email. In this way, I 
joined scholars who are contributing to the burgeoning subfield of digital anthropology, which 
is  defined  by  its  approach  to  studying  internet  usage  practices  as  an  entwined  part  of  the 
practices of everyday life.  
This  thesis  draws  upon  broader  theories  from  media  anthropology  and  media  studies  that 
highlight how both the content and the material form of media shape the way people interpret 
messages  and  experience  communication. As  is  bolstered  by  existing  theories  of media  and 
identity,  notions  of  Iranian  American‐ness  and  processes  of  identification  rely  on  such 
experiences  and  interpretations.  I  investigate my  respondents’ particular  interpretations  and 
experiences  with  the  specific  web  applications  they  use  in  order  to  understand  how  their 
identities are formed with and through media, and how they come to have a sense of belonging 
as Iranian Americans. My work, therefore, adds to the body of work on internet as it helps build 
an  understanding  of  how  Iranian  American‐ness  comes  to  be  experienced  as  such  through 
people’s everyday media usage.  
By focusing on Iranian diaspora in the US this research contributes to the existing body of work 
that has engaged with questions of  self and  identity  formation  in  the  context of  the  Iranian 
diaspora  in  the  West.  Los  Angeles  in  particular  is  well‐known  as  a  hub  for  Iranian  exile 
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migration,  and  has  attracted  much  scholarly  attention,  also  with  regard  to  exile  media 
production  in  the city. However, as  the causes, demographics, and policies shaping migration 
from  Iran  have  transformed  over  the  years,  research  that  explores  the  changing  nature  of 
diaspora  identifications becomes very  important. More  specifically, with  the  relatively  recent 
rise of internet technologies and the coming of age of a new generation of Iranian Americans, 
the question of how important the concept of exile (and its associations with longing from afar) 
still  is  for  understanding  identity  formation  among  Iranian  diaspora  comes  to  the  fore  even 
more clearly.  
Through  conducting  fieldwork,  I  found  that  specific  themes  and  topics  were  of  particular 
importance  for people regarding how  they  talked about and put  into practice  their senses of 
belonging. These included notions of home, modes of remembering the past, ways of engaging 
with racial difference, and narratives of connecting with Iran’s Green Movement. This last topic 
was  significant  as  the  field  research was  primarily  carried  out  during  2009,  the  year  of  the 
Iranian Presidential elections and  the  rise of  the Green Movement as a protest movement  in 
the wake of  these elections  that summer. Each of  the ethnographic chapters of  this  thesis  is 
devoted, respectively, to discussing each one of these themes.  
 Chapter 1 draws on key notions of diaspora home. Home  is conceptualized as being  formed 
through  social  processes  rather  than  being  located  in  a  given  place  (such  as  a  distant 
homeland). However, physical places are still very important for formations of home — even in 
the context of web usage — as people create changing, diasporic attachments  to new places 
both  in  Iran and the US. Scholars of  Iranian diaspora  in Los Angeles have shown how place  is 
important for formations of home as people make new places into home as they live their lives 
there. The chapter builds on this idea, showing how places themselves also responsible for how 
people come  to be at home  there. Specifically,  this chapter  focuses on  three kinds of places 
that I found to be important to my respondents when talking about home: 1. the family house, 
2. the city of Los Angles, and 3. sites of return inside Iran.  
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I argue that the use of web applications plays a role  in processes of home formation  in these 
places,  as  web  usage  fosters  certain  ways  of  being  in,  moving  between,  and  developing 
relationships to places. I demonstrate that formations of home for my respondents depend on 
a combination of the places in question and ways in which they put specific web applications to 
use.  In  being  at  home,  my  respondents  seek  out  emotional,  experiential,  and  personalized 
approaches  to  representing  and  engaging  with  places  that  have  relevance  to  their  second‐
generation  lives.  While  they  do  this  in  ways  that  at  times  invoke  and  build  upon  the  first 
generation’s  movements  and  traces,  my  respondents’  own  practices  of  living  in  particular 
places  crisscross  the places  that  their parents’  generation bestow(ed) with meaning  through 
their  (continued)  inhabitation.  It  is  in  this way  that  they  re‐shape  diaspora  home  as  a  new 
generation.  
Chapter 2 concerns remembering. It focuses on how the past is part of notions of belonging for 
my second‐generation respondents. They choose and shape the narratives of the past that they 
want to represent based on their claims in the (diasporic) present. However, they also feel the 
responsibility  to  conserve  the past as  something  that  is not of  their own making, but  rather 
something  inherited. In this way, their practices align with a notion of cultural heritage. I take 
this term to mean the production of the past for a collective in the present, while framing that 
past  as  inherited  from  antecedent  others.  I  have  focused  on  three  main  practices  of 
remembering that emerged as important in my findings: 1. Remembering Iranian and American 
national pasts in overlap with one another, 2.  remembering the ancient Persian (Achamaenid) 
period, and 3. remembering the modern pre‐revolutionary past of Iran’s 60s and 70s.  
Through  their  practices  of  remembering,  my  respondents  made  efforts  at  towards  re‐
politicizing  the past,  re‐educating  themselves, and  re‐defining diaspora.  I  found  that people’s 
interactions with artifacts, their bodily experiences, and their engagements with the materiality 
of made products all allow them to experience elements of the past through their senses. This, I 
argued, helped build certain shared sensibilities and styles that appeal to  (sometimes specific 
parts  of)  the  second  generation.  I  also  show  how  physical  objects  are  seen  as  mediating 
vii	
	
elements  of  the  past  in  ways  that  the  web  applications  they  use  cannot.  Instead  these 
applications  facilitate access  to  the  copies, digitizations, and networks  that  feed  the  creative 
processes of producing, reproducing, and bestowing importance on a past for young people to 
hold on to. 
Chapter  3  covers  the  topic  of  race.  It  discusses my  second‐generation  respondents’  diverse 
claims to racial difference  in a context where Middle Easterners and Muslims  living  in the US 
are  increasingly racialized as a group.  In  this chapter,  I  focus on my respondents’ practices of 
self‐representation  and  how  their web  use  fits  into  their  broader media  environments  that 
include representations of Iranians and Iranian Americans. This inescapably implicates them in a 
wider  atmosphere where Muslims  and Middle  Easterners  are  racialized  as minorities  in  the 
West.  With  the  help  of  web  applications,  they  position  themselves within  this  context  and 
engage with categories of  racial difference  through projects of  identity politics  that set  them 
apart from their parents’ generation and align them with other minorities.  I discuss the many 
ways  they  use  web  applications  to  engage  with  (subverting,  resisting,  and  appropriating) 
racialized ways of seeing and being seen. 
This  chapter  argues  against  assumptions  about  the  disappearing body  (and with  it  race  and 
gender  categories)  in  studies  of  internet‐mediated  self‐representation.  The  respondents  use 
web applications as extensions of offline  spaces  for alternative  self‐representations, but  face 
the same  limitations as those face‐to‐face spaces when  it comes to reaching wider audiences. 
In this chapter I discuss three ways in which my respondents engage with racial difference and 
dedicate a section to each of these aspects. First I discuss how whiteness is rejected and racial 
difference  claimed  in ways  that are  seen as  contrasting with  the  first generation’s practices. 
Second  I  cover  some of  the divergences within  the  second  generation  as  to how  and under 
which  circumstances  such  racial  difference  is  claimed with  the  use  of  digital media.  Third,  I 
consider  the  gendered  aspects  of  racialization  that  emerged  as  a  significant  part  of  my 
respondents’  stories and practices.  I  show how many of my  respondents  see  race as  located 
unchangingly  in  their bodies, while at  the same  time, somewhat paradoxically,  there are also 
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those who acknowledge and advocate for the multi‐vocality and dynamism of the group, which 
blurs the boundaries of newly‐appropriated racial categories.   
Chapter  4  deals  with  social  media’s  significant  role  for  the  diaspora  during  the  2009  post‐
election  turmoil  in  Iran.  This  was  very  important  for  many  diaspora  Iranians’  sense  of 
identification with those in Iran. Social media also took on the status of a newsworthy thing in 
itself.  In this chapter,  I highlight three main narratives that circulated  in the aftermath of the 
hotly disputed Presidential elections of 2009 and during the protest movement that it spurred. 
These include 1. Narratives about possibilities of virtually “being there” or mediated presence, 
2.  narratives  about  the  possibilities  for  “internet  democracy,”  and  3. narratives  about  social 
media’s ability to go beyond its own supposed “shallowness.” Underlying each of the dominant 
narratives I discuss is  how that web usage brings people a sense of immediacy, whether this is 
through  a  sense  of  presence,  control,  or  emotional  connection.  I  argue  that  this  sense  of 
immediacy relies precisely on how particular messages are mediated. That is, an experience of 
immediacy  is  compelling  for  users  in  certain  situations,  and  this  primarily  relies  on  the 
aesthetics of the mediated experience. 
 Some of my respondents were instrumental in shaping how this movement was transnationally 
mediated  in  their  capacity  as web media  users  and  producers.  Key  actors  from  the  second 
generation  joined with  recent migrants  and  activists  in  Iran  to  convey  interpretations of  the 
social and political  intricacies of the  Iranian context for diaspora audiences and take positions 
themselves. For my  respondents, making  sense of  this movement and negotiating  their own 
positioning  in relation  to  these events relied  inexorably on  their practices of making sense of 
their  media  environment.  Based  on  how  people  implement  and  make  sense  of  their  own 
practices  involving  social media,  I  argue  that  they  develop  new  sensitivities,  new  literacies, 
particular creative forms of expression, and certain logics of media usage.   
This  thesis  comes  to  two main  conclusions.  First,  second‐generation migrants’  transnational 
modes  of  positioning  themselves  towards  the  country  of  “settlement”  and  “origin”  are 
intertwined with one another. They strengthen one another through long‐distance belonging to 
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a homeland  in adaptive ways, while also developing claims  to  rights  through  identity politics 
frameworks  in  the  society where  they  live.    It  is  clear  that my  respondents  display  various 
emerging ways of  claiming and appropriating otherness, and  that  these  sometimes  set  them 
apart  from  their parents’ generation, and other  times align  them with  longer ancestries  that 
include their families, immediate and distant, and also situate them with respect to the varied 
environments they find themselves in as Americans. Doing this is crucial for how they attain a 
sense of belonging as children of migrants. Second, being oneself as an Iranian American relies 
on mediation. Whether  it  is  through place  attachments,  remembering,  representing  race, or 
relating  to an uprising  from  afar,  these ways of being  Iranian American  require media. Web 
usage  becomes  incorporated  into  second‐generation  migrants’  practices  of  self‐styling,  and 
these practices create specific modes of migrant belonging. These styles are a testament to the 
particularities of overlapping and multiple ways of being Iranian American. 
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“Not	to	toot	my	own	horn	or	anything,”	Sepideh	said,	“but	I	was	doing	what	Nokteez	did	in	
the	UK	years	before	them.”	Sepideh	and	I	were	having	our	conversation	at	the	desk	in	the	
bedroom	 of	 her	 Santa	 Monica	 house	 while	 sitting	 in	 front	 of	 her	 large,	 sleek	 computer	
screen.	Nokteez.com1	was	 a	 London‐based	website	 that	 described	 itself	 as	 a	 project	 that	
“collects	 and	 shares	 slices	 of	 Contemporary	 Iranian	 culture,	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 art,	 music,	
design,	theatre	and	film.”	Sepideh	was	talking	about	her	work	on	her	blog,	Parsarts,	as	well	
as	some	sites	and	blogs	she	followed.	To	her,	Nokteez	was	exemplary	of	how	blogs	and	sites	
similar	to	hers	had	begun	to	emerge	since	she	started	blogging	in	2002/2003.	These	were	
sites	that	focused	on	Iranian	cultural	production	and	were	produced	by	diaspora	Iranians.	
With	 its	 byline,	 “Iranian	 Diaspora	 Life/Culture/Identity,”	 Sepideh	 had	 (according	 to	 the	
site’s	description)	begun	Parsarts	to	highlight	“Iranian	life	and	culture	abroad.”	Something	
of	an	early‐adopter,	Sepideh	had	worked	in	web	content	editing,	and	very	soon	after	I	met	
her	in	California	in	2008,	she	began	working	for	Google	in	Santa	Monica.	It	was	striking	that	
after	my	main	fieldwork	period	in	Los	Angeles	came	to	a	close	at	the	end	of	2009,	a	few	of	
my	 other	 respondents	 also	 started	 up	 English‐language,	 web‐based	 projects	 focusing	
specifically	 on	 Iranian	 culture,	 history,	 and	 arts,	 including	 a	 range	 of	 diaspora	 cultural	
production	and	scholarly	writing.	It	seemed	something	of	a	trend	was	emerging;	a	growth	
of	sites	different	than	the	older	and	widely‐known	Iranian.com	in	that	they	were	set	up	not	
as	open	platforms	but	each	curated	with	a	vision,	the	vision	of	a	younger	generation.		
																																																								
1	The	site	has	since	become	inactive.	The	last	Twitter	updates	are	from	posts	in	2010.	
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Dedicated	to	Iranian	diasporic	culture,	and	each	with	their	own	scope,	sites	like	Ajam	Media	
Collective,	Btaarof,	Jigaram.com,	and	Yaddashts	had	in	common	that	they	were	small‐scale	
projects	 and	 where	 almost	 entirely	 produced	 by	 US‐based	 children	 of	 Iranian	migrants.	
Non‐existent	 just	 a	 few	 years	 prior,	 these	 projects	 sprouted	 up	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	
increasing	 proliferation	 and	 diversification	 of	 web	 technologies.	 Their	 emergence	 also	
overlapped	with	the	coming‐of‐age	of	a	generation	of	young	people	who	had	grown	up	in	
the	diaspora	and	had	something	 to	 say	about	 that	experience.	During	my	 time	 in	LA	and	
thereafter,	I	was	continuously	fascinated	by	how	this	new	generation	of	Iranian	Americans	
incorporated	their	web	usage	into	their	ways	of	being	Iranian	American	and	how	Iranian	
American‐ness,	in	turn,	came	to	shape	their	web	usage.		
But	 this	 was	 not	 what	 I	 had	 originally	 set	 out	 to	 study	 by	 doing	 research	 on	 Iranian	
diaspora	web	users.	Having	been	intrigued	by	the	Iranian	blogging	phenomenon	that	rose	
significantly	 in	 the	 early	 2000s,	 I	was	drawn	 to	 the	unique	border‐crossing	potentials	of	
blogs	 for	 helping	 diaspora	 bloggers	 and	 readers	 at	 a	 distance	 to	 participate	 in	 and	
contribute	to	the	formation	of	the	predominantly	Iran‐based,	Farsi	language	blog	scene,	or	
Weblogistan/“Veblogestan”	 (Alinejad,	 2011;	 Amir‐Ebrahimi,	 2004;	 Doostdar,	 2004;	
Hendelman‐Baavur,	2007;	Shakhsari,	2011).2	I	was	impressed	by	stories	about	the	political	
potential	of	easy‐to‐use	blogging	applications	and	the	brave	acts	of	political	dissidents	 in	
the	Islamic	Republic,	though	some	had	since	fled	overseas	to	pursue	their	web	publishing	
activities	while	gaining	 international	audiences.3	 I	went	 to	LA,	 the	place	known	for	being	
the	highest	concentration	of	Iranians	outside	Iran,	for	the	first	time	in	2008	to	contact	the	
authors	and	readers	of	these	kinds	of	blogs	and	sites	and	to	find	out	more	about	their	ways	
of	living	in	the	diaspora	while	being	users	of	blogs	and	other	websites.	But	spending	time	in	
LA	and	meeting	a	variety	of	web	users,	I	realized	that	web	uses	were	far	more	diverse	than	
the	political	dissidents	that	had	originally	drawn	my	interest.	This	realization	and	meeting	
people	like	Sepideh,	quickly	led	me	to	shift	interest	and	focus.		
																																																								
2		Also	referred	to	by	some	as	“Blogistan”	(Hendelman‐Baavur,	2007;	Sreberny	&	Khiabany,	2010).	
3	I	further	discuss	the	literature	on	these	Farsi	language	blogs	in	Chapter	4.	
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Sepideh	was	no	 stranger	 to	 the	phenomenon	of	 the	diaspora	blogger	dissident.	And	as	a	
young	but	experienced	web	editor	 she	was	 interested	 in	 the	 role	of	 internet	 for	 Iranians	
living	 in	 the	 diaspora.	 But	 she	 echoed	 the	 sentiments	 of	many	 other	 children	 of	 Iranian	
parents	in	LA	I	spoke	with	when	she	said	of	those	blogs:	“The	time	it	takes	for	me	to	read	
those	 is	 simply	 too	 long	 [due	 to	 language].	And	 the	 context	 they	are	writing	 from	within	
doesn’t	 speak	 to	 me.	 Their	 experience	 is	 not	 mine.”	 Increasingly,	 children	 of	 Iranian	
immigrants	who	had	grown	up	in	the	US,	and	whose	parents	had	left	Iran	in	large	numbers	
around	 the	 1970s	 and	 80s,	 were	 taking	 to	 the	 web	 to	 fashion	 their	 own	 stories	 and	
experiences	 of	 life	 in	 the	 Iranian	 diaspora.	 While	 Sepideh	 had	 never	 been	 in	 Iran	 and	
sometimes	 endured	 the	 accompanying	 skepticism	 about	 her	 Iranian‐ness	 from	 other	
Iranians,	her	blog	had	become	a	source	of	connection	to	other	children	of	Iranian	parents	in	
LA,	 people	 she	 had	 befriended	 over	 time	 and	 with	 whom	 she	 shared	 many	 of	 her	
understandings	of	Iranian‐ness.	Her	blog	gave	rise	to,	and	thus	became	rooted	within,	new	
social	 relationships,	 helping	 to	 articulate	 imagined	 connections	 to	 Iran	 while	 also	
acknowledging	her	life	as	an	American.		
Sepideh’s	 generation	 of	 web‐using	 Iranians	 in	 LA	 raised	 questions	 about	 how	 a	 new	
generation	of	 Iranians	was	using	 the	web	while	entering	adulthood	in	the	country	where	
they	had	grown	up.	The	web	activities	of	Sepideh	and	others	like	her	made	me	wonder	how	
these	young	people’s	web	use	and	their	Iranian	American‐ness	were	mutually	shaping	one	
another	under	 the	given	 technological	 and	social	 circumstances.	 In	addressing	 this	 issue,	
my	 ethnography	 of	 Iranian	 American	 internet	 users	 in	 LA	 follows	 existing	 research	 on	
Iranian	diaspora	populations	 that	has	 investigated	questions	of	belonging	and	 identity	of	
LA‐based	Iranian	migrants	(Ghorashi,	2002;	Naficy,	1993;	Sullivan,	2001).	However,	it	does	
so	 in	 a	 very	 different	 context;	 one	 in	 which	 proliferating	 web	 usage	 is	 becoming	
increasingly	a	part	of	everyday	life	in	the	American‐based	diaspora.	Moreover,	it	focuses	on	
a	migrant	generation	that	has	received	relatively	little	scholarly	attention,	despite	being	the	
first	 generation	 to	 have	 grown	 up	 outside	 Iran	 from	 their	 earliest	 years.	 In	 this	
introductory	 chapter,	 I	 further	 elaborate	 upon	 and	 contextualize	 my	 focus	 on	 second‐
generation	Iranian	American	web	users.	I	frame	this	focus	by	discussing	relevant	currents	
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from	theories	of	diaspora	and	digital	media	research.	I	also	introduce	the	methods	through	
which	I	conducted	my	field	research.		
	
Exile	migration	versus	the	rise	of	a	new	generation	
Since	 Naficy’s	 The	Making	 of	 Exile	 Cultures:	 Iranian	 Television	 in	 Los	 Angeles	 (1993),	 an	
important	thread	in	the	literature	on	Iranian	diaspora	is	the	question	of	how	far	exile	is	and	
remains	a	useful	concept	with	which	to	understand	Iranian	migration.	This	question	is	even	
more	 relevant	 given	 the	 increasingly	 diverse	 motivations	 and	 experiences	 that	 underlie	
recent	 emigration	 from	 Iran.	My	 respondents	 are	 part	 of	 a	 generation	whose	 entry	 into	
young	 adulthood	 largely	 overlaps	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 digital	 media	 in	 their	 day‐to‐day	
environments	 and	 who	 live	 amidst	 exposure	 to	 swiftly‐developing	 communications	
technologies.	 They	 are	 also	 coming	 of	 age	 within	 the	 changing	 topography	 of	 Iranian	
diaspora,	 and	 in	particular	a	 changing	population	of	 Iranian	Americans	 in	 the	 city	of	Los	
Angeles,	a	city	where	it	is	scarcely	possible	to	live	without	being	somewhat	cognizant	of	the	
significantly	sized	Iranian	American	population.	Doing	research	on	the	second	generation	
in	 LA	 means	 taking	 into	 account	 not	 only	 the	 lingering	 traces	 of	 exile,	 but	 also	 these	
ongoing	shifts	in	demographics,	migration	flows,	and	developments	in	media	technologies.	
Anthropological	work	focusing	specifically	on	the	second	generation	of	Iranian	migrants	is	
extremely	 sparse,	 although	 the	 work	 of	 Sreberny	 (2000),	 McAuliffe	 (2007),	 and	
Maghbouleh	 (2012)	 presents	 rich	 ethnographic	 accounts	 from	 the	 disciplines	 of	 media	
studies,	 human	 geography,	 and	 sociology	 respectively.4	 Maghbouleh’s	 work	 on	 second	
generation	 Iranian	 Americans	 makes	 an	 argument	 for	 Iranian‐ness	 as	 “an	 affirmative	
identity”	(2012:	158)	that	empowers	young	people	to	make	collective	bonds	as	well	as	take	
critical	stances	towards	the	“host”	society.	Bozorgmehr	and	Douglas’	contribution	points	to	
an	 upward	 socioeconomic	 trajectory	 for	 second‐generation	 Iranian	 Americans	 (2011)	 in	
																																																								
4	Other	(non‐ethnographic)	research	covering	the	second	generation	is	focused	mainly	on	the	US	and	comes	
from	sociology,	developmental	studies,	and	literary	studies	(see	Bozorgmehr	&	Douglas,	2011;	Chaichian,	
1997;	Daha,	2011;	Mahdi,	1998;	see	also	Sreberny‐Mohammadi,	2013).	
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contrast	 to	 the	 thesis	 of	 “second‐generation	 decline”	 (Gans,	 1992).	 These	 developments	
signify	changes	in,	and	increased	documentation	of,	the	internal	diversity	and	evolution	of	
Iranian	 Americans	 over	 the	 past	 decades.	 Bozorgmehr’s	 “internal	 ethnicity”	 notion	 has	
drawn	 attention	 to	 diversity	 among	 Iranian	 Americans	 (Bozorgmehr,	 1997).5	 Given	 this	
dynamism,	Bozorgmehr	and	Sabagh	also	raise	the	question	of	whether	narratives	of	exile	
actually	characterize	most	experiences	of	migration	among	Los	Angeles	Iranians	(Sabagh	&	
Bozorgmehr,	1987).	Bozorgmehr’s	more	recent	documentation	of	post‐9/11	consequences	
for	 Iranians	 in	 Los	 Angeles,	 and	 for	Middle	 Easterners	 in	 the	 US	 in	 general	 (Bakalian	&	
Bozorgmehr,	2009)	has	also	contributed	to	understanding	and	conceptualizing	the	changes	
over	time	that	this	immigrant	population	has	collectively	undergone.		
Treating	the	Iranian	migrant	population	in	the	US	as	not	only	full	of	internal	diversity	but	
also	showing	changing	patterns	over	time	calls	for	a	brief	historical	interlude	to	lay	out	the	
basic	 trajectory	 of	 Iranian	 migration	 trends	 over	 recent	 decades.	 Tens	 of	 thousands	 of	
Iranians	have	been	in	Los	Angeles	since	the	first	wave	of	migration	to	the	US	in	the	1960s	
through	 early	70s	 (Ghorashi	&	Boersma,	 2009).	This	was	 a	period	during	which	US‐Iran	
relations	 were	 relatively	 amicable,	 and	 Los	 Angeles	 and	 Tehran	 became	 sister	 cities.	
However,	the	 reasons	 for	 migration	 changed	 from	the	 often	temporary	
student	migration	to	more	extended	 or	 permanent	exile	 and	 political	 refuge	 due	 to	 the	
Islamic	 Revolution	 of	 1979.	 The	 latter	 led	 to	 a	much	 more	 intense,	second	 wave	 of	
emigration	 from	 Iran.6	The	 third	wave	 is	 thought	 to	have	been	 set	 in	motion	 since	1984	
(Jalali,	 2005)	 and	 can	 be	 attributed	 in	 part	 to	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 Iran‐Iraq	war	 of	
1980‐1988.	 In‐depth	accounts	of	migrational	trends	to	the	US	have	been	covered	 in	other	
research	(Bozorgmehr,	1997;	Ghorashi,	2002;	Mobasher,	2006;	Modarres,	1998)	and	will	
																																																								
5	The	study	of	Iranian	Americans	is	an	area	to	which	he	and	collaborators	contributed	a	considerable	amount	
of	scholarship	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	(Sabagh	and	Bozorgmehr,	1986;	Bozorgmehr	and	Sabagh,	1988;	
Waldinger	and	Bozorgmehr,	1996;	Bozorgmehr,	1997;	Bozorgmehr	and	Sabagh,	1998;	Bakalian	and	
Bozorgmehr,	2009).This	includes	a	particular	focus	on	LA	in	some	early	work.	The	bulk	of	this	is	based	on	
predominantly	quantitative	data	and	analysis.		
6An	additional	intermediate	wave	has	also	been	defined	between	1970	and	1978,	comprised	of	an	affluent,	
urban	populace	who	had	become	wealthy	during	these	years	of	economic	growth.	Like	the	first	wave,	their	
motivations	for	movement	were	also	largely	economic	and	professional,	and	they	were	dispersed	throughout	
the	country	(Jalali,	2005).	
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not	 be	 recapitulated	 in	 full	 here.	 The	 emigration	 since	 the	 2009	 uprising	 and	 the	
crackdown	 on	 student	 protesters	 and	 other	 activists	 signals	 another,	much	more	 recent	
wave	that	has	been	less	researched	as	yet.		
The	Iranian	media	environment	in	LA	has	been	suggested	by	Sreberny	to	be	the	richest	in	
the	Iranian	diaspora	(Sreberny,	2001).	I	take	this	as	a	reference	to	Persian	language	media	
that	 encompasses	 the	 many	 print	 publications,	 radio	 stations,	 satellite	 television	
productions,	and	basic	cable	broadcasts	coming	out	of	the	city.	This	is	part	of	what	makes	
LA	 a	 fertile	 field	 site	 for	 researching	 diaspora	 media.	 Yet	 with	 the	 rise	 in	 popularity	 of	
certain	 websites,	 web	 media	 produced	 outside	 the	 illustrious	 city	 emerged	 as	 familiar	
among	many	of	my	respondents.	These	include	such	sites	as	the	Persian	language	internet	
radio	broadcast	Radio	Javan	in	DC,	Iranican.com	in	Toronto,	Iranian.com	in	San	Francisco,	
and	 Biya2.com	 in	 DC7,	 as	 well	 as	 English	 language	 sites	 aimed	 at	 Iranian	 Americans	
audiences	 based	 elsewhere	 in	 North	 America.	 These	 media	 productions	 have	 not	 yet	
enjoyed	 the	 scholarly	 attention	 that	 LA’s	 satellite	 television	 industry	 has.	 However,	
together	they	signal	a	possible	move	towards	possible	new	centers	and	modes	of	 Iranian	
diaspora	media	production	 that	 coincides	with	 the	 generational	 changes	 in	 the	diaspora.	
While	such	shifts	need	not	be	attributed	to	the	rise	of	internet	alone,	there	is	a	clear	need	
for	research	that	sheds	light	on	a	changing	Iranian	diasporic	media	landscape	that	includes	
web	media.		
Thus	far	ethnographic	research	has	been	focused	on	the	first	generation	of	migrants	from	
Iran,	a	great	deal	of	whom	experienced	firsthand	the	major	transformations	that	came	with	
revolution	and	war,	and	whose	migration	experiences	were	wrought	by	this.	This	body	of	
work	 has	 tended	 to	 highlight	 in	 varying	 balances	 the	 trauma	 of	 these	 dramatic	
transformations	 that	 caused	 the	 dispersion	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	
possibilities/advantages	of	migration	on	the	other.	Naficy’s	theorization	of	exile	and	media	
sees	the	state	of	 liminality	as	a	stage	 that	not	only	connects	 to	 the	 lost	 Iranian	homeland	
																																																								
7 	Radiojavan.com;	Iranican.com;	Iranian.com;	Biya2.com 
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but	does	so	while	adapting	to	American	commercial	and	societal	values.	Zohreh	Sullivan’s	
work	 on	 Iranian	 exiled	 intellectuals	 in	 LA	 shows	 the	 productivity	 of	 diaspora	 within	 a	
literary	 studies	 tradition.	 That	 is,	 she	 sees	 exile	 as	 having	 more	 diverse	 metaphorical	
meanings	 for	migrant	 imaginaries	 than	 only	 loss	 and	 longing	 (Sullivan,	 2001).	 Ghorashi	
also	foregrounds	the	productive	possibilities	of	the	liminal	condition	of	hybridity.	But	she	
also	argues	 for	making	a	 conceptual	distinction	between	exile	and	diaspora	 in	which	 the	
former	helps	harbor	sentiments	of	a	lost	national	homeland,	while	the	latter	helps	embrace	
new	beginnings	(Ghorashi,	2005;	Ghorashi,	2002).	Sreberny‐Mohammadi	makes	a	similar	
distinction,	drawing	on	Brah’s	discussion	of	diasporic	space,	which	leads	her	to	understand	
Iranian	diaspora	 as	 a	 “looking	 around”	 in	 an	 “all‐around”	 and	 “multi‐directional”	 gaze	 in	
contrast	with	 the	 inward	 looking	of	a	 focus	on	ethnicity	and	a	backward	 looking	of	 exile	
(Sreberny,	2000:	182).	
In	recent	work	on	Iranian	diaspora	and	the	second	generation,	the	notion	of	exile	maintains	
relevance.	 Maghbouleh	 situates	 the	 Persian	 language	 music	 industry	 –essentially	 an	
industry	transported	 from	Iran	 to	Los	Angeles	after	 the	Islamic	revolution	–	within	exilic	
modes	 of	 cultural	 production.	 She	 argues	 that	 these	 modes	 also	 generate	 second‐
generation	claims	to	homeland	and	appropriation	of	collective	narratives	of	loss	and	pain	
remembered,	or	rather,	experienced	vicariously	by	the	younger	generation	through	shared	
interest	in	Persian	music	(Maghbouleh,	2010a).	In	addition,	Malek’s	essay	on	contemporary	
(literary)	 cultural	 production	 in	 the	 Iranian	diaspora	 invokes	 the	productive	 elements	of	
Naficy’s	 conceptualization	 of	 exile	 to	 argue	 that	 this	 allows	 Iranian	 diaspora	 cultural	
producers	to	occupy	new	a	“in‐between”	positioning	as	part	of	creating	a	“third	space”	in	
the	 vein	 of	 Homi	 Bhabha’s	 notion	 (Malek,	 2006:	 356).	 Indeed,	 the	 work	 of	 postcolonial	
thinkers	like	Bhabha	have	been	highly	influential	in	the	social	sciences	and	humanities	for	
expounding	on	the	ways	diaspora	positionings	represent	more	than	marginalized,	silenced,	
or	otherwise	discounted	states	of	pain	and	dislodgement.	Such	analyses	seize	on	diaspora	
as	a	productive	condition,	one	that	is	envisioned	as	both	future‐oriented	in	the	sense	of	the	
migrants’	own	life,	but	also	as	template	of	an	increasingly	prevalent	condition	in	a	future	of	
movement	and	plasticity.		
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This	tendency	in	work	on	Iranian	diaspora	draws	on	post‐colonial	scholarship,	which	also	
pays	 attention	 to	 the	possibilities	 of	 diaspora,	 as	well	 as	 the	 conditions	of	 often‐extreme	
oppression,	violence,	and	exclusion	that	brought	many	of	these	diasporic	conditions	to	bear	
in	the	first	place.	Over	time,	the	literature	on	Iranian	diaspora	has	increasingly	moved	from	
the	longing	and	loss	of	exile	of	the	first	generation,	towards	seeing	diasporic	Iranian—nes	
as	an	adaptive	formation	that	has	generative	capacities.	Along	the	way,	the	notion	of	exile	
seems	to	retain	relevance;	not	only	as	an	analytical	reference	point	for	understanding	the	
character	of	 second‐generation	 Iranian	migration	experiences,	but	also	socially	as	a	 trace	
that	lingers	heavily	in	one	form	or	another	in	my	respondents’	lives.		
The	specificities	of	exile	migration	also	have	implications	for	thinking	about	transnational	
migrant	 identities	of	the	second	generation.	The	lasting	fissure	of	Iranian	exile	has	meant	
that	 an	 Iranian	 “transnational	 generation”	 (Glick	 Schiller	&	Fouron,	 2001:	175)	has	been	
marked	 by	 uneven	 obstacles	 to	 the	 flow	 of	 transmigracy.	 The	 notion	 of	 transnational	
generations	has	been	posited	based	on	the	case	of	the	Haitian	second	generation	residing	in	
the	US,	which	are	seen	to	belong	to	the	same	generation	as	their	chronological	counterparts	
in	Haiti.	Although	some	of	my	respondents	did	indeed	travel	back	and	forth	between	the	US	
and	Iran	with	family	from	a	young	age,	movement	is	often	restrictive	in	the	case	of	Iran	and	
the	 US,	 in	 part	 because	 of	 the	 relatively	 tense	 diplomatic	 atmosphere	 between	 the	 two	
countries’	 governments.	 Therefore,	 the	 children	 of	 Iranian	 migrants	 may	 share	 more	 in	
common	 in	 this	 regard	with	 those	of	Cuban	 immigrants8	 than	 their	Haitian	 equivalents.9	
Opportunities	 for	 return	 travel	 among	 the	 second	 generation	 hinge	 on	 birth	 certificates,	
passports,	parents’	political	background,	time	of	migration,	possibly	severed	ties,	parents’	
																																																								
8 The	element	of	exile	that	has	long	defined	Iranian	migration	invokes	a	particular	trajectory	that	has	led	to	
interesting	comparisons	with	Palestinian	immigrant	experiences	in	the	US	(McCloud,	2006:	103)	and	
experiences	of	pre/post‐revolutionary	Cuban	immigrants/exiles	(Bozorgmehr,	1986:	3).		
9	Though	the	notion	of	a	“transnational	generation”	may	offer	an	analytical	encompassment	of	the	lives	of	
young	Iranians	in	Iran	and	how	it	is	shaped	by	diaspora	influences,	that	investigation	lies	outside	the	scope	of	
this	research.	
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trauma,	etc.	Such	travel	is	therefore	neither	a	given	or	fluid	part	of	migrant	life	for	many	of	
even	the	children	of	Iranian	migrants,	in	LA	or	elsewhere.10		
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 specific	 consequences	 of	 exile,	 much	 of	 the	 literature	 conceptualizing	
transnationalism	 seems	 to	 overstate	 the	 role	 of	 cross‐border	 practices	 and	 nation‐state	
incorporation.	I	discuss	how	I	draw	from	these	transnational	migration	studies	later	on	in	
this	 chapter	 when	 I	 introduce	 the	 notion	 of	 migrant	 social	 fields.	 I	 also	 draw	 on	
perspectives	 that	 highlight	 digital	 media,	 exile,	 and	 the	 second	 generation	 as	 they	
foreground	 limitations	 to	 diaspora	 flows	 and	 mobility	 while	 studying	 transnational	
meaning‐making.	 For	 instance,	 Mason’s	 work	 on	 Palestinian	 migrants	 argues	 that	 the	
second‐generation	 also	 engage	 with	 experiences	 of	 exile,	 and	 shows	 that	 the	 role	 of	
transnational	 media	 such	 as	 books,	 songs,	 and	 poetry,	 as	 well	 as	 blogs	 and	 email	 are	
particularly	 formative	 for	 the	 second	 generation’s	 “’virtual’	 relationship	 with	 the	
homeland”	 (Mason,	 2007:	 279).	 This	 work	 shows	 how	 issues	 of	 exile	 persist	 in	 specific	
ways	for	the	second	generation,	but	also	make	it	relevant	to	understand	what	role	internet	
plays	under	circumstances	where	transnational	mobility	is	not	a	given	(Aouragh,	2011).	In	
the	case	of	the	Iranian	diaspora	such	impediments	emerge	due	to	visa	restrictions	in	the	US	
and	fears	of	detainment	or	travel	restrictions	in	Iran	among	other	concerns.		
Indeed,	 elements	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 exile	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 connection	 to	 a	 territorial	
homeland	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 nostalgic	 loss	 are	 not	 all	 obsolete	 for	 my	 second‐generation	
respondents,	even	as	 they	 take	up	new	web	uses;	 some	still	express	 longing	 for	 Iran	and	
experience	 impediments	 to	 traveling	 there.	 Yet	 changes	 in	 the	 diasporic	 and	 media	
landscape,	 especially	 over	 the	 past	 10	 or	 so,	 years	mean	 that	 the	 status	 of	 exile	 cultural	
production	in	LA	has	been	complicated	by	the	rise	of	a	new	generation,	as	well	as	emerging	
media	productions	and	a	changing	global	political	environment.	While	acknowledging	how	
exile	 can	be	 the	nexus	of	 creative	and	critical	 forms	of	 identification	 for	young	people	as	
well,	I	focus	specifically	on	certain	media	uses	of	this	new	generation	within	this	changing	
																																																								
10 Although	this	atmosphere	is	not	without	its	changes	and	shifts	with	the	changing	of	Presidents	and	
(informal)	policies. 
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environment	of	cultural	production.	 I	now	move	on	to	discuss	the	role	of	digital	media	in	
the	context	of	migration	research	in	an	effort	to	frame	my	focus	on	generation,	migration,	
and	the	web.		
	
Digital	media	research	and	second‐generation	migrants	
A	proliferation	of	 studies	on	migrants	and	 Information	and	Communication	Technologies	
or	ICTs	(internet	technologies	in	particular)	has	been	generated	from	a	range	of	academic	
disciplines	 over	 the	 past	 half‐decade,	 and	 the	 term	 of	 “digital	 diaspora”	 has	 created	
substantial	 buzz	 around	 this	 work.	 Arguing	 for	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 “connected	migrant,”	
Diminescu’s	 (2008)	 influential	work	on	migrants	 and	 ICTs	 shares	basic	 similarities	 in	 its	
argument	 with	 earlier	 work	 on	 migration,	 which	 argued	 that	 flows	 of	 migration	 have	
shifted	scholarly	understandings	of	the	world	as	naturally	sedentary	with	immobility	as	the	
norm,	to	movement	and	migration	being	the	norm,	with	the	migrant	as	the	ideal‐type	in	a	
mobile	world	(see	also	Malkki,	1995).	Barbara	Kirshenblatt‐Gimblett	(1994)	reflects	on	the	
seminal	work	of	James	Clifford	(Clifford,	1992)	on	diaspora	to	propose	“spaces	of	dispersal”	
that	are	characterized	not	by	displacement	and	disarticulation	from	an	earlier	placement,	
but	 by	 movement	 that	 brings	 about	 the	 conditions	 for	 new	 articulations	 while	 socially	
reconfiguring	 time	 and	 space.	 These	 new	 conditions	 call	 for	 new	ways	 of	 understanding	
migrant	lives,	and	specifically	how	ICT	usage	shapes	today’s	migrants’	experiences	of	their	
migrancy	(Diminescu,	2008).	
The	work	on	second‐generation	migrants	and	digital	media	also	contributes	to	a	growing	
field	 of	 study	 across	 academic	 disciplines	 (Faulstich	 Orellana,	 Thorne,	 &	 Lam,	 2001;	
Gillespie,	2000;	Lam,	2006;	Leurs	&	Ponzanesi,	2011;	McAuliffe,	2007a;	Panagakos,	2003;	
Annabelle	Sreberny,	2000;	Wilding,	2006).	A	number	of	 trends	emerge	 from	this	body	of	
work.	First,	this	work	focuses	on	young	people.	 	This	has	led	to	some	concerns	regarding	
the	way	young	people	are	studied	in	conjunction	with	digital	media,	namely,	assumptions	
are	 made	 about	 young	 people	 (and	 children)	 as	 either	 being	 susceptible	 to	 supposed	
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virtues	and/or	vices	of	internet	on	account	of	their	age	alone	(see	Buckingham	on	utopian	
and	dystopian	ideas	about	children	and	computers,	2006:	75).	Such	suppositions	have	been	
criticized	as	being	detached	from	actual	usage	practices,	in	addition	to	which	the	language	
of	 the	 native/non‐native	 dichotomy	 has	 been	 pointed	 out	 as	 problematically	 applied	 to	
digital	media	 use	 (Ginsburg,	 2008).	 A	 focus	 on	 uptake	 of	 digital	media	 by	 young	 people	
therefore	 helps	 reveal	 the	 extent	 to	which	 age	 indeed	 plays	 into	 particularities	 in	 usage	
practices.	Yet	I	take	care	not	to	treat	a	respondents’	youth	as	an	assumption	of	their	innate	
digital	 fluency	or	as	necessarily	 indicating	respondents’	desire	 for	change.	Rather,	 I	delve	
into	their	modes	of	using	internet	within	social	fields	of	older	and	younger	actors.		
A	second	trend	is	that	the	children	of	migrants	are	(almost	exclusively)	studied	in	terms	of	
their	status	within	families.	And	attention	for	second‐generation	migrants’	positions	within	
domestic	environments	tends	to	prevail.	In	contrast,	my	respondents	are	slightly	older	on	
average,	 which	means	 that	 they	 also	 position	 themselves	with	 regard	 to	 either	 younger	
members	 of	 the	 second	 generation	 or	 a	 hatchling	 third	 generation	 and	 not	 only	 to	 their	
parents	 or	 others	 within	 their	 family.	 This	 account	 is	 hence	 also	 characterized	 by	 the	
relative	 autonomy	 and	 cognizance	 of	 (young)	 adulthood.	 It	 is	 an	 account	 focused	 on	 the	
second	generation’s	own	perspective	rather	than	being	driven	by	the	terms	of	public	policy	
debates	about	successive	generations’	“integration”/“assimilation”	or	foregrounding	older	
generations’	 concerns	 about	 how	 young	 people	 are	 growing	 up	 in	 the	 diaspora.	 By	 not	
privileging	 the	 place	 of	 these	 young	 people	 within	 their	 families,	 I	 describe	 my	
respondents’	roles	more	broadly;	as	professionals,	in	their	relationships	with	peers,	and	in	
terms	 of	 their	 awareness	 of	 and	 stakes	 in	 overlapping	 scales	 of	 social	 and	 political	
developments.	
Third,	 there	 is	an	emphasis	on	cross‐generational	change.	But	as	Gillespie	points	out,	 the	
combination	 of	 second	 generation	 youth	 and	 digital	 media	 should	 not	 be	 taken	 to	
automatically	 signal	 inter‐generational	 change	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 cultural	 values	 of	
parents	 (Gillespie,	 2000).	 Gillespie’s	 work	 on	 second‐generation	 immigrants	 has	
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highlighted	 how	 studying	 culture	 over	 generations	 should	 not	 treat	 generational	
progression	as	the	source	of	cultural	change	per	se.	She	argues	that:	
[S]uch	polarised	 conceptions	of	 culture	and	of	generational	differences	 impede	an	
understanding	 of	 their	 interrelationships	 and	 overlap	 –	 like	 cultures,	 generations	
are	not	impermeable	or	fixed”	(2000:	68).		
She	 emphasizes	 both	 “malintegration	 and	 solidarity	 between	 generations”	 	 (2000:	 68),	
drawing	on	Mannheim’s	influential	1952	essay	on	generations	that	argues	for	viewing	each	
generation	 as	 the	 repository	 of	 prevailing	 ideas	 (see	 Mannheim,	 1952).	 It	 is	 useful	 to	
understand	how	 internet	usage	 signals	 certain	generational	breaks	as	 young	people	 gain	
increased	independence	at	particular	points	in	their	lives.	However	I	do	not	underestimate	
the	pursuit	for	cultural	continuity.		
Fourth,	scholars	argue	for	acknowledging	the	diversity	within	the	second	generation	itself.	
Highlighting	 inter‐generational	 differences	 only	 suggests	 uniformity	 within	 generations.	
Addressing	 this,	 McAuliffe’s	 work	 destabilizes	 nationally	 bounded	 notions	 of	 identity	
among	 the	 second	 generation	 by	 highlighting	 differences	 between	 religious	 identities	
(McAuliffe,	 2007a,	 2007b),	 while	 Sreberny	 pays	 attention	 to	 the	 interaction	 between	
generation	 and	 gender	 (Sreberny,	 2000).	 With	 this	 in	 mind,	 I	 also	 elaborate	 on	 the	
particular	ways	race,	class,	 religion,	and	gender	cross‐cut	my	respondents’	ways	of	being	
Iranian	 American	 –	 intersections	 that	 tend	 to	 be	 aligned	 to	 reflect	 the	 particularities	 of	
their	second‐generation	positioning	and	reflect	the	diversity	within	this	generation.		
Fifth	 and	 finally,	 categories	 of	 “ethnic	 media”	 that	 have	 dominated	 research	 on	 first‐
generation	 migrant	 media	 practices	 appear	 less	 relevant	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 second	
generation.	Panagakos’	research	on	Greek	satellite	television	in	Canada	sees	ethnic	media	
as	 an	 “everyday	 fixture	 for	Greek	 immigrants”	 (Panagakos	&	Horst,	 2006:	116).	 She	 also	
shows	 how	 second	 and	 third	 generations	 have	 relatively	 little	 use	 for	 Greek	 satellite	
television	 and	 favor	 internet	 for	 its	 accessible,	 English‐language	 content,	 and	 the	
international	 links	to	other	parts	of	the	Greek	diaspora	(Panagakos,	2003).	Such	research	
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on	the	second	generation	that	compares	older	and	newer	media	forms	in	particular	cases11	
offers	useful	ways	of	looking	at	inter‐generational	changes	as	they	develop	in	line	with	the	
particularities	 of	 a	 given	 migration	 context.12	 My	 approach	 incorporates	 transnational	
circuits	of	media	messages	that	are	interspersed	with	other	English‐language	web	content	
and	 thus	 engaged	with	differently	 than	 typical	 “ethnic	media”	 forms	 like	dedicated	 long‐
distance	 or	 diaspora‐produced	 (Farsi‐language)	 satellite	 programming	 (Dayan,	 2002).	
Having	discussed	how	my	research	is	situated	within	some	of	the	themes	running	through	
literature	 on	 Iranian	 diaspora	 and	 media	 and	 migration	 research,	 I	 now	 move	 on	 to	
introduce	 my	 research	 questions	 regarding	 web	 media	 and	 second‐generation	 Iranian	
Americans.	
	
Being	Iranian	American	amidst	the	internet’s	rise	
As	 a	 child	 growing	 up	 in	 Australia	my	mother	would	 laugh	while	 tenderly	 satirizing	my	
(now	 late)	 paternal	 grandmother	 who	 lived	 in	 Tehran.	 My	 parents	 talked	 about	 her	
memorably	comical	way	of	using	the	telephone	in	the	family	house,	the	house	they	shared	
with	her	and	the	rest	of	my	father’s	family	for	the	first	years	of	their	marriage	before	I	was	
born.	When	people	would	call	from	overseas,	her	voice	would	rise	from	the	moderate	“alo?”	
(hello?)	 with	 which	 she	 answered	 the	 phone,	 to	 a	 vociferous	 shout	 at	 the	 moment	 of	
realizing	who	the	caller	was	and	the	distant	location	from	which	the	call	was	reaching	her.	
The	 volume	 of	 conversation	would	 rise	 a	 little	 even	when	 friends	 and	 family	would	 call	
from	Shiraz	several	hundred	kilometers	away,	my	mother	described.	But	never	as	much	as	
for	an	international	call;	a	call	 from	khaarej	(overseas	–	literally	“outside”).	A	little	over	a	
																																																								
11	See	also	how	Alexanian’s	study	places	her	analysis	of	chosen	Iranian	websites	against	the	backdrop	of	
satellite	television	channels,	revealing	important	shifts	and	changes	in	media	production	specific	to	the	
emergence	of	certain	popular	sites,	and	arguing	that	such	websites	create	a	“transnational	Iranian	public	
sphere”	in	addition	to	developing	Iranian	literary	production	by	promoting	heterogeneity	of	“diaspora”	voices	
(Alexanian,	2008).		
12	Indeed,	as	Gillespie	points	out	(2000),	much	of	the	recent	research	that	has	focused	on	childhood	also	
suggests	that	children	are	often	the	first	to	adopt	new	communication	technologies.		
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year	after	my	birth,	my	parents	relocated	our	small	 family	 to	Sydney	where	we	were	the	
ones	 on	 the	 other	 end	 of	 those	 international	 calls	 now.	 And	 my	 dear	 grandmother’s	
shouting	voice	came	to	us	across	the	ocean	and	over	the	wires	we	relied	on	and	devices	we	
spoke	into.	
It	was	not	only	with	my	grandmother	with	whom	I	was	 raised	 to	speak	over	 the	phones	
that	sat	in	each	of	the	living	rooms	we	inhabited	over	time	in	Sydney,	but	a	range	of	other	
relatives	that	I	grew	up	knowing	(if	at	all)	only	from	those	phone	conversations	and	the	few	
photo	 albums	 my	 parents	 brought	 with	 them	 when	 they	 fled	 Iran	 during	 the	 war.	 The	
precious	 albums	 and	 the	 letters	 that	 came	 for	my	 parents	 in	 Farsi	 –	 the	 script	 that	was	
consistently	and	 familiarly	 indecipherable	 to	me	 for	my	entire	childhood	and	yet	which	 I	
remember	so	clearly	as	the	writing	of	letters	from	afar	and	my	mother’s	diary,	which	she	
had	brought	with	her	to	Sydney.	The	albums,	those	letters,	and	of	course	that	all‐important	
telephone.	That	was	what	we	had	of	those	people	and	that	place.	And	so	my	parents	would	
encourage	me	to	speak	to	these	relatives	over	the	phone	as	a	child.	Sometimes	gingerly	and	
sweetly	enticing	me	with	stories	of	how	deeply	those	strangers	loved	me	as	a	small	baby,	
sometimes	 coercing	 me	 with	 social	 obligation	 and	 cultural	 custom.	 And	 so	 I	 spoke	 and	
listened;	sometimes	with	love,	sometimes	robotically.	And	later	I	wondered	if	I	would	one	
day	laugh	with	my	own	(unborn)	children	at	my	parents’	practices	around	the	phone,	the	
same	way	 they	 had	 laughed	 about	my	 grandmother.	 Later	 still,	 I	 also	wondered	what	 it	
would	mean	 for	 transnational	 families	 like	mine	 that	 new	 communications	 technologies	
were	mushrooming	in	use	across	the	globe,	technologies	that	most	of	my	family	members	
would	never	have	envisioned	becoming	a	part	of	our	regular	ways	of	being	in	touch	with	
one	another.	
During	 the	 process	 of	 fieldwork,	 I	 attended	 a	 theatre	 production	 put	 on	 by	 one	 of	 the	
Iranian	student	groups	I	had	contact	with.	The	play	included	a	humorous	skit	in	which	the	
character	of	the	Iranian	grandmother	in	LA	who	was	the	lovable	butt	of	the	joke	about	how	
she	 used	 the	 internet	 telephony	 program,	 Skype,	 to	 make	 international	 calls	 to	 Iran,	
including	that	familiar	idiosyncrasy:	shouting.	The	main	issue	this	book	deals	with	concern	
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how	the	children	of	Iranians	settled	outside	Iran,	and	living	lives	connecting	them	to	Iran	
and	 other	 diaspora	 places	 across	 borders,	 deal	 with	 issues	 of	 cultural	 change	 over	
generations	alongside	the	transformations	that	come	with	technological	development.	How	
are	 their	 Iranian‐ness	 and	 American‐ness	 formed	 at	 once	 through	 these	 important	
changes?	
The	 central	 question	 I	 address	 in	 this	 book	 is	 how	my	 respondents	 fashion	ways	 of	 being	
Iranian	American	through	their	lives	as	second‐generation	migrants	web	users.	I	investigate	
how	 my	 respondents	 put	 Iranian	 American‐ness	 into	 practice	 through	 processes	 of	
becoming	(them)selves,	and	I	focus	on	how	their	web	usage	figures	into	this.	That	is,	I	try	to	
understand	the	process	of	becoming	Iranian	American	by	accessing	the	practices	(including	
web	 usage	 practices)13	 of	 a	 group	 of	 second‐generation	 residents	 of	 LA.	 I	 treat	 “Iranian	
American”	in	the	first	place	as	an	identity	label	my	respondents	themselves	apply	and	have	
a	stake	in,	rather	than	a	category	that	this	research	project	seeks	to	define	conceptually.	I	
examine	how	the	meaning	of	 this	 label	 is	 applied	 to	 selves	and	how	 it	 is	defined	and	re‐
defined	and	negotiated	situationally	while	being	compounded	and	cross‐cut	by	other	facets	
of	my	respondents’	selves.		
I	also	specifically	 investigate	what	role	 internet	has	 in	this	process	of	self‐formation.	 I	do	
this	 by	 focusing	 on	my	 respondents’	 internet	 usage.	What	 I	mean	 by	 internet	 should	 be	
specified	 here.	 The	 difference	between	 the	 “internet”	 (or	 “the	net”)	 and	 the	World	Wide	
Web	 (or	 the	 “web”)	 is	 that	 “internet”	 is	 the	 network	 through	 which	 computers	
communicate	with	one	another.	It	 is	the	basic	infrastructure,	so	to	speak,	and	the	earliest	
network	that	connected	multiple	computers	to	one	another.	It	was	developed	in	the	1960s	
first	 as	 a	 military	 project	 (ARPAnet)	 and	 later	 experimented	 with	 in	 academia	 and	
eventually	used	to	connect	computers	for	personal	and	commercial	purposes.	It	has	since	
been	developed	 to	 connect	with	expanding	communications	 infrastructures.	The	web,	on	
the	other	hand,	was	developed	much	later	and	made	public	in	the	1990s.	It	is	a	collection	of	
																																																								
13	Later	in	this	chapter	I	come	back	to	defining	practices	and	what	I	mean	by	the	term	“web.”	
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pages	(in	the	HTML	protocol),	which	can	be	accessed	through	a	browser	software	and	that	
are	 connected	 to	one	 another	 through	hyperlinks	 and	 accessible	 through	URLs	 (Uniform	
Resource	 Locator)	 or	 “web	 addresses.”	 These	 pages	 can	 also	 be	 summarily	 searched	
(through	 the	 use	 of	 a	 search	 engine).	 The	 web	 is	 basically	 built	 on	 top	 of	 the	 internet	
infrastructure	 and	 is	 the	most	 popular	 way	 in	 which	 the	 information	 on	 the	 internet	 is	
accessed	 by	 people.	 Other	 ways	 of	 accessing	 the	 internet	 include	 email,	 instant	 chat	
services,	and	file	transfer	services.		
The	recent	advances	in	web	software	have	also	meant	changes	in	social	scientific	research	
about	internet.	The	proliferation	of	the	web	as	a	fast‐growing	format	through	which	people	
access	the	internet	has	signaled	a	shift	 toward	websites	that	place	the	user	central	 in	the	
interface	and	in	the	business	model	(sites	like	Facebook	and	Myspace),	and	this	has	made	
the	“social”	aspects	and	implications	of	web	application	usage	increasingly	significant.	This	
social	 or	 interactive	 feature	 that	 allows	 users	 to	 interact	 with	 one	 another	 has	 been	
popularly	promoted	as	one	of	the	main	differences	(if	not	the	defining	difference)	between	
Web	1.0	and	Web	2.0,	even	though	formal	definitions	of	the	difference	between	the	“old”	
and	 the	 “new”	 web	 are	 not	 hard	 and	 fast	 (see	 Cormode	 &	 Krishnamurthy,	 2008).	 I	 am	
interested	 in	 the	 means	 through	 which	 people	 access	 the	 internet	 (i.e.	 the	 “network	 of	
networks”	that	relies	on	hardware,	servers,	cables,	wires,	and	signals	to	connect	computers	
and	other	devices	to	one	another).	Hence,	the	specificities	of	the	various	formats	through	
which	 people	 access	 the	 net	 becomes	 increasingly	 interesting	 to	 investigate	within	 their	
specific	contexts	of	use.	For	this	reason	I	try	to	specify	to	which	mode	of	accessing	internet	
I	am	referring	when	I	discuss	my	respondents’	use	of	internet,	rather	than	referring	to	their	
general	use	of	“the	 internet.”	 I	also	use	 the	term	“application”	to	refer	most	 frequently	to	
web	applications	or	online	software	like	websites	and	social	media	platforms,	but	I	also	use	
the	term	to	refer	to	non‐web	services	such	as	email.	By	this	I	mean	to	refer	to	the	various	
forms	 in	 which	 people	 encounter	 the	 internet,	 as	 they	 contribute	 to	 and	 interact	
(primarily)	through	the	web	through	usage.		
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My	 focus	 is	 on	 how	 these	 practices	 of	 (predominantly	 web‐based)	 usage	 interact	 with	
processes	of	self‐formation	for	my	second‐generation	Iranian	American	respondents.	I	set	
out	 to	 show	how	 Iranian	American‐ness	 comes	 into	 being	 through	 a	 variety	 of	 practices	
that	pertain	to	 its	various	aspects	and	that	people	who	identify	as	such	engage	 in.	 In	this	
book,	I	discuss	such	aspects	of	Iranian	American‐ness	in	the	form	of	a	few	themes.	Delving	
into	 each	 of	 these	 themes	 contributes	 to	 addressing	 the	 central	 question	 of	 how	 Iranian	
American	 selves	 are	 formed	 through	 web	 usage.	 These	 themes	 include:	 home,	 the	 past,	
race,	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 green	movement	 in	 Iran.	 I	 choose	 to	 give	 these	 four	 themes	 a	
central	place	in	the	book	because	they	emerged	strikingly	during	my	fieldwork	period	and	
appeared	to	have	important	implications	and	resonance	for	my	respondents	and	the	field.	I	
therefore	 organize	 the	 four	 main	 ethnographic	 chapters	 of	 this	 book	 around	 these	 four	
themes.	I	describe	these	further	at	the	end	of	this	chapter	where	I	present	the	structure	of	
the	book.	 In	 the	 following	 I	discuss	more	 in	depth	 the	 concept	of	mediation	 I	use	 in	 this	
book,	which	links	media	with	notions	of	cultural	identification/belonging.		
 
Internet	and	the	formation	of	selves	
Cultural	mediation	
The	study	of	culture/society	and	media	deals	 from	various	perspectives	with	the	issue	of	
where	power	is	in	the	relationship	between	media	and	people.	Simply	put,	it	asks	whether	
media	have	power	over	 the	 lives	of	passive	people,	or	whether	people	are	 the	ones	with	
power	over	media.	The	move	 from	the	Frankfurt	School’s	 interpretation	of	mass	media’s	
complicity	 in	 capitalism’s	 structures	 of	 (re)production	 has	 largely	 given	way	 to	 theories	
that	call	attention	 to	how	people	actively	 interpret	messages	 in	diverse	ways,	 sometimes	
contrary	 to	 the	 intention	behind	production.	 From	a	 communication	 science	perspective,	
Lievrouw	describes	the	shift	towards	theorizing	the	active	role	people	play	in	assigning	and	
negotiating	 the	meanings	of	media	content	within	social	and	cultural	contexts	(Lievrouw,	
2009).	She	argues	for	situating	the	notion	of	“mediation”	centrally	in	theories	of	media	and	
18	
	
communication	 as	 a	 way	 to	 merge	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 with	 the	 technological	 in	 a	
process	of	mutually	constitution.	This	draws	on	what	 science	and	 technology	studies	has	
referred	 to	 as	 a	 “mutual‐shaping”	 perspective	 (Boczkowski,	 1999).	 The	 important	 thing	
about	 this	 perspective	 is	 that	 it	 acknowledges	 the	 shaping	 power	 of	 people’s	 everyday	
practices	 while	 also	 highlighting	 the	 “constraints	 and	 affordances	 of	 material	
infrastructure”	(Lievrouw,	2009:	310).	
The	 role	 of	 materiality	 in	 processes	 of	 mediation	 has	 been	 stressed	 by	 scholars	 of	
new/digital	media	 and	 culture	with	 various	 different	 emphases.	 Stuart	 Hall’s	 analysis	 of	
coding	 and	 decoding	 culture	 as	 text	 is	 one	 extension	 of	 this	 turn	 towards	 the	 active	
interpretation	work	involved	in	the	communication	of	media	and	cultural	messages	(2006).	
While	this	is	a	semiotic	theory	of	culture	as	text,	media	scholars	have	emphasized	how	not	
only	media	texts	but	also	the	meanings	of	material	media	devices	are	also	interpreted	by	
people.	 This	 interpretation	 happens	 when	 they	 are	 taken	 up	 in	 practices	 of	 use.	 Sonia	
Livingstone	has	made	this	distinction	in	the	terminology	of	“media‐as‐object”	from	“media‐
as‐text,”	but	states	that	“people	are	always	both	interpreters	of	the	media‐as‐text	and	users	
of	media‐as‐object,	and	the	activities	associated	with	 these	symbolic	and	material	uses	of	
media	 are	 mutually	 defining”	 (Livingstone,	 2006:	 346).	 Another	 approach	 is	 Roger	
Silverstone’s14	 notion	 of	 “domestication”	 (Haddon,	 2004;	 Silverstone	&	Haddon,	 1996).15	
This	 approach	 also	 treats	 media	 objects	 and	 texts	 as	 integrated.	 “Domestication	
emphasizes	 the	meanings	 that	 people	 attribute	 to	 technologies,	 as	well	 as	 how	 they	 use	
																																																								
14	Silverstone’s	notion	of	mediation	has	also	been	influential	in	media	and	communication	studies.	As	he	
writes,	“mediation…	requires	us	to	understand	how	processes	of	communication	change	in	the	social	and	
cultural	environments	that	support	them	as	well	as	the	relationships	that	participants…	have	to	that	
environment	and	each	other”(Silverstone,	2005),	which	suggests	a	two‐way	flow	of	influence.	His	notion	
further	seems	to	mesh	with	the	other	notions	of	mediation	mentioned	here	in	the	sense	that	it	sees	media	not	
only	as	socially	embedded	but	also	a	mutual	shaping	between	the	social	and	the	technological.	He	states:	
“Mediation…	extends	into	a	concern	with	how	culture	is	negotiated	in	the	tactics	of	everyday	life”(Silverstone,	
2005).	
15	“Silverstone,	Hirsh,	and	Morley	(1992),	and	later	Silverstone	and	Haddon	(1996),	isolated	four	intersecting	
processes	that	constituted	television’s	domestication:	appropriation,	incorporation,	objectification,	and	
conversion.	Objectification	refers	to	the	physical	placement	or	inscription	of	the	technical	object,	a	
commodity	bought	in	the	market	and	hence	initially	alien	to	the	domestic	fabric.	The	physical	placement	of	
material	artifacts	into	a	particular	domestic	environment,	Silverstone	and	colleagues	(1992)	argue,	objectifies	
the	moral,	aesthetic,	and	cognitive	universe	of	those	feeling	comfortable	with	them”(Bakardjieva,	2011).	
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them	–	that	is,	both	the	material	and	the	symbolic	aspects	of	technology”	(Lievrouw,	20093:	
313).	Both	 the	objects	and	 (textual)	 content	of	media	are	 appropriated	by	 their	 actively‐
interpreting	 audiences/users.	 I	 see	 mediation	 therefore	 as	 encompassing	 the	 role	 of	
technological	forms	of	programs	and	devices	as	well	as	the	content	of	the	message.		
The	 concept	 of	 mediation	 has	 also	 been	 used	 in	 cultural	 anthropology	 to	 analyze	 the	
relationship	between	socio‐cultural	processes	and	media.	William	Mazzarella	makes	a	call	
for	 anthropology	 to	 study	media	 and	 society	 precisely	 in	 this	way,	which	 sees	media	 as	
constitutive	 of	 and	 therefore	 integral	 to	 the	 processes	 of	 social	 life	 (2004).	 Birgit	Meyer	
(Meyer,	 2013)	 has	 similarly	 conceptualized	media	 and	 culture	 as	 co‐composed	within	 a	
single	 historical	 trajectory.	 From	 this	 media	 anthropological	 perspective,	 culture	 and	
cultural	identity	are	always	necessarily	mediated,	even	when	face‐to‐face	interactions	are	
involved.16	 As	 Lievrouw	 also	 argues,	 mediation	 allows	 for	 media	 to	 be	 seen	 not	 as	
interference	between	people	and	reality,	but	 indeed	mediation	is	what	makes	that	reality	
for	 people	 (Lievrouw,	 2009).	 As	 Mazzarella	 suggests,	 modernity	 serves	 to	 draw	 our	
attention	 to	 the	 ways	 meaning	 and	 value	 have	 always	 necessarily	 been	 made	 through	
ongoing	processes	of	mediation,	 rather	 than	 this	being	a	 characteristic	 that	accompanies	
recent	 media	 forms.17	 It	 implies	 that	 the	 processes	 of	 cultural	 mediation	 in	 the	 current	
moment	are	different	 from	those	of	 the	pre‐Enlightenment	past	only	 in	 scale	and	degree	
rather	 than	 in	kind,	and	 that	 there	 is	no	pre‐mediated	condition	 to	which	to	contrast	 the	
current	processes.		
In	 the	 context	 of	 modern	 “disenchantment”	 (Taylor,	 2009)	 mediation	 takes	 on	 extra	
importance	as	it	becomes	the	way	for	the	self	to	be	successfully	communicated	and	situated	
within	collectives,	or	“aesthetic	formations”	(Meyer,	2009).	These	formations	are	suggested	
																																																								
16	The	term	“configuration”	is	used	by	Bakardjieva	(2005)	to	reflect	the	ways	people	are	configured	by	their	
use	of	media	while	they	configure	it	through	their	usage.	
17	Indeed,	the	emphasis	that	influential	scholars	like	Giddens	(1991)	and	Bauman	(2013)	have	placed	on	the	
modern	world’s	shift	from	stability	to	fragmentation	of	people,	places,	cultures	and	identities	has	in	turn	been	
criticized	by	others	to	be	an	overstatement	of	the	impact	of	(late)	modernity	(Ahmed,	Castaneda,	Fortier,	&	
Sheller,	2003;	Featherstone	&	Burrows,	1995;	Massey,	1994).			
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to	create	a	sense	of	belonging,	as	they	use	their	own	particular	modes	of	address	to	create	
audiences.	My	object	of	study	here	is	processes	of	mediation,	since	compelling	mediation	is	
what	 forms	 Iranian	 American	 selves.	 In	 other	 words,	 if	 culture	 necessarily	 requires	
mediation,	then	the	ways	in	which	culture	is	mediated	compellingly	for	people	is	revealing	
of	 how	 Iranian	 American	 selves	 are	 formed.	Meyer	 also	 argues	 that	media	 have	 specific	
“aesthetic	properties	and	propensities”	such	that	 they	“do	not	simply	transport	messages	
neutrally	 but	 shape	 them”	 by	 virtue	 of	 these	 propensities	 (Meyer,	 2013).	 This	
transportation	 of	 messages	 through	 particular	 formats	 and	 forms	 reiterates	 the	 role	 of	
material	 affordances	 and	 constraints	 mentioned	 above.	 Meyer	 argues	 that	 these	
propensities	 of	 media	 constitute	 audiences	 by	 appealing	 to	 certain	 senses	 and	 raising	
certain	sensibilities.		
Like	culture,	selves	are	not	less	real	because	they	are	mediated.	Rather,	it	is	the	process	of	
mediation	that	gives	people	a	sense	of	inclusion	into	the	audience,	a	sense	of	belonging	to	
an	aesthetic	formation,	a	feeling	of	deep	connection.	There	is	an	important	link	here	with	
what	 Don	 Slater	 has	 argued	 in	 his	 work	 on	 internet.	 He	 shows	 that	 although	 there	 are	
assumptions	 that	 internet	usage	 leads	 to	new	kinds	of	 identities	 that	are	 seen	as	merely	
“realistic”	 rather	 than	 real,	 people	 are	 nonetheless	 deeply	 invested	 in	 making	 sure	 the	
identities	 they	 encounter	 online	 are	 authentic.	 He	 states,	 “authenticity	 is	 a	 fundamental	
criterion	by	which	participants	understand	and	manage	their	on‐line	experiences”	(Slater,	
1998:	91).	As	Slater	goes	on	to	argue,	the	participants	in	these	exchanges	use	strategies	of	
authentication	that	fix	the	other	in	a	body‐like	presence	locatable	in	time	and	space.	He	also	
argues	 elsewhere	 that	 people	 engage	 in	 a	 “materialization”	 of	 digital	 objects,	 suggesting	
that	 digital	 objects	 have	 ambiguous	 materiality	 and	 that	 people	 therefore	 give	 them	
material	qualities	in	order	to	be	able	to	place	them	in	orders	of	ethics,	trustworthiness,	and	
morality	(Slater,	2002).	It	appears	that	rather	than	solids	melting	into	air,	users	of	internet	
appear	to	use	various	strategies	to	solidify	selves	and	one	another,	making	mediated	selves	
real	through	authentication.		
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The	 inclusion	 of	 internet	 into	 perspectives	 that	 treat	 culture	 as	mediated	 is	 particularly	
important,	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	 persistent	 assumptions	 (that	 Slater	 and	 others	 have	
pointed	out)	that	there	is	something	particular	about	internet	that	makes	it	and	the	social	
configurations	 it	 mediates	 “virtual,”	 a	 notion	 is	 (still)	 often	 understood	 in	 opposition	 to	
“real.”18	 This	 is	 despite	 arguments	 that	 internet‐mediated	 selves	 are	 not	 necessarily	 less	
“authentic”	 than	 selves	 un‐mediated	 by	 internet,	 or	 can	 even	 be	 “more	 authentic	 than	
actual‐world	 embodiment”	 (Boellstorff,	 2008:	 134).	 In	 this	 study	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 case	 of	
second‐generation	 Iranian	 American	 internet	 users,	 and	 seek	 to	 find	 out	 how	 they	 use	
internet	 as	 part	 of	 their	ways	 of	 forming	 their	 true	 selves.	 Focusing	 on	 people’s	 uses	 of	
internet	requires	ways	of	studying	their	media	practices	in	the	context	of	their	lives.	In	the	
following	I	elaborate	on	what	this	means.	The	importance	of	locating	power	in	this	analysis	
of	 media	 and	 selves	 (as	 mentioned	 above)	 is	 important	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	
significance	of	questions	about	who	has	the	power	to	decide	who	is	who/what.		
	 	
Affordances	and	use	
Elemental	 to	 debates	 around	 the	 relationship	 between	 society	 and	media	 is	 the	 issue	 of	
technological	determinism.	Extending	 from	debates	over	whether	power	 lies	with	people	
who	do	things	with	media	or	media	who	do	things	to	people,	discussions	of	technological	
determinism	 concerns	 whether	 technology	 causes	 the	 social	 changes	 that	 accompany	
technological	 change,	 or	 whether	 human	 agents	 intend/bring	 about	 that	 change	 (Lister,	
Dovey,	 Giddings,	 Grant,	 &	 Kelly,	 2003).	 Technologically	 deterministic	 analyses	 of	 the	
transformative	power	of	 internet	over	 society	were	particularly	 typical	 of	 early	accounts	
when	 concepts	 and	 analyses	 were	 informed	 more	 by	 science	 fiction	 notions	 such	 as	
“cyberspace”	 than	wide‐scale,	 everyday	usage	 (see	Hine,	2008:	258).	 Scholars	have	 since	
																																																								
18	Even	though	relatively	early	internet	studies	were	also	produced	that	challenged	this	conceptual	
opposition	and	methodological	separation	between	virtual	and	real	in	research	on	and	about	internet	
communications	technologies	(Hine,	2000;	Miller	&	Slater,	2000;	Wellman	&	Gulia,	1999),	it	is	noteworthy	
that	students	and	scholars	of	internet	studies	from	various	academic	disciplines	still	apply	this	dichotomy	to	
varying	degrees	of	explicitness.	
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become	increasingly	wary	of	the	accusation,	and	nuances	have	emerged	in	the	debate	that	
differentiate	 “hard	 determinism”	 from	 “soft	 determinism”	 (see	 Lievrouw	 &	 Livingstone,	
2006;	Lister	et	al.,	2003).	The	latter	is	thought	to	differ	from	the	former	in	that	it	does	not	
suggest	 that	technology	 is	the	cause	behind	societal	change	with	the	development	of	new	
tools,	 but	 rather	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 technological	 and	 societal	 changes,	 because	 these	 do	
indeed	become	determined	by	technologies	at	a	certain	stage	in	their	development	(Lister	
et	 al.,	 2003).	 Seen	 in	 this	 way,	 media	 technologies	 are	 not	 only	 shaped	 by	 social	
circumstances,	but	also	shape	social/cultural	change	themselves.		
The	 notion	 of	 “affordances”	 explains	 how	media	 shapes	meanings	 for	 people.	 Namely,	 it	
posits	that	this	shaping	is	not	complete	and	deterministic	but	more	of	a	constraint	on	a	set	
of	possibilities	for	use.	As	the	social	and	technological	develop	through	an	ongoing,	mutual	
interaction,	thinking	about	affordances	helps	to	encompass	this	mutuality	without	claiming	
that	 either	 the	 social	 or	 the	 technological	 determines	 how	 things	 develop.	 As	 first	
articulated	by	Gibson	(1979),	“the	theory	of	affordances”	drew	on	and	critiqued	elements	
of	gestalt	psychology	to	assert	that	an	affordance	of	a	thing	or	artifact	is	both	its	physical	
properties	and	the	value	it	is	attributed.	That	is:		
An	affordance	is	neither	an	objective	nor	a	subjective	property;	or	it	is	both	if	you	like.	
An	 affordance	 cuts	 across	 the	 dichotomy	 of	 subjective‐objective	 and	 helps	 us	
understand	its	inadequacy	(Gibson,	1979:	129)	
An	 affordance	 is	 basically	what	 an	 artifact	makes	possible	 for	 a	user	 to	 do	with	 it.	 Later	
definitions	of	affordances	developed	in	the	context	of	the	sociological	study	of	technology	
highlighted	 how	 the	 concept	 helped	 recognize	 the	 “constraining,	 as	 well	 as	 enabling,	
materiality	of	artefacts”	(Hutchby,	2001:	441).	This	rejects	the	technological	determinism	
of	 a	 view	 that	 suggests	 that	 technology	 is	 the	 cause	of	 new	 forms	of	 sociality,	while	 also	
arguing	that	technological	artefacts	are	not	simply	neutral	objects	but	ones	that	are	made,	
designed,	 programmed	 by	 people.	 Hence,	 not	 just	 any	 interpretation	 or	meaning	 can	 be	
given	 to	a	 technological	artefact	 regardless	of	 its	material	properties	 (many	of	which	are	
created	with	intent).		
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What	is	important	is	that	these	properties	of	a	technological	artefact	become	apparent	and	
perceived	through	the	act	of	use,	which	is	based	on	information	about	the	environment	or	
artefact.	 Web	 applications,	 in	 other	 words,	 have	 certain	 affordances	 that	 we	 can	 only	
understand	if	we	look	at	how	they	are	made	use	of	by	people.	In	this	way,	affordances	not	
only	 constrain	and	enable	 certain	activities	and	uses,	 they	are	also	present	 in	 relation	 to	
kinds	 of	 usage.	 This	 is	 what	 Hutchby	 highlights	 from	 Gibson’s	 theory	when	 stating	 that	
affordances	 are	 both	 “functional”	 and	 “relational”	 (2001).	 In	 this	 way	 the	 notion	 of	
affordances	aims	to	bypass	the	weaknesses	of	“social	shaping	of	technology”	theses	as	well	
as	theories	of	media	that	are	technologically	deterministic.		
Daniel	 Miller	 is	 one	 scholar	 who	 has	 developed	 this	 notion	 within	 the	 field	 of	 digital	
anthropology,	arguing	that	internet	comes	into	being	through	a	combination	of	how	people	
make	 use	 of	 its	 certain	 applications	 in	 a	 given	 social	 and	 cultural	 context	 and	 the	ways	
these	applications	are	configured.	With	Don	Slater,	he	uses	the	case	of	Facebook	in	Trinidad	
to	 elaborate	 this	 view	 (Miller	 &	 Slater,	 2000).	 Nancy	 Baym’s	 work	 on	 social	 media	 also	
highlights	 this	 intersection	 between	 the	 technical	 capacities	 of	 web	 applications	 like	
Facebook	 and	 social,	 personal,	 and	 cultural	 influences	 (Baym,	 2010).	 Additionally,	 Dana	
Boyd’s	work	on	 “social	network	 sites”	proposes	 the	 term	 “networked	publics”	 as	publics	
that	are	restructured	by	networked	technologies.	That	is:	
Networked	 publics’	 affordances	 do	 not	 dictate	 participants’	 behavior,	 but	 they	 do	
configure	the	environment	in	a	way	that	shapes	participants’	engagement.	In	essence,	
the	 architecture	 of	 a	 particular	 environment	 matters	 and	 the	 architecture	 of	
networked	publics	is	shaped	by	their	affordances	(Boyd,	2010:	1).	
Furthermore,	 just	 as	 people	make	 apparent	 the	 affordances	 of	web	 applications	 through	
their	usage,	they	also	make	choices	about	which	applications	to	use	on	the	basis	of	which	
affordances	 an	 application	 has.	 The	 implication	 of	 this	 is	 that	 people	 choose	 between	
various	 media	 forms	 that	 are	 neither	 neutral	 nor	 determining,	 but	 rather	
constraining/enabling	as	well	as	actively	taken	up	in	particular	ways.	In	my	analysis	of	the	
web	applications	my	respondents	use,	 I	 look	at	how	 they	make	 the	 choice	 to	use	 certain	
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applications	 for	 their	purposes,	and	how	they	prefer	 to	 take	up	certain	applications	over	
others	at	these	moments	(Madianou	and	Miller,	2013).	I	also	investigate	the	everyday	uses	
of	 internet	 in	 my	 respondents’	 lives	 in	 LA	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 understanding	 how	 the	
relationship	 between	 technology	 and	 social	 life	 is	 developing	 for	 a	 generation	 in	 the	
process	 of	 positioning	 themselves	 in	 their	 own	 ways	 among	 families,	 peers	 and	 with	
respect	to	the	public	institutions	around	them.		
The	 rise	 of	 a	 “the	 network	 society”	 (Castells,	 2000),	 and	 “networked	 individualism”	
(Wellman,	 2002)	 suggest	 the	 causative	 role	 of	 networked	 digital	 technologies	 in	 societal	
changes.	Miller	argues	that	rather	than	internet	technologies	being	the	driving	force	behind	
social	and	cultural	changes,	they	are	extensions	of	already‐existing	aspirations	that	people	
have	 (Miller,	 2011).	While	 it	 highlights	 the	 agency	 of	 internet	 users,19	 Miller’s	 approach	
differs	subtly	from	perspectives	that	emphasize	the	“domestication	thesis”	(see	above)	as	
he	analyzes	appropriation	as	more	of	a	 two‐way	power	relationship	between	people	and	
media	technologies.	While	Miller’s	influential	ethnographic	approach	to	internet	focuses	on	
technological	use	by	people	in	the	field,	it	also	argues	that	internet	has	certain	affordances	
that	both	open	up	and	confine	possibilities	for	types	of	use.	There	are	links	here	between	
media	 technologies	 and	 technologies	 as	 systems	 of	 power	 over	 people,	 as	 both	 offer	
possibilities	and	constraint.	Bird	argues,	drawing	on	Sherry	Ortner’s	work	on	culture	and	
power,	 that	 social	 systems	 of	 culture	 are	 as	 much	 reproduced	 through	 the	 activity	 of	
individuals	as	 they	are	 ideologically	constrained	(Bird,	2013).	 I	understand	Bakardjieva’s	
approach	to	everyday	life	and	internet	as	seeing	these	constraints	and	possibilities	in	terms	
of	 users’	 sense	 of	 empowerment	 and	 alienation,	 stating	 that	 “both	 alienation	 and	
empowerment	can	be	detected	 in	 the	daily	practices	of	 Internet	use”	 (Bakardjieva,	2005:	
																																																								
19 Taking	people’s	everyday	lives	seriously	has	partly	led	to	the	shift	towards	seeing	people	as	users	rather	
than	“audiences,”	notwithstanding	the	valuable	media	scholarship	on	active	media	audiences	that	has	been	
drawn	on	to	develop	new	understandings	of	media	use. 
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64).20	I	follow	these	approaches	to	internet	and	culture	as	based	on	affordances	and	limits,	
agency	and	constraint.		
As	part	of	my	discussion	of	internet	media	in	formations	of	Iranian	American	selves,	I	rely	
on	an	analysis	of	my	respondents’	media	and	cultural	practices	to	make	an	argument	about	
social	and	cultural	changes	and	the	role	of	internet	therein.	This	regards	both	the	changes	
of	 Iranian	American‐ness	 as	my	 respondents	 see	 and	 develop	 it	within	 their	 generation,	
and	changes	in	internet	technologies	that	have	become	normal	within	their	young	lifetimes	
and	continue	to	develop.	The	argument	I	make	therefore	is	very	different	than	arguments	
that	have	highlighted	the	role	of	digital	networked	media	as	being	the	driving	force	behind	
vast	changes	 in	the	way	society	 is	organized.	While	 I	assume	that	 technologies	cannot	be	
seen	as	having	a	causative	role	regarding	social	and	cultural	changes,	the	question	remains	
how	to	understand	such	changes	and	their	relationship	to	media	technologies.		This	is	why	
I	 take	 a	 dialectical	 approach	 to	 media;	 one	 that	 acknowledges	 that	 outcomes	 are	 not	
technologically	 predetermined,	 and	 thus	 calls	 for	 ethnographic	 research	 into	 usage	
practices	as	they	unfold	under	particular	circumstances.		
	
Media	practices	in	everyday	life	
Complicating	the	question	of	whether	people	have	power	over	media	or	vice	versa,	some	
scholars	 of	 media	 have	 moved	 towards	 seeing	 the	 agency	 of	 media‐using	 actors	 as	
constrained	 and	 enabled	 by	 power	 structures	 in	 effect	 in	 everyday	 situations.	 Postill’s	
account	of	Sherry	Ortner’s	influential	work	on	agency,	power,	and	culture	is	useful	for	its	
suggestions	for	how	to	understand	the	role	of	actors	in	social	processes	without	neglecting	
the	ways	 larger	structures	enable	and	constrain	their	actions	(Postill,	2010).21	 Indeed,	by	
																																																								
20	Understanding	how	media	develop	in	conjunction	with	cultural	processes	has	for	many	scholars	meant	a	
turn	towards	studying	internet	within	the	context	of	everyday	life.	This	has	led	to	a	variety	of	approaches	to	
studying	internet	within	this	“everyday	life”	approach	(see	María	Bakardjieva,	2011	for	an	overview).		
21	Developing	practice	theory	with	relation	to	media,	Postill	states	of	Ortner’s	contribution	to	practice	theory	
that	“[s]he	found	Gramsci’s	notion	of	‘hegemony’	more	useful	than	Foucault’s	totalizing	account	of	
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adopting	an	approach	oriented	towards	practices	when	studying	media	I	aim	to	do	justice	
to	 Hobart’s	 claim	 that,	 “recognition	 of	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 lived	 world	 is	 what	
anthropologists	 can	 contribute	 to	 media	 studies	 debates”(Hobart,	 2010:	 56).	 I	 am	
sympathetic	to	Hobart’s	call	for	including	media‐related‐practices	(which	he	distinguishes	
from	 media	 practices	 or	 media‐oriented‐practices)	 as	 I	 analyze	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 my	
respondents’	practices	–	including	those	that	are	not	oriented	 towards	media	(or	 internet	
specifically).	For	example,	a	young	woman’s	neglect	of	updating	her	own	website	because	
of	 lack	of	 technical	skills,	or	 the	 impending	closing‐down	of	an	Iranian	bookshop	and	the	
elderly	 owner’s	 lamentations	 about	 internet,	 or	 two	 young	 men’s	 initiation	 of	 a	 print	
publication	 about	 Iranian	diaspora	 cultural	 because	 internet	 is	 not	 the	 ideal	medium	 for	
their	 project	 are	 all	 instances	 of	 internet‐related	 practices	 though	 not	 being	 oriented	
towards	internet	per	se.	I	also	do	not	define	practice	in	opposition	to	discourse	(or	people’s	
reflections	on	or	 accounts	of	 their	 practices),	which	gives	 rise	 to	my	 focus	on	 a	 range	of	
discursive	practices	of	media	use.		
Investigating	people’s	practices	allows	researchers	to	try	to	understand	the	meanings	that	
develop	 around	 the	use	 of	 technology	 in	 any	 given	 context.	 In	 this	way,	my	 approach	 to	
internet	 is	 one	 focused	 not	 only	 on	 usage,	 but	 also	 meanings	 of	 this	 usage	 for	 people	
themselves.	 Practices	 are	 “the	 embodied	 sets	 of	 activities	 that	 humans	 perform	 with	
varying	degrees	of	regularity,	competence,	and	flair,”	as	Posthill	defines	them	in	the	context	
of	media	(Postill,	2010:	1).	He	places	 the	role	of	 the	body	central	 to	 the	 field	of	 “practice	
theory”	within	which	he	situates	his	work,	stating	that	“practice	theory	is	a	body	of	work	
about	the	work	of	the	body”	(2010:	11),	the	body	being	the	site	at	which	the	agency	of	the	
individual	and	the	confining	structures	of	society	are	concentrated.	 I	 therefore	 follow	the	
long	 line	 of	 anthropologists	 who	 have	 focused	 on	 “media	 practices”	 as	 a	 means	 to	
understand	social	and	cultural	processes,	including	an	emphasis	on	embodied	practices	of	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
disciplinary	power	(hegemony,	for	Gramsci,	is	‘strongly	controlling	but	never	complete	or	total’”(	Postill,	
2010).	This	gives	an	idea	of	the	inspiration	for	how	to	see	power	relations	in	the	context	of	everyday	
constraints	of	media	use	in	his	approach	to	media	practices.	This	also	implies	parallels	with	Bakardjieva’s	
understanding	“everyday	life”	in	her	approach	to	internet	in	everyday	life.		
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engaging	with	mediated	messages	and	 technological	devices,	 thus	developing	 the	 field	of	
media	studies	that	also	theorizes	the	materiality	of	media.		
Definitions	of	practice	in	media	studies	remain	debated	and	somewhat	open‐ended,	having	
far‐reaching	 epistemological	 implications	 (Bräuchler	&	 Postill,	 2010),	 and	 this	 is	 equally	
true	for	notions	of	“the	everyday”	or	“everyday	life.”		Indeed,	as	anthropologist	of	internet	
media,	 Gabriella	 Coleman	 points	 out,	 “digital	 media	 have	 extended	 their	 reach	 into	 the	
mundane	heart	of	everyday	life”	(2010:	488).	At	the	same	time,	however,	Bird’s	discussion	
of	“the	mediated		moment”	invokes	Liisa	Malkki’s	work	to	argue	that	“we	might	also	learn	
through	examining	moments	that	break	up	the	everyday	flow	and	bring	people	together	to	
marvel,	laugh,	or	discuss”	(Bird,	2013:	96).		I	am	interested	in	my	respondents’	practices	of	
the	everyday	as	well	as	the	moments	that	break	it	up	and	make	it	the	object	of	reflection.	I	
therefore	focus	on	the	mundane	of	the	everyday	as	well	as	its	breaches.	This	contrasts	with	
research	 that	 has	 focused	 on	 a	 particular	 forum,	 platform,	 website,	 or	 application	 –	 an	
approach	to	which	most	studies	carried	out	 in	the	developed,	Western	world	are	 limited.	
This	avoids	reifying	users	into	a	single	role,	as	some	scholars	have	warned	against,	in	favor	
of	 situating	 people’s	 uses	 of	 technologies	 within	 dynamic	 relationships	 that	 include	
multiple	media	forms	and	broader	cultural	practices	(see	Lievrouw	&	Livingstone,	2006).		
I	also	acknowledge	that	media‐related	practices	themselves	change	with	the	development	
of	 new	 technologies	 (Postill,	 2011).	 The	 sense	 in	 which	 I	 apply	 the	 term	 use	 here	 is	
therefore	in	accordance	with	critical	perspective	offered	by	Pfaffenberger,	which	takes	as	a	
starting	point	an	anthropology	of	technology	that	sees	technology	as	shaping	people’s	ways	
of	 being	 through	 the	uses	 to	which	 they	 are	 put	 (Pfaffenberger,	 1988).	He	draws	on	 the	
work	 of	 Marx	 and	 Engels	 to	 see	 the	 use	 of	 technology	 as	 sustaining	 certain	 modes	 of	
production	while	 in	 the	 same	 process	 bringing	 about	 certain	 patterns	 in	 human	 activity	
and	 changes	 therein	 (Pfaffenberger,	 1988).	 I	 draw	 inspiration	 from	 these	 perspectives,	
bringing	 them	 together	with	 the	perspectives	 from	media	 anthropology	 and	 science	 and	
technology	studies	that	see	media	and	culture	as	mutually	configured	by/configuring	social	
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activities	outlined	above	in	the	cultural	mediation	framework.	22	I	observe	practices	as	part	
of	ongoing	(technological	and	social)	change.	
These	 changing	 roles	of	 usage	 also	 link	 to	 the	work	of	media	 anthropologists	 and	media	
studies	 scholars	 that	 propose	 understanding	 media	 as	 environments.	 Namely,	 media	
environments	are	where	everyday	practices	of	media	usage	and	other	connected	practices	
take	shape,	and	are	important	for	what	they	tell	us	about	people’s	agentive	choices	for	one	
form	 of	media	 over	 another,	 and	 about	 the	 particular	 affordances	 of	 a	 particular	media	
form	over	 another.	 This	 has	 been	 theorized	 in	 different	ways	 from	different	 disciplinary	
perspectives.	 “Polymedia”	 is	 the	 term	 Mirca	 Madianou	 and	 Daniel	 Miller	 have	 used	 to	
theorize	 media	 as	 an	 environment	 in	 which	 people	 take	 up	 particular	 media	 forms	 or	
applications	(Madianou	&	Miller,	2012).	Nick	Couldry	furthers	this	by	stating	that	“media	
ecologies”	or	“environments”	have	become	a	commonplace	way	of	analyzing	media	worlds	
(Couldry,	2010).		
This	 reflects	 a	 range	 of	 media	 that	 seem	 inextricable	 from	 one	 another	 in	 any	 absolute	
sense.	 What	 the	 notion	 of	 “polymedia”	 does	 in	 particular	 is	 explicitly	 foreground	 the	
choices	that	actors	make	between	different	media	forms,	which	make	up	the	repertoires	of	
communication	 and	 sociality.	 This	 inter‐relation	 between	 multiple	 media	 forms	 is	
emphasized	 also	 in	 “mediatization”	 research	 (Hepp	 &	 Krotz,	 2014).23	 In	 media	 and	
																																																								
22	Some	would	refer	to	this	as	a	soft	determinist	perspective	as	it	attributes	to	the	technology	a	role	that	leads	
societal	changes	in	a	certain	direction	because	of	having	certain	technological	characteristics.	While	
preserving	an	interest	in	the	particularities	of	media	practice,	this	perspective	also	highlights	how	
technologies	may	give	rise	to	a	kind	of	technological	feedback	loop	that	shapes	the	direction	of	societal	
changes.	The	important	work	of	Pfaffenburger	as	well	as	that	of	MacKenzie	&	Wajcman	(1999)	have	rescued	
an	area	of	analysis	from	accusations	of	technological	determinism	by	drawing	especially	on	the	work	of	Marx	
to	argue	that	technology	is	far	from	neutral,	but	develops	under	conditions	that	are	politically,	and	
economically	contingent	in	the	first	place	and	are	therefore	socially	shaped	and	developed	in	accordance	with	
inequalities	in	decision‐making	and	power	inequalities	at	their	outset.	My	approach	draws	on	both	
anthropological	approaches	that	see	media	as	material	culture	with	an	idea	of	technology	as	a	“total	social	
phenomenon”	(Pfaffenberger,	1988),	such	that	both	seem	to	suggest	a	mutual	“structuration”	drawing	on	
Giddens’	(1984)	notion	(Miller,	2007	(first	published	in	1982);	Pfaffenberger,	1992).	
23	I	understand	the	focus	on	mediatization	to	be	different	than	the	study	of	the	process	of	mediation	itself,	
without	the	latter	necessarily	precluding	the	former.	Lunbdy	refers	to	the	difference	between	mediation	and	
mediatisation	not	being	mutually	exclusive,	while	also	referencing	his	different	concept	of	mediation	in	the	
context	of	research	on	religion	(see	Lundby’s	support	of	Andreas	Hepp’s	account	of	the	relationship	between	
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communication	 studies,	 the	 notion	 of	 mediatization	 became	 influential	 in	 the	 1990s	 for	
describing	 the	way	 life	 (private,	 institutional,	 political,	 etc.)	 is	 increasingly	 lived	 through	
media,	 and	 how	 modern	 media	 saturation	 signals	 interconnected	 social/cultural	 and	
communicative/media	change.24	This	recent	surge	of	interest	in	mediatization	is	concerned	
with	 the	 changes	 that	 come	 about	 with	 the	 increasing	 reach	 and	 ubiquity	 of	 media	
messages	and	devices	into	various	aspects	of	people’s	everyday	lives	(e.g.	politics,	religion,	
migration,	etc.)	(Hjavard,	2013;	Krotz	&	Hepp,	2011).	In	the	following	section	I	go	into	how	
the	 notion	 of	 field	 is	 useful	 for	 thinking	 about	 transnationally	 construed	 media	
environments,	both	methodologically	and	conceptually.	
	
Social	fields	and	doing	fieldwork	
Media	and	the	field	
In	the	1990s,	scholars	began	claiming	that	a	concept	of	culture	as	dynamic	and	contextual	
calls	 for	methodological	approaches	 that	encompass	 this	 range	of	complexity.	Multi‐sited	
fieldwork	(Marcus,	1995)	was	proposed,	and	the	problems	of	how	to	study	cultural	flows	
and	movement	were	 raised	 (Appadurai,	 1996).	 Culture	 is	more	 complex	 to	 study	 than	 a	
bounded	 society	 in	 a	 single	 site,	 and	 so,	 theorizations	 of	 the	 field	 made	 more	 room	 to	
include	 holistic	 analysis	 of	 cultural	 practices	 together	 with	 what	 it	 means	 to	 live	 in	 a	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
the	two	concepts	in	Mediatized	Worlds,	p.22).	Mediatization	research	emphasizes	the	importance	of	change	
and	transformation,	specifically	societal	change	in	line	with	a	certain	“media	logic”	(Couldry,	2008).23	(See	
Couldry,	2008	for	an	in‐depth	analysis	of	the	strengths	of	the	mediation	and	mediatisation	concepts	from	a	
communication	science	perspective,	explored	with	reference	to	the	case	of	“digital	storytelling”).	Theories	of	
culture	and	technology	that	see	these	two	things	as	being	in	a	constant	state	of	flux	and	change	suggest	that	
the	study	of	cultural	mediation	is	as	much	concerned	with	continual	change	as	mediatization	research	(if	not	
necessarily	with	particular,	non‐continual	changes	that	take	place	at	certain	historical	moments),	with	
attention	to	the	dialectical	relationship	between	transformations	in	social	meanings	and	technology.23	I	
return	to	mediatization	approaches	later	on	in	this	chapter	when	discussing	Andreas	Hepp’s	concept	of	the	
“mediatized	migrant.”	
24	As	Hepp	and	Krotz	note	in	their	Introduction	in	Mediatized	Worlds:	Culture	and	Society	in	a	Media	Age	
(Hepp	&	Krotz,	2014),	mediatisation	is	a	much	older	term	than	its	rise	in	the	1990s	within	the	media	and	
communications	literature	suggests.	The	broader	sense	it	has	been	used	in	prior	to	the	recent	abundance	of	
digital	media	has	more	parallels	to	the	discussion	of	“mediation”	I	presented	above.		
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mediated	 world	 (Bird,	 2013).25	 I	 define	 the	 social	 field	 of	 practices	 of	 being	 Iranian	
American	 by	 its	 occupation	 with	 issues	 of	 cultural	 politics,	 family	 relations,	 collective	
organizing,	cultural	transmission,	media	representations,	and	emotional	engagements.	This	
social	field	is	where	my	respondents,	seek	out,	find,	and	develop	a	sense	of	belonging,	and	
through	doing	fieldwork	I	observe	and	engage	with	this	social	field.		
The	site	of	my	fieldwork	is	the	city	of	Los	Angeles,	and	I	was	interested	in	the	lives	of	my	
respondents	 residing	 there.	 These	 lives	 unfolded	 in	 a	 rage	 of	 settings	 in	 the	 city,	 from	
people’s	houses,	to	college	campuses,	to	workplaces,	to	stores	and	restaurants,	to	the	cars	
they	drive	in	between	these	places,	to	gatherings	of	various	sizes	and	kinds,	in	living	rooms,	
in	 parks,	 in	 cultural	 centers,	 libraries,	 museums	 and	 galleries,	 cinemas,	 and	 on	 street	
corners.	These	settings	are	where	I	followed	my	respondents.	In	addition,	part	of	being	in	
the	field	I	was	constantly	using	media.	I	visited	the	websites	people	told	me	about,	watched	
the	various	ethnic	media	channels	available	to	them	in	LA,	including	well‐known	local	radio	
channels	and	certain	satellite	broadcasting,	 sometimes	 together	with	my	respondents,	 as	
well	 as	 being	 exposed	 to	 the	myriad	 of	media	messages	more	 generally	 that	 came	with	
living	 in	 LA.	 This	 included	 gathering	 information	 from	 and	 about	 websites	 that	 my	
respondents	 used.	 I	 did	 this	 by	 saving	 textual	 and	 visual	 content,	 often	 in	 the	 form	 of	
screenshots.26		
Furthermore,	 through	 email,	 messaging,	 and	 social	 media	 applications,	 my	 respondents	
and	I	got	in	touch	and	communicated	with	one	another.	Through	these	channels	I	learned	
about	events	and	through	web	telephony	and	instant	chat,	I	stayed	in	contact	with	some	of	
them	after	 leaving	LA	or	during	 times	 they	were	 away.	Not	 simply	 because	my	 research	
																																																								
25	However,	see	Hine’s	work	for	a	critique	of	holism	in	the	endeavour	of	virtual	ethnography	and	an	embrace	
of	partiality	(Hine,	2000).	
26	Both	screenshots	and	copy‐pasted	material	from	websites	were	copied	into	word	processing	document	
formats	and	later	imported	to	the	qualitative	data	analysis	program	I	was	using	to	organize	and	code	the	rest	
of	my	interview	and	observational	material.	Newer	versions	of	such	programs	have	the	functionality	of	
directly	downloading	material	from	websites	and	code	segments	of	images	(e.g.	Nvivo	10).	This	was	more	
difficult	to	do	in	the	version	of	the	program	that	I	was	using.	Hence,	screenshots	were	coded	as	whole	images,	
and	closer	analysis	of	their	content	was	done	without	the	functionality	of	the	program.	Videos	were	generally	
not	downloaded	into	the	database	but	the	links	to	particular	videos	were	saved.  
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concerned	 internet	 and	 media	 but	 also	 because	 these	 web	 applications	 were,	 and	
increasingly	are	becoming,	the	standard	tools	of	fieldwork.	The	abundance	of	various	forms	
of	media	use	as	part	of	fieldwork	practices	speaks	to	the	ubiquity	of	media	in	almost	any	
field	of	contemporary	ethnographic	investigation.	When	it	comes	to	internet	and	studying	
the	various	ways	 it	 is	accessed	by	users	 through	social	media	platforms	 for	 instance,	 the	
technological	advancements	have	particular	implications	for	fieldwork.	As	John	Postill	and	
Sarah	Pink	state:	
For	the	internet	ethnographer,	the	implications	of	the	shift	to	web	2.0	and	the	rapid	
growth	of	social	media	platforms,	applications,	practices	and	activity	are	three‐fold.	
They	create	new	sites	for	ethnographic	fieldwork,	foster	new	types	of	ethnographic	
practice,	 and	 invite	 critical	 perspectives	 on	 the	 theoretical	 frames	 that	 dominate	
internet	 studies,	 thus	 providing	 opportunities	 for	 re‐thinking	 internet	 research	
methodologically	(Postill	&	Pink,	2012:	124).	
I	 accessed	my	 respondents’	 web‐	 and	wider	 internet‐use	mostly	 by	 engaging	with	 them	
through	 it.	 This	 included	 being	 Facebook	 and	 Twitter	 contacts,	 exchanging	 emails	 and	
photos,	chatting	online,	reading	one	another’s	blog	postings,	etc.	But	it	also	meant	at	times	
observing	 them	 engaging	 with	 others	 through	 these	 applications.	 This	 took	 the	 form	 of	
them	showing	me	photos	 they	 shared	on	 social	media	via	 their	 smartphone	 in	 a	 café,	 or	
being	in	the	rooms	of	their	houses	as	they	showed	me	web	videos	or	blogs	they	watch	and	
follow,	 or	 just	 seeing	how	 they	 interact	with	one	 another	 in	 groups	 around	a	 laptop,	 for	
instance.	I	also	listened	to	how	they	talked	about	using	internet,	which	also	meant	asking	
questions	about	internet	and	its	meanings	in	a	variety	of	different	settings	and	with	various	
degrees	of	structure	and	formality.		
This	 use	 of	 internet	 as	 research	 tool	 is	 by	 no	 means	 to	 detract	 from	 the	 role	 of	 casual	
telephone	conversations	about	where	and	when	to	meet,	as	well	as	interviews	I	conducted	
on	the	phone	with	people,	and	indeed	in	face‐to‐face	settings.	I	return	to	this	at	the	end	of	
this	 chapter	 when	 I	 describe	 my	 respondents	 more	 elaborately.	 Basically,	 the	 field	 as	
defined	 in	 this	 research	 is	one	 that	media	 is	 inherent	 to.	Taking	 the	 social	 field	 in	which	
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Iranian	American‐ness	is	formed	as	a	unit	of	study,	I	follow	people,	their	practices,	and	the	
connections	 they	 make	 with	 other	 people,	 places,	 and	 things	 as	 guiding	 principle	 for	
delineating	the	field.	And	following	people	in	this	way	meant	using	a	variety	of	media	while	
reflecting	 on	 this	 usage	 as	 part	 of	 the	 research	 process.	 The	 field	 site	 is	 implicated	 in	
transnational	 circuits	 of	 information,	 affect,	 and	 imaginations	 that	 extend	 beyond	 the	
bounds	 of	 the	 physical	 places	 in	 which	 I	 carried	 out	 this	 research.	 And	 seeing	 these	
circulations	of	meaning	as	integral	to	the	field	of	practices	that	constitute	Iranian	American	
self‐formation	 is	essential	 to	how	I	understand	the	role	of	media	 in	 the	 field,	as	 I	explain	
further	in	the	following.		
	
Migration	and	social	fields		
The	1990s	and	early	2000s	saw	a	boom	in	work	on	transnational	migration	and	diaspora	
that	prepared	new	ground	in	this	field	of	research	(Basch,	Schiller,	&	Blanc,	1994;	Clifford,	
2011;	 Cohen,	 1997;	 Faist,	 Fauser,	 &	 Reisenauer,	 2013;	 Hall,	 2003;	 Ong	 &	 Nonini,	 1996;	
Portes,	 1997;	 Rouse,	 1991;	 Sassen,	 1999;	 Smith	 &	 Guarnizo,	 1998;	 Tölölyan,	 1996;	
Vertovec,	 2001;	 Werbner,	 2002;	 see	 also	 the	 later	 Clifford,	 2011	 and	 Bauböck	 &	 Faist,	
2010).	It	was	a	response	to	new	kinds	of	migrant	flows,	which	required	terminologies	that	
the	 existing	 migration	 studies	 frameworks	 did	 not	 offer.	 This	 body	 of	 work	 introduced	
transnational	 approaches	 that	 dislodged	 the	 unspoken	 primacy	 of	 the	 nation	 state	 in	
migration	research,	and	re‐conceptualized	diaspora	to	extend	beyond	a	prototypical	model	
of	 characteristics	 shared	 by	 groups	 of	 dispersed	 peoples.	 Diaspora	 became	 more	 of	 a	
“consciousness,”	 a	 mode	 of	 identification	 (as	 I	 elaborate	 below),	 and	 migration	
conceptualized	 through	 flows	 and	 “social	 fields”	 rather	 than	 nation‐state	 entities.	 Rather	
than	 explaining	 specific	 processes,	 these	 were	 breakthroughs	 on	 how	 to	 better	
conceptualize	 migrant	 identities	 and	 frame	 the	 study	 of	 migration.	 These	 contributions	
have	since	become	established	 insights	 in	migration	 studies	 in	contexts	of	migration	and	
multi‐culture,	 and	 together	 they	 highlight	 how	 the	 nation	 is	 a	 construct	 situated	 amidst	
other	crosscutting	loci	of	identification,	not	an	absolute	unit	of	study	or	identification.		
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The	notion	of	“transnational	social	fields”	(Basch	et	al.,	1994;	Levitt	&	Schiller,	2006;	Levitt	
&	Waters,	2002;	Smith	&	Guarnizo,	1998)	was	proposed	and	used	as	a	way	of	talking	about	
the	 activities	 of	 migrants	 across	 nation	 state	 borders,	 defining	 these	 activities	 not	 as	
fragmented	experiences	but	as	constituting	“a	single	 field	of	social	relations”(Basch	et	al.,	
1994).	This	perspective	does	not	hold	local	ethnic	or	long‐distance	national	identifications	
as	 exclusive	 of	 one	 another,	 nor	 as	 static	 and	 self‐evident.	 Instead	 identifications	with	 a	
range	 of	 social	 categories	 are	 seen	 as	 having	 the	 capacity	 to	 subvert	 state	 discourses	 of	
national	 identity.27	 Following	 closely	 from	 this,	 a	 specific	 focus	 also	 emerged	 on	 the	
particular	issues	that	faced	the	children	of	migrants	who	were	either	born	in	their	country	
of	residence	or	arrived	there	at	a	very	young	age.	Termed	second‐generation	migrants,	the	
scholarship	focused	on	what	this	new	generation’s	lives	meant	for	theoretical	discussions	
and	 policy	 issues	 revolving	 around	migrant	 identity,	 transnational	 lives,	 integration,	 and	
assimilation	 (Alba	&	Nee,	 2005;	 Crul	&	 Vermeulen,	 2006;	 Glick	 Schiller	&	 Fouron,	 2001;	
Kasinitz,	Mollenkopf,	&	Waters,	 2006;	Kasinitz,	 2004;	 Levitt	&	Waters,	 2006;	A	 Portes	&	
Rumbaut,	2001;	Alejandro	Portes,	1997;	Purkayastha,	2005;	Skrbiš,	Baldassar,	&	Poynting,	
2007;	Thomson	&	Crul,	2007;	Waldinger	&	Perlmann,	1998;	Wolf,	2006).28	These	studies	
pointed	out	the	tendency	among	the	children	of	migrants	to	claim	their	parents’	country	of	
birth	as	a	“homeland”	and	engage	in	practices	that	connect	them	to	this	distant	place.	This	
made	 the	 important	 argument	 that	 transnational	 social	 fields	 were	 sustained	 over	
generations,	and	would	therefore	maintain	conceptual	relevance.		
The	 idea	of	migrants	 living	 in	 social	 fields29	 that	 cross	borders	problematized	notions	of	
assimilation	that	had	assumed	that	migrants	would	gradually	lose	their	attachments	with	
																																																								
27 As	Levitt	and	Glick	Schiller	write,	“We	define	social	field	as	a	set	of	multiple	inter	locking	networks	of	social	
relationships	through	which	ideas,	practices,	and	resources	are	unequally	exchanged,	organized,	and	
transformed	{see	also	Glick	Schiller	and	Fouron,	1999;	Glick	Schiller,	1999,	2003)”	(Levitt	&	Schiller,	2006)	
28	This	was	essentially	a	body	of	work	that	looked	at	people	with	south	to	north	migrant	backgrounds,	
focusing	on	North	American	and	European	countries’	second‐generation	migrant	populations.	The	interest	in	
these	groups	seems	to	have	been	driven	by	public	discourses	regarding	“integration”	and	the	social	and	
economic	“problems”	caused	by	intensified	migration	flows	to	the	West	that	intensified	at	this	time	and	
forcefully	continue	to	the	present	day. 
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the	“country	of	origin”	in	a	linear	fashion	over	successive	generations	while	becoming	more	
culturally	 indistinguishable	 from	 the	 “host”	 country	 majority.	 Kasinitz’s	 and	 others’	
(Kasinitz	et	al.,	2006;	Kasinitz,	2004)	sociological	research	on	US	immigration	–	which	was	
limited	by	US	national	borders	but	compared	a	variety	of	migrant	groups	with	one	another	
–	 showed	 that	 hypotheses	 of	 linear	 cross‐generational	 assimilation	 did	 not	 suffice.	 They	
failed	to	explain	how	those	who	were	one	or	two	generations	removed	from	the	experience	
of	 their	 family’s	 initial	 transnational	migration	 identified	with	 their	 familial	 “homelands.”	
Such	models	 of	 linear	 cross‐generation	 assimilation	 also	did	not	 explain	how	 the	 second	
generation’s	affiliations	with	such	a	“homeland”	was	not	necessarily	a	threat	to	the	social,	
cultural,	 economic,	 and	 political	 incorporation	 of	 this	 generation	 into	 their	 country	 of	
residence.	 In	 contrast,	 transnational	 social	 fields	 perspectives	 overcame	 these	
shortcomings	 by	 arguing	 that	 “assimilation	 and	 enduring	 transnational	 ties	 are	 neither	
incompatible	nor	binary	opposites”	(Levitt	&	Glick	Schiller,	2006).	
Another	strength	of	a	social	fields	approach	is	that	it	provides	a	framework	for	seeing	the	
situational	formation	of	transnational	selves	as	hinging	on	sets	of	changing	factors	(e.g.	life	
cycles	 see	 Levitt	 &	Waters,	 2002).	 Hence,	migrant	 selves	 remain	 in	 a	 perpetual	 state	 of	
formation	 depending	 on	 these	 situational	 factors;	 for	 example,	 circular	 migration,	
continued	migration	of	new	migrants	from	the	same	“homeland,”	migration	policy	changes.		
Furthermore,	 this	 perspective	 includes	 the	 changing	 circulation	 of	 messages	 and	 their	
publics.	Like	the	notion	of	a	“transnational	migrant	circuit”	(Rouse,	1991:	14),	social	fields	
mean	acknowledging	that	mass	and	small	media	messages	are	involved	in	the	formation	of	
migrant	 selves	 as	 they	 create	 transnational	 migrant	 publics,	 with	 people	 and	 messages	
moving	back	and	forth	rather	than	constituting	a	unidirectional	flow	or	singular	movement.	
This	 role	 that	 media	 plays	 in	 such	 circuits	 goes	 beyond	 social	 interactions	 and	 creates	
“transnational	spaces	of	orientation”	(Yang,	2002:	197)	in	much	the	same	way	Anderson’s	
imagined	 communities	 are	 created	 without	 their	 members	 socially	 interacting	 with	 one	
another.	Work	inspired	by	frameworks	of	transnationalism	in	migration	studies	have	made	
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mention	of	 the	 role	of	burgeoning	media	 forms	 in	 creating	 the	 transnational	 social	 fields	
that	 the	 second	 generation	 live	 within	 (e.g.	 Levitt	 &	Waters,	 2002),	 but	 have	 until	 very	
recently	 tended	 not	 to	 focus	 specifically	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 diversifying	 forms	 of	 digital	
media.		
It	is	within	these	social	fields	that	I	study	my	respondents’	self‐formation	practices.	I	follow	
work	that	has	brought	the	insights	of	a	social	fields	perspective	to	bear	on	migrant’s	digital	
media	usage.	Horst	and	Millers’	work	on	Jamaican	mobile	phone	usage	has	been	unique	in	
this	regard.	This	social	fields	approach	helps	to	show	how	practices	of	social	networking	
among	people	through	mobile	phones	further	traditional	practices	of	networking	in	
Jamaica,	and	become	integral	to	transnational	remittance	flows	within	families	(Horst	&	
Miller,	2006).	Horst’s	work	also	situates	itself	amidst	the	growing	body	of	work	that	
focuses	on	digital	communications	media	for	migrants,	pointing	out	that	much	of	it	does	
not	offer	insight	into	how	new	technologies	change	migrants’	everyday	lives	(Horst,	2006).	
With	my	research	I	aim	to	follow	Horst	and	others	in	trying	to	understand	how	my	
respondent’s	lives	are	influenced	by	seeing	their	digital	media	usage	as	constitutive	of	
transnational	social	fields,	and	specify	what	implications	this	has	for	their	ways	of	being	
Iranian	American.	I	bring	together	this	social	fields	perspective	with	a	perspective	on	
cultural	identification	and	media	that	seeks	to	encompass	what	makes	identities	real	for	
people.		
From	different	disciplinary	perspectives,	 scholars	have	 covered	migrants’	 internet	use	 in	
the	 context	 of	 dispersal	 that	 comes	 with	 migration	 and	 increased	 transnational	 flows.	
Internet	has	been	argued	by	some	as	overcoming	the	dispersal	and	distance	of	conditions	
of	migration.	 Diminescu’s	 notion	 of	 the	 “connected	migrant”	 as	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 this	
chapter	 is	 an	 important	 instance	 of	 this.	 The	 collaborative	 work	 of	 Andreas	 Hepp	 has	
furthered	this	idea	by	arguing,	on	the	basis	of	cases	of	migrants	in	Germany,	for	the	concept	
of	the	“mediatized	migrant.”	This	encompasses	a	wider	range	of	media	than	internet	and	in	
line	with	what	I	described	earlier,	sees	media	as	part	of	an	environment,	one	that	fosters	a	
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“communicative	 connectivity”	 (Hepp,	 Bozdag,	 &	 Suna,	 2011).30	 The	 idea	 that	 seems	 to	
underpin	this	and	much	work	on	 internet	and	diaspora	 is	 that	diaspora	communities	are	
particularly	prescient	of	 the	 internet’s	 rise	because	of	 their	geographic	dispersal	 coupled	
with	their	connectivity	to	one	another	through	communication.		
This	idea	was	also	integral	to	the	early	work	on	internet.	The	 influential	work	of	 internet	
scholar	Howard	Rheingold	has	described	connections	as	allowing	experiences	of	physical	
location	 to	 become	 “accidents	 of	 proximity”	 (see	 Rheingold,	 1993:	 65,	 referring	 to	 the	
visions	of	internet's/ARPANET's	first	founders'	visions	of	connectivity	and	the	experiences	
of	members	 of	 a	 "virtual	 community"	message	 board).	 31	 This	 begs	 the	 question	 of	 how	
migrants	 connect	 with	 their	 “accidental”	 physical	 surroundings	 in	 such	 a	 context,	 since	
other	 research	 on	 digital	 media	 and	 migrants	 highlights	 how	 transnational	 connections	
through	media	do	not	suggest	disconnection	from	the	society	in	which	migrants	live	their	
daily	lives.		
For	 instance,	 Dayan	 draws	 on	 Naficy’s	 discussion	 of	 exile	 satellite	 television	 (in	 which	
Naficy	 argues	 that	 Iranian	 exile	 television	 helps	 produce	 a	 liminal	 state	 that	 eventually	
leads	to	further	integration	into	American	society)	to	point	out	that	“particularistic	media	
are	 not	 always	 instruments	 of	 a	 secession”(Dayan,	 2002:	 110).	 That	 is,	 questions	 about	
whether	internet	is	helping	to	“integrate”	second‐generation	migrants	into	the	host	society	
																																																								
30 “When	we	reflect	in	the	following	the	communicative	connectivity	of	mediatized	migrants,	we	understand	
by	this	such	a	totality	of	interrelated	mass‐mediated	and	personal	communicative	connections.	They	are	not	
articulated	by	the	appropriation	of	a	single	media	but	by	the	interference	of	different	media	in	the	whole	
repertoire	of	a	person”	(Hepp	et	al.,	2011)	
31	This	quote	from	Kirshenblatt	Gimblett’s	piece	on	diaspora	brings	Clifford	and	Rheingold’s	visions	together.	
“Increasingly,	however,	as	distance	becomes	a	function	of	time,	the	instantaneity	of	telecommunications	
produces	a	vivid	sense	of	hereness	and	interactivity	the	feeling	of	presence.	The	result	is	an	extreme	case	of	
physical	immateriality	of	place.	New	spaces	of	dispersal	are	produced	–	traversed	and	compressed	–	by	
theologies	of	connection	and	telepresence.	Physical	location	can	be	experienced	as	accidents	of	proximity,	
while	common	interests,	rather	than	common	location	can	become	the	basis	for	social	life	in	a	medium	where	
location	is	not	defined	by	geographical	coordinates	but	by	the	topic	of	conversation”	(Rheingold,	1992).	There	
is	a	convergence	between	diaspora	as	we	understand	it	from	Clifford’s	account	and	the	spaces	of	dispersal	
defined	and	mediated	by	communication	technologies.	It	is	at	this	convergence	that	we	might	rethink	
diaspora”(Kirshenblatt‐Gimblett,	1994)		
37	
	
(presupposing	that	 they	 lack	 integration)	are	much	more	complex	to	answer	than	simply	
looking	at	whether	these	young	people	use	internet	to	make	long	distance	connections	with	
Iran	 or	 with	 other	 diaspora	 Iranians	 (or	 not).	 It	 is	 more	 important	 to	 understand	 the	
processes	through	which	young	people	engage	with	and	give	meaning	to	their	internet	use	
in	 a	 transnational	 context	 that	 includes	 various	 forms	 of	 national	 and	 subnational	
identifications	 and	 forms	 of	 belonging.	 Paying	 attention	 to	 the	 environment	 in	 which	
migrants	 live	their	daily	 lives,	 I	move	on	to	discuss	the	 implications	of	studying	migrants	
and	 their	 media	 usage	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 the	 chosen	 themes	 (mentioned	 earlier)	 in	 the	
specific	context	of	LA.		
	
Fieldwork	in	media	and	migration	hub,	Los	Angeles	
There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 LA	 represents	 a	 global	 media	 hub.	 First,	 LA	 has	
become	 an	 influential	 reference	 point	 for	 Iranian	 American‐ness	 globally.	 Maghbouleh	
notes	that	the	LA	Iranian	culture	industry	also	has	some	influence	inside	Iran	(2012).	For	
the	 second	 generation,	 the	 sheer	 concentration	 of	 Iranians	 in	 the	 city	 has	 shaped	 the	
development	 of	 Iranian‐ness	 in	 this	 context.	 Because	 of	 the	 distinct	 presence	 of	 Iranian	
Americans	in	many	urban	neighborhoods	in	and	around	LA	County,	Mahdi	has	argued,	the	
second	 generation's	identification	as	 "Iranian"	 is	 strengthened	 by	 being	 surrounded	with	
other	Iranians,	citing	ease	of	 language	transmission	and	retention	as	one	of	the	results	of	
this	 (Mahdi,	 1998).	 Naficy’s	 work	 has	 shown	 how	 the	 particularities	 of	 Los	 Angeles	 are	
important	to	understand	–	especially	the	way	the	city	itself	has	shaped	and	been	shaped	by	
immigration	 patterns.	 The	 early	 development	 of	 LA’s	 Westside	 reflected	 economic	
competition	 with	 Downtown	 LA,	 making	 today’s	 LA	 landscape	 rather	 two‐headed.	 Both	
centers	are	steeped	in	affluence	and	reflect	what	has	been	argued	is	an	approach	to	urban	
planning	and	architecture	 that	excludes	 the	poor	and	working	classes	 (Davis,	1992).	The	
experience	of	living	in	and	moving	through	the	various	spaces	of	the	city	makes	this	rather	
clear.	Furthermore,	the	Westside	emerged	in	the	1920s	as	a	(European)	Jewish	center	as	a	
result	of	the	film	industry’s	(mainly	Protestant)	exclusion	of	this	group	despite	their	wealth	
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(Davis,	1992).	It	experienced	an	influx	of	Jewish	immigrants	during	the	second	World	War	
(Fine,	2004).	
	This	 was	 combined	 with	 a	 new	 middle‐	 and	 upper‐class	 population	 (Fine,	 2004).	
“Multiethnic	 from	 the	 beginning,	 but	 dominated	 by	 the	 Anglo‐Protestant	 downtown	
plutocracy,	 Los	 Angeles	 in	 the	 1920s	 was	 moving	 towards	 its	 present	 configuration	 –	
massive	westward	spread,	Westside	affluence,	and	increasing	racial	and	class	segregation	
along	east‐west	 lines”,	writes	Fine	(2004:	12).	 It	was	mostly	within	the	affluent	Westside	
that	my	 research	activities	were	most	 concentrated,	but	 spanned	 from	Orange	County	 to	
the	Valley	with	many	 stops	 between.	 The	Westside	was	 the	 area	 of	 LA	 to	which	 Iranian	
Jews	 gravitated	 upon	 their	 arrival,	 but	 experienced	 some	 difficulties	 because	 of	 the	
predominantly	Ashkenazi	background	of	the	Westside	Jews	(Jalali,	2005).	
The	 Westside	 ‐	 especially	 Westwood	 and	 Beverly	 Hills	 ‐	 are,	 nevertheless,	 best	 known	
today	 for	 their	 largely	 Jewish	 Iranian	population	concentrations	and	 their	affluence.	East	
LA,	by	contrast,	 is	known	for	 its	 large	Hispanic	populations,	and	relatively	a	 less	wealthy	
and	working‐class	demographic.	By	1930	East	Los	Angeles	constituted	the	nation’s	largest	
Mexican	 barrio,	 booming	 in	 the	 early	 20th	 century	 with	 the	 key	 period	 in	 the	 city’s	
industrialization	(Romo,	1983).	Iranian	American	respondents	who	work,	live,	and	grew	up	
in	 this	 part	 of	 the	 city	 have	 a	 qualitatively	 different	 experience	 than	 their	 West	 LA	
counterparts,	as	do	those	whose	families	call	South	Central	or	other	parts	of	LA	home.	The	
spaces	of	the	city	form	everyday	life	and	second	generation	subjects’	positions	with	regard	
to	the	class	and	racial/ethnic	diversity	within	LA	and	among	the	Iranian	Americans	in	it.		
Much	of	the	work	done	on	Iranians	in	the	US	between	the	late	1980s	and	early	1990s	was	
on	Iranians	in	Los	Angeles,	California	(Bozorgmehr,	1998:	14).	Perhaps	most	significantly	
this	 included	 Kelley	 and	 Friedlander’s	Irangeles:	 Iranians	 in	 Los	Angeles	 (1993),	 Naficy’s	
Exile	Cultures:	 Iranian	Television	 in	Los	Angeles	 (1993)	and	Waldinger	 and	Bozorgmehr’s	
Ethnic	 Los	Angeles	 (Bozorgmehr	 &	Waldinger,	 1996).	 This	 work,	 in	 turn,	 contributed	 to	
solidifying	 the	 presence	 of	 Iranians	 in	 Los	 Angeles	 (see	 Feher,	 1998;	 Jalali,	 2005).	 It	 is	
noteworthy	 that	most	 of	 this	 scholarship	 on	 Iranians	 in	 LA	 came	 from	 researchers	 and	
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institutions	based	 in	Los	Angeles	and	California,	many	of	whom	were	Iranian	themselves,	
lending	not	only	a	self‐contained	quality	 to	 the	city	and	 its	 relationship	 to	 this	particular	
immigrant	population,	but	also	a	merging	of	scientific	and	social	dynamics	around	notions	
of	being	Iranian	in	LA.		
Second,	LA	is	a	national	and	international	center	for	media	production	in	the	US	between	
major	 news	 outlets	 to	 the	 Hollywood	 production	 studios.	 Powdermaker’s	 1950	
ethnography	of	cultural	producers	in	the	Hollywood	movie	industry	points	out	how	these	
films	are	a	“uniquely	influential	institution	in	US	society”	(Mahon,	2000:	48).	In	addition	to	
this,	 she	 outlines	 how	 cultural	 producers	 act	 within	 a	 social	 system	 in	 which	 economic	
forces	 and	 artistic	 goals	 are	 in	 tension	 with	 one	 another.	 This	 reveals	 the	 links	 to	 the	
present	 day.	 The	 designation	 of	 LA	 as	 a	 media	 production	 center	 and	 oftentimes	
internationally	 synonymous	 with	 Hollywood	 means	 that	 Iranian	 Americans	 find	
themselves	 in	 close	 proximity	 to	 a	 film	 industry	 that	 shapes	 their	 lives	 in	 direct	 and	
indirect	 ways.	 Through	mass	 media	 representations	 of	 Iran	 and	 Iranian	 Americans	 and	
Middle	Easterners,	but	also	by	being	at	the	centre	of	where	American‐ness	is	shaped	by	the	
film	industry	and	the	“dreams	it	manufactures”	(Powdermaker,	1950:	11).	A	large	part	of	
Powdermaker’s	 research	 discussed	 the	 social	 systems	 that	 the	 Hollywood	 film	 industry	
produced.	Although	the	music	industry	is	not	mentioned,	this	is	another	major	part	of	the	
global	commercial	cultural	production	emanating	from	LA.	Contemporary	California	is	also	
a	global	center	and	place	of	genesis	when	it	comes	to	the	ICT	industry.	This	industry	comes	
to	 produce	 its	 own	 social	 systems.	 One	way	 in	which	 this	 is	 relevant	 to	 this	 research	 is	
through	 the	 archetypal	 venture	 capitalism‐fuelled	 tech	 start‐up,	 and	 the	 ways	 it	 is	
sometimes	promoted	as	part	of	activist	liberation.32		
																																																								
32	Scholars	from	various	disciplines	have	pointed	to	the	ways	in	which	the	beginnings	and	developments	of	
networked	digital	technologies	in	California	have	become	entwined	with	notions	of	communitarianism	and	
an	idealized	vision	of	“community”,	millennialism,	pioneering	in	a	new	world,	and	the	fundamental	
transformation	of	society	mixed	in	with	elements	of	the	transcendental,	but	also	how	this	has	undergone	
change	and	continuity	over		time	(Agre,	2002;	Turner,	2010;	Zandbergen,	2011)	
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The	 expansiveness	 of	 the	 tech	 industry	 (and	 important	 part	 of	 the	 California	 state	
economy)	means	that	Iranian	Americans	and	other	ethnic	minorities	are	increasingly	a	part	
of	the	workforce	of	this	industry	at	different	levels.	From	the	heralded	CEO	of	Google	and	
the	 head	 of	 eBay,	 to	 the	 youthful	 employees	 who	 were	 interviewed	 at	 the	 Facebook	
headquarters	 as	 part	 of	 CNN’s	 coverage	 of	 the	 role	 of	 Facebook	 in	 the	 2009	 elections,	
Sepideh	who	worked	for	Google’s	Santa	Monica	branch,	to	tech	blogger	and	author	Cyrus	
who	 grew	up	 in	 Santa	Monica,	 Iranian	Americans	 and	 the	 second	 generation	 are	 among	
those	who	not	only	use	internet	applications,	but	are	sometimes	in	a	position	to	shape	their	
technical	development	and	the	discourses	around	them	as	either	professionals	in	the	area	
of	web	development	or	as	tech	journalists	who	cover	these	developments.	Seeing	subjects	
as	active	in	the	ways	technologies	develop	on	technical	and	discursive	levels	is	important	
given	 the	 role	 of	 such	 actors	 in	 the	 history	 of	 internet’s	 development	 (see	 Agre,	 2002;	
Turner,	2010)	rather	than	only	consumers	and	producers	of	content	at	the	level	of	general	
usership.	 While	 I	 see	 these	 roles	 as	 part	 of	 the	 varied	 functions	 of	 usership	 described	
earlier,	 there	 are	 also	 roles	 that	 are	 particular	 to	 the	 condition	 of	 living	 in	 proximity	 to	
media	and	technology	hubs	within	California.		
Finally,	the	city	is	an	important	infrastructural	node	for	telecommunications.	The	economic	
geography	 of	 internet	 has	 been	 argued	 to	 reflect	 a	 global	 tendency	 towards	 the	
concentrated	 development	 of	 internet	 backbone	 networks	 around	 the	 already‐existing	
telecommunications	 and	 other	 urban	 infrastructure	 of	world	 cities	 (Malecki,	 2009).	 This	
supports	speculations	about	the	role	of	world	cities	in	the	development	of	global	 internet	
connectivity	 by	 such	 prominent	 theorists	 such	 as	 Emanuel	 Castells	 (Castells,	 2000)	 and	
Saskia	 Sassen	 (1995).	 However,	 as	 Townsend	 suggests,	 empirical	 investigation	 of	 these	
ideas	was	lacking	as	much	as	the	lacking	empirical	investigation	of	opposite	claims,	such	as	
Nicholas	 Negroponte’s	 (1995)	 ideas	 that	 internet’s	 development	 would	 lead	 to	 a	
decentralization	 rather	 than	 a	 centralization	 of	 communications	 technologies	 around	
already‐established	 urban	 nodes	 (Townsend,	 2001).	 As	 technologies	 spread,	 this	
empirically	 grounded	 work	 has	 fuelled	 debates	 over	 which	 explanatory	 models	 best	
measure	 the	 changing	 processes	 of	 internet’s	 centralization	 around	 global	 cities	 versus	
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other	locales.	And	what	has	emerged	is	increased	attention	for	the	dynamics	of	inequality	
within	 (global)	 cities	 themselves.	 As	 Townsend	 presents	 the	 startling	 finding	 that,	 Los	
Angeles’	distribution	of	domain	names,	in	comparison	to	San	Francisco’s,	for	instance,	are	
much	 more	 unevenly	 distributed,	 specifically	 because	 “immigrant	 and	 minority	
neighborhoods	show	little	internet	activity.	Within	the	San	Francisco	area,	the	difference	in	
domain	name	density	between	academic	Berkeley	and	poor,	 ethnic	Oakland	 is	hardly	on	
the	scale	that	separates	South	Central	Los	Angeles	from	the	affluent	Westside”	(Townsend,	
2001:	53).33		
It	is	therefore	important	to	note	that	the	patterns	of	uneven	distribution	of	internet	access	
and	 usage	 across	 Los	 Angeles	means	 that	 the	Westside	 focus	 of	my	 investigation	 comes	
with	 its	particularities	 that	 should	not	be	assumed	 to	 carry	 for	 the	 rest	of	Los	Angeles.	 I	
spent	 my	 fieldwork	 period	 staying	 in	 a	 visiting	 various	 parts	 of	 what	 is	 officially	 The	
Greater	Los	Angeles	Area.	This	area	 refers	 to	a	 region	 that	 includes	5	counties,	 including	
Los	Angeles	County,	Orange	County,	San	Bernardino	County,	Riverside	County,	and	Ventura	
County,	the	combined	populations	of	which	give	Los	Angeles	its	megacity	status.	The	city’s	
population	within	 the	Metropolitan	 Area	 and	 the	 Greater	 Los	 Angeles	 area,	make	 it	 the	
second	largest	in	the	country	after	New	York,	based	on	a	2005	US	Census	estimate.	The	Los	
Angeles	Metropolitan	Area	–	where	I	ended	up	spending	most	of	my	time	and	where	most	
of	my	respondents	also	tended	to	spend	most	of	their	time	–	contains	various	parts,	some	
of	 which	 are	 officially	 “unincorporated”	 parts	 of	 LA	 City,	 such	 as	 East	 Los	 Angeles.	
Generally	speaking,	the	city	is	divided	into:	Downtown	LA,	the	Eastside	and	Northeast	LA,	
South	Central,	the	Harbor	Area,	Wilshire,	Hollywood,	the	Westside,	and	the	San	Fernando	
Valley	Area.	The	research	took	me	to	meet	people	and	attend	events	located	across	most	of	
these	 areas,	 with	 a	 concentration	 in	 the	 Westside	 and	 Wilshire	 where	 most	 of	 the	
gatherings	took	place	and	where	several	of	my	respondents,	lived,	worked,	and	studied. 
																																																								
33 Townsend	has	also	argued	vigorously	that	the	dependency	between	cities	(rather	than	competition)	that	
comes	with	interconnected	networks	of	communications	technologies	are	shaping	relationships	and	
hierarchies	between	cities	in	more	complex	ways	than	a	global	cities	thesis	allows	(Townsend,	2001a;	
2001b). 
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Respondent‐users	
In	 this	 book	 I	 tell	 a	 story	 about	 a	 number	 of	 young	 people	 I	 got	 to	 know	 during	
approximately	 a	 year	 in	 LA.	 I	 analyze	 how	 they	 position	 themselves	with	 respect	 to	 the	
significant	forces	and	actors	around	them.	How	they	relate	and	respond	to	1)	their	parents	
and	influential	older	members	of	“the	Iranian	American	community,”	2)	their	counterparts	
back	in	Iran,	3)	Americans	in	the	US	–	including	a	range	of	other	“minority”	groups	–	and	4)	
other	 parts	 of	 the	 second	 generation	 in	 LA	 and	 other	 places	 in	 the	 world.	 These	 other	
parties	 and	actors	 exert	 influences	on	 these	young	people	 concerning	how	 they	 (should)	
live	their	lives.	I	selected	my	key	respondents	for	a	variety	of	intersecting	reasons.	They	are	
not	meant	to	be	representatives	–	as	 individuals	or	 in	sum	–	of	any	second	generation	of	
Iranian	immigrants.	What	they	have	in	common	is	that	they	are	all	internet	users,	they	are	
all	children	of	parents	whose	migration	is	responsible	for	their	presence	in	the	US	(rather	
than	 having	 been	 old	 enough	 to	 make	 that	 decision	 themselves),	 they	 almost	 all	
consistently	identify	as	Iranian	and	American	in	some	combination	and	to	some	degree	or	
other,	 and	 they	have	all	 lived	 (or	plan	 to	 live)	 in	Los	Angeles	 for	an	extended	amount	of	
time	(years).	And	in	these	ways,	they	are	typical	of	so	many	children	of	Iranian	immigrants	
in	Los	Angeles.		
In	 addition,	 they	 are	mostly	people	who	play	 a	unique	 and	active	 role	 in	 contributing	 to	
how	Iranian	American‐ness	 is	articulated	 in	LA	(whether	among	their	 friends	and	family,	
fans	and	followers,	or	wider	publics),	a	task	which	also	most	often	involves	digital	media	in	
some	 capacity.	 They	 do	 this	 as	 educators,	 artists,	 intellectuals,	 students,	 photographers,	
poets,	organizers,	activists,	DJs,	 filmmakers,	and	other	kinds	of	professionals.	Though	not	
all	 necessarily	 “community	 leaders”	 in	 any	 formal	 sense,	 I	would	 say	 that	many	of	 them	
certainly	are	cultural	leaders	in	putting	their	own	formations	of	Iranian	American‐ness	into	
practice,	 and	giving	 form	 to	 Iranian	American‐ness	 through	 these	practices.	According	 to	
Levitt	 and	 Glick	 Schiller’s	 distinction	 between	 ways	 of	 “being”	 and	 “belonging”	 in/to	
transnational	 fields,	 these	 people	 are	 those	 who	 are	 not	 only	 “being”	 Iranian	 American	
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(through	social	interactions	that	place	them	in	the	social	fields	joining	Iran	and	the	US)	but	
are	 also	 “belonging”	 to	 a	 transnational	 Iranian	 American	 social	 field	 (which	 includes	
making	a	conscious	connection	with	an	identity	label,	“combining	action	and	awareness”)	
(Levitt	 &	 Schiller,	 2006:	 11).	 That	 is,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 they	 are	 invested	 in	 labels	 and	
cultural	 politics	 in	 this	 field;	 they	 show	 a	 conscious	 connection	 to	 the	 field	 and	 exhibit	
concrete	 actions	 along	 such	 lines.	 This	 as	 opposed	 to	 coming	 from	 Iranian	 American	
families	 but	 evading	 identification	 as	 Iranian	 American	 or	 finding	 the	 label	 irrelevant	 to	
their	lives.		
However,	as	Levitt	and	Glick	Schiller	also	acknowledge,	 this	conscious	engagement	 is	not	
constant.	While	engagement	with	the	label,	Iranian	American,	gives	rise	to	a	wide	range	of	
practices	on	the	part	of	most	of	my	respondents,	I	also	noticed	how	they	struggled	not	to	be	
seen,	 for	 instance,	as	 “an	 Iranian	American	artist/musician”	but	someone	who	does	good	
work	(e.g.	makes	music)	and	who	also	happens	to	be	Iranian	American.	My	respondents	are	
attuned	 to	 this	 variety	 in	 positionings	 professionally,	 publicly,	 and	personally.	 I	 focus	on	
their	 practices	 of	 stretching,	 reshaping,	 and	 re‐appropriating	 this	 label	 to	 fit	 and	 include	
them.	My	respondents	are	people	who	use	the	term	critically,	productively,	and	often	from	
the	margins.	That	 is,	 they	predominantly	 feel	 they	are	not	 typical	 Iranians	 in	LA.	Despite	
this	self‐perception,	 their	high	education	 levels,	 interest,	 and	predominantly	middle‐class	
backgrounds	 mean	 that	 they	 are	 well‐connected,	 both	 with	 one	 another	 and	 with	
institutions,	organizations,	and	public	debates	that	implicate	them.	They	mostly	represent	a	
minority	of	a	minority,	but	a	potentially	highly	influential	one.		
Diaspora	as	a	mode	of	“consciousness”	(as	I	referenced	above)	is	important,	(see	especially	
Clifford,	 1994;	 Gilroy,	 1993;	 see	 also	 Vertovec,	 2006	 and	 Sreberny,	 2000)	 but	 this	 is	 an	
aspect	I	treat	here	as	inseparable	from	the	sociality	of	relationships	and	modes	of	cultural	
signification	 or	 reproduction	 of	 meaning	 around	 diasporic	 belonging.	 This	 is	 why	 I	 pay	
attention	to	people’s	practices.	Essentially,	my	respondents	are	people	for	whom	the	future	
is	at	stake	in	their	negotiations	of	Iranian	American‐ness.	That	is,	the	future	of	“the	Iranian	
American	 community”	 and	 other	 collective	 entities	 they	 see	 themselves	 a	 part	 of,	 their	
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personal	 futures	 as	 burgeoning	 adults,	 the	 future	 of	 the	 generations	 they	 precede.	
Following	 people	 and	 tracing	 their	 various	 connections	 means	 finding	 out	 how	 my	
respondents’	selves	are	positioned	within	this	web	of	connectivity.	That	is,	with	relation	to	
groups,	people,	and	other	social	influences	in	their	environment.	By	implication	this	focus	
also	 helps	 reveal	 where	 there	 are	 disconnects;	 whether	 these	 are	 evidenced	 by	 my	
respondents’	 own	 practices	 of	 disconnecting	 from	 others	 around	 them	 (such	 as	 other	
Iranian	 Americans	 they	 do	 not	 relate	 to),	 or	whether	 they	 are	 unwittingly	 disconnected	
from	others	(such	as	older	 Iranian	Americans	who	do	not	use	the	same	media),	and	how	
they	 see	 this	 (such	 resentment	 about	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 larger	 audiences	 for	 personal	
websites	for	instance).		
A	 qualitative,	 ethnographic	 approach	 to	 connections	 is	 able	 to	 overcome	 some	 of	 the	
pitfalls	 of	 (mostly	 quantitative)	 social	 network	 analysis.	 That	 is,	 it	 allows	 researchers	 to	
study	 links	 between	 nodes	 (people)	 as	 dynamic	 and	 as	 having	 certain	 qualities	 and	
meanings,	which	goes	beyond	understanding	links	between	people	in	terms	of	dichotomies	
of	either	“strong”	or	“weak	ties”(Vertovec,	2006).	Living	among	second‐generation	Iranian	
Americans	 in	 LA	 and	 observing	 their	 practices	 and	 speaking	 with	 them	 allowed	 me	 to	
follow	 them	 through	parts	 of	 their	 daily	 activities,	 and	 therefore	 trace	 their	 enacted	 and	
discursive	 connections	 to	 people,	 places,	 things,	 and	 bodies.	 I	 did	 ethnographic	 research	
that	followed	several	children	of	Iranian	immigrants	in	LA	and	the	connections	they	made,	
spending	 time	with	 them	 in	various	contexts,	asking	 them	about	how	they	use	and	 think	
about	 internet	 in	 various	 senses	 and	manifestations	 –	 from	 a	website	 to	 a	 listserv,	 to	 a	
social	media	application,	to	“the	internet”	as	an	entity.	I	spent	13	months	in	total	(between	
2008	and	2012)	in	LA,	and	after	returning	each	time	it	was	ever	more	difficult	to	say	–	as	
anthropologists	 of	 all	 subareas	 are	 increasingly	 noticing	 –	 that	 I	 had	 left	 the	 field,	
particularly	 because	 of	 the	 continued	 use	 of	 internet	 to	 stay	 in	 touch	 with	 friends	 and	
contacts	I	met	and	myself	developed	connections	with	along	the	way.	I	also	returned	to	the	
field	for	over	a	month	in	2013	where	I	presented	some	of	my	findings	to	an	audience	that	
included	some	of	my	respondents,	as	well	as	had	informal	conversations	and	shared	parts	
of	my	writing	for	comments	as	part	of	efforts	towards	respondent	validation.		
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I	started	by	approaching	a	wide	range	of	people,	and	thus	my	fieldwork	included	meeting	
and	conducting	interviews	with	both	first‐	and	second‐generation	Iranian	Americans	in	LA.	
These	 conversations	 produced	 records	 of	 approximately	 80	 interviews	 varying	 in	 length	
from	30	minutes	 to	 4	 hours.	 This	material	was	 supplemented	by	material	 from	my	 field	
notes,	taken	at	dozens	of	events	as	well	as	based	on	shorter	and	sometimes	more	informal	
conversations	I	had	with	people	there.	I	also	took	photographs	of	these	events,	as	well	as	of	
other	media	forms	(such	as	print	booklets	and	sign	boards).	I	use	a	small	selection	of	these	
photos	in	this	book	for	illustration	purposes.	My	notes	also	cover	some	of	the	interactions	
with	a	 few	of	the	young	people	I	befriended	more	closely	and	whose	 family	and	friends	I	
met	and	whose	 lives	 I	became	a	part	of	 for	a	 longer	 time	than	the	 fieldwork	period.	This	
included,	for	instance,	a	friend	I	came	to	share	an	apartment	with	for	several	months,	but	
also	 others	 who	 I	 have	 continued	 exchanges	 with.	 When	 writing	 up	 the	 accounts	 my	
respondents	shared	with	me	in	this	book,	I	most	often	use	people’s	real	names.	In	cases	in	
which	 people	 I	 have	 spoken	 with	 asked	 me	 not	 to	 reveal	 their	 identities,	 I	 have	 used	
pseudonyms.	 However,	 I	 noticed	 that	 when	 engaging	 with	 versions	 of	 my	 work‐in‐
progress,	some	respondents	could	recognize	themselves	and	one	another	despite	the	use	of	
these	 pseudonyms.	 So	 in	 cases	 where	 I	 intended	 to	 better	 ensure	 anonymity,	 personal	
details,	dates,	or	 links	 to	websites	have	been	omitted.	 (the	next	sentence	 is	not	complete	
and	 unclear)	 I	 have	 taken	 into	 account	 that	 when	 using	 verbatim	 quotes	 from	 online	
sources,	internet	searchability	makes	these	statements	(when	made	on	publicly	accessible	
websites)	traceable,	and	may	make	the	authors	of	such	statements	more	easily	identifiable.	
In	cases	where	online	statements	were	not	publicly	accessible	and	I	have	used	screenshots,	
I	have	anonymized	names	of	authors.	
Upon	beginning	the	research	I	quickly	developed	a	heightened	awareness	of	the	fact	that	so	
many	 of	 those	 I	 would	 like	 to	 speak	 with	 for	 my	 research	 were,	 themselves,	 either	
conducting	academic	research	having	to	do	with	Iranian	diaspora	or	related	issues,	or	held	
and	active	stake	in	issues	of	academic	and	other	public	representation	of	Iranian	American‐
ness.	Accessing	and	including	their	perspectives	in	this	analysis	therefore	was	also	a	matter	
of	 negotiation	 of	 obligations	 that	 my	 respondents	 emphasized	 to	 “the	 Iranian	 American	
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community.”	This	was	a	 “community”	of	which	 I	was,	myself,	often	 implicated	as	being	a	
part.	My	 own	 background	made	 this	 self‐evident	 in	many	ways.	 Being	 a	 child	 of	 Iranian	
migrants,	it	was	clear	when	I	introduced	myself	to	people	that	I	was	immediately	seen	by	
name,	 appearance,	 and	 interest	 to	 be	 an	 insider	 to	 Iranian	 American‐ness.	 My	 bilingual	
upbringing	 and	 entirely	 English‐language	 education	 and	 recognition	 of	Western	 cultural	
reference	 points	 immediately	made	me	 a	 convincing	 (Iranian)	 American	 to	many	 of	 the	
Iranians	and	others	I	met	in	LA.		
However,	 my	 insider	 status	 was	 often	 called	 into	 question	 when	 my	 background	 was	
revealed	as	being	a	resident	of	the	Netherlands,	having	grown	up	in	Sydney,	Australia,	and	
in	fact	never	having	lived	in	the	United	States.	However,	I	did	not	notice	this	bringing	any	
evident	hindrances.	On	the	contrary,	my	positioning	as	a	researcher	also	made	it	possible	
for	me	to	see	and	analyze	American‐ness	from	the	perspective	of	an	outsider	without	being	
seen	as	a	complete	foreigner.	Nevertheless,	my	insider/outsider	positioning	brought	with	it	
disadvantages	in	another	sense,	especially	in	some	conversations	with	members	of	the	first	
generation	that	I	met.		
Being	of	the	second	generation	I	was	perhaps	naïve	about	some	people’s	expectations	and	
categorizations	of	my	own	political	and	personal	agenda.	Only	after	some	time	in	the	field	
did	 I	 come	 to	 understand	why	 I	 had	 been	 initially	 received	with	 apprehension	 by	 some	
after.	 For	 instance,	 I	 was	 told	 by	 some	 first‐generation	 graduate	 students	 that	 they	 had	
assumed	me	to	be	a	spy	for	the	Iranian	government	sent	to	track	their	student	organizing	
activities.	 Only	 after	 getting	 to	 know	 them	 over	 time	 did	 they	 reveal	 their	 deep,	 former	
suspicions.	 Other	 experiences	 with	 older	 members	 of	 the	 first	 generation	 of	 Iranian	
Americans	placed	me	in	situations	where	 I	 felt	 I	was	expected	to	meet	a	higher	standard	
than	 a	 non‐Iranian	 ethnographer	 would	 have.	 My	 knowledge	 and	 language	 skills	 as	 an	
Iranian	 were	 scrutinized	 by	 other	 Iranians	 I	 spoke	with	 for	 the	 research,	which	 did	 not	
always	 lend	 itself	 to	me	being	seen	as	a	 legitimate	 researcher	and	my	project	as	worthy.	
The	 greater	mutual	 understanding	 (despite	 different	 kinds	 of	 scrutiny)	 with	 the	 second	
generation	may	have	led	me	to	more	easily	access	their	accounts	and	modes	of	web	use.		
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This	 is	not	 to	say	 that	 the	 first	generation	as	a	whole,	or	 the	older	members	of	 it	did	not	
feature	 in	 my	 field	 data.	 I	 interviewed	 and	 otherwise	 interacted	 with	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	
people	from	the	Iranian	“community”	 in	LA,	 including	first‐generation	Iranian	Americans.	
However,	the	intention	of	this	investigation	is	not	to	be	comparative	between	generations.	
And	my	main	respondents	ended	up	being	a	group	of	about	20	people	I	conducted	in‐depth	
interviews	with,	 and	about	10	people	who	 I	had	 repeated	 contact	and	 closer	 friendships	
with	 and	 whom	 I	 came	 to	 rely	 on	 as	 key	 respondents.	 I	 accessed	 them	mainly	 through	
youth‐oriented	organizations	for	Iranian	Americans	including	student	organizations	geared	
toward	 academic,	 social,	 and	 cultural	 programming	 for	 their	 members.	 They	 also	
introduced	me	to	one	another	based	on	their	knowledge	of	my	research	interests.	Through	
people	 I	 came	 to	 know	 through	 such	 organs	 and	 individuals,	 I	 came	 into	 contact	 with	
others.		
Over	 time	 I	 noticed	 that	most	 of	my	 respondents	 saw	 themselves	 as	 somehow	 different	
from	typical	LA	Iranians.	They	expressed	this	in	various	ways.	Most	of	my	respondents	did	
not	see	themselves	as	having	the	profession	or	the	lifestyle	that	is	typically	associated	with	
an	image	of	(the	most	high‐profile)	Iranians	in	LA.	Most	made	an	effort	to	explain	how	they	
were	 different	 from	 typical	 Iranians	 in	 LA	 (such	 as	 the	 stereotypical	 LA	 Iranians	 who	
identify	as	 “Persian”	and	 live	 in	 the	 relatively	wealthy	West	LA	neighborhoods),	but	also	
from	many	Iranians	they	knew	around	them.	Yet	at	the	same	time,	all	of	them	did	indeed	
have	the	high	 level	of	education	that	was	 typical	of	 Iranian	Americans,	as	well	as	coming	
from	families	and	have	career	prospects	where	upper‐middle	class	life	would	be	attainable	
for	 them.	My	key	 respondents	also	 turned	out	not	 to	 include	 the	 Iranian	Americans	who	
explicitly	identified	as	Jewish.	While	by	far	not	all	Jewish	Iranians	in	LA	come	from	wealthy	
backgrounds,	 it	 was	 commonplace	 among	 those	 I	 spoke	 with	 to	 associate	 the	 Iranian	
Jewish	population	most	strongly	with	the	West	LA	presence	of	Iranians	in	the	city.	Most	of	
my	 respondents,	 in	 contrast,	 identified	 as	having	 a	Muslim	 cultural	 background	or	 being	
practicing	Muslims,	very	few	mentioned	having	been	raised	Christian,	and	for	a	great	many	
the	issue	of	their	own	religion	self‐identification	did	not	come	up.	While	I	made	efforts	to	
include	 and	 access	 a	 range	 of	 people	 when	 conducting	 fieldwork,	 I	 did	 not	 select	 my	
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respondents	so	as	to	make	up	a	representative	sample	of	the	religious/ethnic	variety	of	the	
demographic	makeup	of	LA	Iranians.		
	
Structure	of	the	book	
As	mentioned	earlier,	I	organize	the	four	main	ethnographic	chapters	of	this	book	around	
these	 four	 themes.	 In	 Chapter	 1,	 I	 deal	with	 the	 various	meanings	 and	manifestations	of	
home	 for	my	 respondents.	 I	 ask	 how	 relationships	 to	 places	 and	ways	 of	 being	 in	 those	
places	constitute	home,	and	how	web	usage	shapes	such	relationships.	I	focus	on	people’s	
felt	and	practiced	connections	to	places	of	various	scales	in	the	US	and	Iran.	In	doing	so,	I	
show	how	internet	media	are	taken	up	in	certain	particularly	second‐generation	styles	of	
feeling	and	claiming	a	sense	of	home.	I	see	formations	of	home	as	a	significant	part	of	how	
Iranian	 American‐ness	 is	 constituted	 through	 web	 usage.	 These	 uses	 help	 people	 forge	
connections	with	the	city	they	live	in,	the	long‐distance	places	of	home	they	travel	to	and	
imagine,	and	the	intimate	places	of	family	they	grow	up	in,	move	on	from,	and	stay	in	touch	
with.		
Chapter	2	foregrounds	the	past	and	the	notions	of	heritage	and	remembering.	There	I	focus	
on	 the	 relationships	my	 respondents	 have	 to	 the	 past.	History	 and	 heritage	 are	 engaged	
with	through	objects	and	stories	that	refer	to	Iranian	and	American	pasts	and	I	ask:	how	do	
my	respondents	position	themselves	with	relation	to	a	past	that	they	see	as	pertaining	to	
them,	 as	 their	 own,	 and	 how	 is	 this	 past	 mediated	 in	 ways	 that	 speak	 to	 these	 young	
people?	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 ways	 these	 connections	 take	 shape	 relies	 on	 the	 styles	 of	
remembering	that	appeal	to	the	second	generation,	and	that	they	position	themselves	with	
the	help	of	their	web	usage	that	helps	them	contest,	reframe,	and	engage	critically	with	the	
past	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 their	 contemporary	 experiences	 of	 growing	 up	 in	 the	 US.	 Their	
practices	 also	 show	 how	 the	 past	 is	mediated	 through	 particular	 narratives	 and	 objects	
alike,	 such	 that	 the	 materiality	 of	 certain	 things	 and	 pre‐existing	 institutions	 for	
remembering	and	heritage	maintain	their	power.	
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Chapter	 3	 focuses	 on	 race.	 In	 it,	 I	 investigate	 how	my	 respondents	 engage	with	ways	 of	
seeing	 the	 body	 and	 ways	 of	 seeing	 (and	 being	 seen	 as)	 Iranian	 Americans	 as	 a	 group	
(through	various	 forms	of	political	 and	media	 representation).	 I	 focus	on	 the	question	of	
how	my	 respondents	 represent	 their	 racialized	 bodies	 and	 narrate	 their	 experiences	 of	
racism	 through	 their	 use	 of	 web	 applications.	 How	 do	 they	 use	 the	 web	 to	 position	
themselves	 by	mediating	 their	 experiences	 of	 racialization?	 I	 argue	 that	 certain	 styles	 of	
presenting	the	racialized	body	with	the	use	of	internet	media	are	particular	to	the	second	
generation	and	mobilize	emergent	forms	of	collectivity.	It	shows	how	these	both	draw	on	
and	disjoin	from	the	previous	generation’s	modes	of	positioning	within	a	changing	context	
of	racial	discrimination.	In	a	similar	way	to	notions	of	home	and	the	past,	the	issue	of	race	
constitutes	 Iranian	American‐ness	 for	my	 respondents,	 but	 through	 a	 positioning	 that	 is	
only	beginning	to	be	discussed	in	research	on	Iranian	diaspora.		
Chapter	4	focuses	on	the	Green	uprising	in	Iran	that	took	place	during	my	fieldwork	period	
in	Los	Angeles.	The	chapter	starts	out	by	acknowledging	the	dominant	narratives	about	
“social	media”	circulating	around	this	period,	and	moves	on	to	focus	on	my	respondents’	
practices	and	narratives	during	the	same	period.	It	shows	how	the	events	in	Iran	came	to	
represent	a	moment	in	which	Iranians	in	the	diaspora	came	to	practice	their	Iranian‐ness,	
and	how	my	second‐generation	respondents	in	particular	came	to	see	themselves	as	
connected	to	Iran	and	Iranian‐ness	in	ways	specific	to	this	moment.	It	also	discusses	the	
role	of	particular	web	applications	and	their	use,	showing	how	they	offer	certain	
possibilities	and	how	these	possibilities	are	also	limited	in	various	ways	with	regard	to	the	
purposes	and	goals	my	respondents	have.	Hence,	in	each	of	the	chapters,	the	issue	of	my	
respondents’	cultural	belonging	is	approached	from	a	different	vantage	point.	Each	chapter	
aims	to	elaborate	upon	a	particular	facet	of	Iranian	American	belonging	I	observed	as	
important	in	the	field	and	examine	how	the	use	of	web	applications	helps	mediate	that	
belonging.	 	
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Chapter	1	Home	
	
	
	
Introduction		
Driving	with	Arash	along	the	wide	roads	of	his	quiet	neighbourhood	in	the	Valley	at	night,	
we	 passed	by	 the	 high	 school	 he	 used	 to	 attend,	 saw	 the	 house	where	 he	 lived	with	 his	
mother	and	father	before	their	divorce,	and	traversed	the	peaceful	hills	he	had	escaped	to	
so	many	times	for	a	change	of	pace.	As	I	drove,	he	brought	each	of	the	sites	to	life	with	his	
descriptions	of	 times	spent	and	memories	made.	Significant	moments	of	Arash’s	younger	
years	were	woven	into	this	suburban	topography.	And	as	an	adult	he	navigated	its	familiar	
spaces	effortlessly.	At	his	favorite	local	establishment	he	was	greeted	warmly	by	the	DJ	and	
barman,	and	the	familiar	face	of	an	old	friend	he	had	grown	up	with	in	LA	and	gone	to	grad	
school	with	on	the	East	coast.	There	seemed	no	question	that	this	neighborhood	was	home	
for	Arash.		
Even	so,	this	did	not	prevent	him	from	being	asked	the	question,	“when	are	you	going	back	
to	your	country?”	Arash	recounted	the	awkward	experience	in	2009,	 in	a	coffee	shop	not	
far	from	his	family	house,	where	he	had	returned	to	live	upon	coming	back	from	law	school	
in	Boston.	A	teacher	had	asked	him	the	question	during	his	school	years.	Now	himself	an	
educator	and	a	photographer	 in	his	mid‐thirties	 the	distance	of	hindsight	allowed	him	to	
articulate	 the	question’s	 tacit	exclusion	towards	him;	 it	 implicitly	prescribed	a	home	 in	a	
different	 and	 distant	 land	 where	 he	 would	 (or	 perhaps,	 should)	 one	 day	 return.	 Arash	
dismissed	 this	 idea.	 In	 his	 usual,	 thoughtful	 and	 articulate	 way,	 he	 explained	 that	 the	
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question	of	home	was	far	more	complex	to	him	than	such	a	premise	allowed.	To	him,	home	
was	not	self‐evident,	singular,	or	fixed.		
In	ways	similar	to	many	of	my	respondents,	Arash’s	practices	root	him	within	the	places	of	
his	 everyday	 life	 and	 upbringing	 in	 the	 Valley,	 while	 also	 placing	 him	 within	 Iranian	
diaspora	networks	internationally	and	across	the	US	via	his	relationships	with	friends,	kin,	
and	professional	contacts.	Having	lived,	worked,	and	studied	in	various	cities	on	two	coasts	
of	 the	 US,	 Arash	migrated	 comfortably	 between	 the	 different	 American	 locales	 that	 had	
become	part	of	his	biography.	As	 for	his	mobility	between	 the	US	and	 Iran	 these	days,	 it	
was	characterized	by	temporary	travel.	This	travels	had	taken	him	to	multiple	Iranian	cities	
and	brought	him	closer	to	friends	and	family	there,	some	of	whom	he	had	traveled	with	as	
he	developed	attachments	to	new	places	in	Iran	as	a	first‐time	visitor.		
Arash	was	also	deeply	involved	in	networks	of	Iranian	Americans	and	their	creative	work	
in	 the	arts	and	culture	 sector.	And	he	developed	his	 contacts	with	other	members	of	 the	
Iranian	 American	 second	 generation	 both	 in	 and	 beyond	 LA	 through	 his	 involvement	 in	
cultural	 events	 and	 projects.	 He	mentioned	 and	 recommended	 the	websites	 of	 Bidoun34	
magazine	and	the	blog,	jigaram.com,	which	both	have	in	common	a	visual	arts	orientation.	
The	 sites	 approach	 Iranian‐ness	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 artistic	 expression	 in	 the	 diaspora,	
covering	selected	societal	 themes	within	the	Middle	East	and	the	US.	Arash	is	also	one	of	
the	 founders	 of	 the	 print	 publication,	B|taarof,	 a	magazine	 and	website	 that	 offers	 both	
digital	 and	 print	 content.35	 As	 another	 of	B|taarof’s	 second‐generation	 co‐founders	 (also	
named	Arash)	described	 it	 in	an	email,	 the	magazine	“features	visual	arts,	 critical	essays,	
curated	archives,	&	oral	histories	of	Iran	and	Iranians	across	generational	and	geographic	
divides.”	These	(partly)	 internet	mediated	publications,	among	other	events	and	projects,	
situate	Arash	within	networks	of	Iranian	diasporic	cultural	production.		
																																																								
34 Bidoun.org	 
35 Btaarof.com 
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Like	Arash,	most	of	my	respondents	engage	with	and	raise	questions	of	home	in	a	variety	of	
ways.	And	these	include	practices	of	production	and	discussion	that	involve	the	use	of	web	
applications;	the	websites	and	blogs	they	set	up,	the	messaging	platforms	and	social	media	
sites	 they	 use.	 These	 applications	 offer	 a	 way	 to	 investigate	 the	 role	 of	 web	 usage	 in	
formations	 of	 home(s)	 for	 and	 by	 this	 new	 generation.	 Questions	 of	 home	 for	 second‐
generation	web	users	has	not	yet	been	elaborately	dealt	with	in	the	scholarship	that	covers	
issues	of	home	and	Iranian	diaspora	in	the	US	(see	Ghorashi,	2002a;	Naficy,	1993,	1998a;	
Sullivan,	 2001).	 However,	 Hamid	 Naficy	 has	 argued	 of	 internet	media	 and	 home	 among	
(first‐generation)	Iranian	exiles	in	LA	that,“[f]or	many	cosmopolitan	‘homeless’	exiles	who	
are	 physically	 displaced,	 an	 internet	 homepage	 is	 an	 attractive	 method	 for	 becoming	
discursively	emplaced”	(Naficy,	1998:	4).	Writing	at	a	time	when	web	applications	had	yet	
to	 transform	 into	 the	multifarious	 forms	 that	 are	 recognizable	 to	my	 respondents	 today,	
Naficy	 saw	 internet	 as	 alleviating	 the	 sense	 of	 physical	 distance	 that	 diaspora	 Iranians	
experience	 with	 relation	 to	 Iran.	 According	 to	 Naficy,	 internet	 offered	 discursive	
emplacement;	an	 internet	homepage	 is	able	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	geographic	distance	
by	presenting	discursive	proximity.		
In	a	similar	vein,	David	Morely	suggests	that	the	role	of	internet	in	formations	of	home	is	
changing	 people’s	 relationships	 to	 place.	 Morely’s	 influential	 work	 on	 the	 relationship	
between	media	and	spaces	of	home	suggests	that	increased	mobility	and	communications	
technologies	bring	about	 a	 reconfiguration	 in	people’s	 relationships	 to	place	 through	 the	
formation	of	“virtual	geographies”	(Morely,	2000:	191).	In	this	understanding,	a	discursive	
home	 replaces	 a	 physical	 one,	 such	 that	 a	 “virtual	 homeland”	 or	 “rhetorical	 territory”	 is	
formed,	 as	 applications	 of	Morely’s	 idea	 to	 certain	 diasporas	 using	 internet	 have	 argued	
(Basu,	2006;	Mallapragada,	2006;	2014).36	These	 scholars	propose	 that	web	applications	
are	changing	the	link	between	home	and	place,	such	that	online	discursive	spaces	override	
																																																								
36	I	understand	Morely’s	own	argument	about	geography	as	somewhat	more	nuanced	than	how	others	have	
applied	his	concepts	to	diaspora	national	belonging	and	internet	use.	The	latter	verges	on	what	I	have	
referred	to	as	the	“homeland	in	homepages”	thesis	(Alinejad,	2013:	97).	
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or	replace	physical	distances	and	places.	They	also	direct	their	focus	to	the	function	of	web	
usage	for	forming	diaspora	home	through	connections	with	a	distant	homeland.		
In	this	chapter’s	ethnographic	investigation	of	meanings	of	diaspora	home	and	web	usage,	I	
am	interested	in	whether	the	role	of	physical	distances	and	places	changes	to	become	more	
“virtual”	 for	 people	 like	 Arashas	 they	make	 use	 of	web‐based	 applications.	How	do	 they	
understand	home	 from	within	 spread‐out	 and	web‐mediated	networks	of	 social	 contacts	
and	 imagined	 “homelands”	 passed	 down	 to	 them?	 But	 equally,	 how	 do	 they	 understand	
home	from	the	context	of	the	ordinary	places	they	live	in	and	the	various	web	applications	
in	their	day	to	day	lives?	I	treat	the	issue	of	home	for	these	young	people	as	one	of	multiple	
facets	through	which	they	negotiate	Iranian	American	“belonging”	as	conceptualized	in	the	
book’s	Introduction	(the	other	facets	being	dealt	with	in	the	other	chapters	of	this	book).	
Rather	than	conceptualizing	diaspora	home	in	a	given	territory	to	which	a	label	of	national	
identity	 is	 assigned	 (as	 in	 commonplace	 uses	 of	 the	 term	 “homeland”),	 I	 treat	 diaspora	
home	as	a	 feeling	that	 is	sensed	–	a	sensation	of	being	at	home	and	not	only	a	claim	to	a	
place	of	home	(see	Brah,	1996:	197).	The	feeling	of	home	is	thus	an	embodied	experience	
situated	 in	 place.	 This	makes	 embodiment	 and	 being	 in	 place	 integral	 to	 understanding	
home	(Blunt	&	Dowling,	2006;	Gorman	Murray	&	Dowling,	2007).	This	approach	expands	
the	concept	beyond	home	as	a	primarily	cognitive	state	(see	Rapport	&	Dawson,	1998).	 I	
understand	people’s	ways	of	being	in	place	as	practices	that	are	constitutive	of	home.	And	I	
focus	on	my	respondents’	practices	of	web	usage	as	part	of	their	ways	of	being	at	home	in	
various	places.		
I	 present	 three	 types	 of	 practices	 of	 being	 at	 home(s)	 as	 central	 to	 the	 lives	 of	 my	
respondents.	In	each	of	the	three	sections	of	this	chapter,	I	discuss	each	of	these	three	sets	
of	 practices,	 highlighting	 the	 types	 of	 web	 usage	 that	 occurred	 in	 each.	 The	 first	 set	 of	
practices	concerns	 life	 in	 family	houses	and	 the	 turning	point	of	moving	out.	The	second	
concerns	young	people’s	engagement	with	 the	city	of	LA	and	 locations	within	 it.	And	 the	
third	concerns	return	travel	to	destinations	in	Iran.	The	parental	house,	the	city	of	LA,	and	
return	destinations	in	Iran	are	three	sets	of	places	that	are	particularly	important	to	how	
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my	 respondents	 develop	 senses	 of	 being	 at	 home,	 and	 therefore	 construct	 Iranian	
American	diaspora	homes	with	the	help	of	web	applications.		
I	draw	on	scholars	of	Iranian	diaspora	who	have	pointed	out	that	places	are	what	people	
make	of	them,	highlighting	the	agency	of	migrants	in	finding	and	creating	new	conditions	of	
home	(Ghorashi,	2002;	see	also	Sullivan,	2001).37	 I	add	to	this	that	diaspora	home	in	this	
case	as	not	only	formed	through	what	people	make	of	place.	As	I	show	in	the	chapter,	home	
is	also	shaped	by	what	particular	places	offer	to	those	in	them.	I	also	elaborate	on	existing	
notions	 of	 Iranian	 American	 diaspora	 home	 by	 showing	 how	 web	 usage	 fosters	 certain	
ways	of	being	in,	moving	between,	and	developing	relationships	to	certain	places	of	home.	I	
argue	that	formations	of	home	depend	on	a	combination	of	the	places	in	question	and	the	
applications	being	used.	
	
Reclaiming	the	city	
Tehrangeles	
An	artist	and	vocalist	in	her	30s,	Asa	is	flamboyant	and	sociable.	I	met	her	in	2009	at	her	
Venice	studio	apartment,	which	was	adorned	with	 the	photographic	and	print	pieces	she	
has	made	over	the	years.	Her	walls	were	filled	with	shelves	of	LP	records,	and	racks	full	of	
colourful	clothing.	Asa	put	a	Hayideh	track38	on	the	record	player	before	reclining	on	one	of	
																																																								
37 Ghorashi	demonstrates	this	in	the	case	of	Iranian	women	in	the	diaspora,	including	in	LA.	She	states	that	
home	is	“not	related	to	the	soil,	but	rather	to	what	a	place	can	offer	and	how	one	can	become	part	of	a	life	in	a	
certain	place”(2002:	20).	This	understanding	of	migrant	home	explains	how	static	and	exclusive	relationships	
to	a	single	and	given	national	home(land)	of	Iran	can	lose	currency	for	migrants,	while	the	adaptive	
relationships	they	build	with	a	new	place	after	migration	can	make	the	latter	into	a	diaspora	home.	While	this	
is	also	relevant	to	a	case	like	Arash’s	illustrated	here,	it	nevertheless	leaves	open	for	investigation	the	
question	of	how	a	certain	(relatively	new)	place	becomes	taken	for	granted	as	a	home.	
38	Hayideh	is	an	iconic	Iranian	vocal	artist	whose	career	began	in	the	60s	in	Iran.	Her	exile	after	the	revolution	
took	her	to	the	UK	and	then	the	US.	She	lived	in	Los	Angeles	until	her	death	in	1990.	In	2009,	the	first	
documentary	film	about	Hayideh’s	life	was	released	and	screened	at	the	Noor	Film	Festival	in	West	LA	and	
was	received	with	much	enthusiasm,	being	nominated	for	best	documentary.	The	response	to	the	film	was	
noteworthy,	with	the	line	for	the	screenings	extended	out	the	front	door	and	down	along	the	side	walk	down	
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the	sofas.	She	described	Hayideh’s	music	as	having	been	an	inspiration	for	in	her	own	life	
and	work.	We	sipped	tea	while	Asa	talked	about	the	music	projects	she	was	working	on	at	
the	time,	and	she	gave	me	a	copy	of	the	CD	she	had	recently	recorded.	It	was	a	foretelling	
gift	 because	 since	 then	 Asa´s	music	 career	was	 thrust	 forward	 by	 her	 participation	 in	 a	
successful	cable	television	reality	show	called	Shahs	of	Sunset,	which	has	entered	its	second	
season.		
Shahs	is	a	show	about	the	lives	of	a	group	of	Iranian	American	individuals	in	their	30s	living	
in	LA.	It	was	originally	modeled	on	a	popular	(in	the	sense	of	being	both	widespread	and	
low	brow)	reality	show	called	Jersey	Shore,	created	by	the	same	producer	and	aired	on	the	
same	 channel.	 Shahs	 showcases	 the	 lifestyle	 of	 wealth	 and	 extravagance	 enjoyed	 by	 its	
main	characters.	In	doing	so,	it	draws	on	stereotypes	about	Iranians	in	LA	as	rich	and	their	
children	 as	 spoiled.	Asa’s	 position	 (as	 an	 artist)	 among	 the	other	 characters	 in	 the	 show	
was	characterized	by	some	commentators	and	respondents	as	defined	by	her	“bohemian”	
and	“free	spirited”	personality	in	the	group,	and	as	one	of	my	respondents	commented	on	
her	blog,	she	was	the	one	best	at	“being	herself.”	Being	an	artist	additionally	sets	her	apart	
from	the	rest	of	the	five	main	characters,	who	are	mostly	professionals	involved	with	real	
estate	or	are	otherwise	entrepreneurs	and/or	are	beneficiaries	of	 their	parents'	 fortunes.	
This	shift	into	a	public	figure	has	changed	Asa’s	internet	practices.		
																																																																																																																																																																																		
the	street.	Hayideh	remains	key	figure	in	Iranian	music,	for	those	in	LA	and	beyond.	Her	songs	continue	to	be	
reproduced	by	various	artists	and	is	thought	of	by	many	as	one	of	the	legendary	Iranian	divas.  
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Figure	1	Screenshots	from	Asa's	Instagram	page	from	April	2013	
	
Figure	2	Asa's	Tumblr,	wild	and	untamed/trave[l]ing	through	magical	galaxies,	screenshots	from	July	2012	
In	 2009,	 before	 she	 had	 generated	 any	 of	 this	 public	 attention,	 Asa’s	 personal	 website	
exhibited	 photos	 of	 herself	 and	 her	work.	 It	was	 a	 site	 she	 said	 a	 friend	 created	 for	 her	
years	ago	because	 it	seemed	 like	a	good	way	to	gain	audiences	 for	her	art.	However,	 she	
said	she	rarely	updated	or	maintained	the	site	because	of	technical	barriers	(not	being	able	
to	readily	add/change	content)	and	she	said	that	her	artistic	work	meant	that	she	was	not	
inclined	to	physically	sit	behind	a	computer	for	most	of	the	day.	And	so,	she	basically	lost	
track	of	the	site.	Since	the	success	of	Shahs,	however,	Asa’s	 internet	usage	has	diversified	
and	 intensified.	 In	 a	 few	 years,	 her	 internet	 usage	 went	 from	 a	 few	 music	 videos	 on	
YouTube	and	single	website	she	was	not	able	to	update	herself,	to	the	frequent,	mobile,	and	
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instantaneous	updating	of	social	media.	Also,	access	to	mobile	internet	apparently	now	also	
allowed	Asa	 to	overcome	 the	 issue	 she	had	mentioned	earlier,	 i.e.	 being	 someone	whose	
profession	does	not	requires	them	to	sit	behind	a	computer	for	most	of	the	day.	Her	social	
media	postings	are	now	a	mixture	of	publicity	for	her	projects,	gratitude	to	fans/followers,	
and	 general	 image	 crafting.	 Posts	 that	 are	 oriented	 towards	 selling	 products	 are	 in	 the	
same	sociable	tone	as	ones	that,	for	instance,	repost	the	photo	collages	fans	have	made	for	
and	sent	to	her	or	impart	advice	to	her	fans.	Her	social	media	usage	has	become	seamlessly	
incorporated	into	her	life	since	her	introduction	into	the	LA	television	and	music	industry.		
Tehrangeles	is	the	most	popular	of	the	songs	Asa	has	released.	It	is	available	on	iTunes	and	
the	video,	posted	on	YouTube,	is	set	and	shot	in	Venice	Beach,	a	short	bike	ride	away	from	
her	apartment.	Venice	Beach	was	an	important	location	to	Asa.	Walking	to	the	beach	with	
her	from	her	apartment,	we	stopped	by	a	nearby	Mexican	taco	stand	to	pick	up	some	food.	
As	we	waited	in	line	to	order	the	ceviche	that	Asa	recommended,	she	told	me	how	she	felt	
at	 home	 in	Venice	Beach	because	 she	 loved	 to	be	near	 the	water.	 She	mentioned	having	
lived	on	the	Island	of	Khark,	located	off	the	Iranian	coast	in	the	Persian	Gulf,	and	how	she	
had	grown	attached	to	the	beach	from	a	young	age.	She	said	she	wondered	why	 living	 in	
West	LA	was	 typically	 seen	as	more	 Iranian	 than	 living	where	 she	 lived,	 in	Venice,	 away	
from	the	city	and	near	the	water.	As	we	waited	for	our	food,	she	added,	“what’s	not	Iranian	
about	picking	up	Mexican	food	on	your	way	to	the	beach?”	Her	taste	for	Mexican	food	also	
appears	via	her	casual	photo	posts	of	fruit	sprinkled	with	salt,	chili,	and	fresh	lime	juice,	a	
snack	that	Mexican	American	pushcart	vendors	are	known	for	selling,	and	which	more	of	
my	respondents	have	posted	photos	of	via	social	media;	a	typical	LA	snack.	
Asa’s	Tumblr39	is	called	wild	and	untamed/travel[l]ing	through	magical	galaxies.40	On	it	she	
regularly	 posts	 captioned	 photographs	 uploaded	 from	 Instagram,41	which	 are	 also	 often	
cross‐posted	 on	 Facebook	 and	 Twitter.	 These	 chronicle	 an	 ongoing	 series	 of	 everyday	
																																																								
39	Tumblr	is	a	blogging	platform	oriented	towards	less	textual	and	more	visual	content.	
40	http://asasoltanrahmati.tumblr.com/	
41 Instagram	is	social	networking	application	for	sharing	photos	taken	with	a	mobile	phone	camera. 
58	
	
activities	with	 friends	 or	 alone,	 her	music	 performances,	 earlier	 photos	 from	 her	 youth,	
mainly	of	herself	and	some	friends.	The	content	 is	relatively	uniform	across	 the	different	
platforms	used,	is	updated	daily,	and	reaches	an	audience	of	`friends`,	`followers`,	and	fans	
in	the	thousands.	Asa’s	detractors	also	use	social	media	applications,	and	material	insulting	
or	ridiculing	Asa,	 including	her	public	appearances,	 for	 instance,	a	 fight	she	got	 into	on	a	
particular	episode	of	the	show,	circulate	as	well.	Asa	repeatedly	refers	to	such	responses	in	
aggregate	as	the	work	of	"haters"	in	her	postings,	and	advocates	ignoring	such	reactions,	an	
experience	and	a	reaction	that	paralleled	her	earlier	encounters	with	negative	comments	in	
her	YouTube	music	videos	years	ago.		
Asa’s	use	of	social	media	reminded	me	of	how,	in	2009,	she	had	described	seeing	herself	as	
being	 her	 own	 artwork.	 The	 way	 she	 dressed,	 lived,	 what	 she	 did,	 the	 things	 she	
surrounded	 herself	 with,	 were	 all	 included	 as	 her	 art.	 Through	 it,	 she	 expressed	 her	
particular	way	of	being	 Iranian	American.	This	 is	why	 it	seemed	thoroughly	 fitting	 to	me	
that	her	sharply	growing	use	of	internet	media	–	which	coincided	with	the	beginning	of	her	
television	 career	 ‐‐	 was	 oriented	 towards	 visually	 sharing	 precisely	 these	 things	 with	
others	via	social	media	platforms.	That	is,	she	used	a	string	of	social	media	applications	to	
share	the	product	of	her	creative	work:	herself.	And	Asa’s	eccentricity	in	her	art,	music,	and	
public	persona	was	inseparable	from	and	constitutive	of	her	Iranian	Americann‐ness.		
There	were	two	things	Asa’s	statements	conveyed	to	me.	Firstly,	she	seemed	to	explicitly	
yet	 effortlessly	 push	 any	 taken‐for‐granted	 boundaries	 of	 Iranian‐ness.	 Like	 some	 of	my	
other	respondents,	her	creative	expressions	thrived	on	the	fact	that	she	saw	herself	as	part	
of	a	generation	of	young	people	with	specific	but	diverse	interests,	experiences,	and	tastes.	
Asa	and	others	I	spoke	with	expressed	certainty	about	these	particularities	being	able	to	be	
integrated	with	 creative	ways	 of	 being	 Iranian	 American,	 and	 also	 that	 these	 could	 find	
audiences	via	internet.	Asa’s	particular	way	of	doing	this	was	public,	colorful,	daring,	pop	
cultural,	 and	 styled	 in	 such	 a	way	 as	 to	 appeal	 to	 a	 broad,	 young	audience.	 For	Asa,	 this	
audience	 was	 found	 through	 a	 combination	 of	 reality	 show,	 music,	 and	 social	 media	
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promotion.	Through	these	channels,	being	Iranian	American	for	Asa	was	negotiated	in	the	
creative	work	of	being	herself.	
The	second	thing	 this	conveyed	to	me	was	 that	her	unconventional	definitions	of	 Iranian	
American‐ness	were	also	shaped	by	 the	city.	Asa's	relationship	 to	 the	city	of	LA	 ‐‐	where	
she	 has	 been	 living	 and	 growing	 up	 since	 her	 teen	 years	 ‐‐	 was	 especially	 evident	 the	
Tehrangeles	music	 video.	 The	 Persian	 lyrics	 of	Tehrangeles	 describe	 practices	 of	 driving	
through	Westwood	 in	a	BMW	and	visiting	particular	establishments	 like	Attari	 sandwich	
shop	 and	 consuming	 particular	 foods	 (chelow	 kabab	 ba	 doogh,	 or	 kabab,	 rice,	 and	
traditional	 carbonated	 yoghurt	 drink).	 The	 lyrics	 about	 West	 LA	 are	 juxtaposed	 to	 the	
setting	 of	 the	 recognizable	 Venice	 Boulevard,	 which	 is	 anything	 but	 a	 known	 Iranian	
neighbourhood	but	no	 less	an	 iconic	 location,	easily	visually	associated	with	Los	Angeles	
and	California.	Hence,	Asa	plays	on	 conventional	 places	 and	practices	 of	 LA	 Iranian‐ness	
while	combining	them	with	much	less	conventional	ways	of	being	Iranian	American	in	the	
city.		
Asa’s	explicit	engagement	with	the	places	of	the	city	of	LA	in	this	song	wraps	the	reference	
to	Iranian	Westwood	in	a	fun	and	visually	flamboyant	package.	It	is	explicitly	Iranian	and	
Angelino,	and	offers	a	mixture	of	recognizable	urban	locations	of	the	city	for	both	Iranian	
Americans	 and	 other	 Angelinos.	 And	 the	 combination	 of	 typical	 and	 atypical	 places	
associated	 with	 Iranian	 Americans	 in	 LA	 that	 are	 represented	 in	 the	 video	 references	
established	 notions	 of	 Iranian‐ness	 as	 located	 and	 practiced	 in	 Westwood,	 while	 also	
expanding	 it	 to	 a	 non‐typical	 site	 like	 Venice	 beach.	 Furthermore,	 the	 city	 as	 a	 whole	
becomes	 a	 reference	 point	 in	 this	 video.	 This	 is	 evident	 in	 Asa’s	 deployment	 of	 the	
“Tehrangeles”	logo	emblazoned	on	the	tank	top	she	wears	in	the	video.	The	text	is	written	
in	 the	 familiar	 font	of	 the	 logo	of	 the	 city’s	baseball	 team,	 the	LA	Dodgers,	which	adorns	
Dodgers	 Stadium	 in	 Elysian	 Heights,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 team’s	 uniforms	 and	 much	 of	 the	
merchandise,	a	sports	symbol	which	arguably	has	contributed	to	the	broader	branding	of	
the	 city	 of	 LA.	 On	 her	 Facebook	 profile,	 Asa	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 photographs	 wearing	 other	
pieces	of	 clothing	decorated	with	 the	 same	 logo,	and	other	users	are	 invited	 to	purchase	
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pieces	in	the	clothing	line.	Appropriating	this	recognizable	and	symbolic	typographic	style	
makes	reference	to	symbols	of	the	city	of	LA	with	an	Iranian	American	spin	that	is	flashy	
and	youth‐/pop	culturally‐oriented,	consistent	with	the	rest	of	her	music	and	persona.		
I	 see	 Asa	 doing	 two	 important	 things	 with	 her	 pop	 cultural	 productions.	 First,	 she	 is	
extending	conventions	of	Iranian	American‐ness	in	a	way	that	is	particularly	appealing	to	a	
younger	generation.	The	places	 that	are	 remnants	of	an	older	generation	are	 referenced,	
but	these	are	supplemented	with	Asa’s	references	to	alternative	sites	of	being	Iranian	in	LA.	
By	referencing	both	 the	old	and	new	places	 in	 the	city	associated	with	practices	of	being	
Iranian	American,	and	by	styling	herself	with	 the	help	of	youth	cultural	 reference	points,	
Asa	performs	Iranian	American‐ness	through	her	practices	of	being	at	home	in	LA.		
Second,	she	uses	social	media	to	stage	this	everyday	performance	for	her	audience	of	fans	
and	followers,	as	her	celebrity	social	media	practices	become	incorporated	seamlessly	into	
her	ways	of	being	Iranian	American	in	LA.	Asa’s	practices	show	how	she	makes	her	home	in	
LA.	 She	 uses	 social	media	 to	 publicize	 her	 eccentric	way	 of	 being	 Iranian	American,	 and	
through	the	sociality	of	fans‐to‐celebrities	between	herself	and	her	followers.	This	is	typical	
of	and	made	possible	by	social	media	interactions.	In	what	follows	I	describe	how	some	of	
my	 other	 respondents	 shape	 Iranian	 American‐ness	 by	 using	 web	 applications	 in	 their	
practices	of	being	at	home	in	LA.	
	
Food	Places	
In	 2010,	 the	 “Living”	 rubric	 of	 the	 Los	 Angeles	 Times	 covered	 a	 local	 “Persian	 Pizza”	
restaurant	 called	 “Café	 Glacé.”42	 with	 a	 positive	 review	 about	 the	 recently‐opened	
establishment	in	Westwood.		
																																																								
42 Beeta	and	Aryana	were	interested	in	this	coverage	and	the	establishment	itself.	For	a	number	of	my	
respondents,	reviews	and	personal	suggestions	for	places	to	eat	were	a	part	of	a	more	general	interest	in	the	
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[T]his	is	an	honest‐to‐God,	full‐blooded,	American‐style	pizza,	with	bell	peppers	and	
melted	 cheese	 and	 everything.	 But	 this	 is	 also	 pizza	 freed	 of	 any	 obligations	 of	
authenticity.	It's	not	authentically	New	York,	nor	authentically	Neapolitan,	nor	is	it	
trying	to	be.	 It's	made	by	Iranians	for	Iranians,	guided	by	a	distinctive,	charmingly	
un‐Italian	aesthetic.	
The	restaurant	became	well‐known	among	a	number	of	my	respondents.	While	visiting	it	in	
2012,	 it	 seemed	 to	me	 that	 part	 of	 its	 attraction	was	 its	 difference	 from	 the	 full‐service	
restaurants	 across	 the	 street	where	 an	 order	 of	 chelo	 kabob	 or	 other	 traditional	 Iranian	
dishes	would	be	common.	Here,	the	food	served	in	plastic	baskets,	the	condiments	on	the	
tables,	and	the	customers	paying	at	the	register	provided	a	more	casual	air,	one	that	might	
appeal	 more	 to	 nearby	 UCLA	 students	 on	 an	 average	 evening	 than	 the	 more	 formal	
neighboring	 alternatives.	 According	 to	 the	 review,	 the	only	origin	 attributed	 to	 this	 food	
was	 fast	 food	 from	 “the	 streets	 of	 Tehran”	 –	 a	 dish	 that	 some	 of	my	 respondents	 knew	
about	from	their	own	and	others’	recent	visits	to	Tehran.	It	was	not	only	the	use	of	modern	
Tehran	as	inspiration	that	made	it	special	within	its	Westwood	surroundings,	but	(perhaps	
even	more	so)	the	restaurant’s	innovation	within	the	LA	landscape	for	Iranian	food.		
In	2013,	 I	went	 to	Café	Glace	with	Sepideh,	a	young	woman,	married	and	 in	her	20s.	She	
worked	in	web	publishing	before	going	to	graduate	school,	and	started	to	work	as	a	mental	
health	professional	 in	an	organization	that	is	especially	set	up	to	offer	services	to	 Iranian	
American	clientele.	Before	making	this	career	shift,	Sepideh	used	to	write	for	a	variety	of	
websites	 and	blogs,	 including	 food	blogs.	Her	 interest	 in	 food	 journalism	meant	 that	 she	
followed	 a	 number	 of	 food	 blogs,	 mainly	 through	 browsing	 RSS	 feeds	 she	 collected	 in	
Google	 Reader.	 She	 also	 considered	 herself	 something	 of	 an	 aficionado	when	 it	 came	 to	
Iranian	 food	places	 in	 the	city,	giving	 tips	 to	newcomers,	exploring	new	 food	places	with	
friend,	and	following	food	journalism	that	covers	"Persian	food."		
																																																																																																																																																																																		
food	culture	of	the	cities	they	live	in	and	visit.	And	talk	about	a	certain	“Persian	food	place”	was	sometimes	
interchangeable	with	a	recommendation	for	a	“pasta	place”	or	“Mexican	place.” 
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In	a	group	email	exchange	from	October	2009,	Sepideh	drew	the	attention	of	friends	to	a	
recent	review	in	the	digital	publication	of	LA	Weekly	magazine.43	The	piece	highlighted	the	
“underrated”	status	of	Westwood	for	cuisine,	but	did	so	by	arguing	that	the	area	had	other	
things	to	offer	than	“Persian	food.”	In	her	slight	annoyance	with	the	article,	Sepideh	stated	
the	following	at	one	point	in	the	private	email	exchange	about	the	piece:	
I	think	what	really	bugs	me	about	it	is	that	we’ve	got	ONE	STREET	in	LA	that	has	all	
our	food	on	it	and	they	won’t	even	let	us	have	that	without	comment	(plus	the	other	
stuff	on	that	street	kinda	sucks	compared	to	the	persianity…).	
Having	made	this	statement,	Sepideh	then	referred	to	a	piece	about	food	in	Westwood	that	
she	had	written	earlier	‐	 it	was	posted	 in	a	different	digital	publication.	Her	reaction	was	
based	in	a	passion	for	and	interest	 in	LA	Iranian	“food	places,”	but	also	an	emotional	one	
that	I	thought	reflected	a	collective	stake	in	the	protection	of	this	part	of	the	city	as	Iranian	
American	(“we’ve	got	ONE	street”).	Her	comment	also	makes	a	claim	to	the	Iranian‐ness,	or	
“persianity,”	of	Westwood	Boulevard	in	the	face	of	coverage	that	downplays	this	element	of	
this	neighborhood’s	food	culture.	
In	a	city	where	the	practice	of	 “eating	out”	 is	a	rather	regular	affair,	 the	status	of	 Iranian	
American‐ness	within	LA’s	often	ethnically	demarcated	food	categories	was	important	for	
several	of	my	respondents.	In	fact,	keeping	one’s	mental	map	of	good	(Persian)	food	in	the	
city	up	to	date	was	almost	a	responsibility,	and	among	friends	who	spent	time	and	effort	
talking	and	writing	about	 Iranian	American‐ness	with	regard	 to	 food	 in	LA,	staying	up	to	
date	 with	 emerging	 food	 places	 was	 part	 of	 being	 Iranian	 American	 in	 LA.	 Sepideh’s	
practices	of	 frequenting	Westwood	Boulevard	restaurants,	 familiarizing	herself	with	new	
ones,	 and	 engaging	 with	 the	 media	 coverage	 of	 these	 places	 reflect	 an	 involved	
protectiveness	of	the	Iranian‐ness	of	the	food	culture	of	this	spatial	location	in	LA.		
																																																								
43	Galuten,	Noah,	“Underrated	Neighborhood:	Westwood	Boulevard,	Not	Just	For	Tehrangelenos”	
	http://blogs.laweekly.com/squidink/2009/10/underrated_neighborhood_westwo.php	(accessed	29/11/14)	
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This	 occurs	 within	 a	 broader	 context	 where	 a	 passion	 for	 food,	 and	 a	 drive	 to	 follow	
columns	 and	 blogs	 on	 the	 topic	 and	 cultivate	 a	 hobby	 of	 food	 specialism,	 is	 part	 of	 an	
increasingly	 fashionable	 way	 to	 know	 one’s	 city.	 And	 being	 a	 “foodie,”	 as	 some	 of	 my	
respondents	 call	 themselves,	 is	 a	 contemporary	 trend	 in	 urban	 culture.	 With	 popular	
websites	 like	 Yelp.com	 –	 used	 regularly	 by	 a	 number	 of	 my	 respondents	 ‐‐	 that	 are	
dominated	by	 local	 food	commentary	by	customers,	 it	 is	 increasingly	common	to	develop	
one’s	general	mental	 food	map	of	the	city	with	the	help	of	 	web	applications	(and	mobile	
devices)44	 when	 moving	 through	 the	 city.45	 The	 passions	 of	 members	 of	 the	 second	
generation	like	Sepideh	fit	 into	this	young	and	fashionable	way	to	know	LA.	This	broader	
context	also	gives	a	particularly	current,	urban	aesthetic	to	how	they	practice	their	Iranian	
American‐ness.46		
The	 restaurant,	 Café	 Glace	mentioned	 above	 attracted	 attention	 among	my	 respondents	
when	it	first	appeared	because	of	its	newness.	The	creative	take	on	Iranian	food	seemed	to	
add	 to	 the	 appeal.	 Another	 innovative	 food	 place	 that	 some	 respondents	 circulated	
coverage	 of	 was	 the	 Pizza	 restaurant,	 PizzaNista,	 in	 particular	 with	 regard	 to	 its	 2012	
special	 event,	 when	 its	 second‐generation	 Iranian	 American	 owner	 served	 a	 Pizza	 with	
																																																								
44	As	some	scholars	have	claimed	(S.	Graham	&	Marvin,	2002;	A.	M.	Townsend,	2000),	the	urban	structure	of	
contemporary	cities	owes	much	to	the	technological	development	of	the	telephone	and	telecommunications	
technologies.	Townsend	also	elaborates	on	how	the	“technologically	constructed	nature	of	space	and	time”	
suggests	that	mobile	communications	technologies	are	changing	urban	life	(Townsend,	2000:	98).	Although	it	
is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	research,	this	raises	questions	about	the	role	of	digital	devices	with	internet	
connectivity	in	the	development	of	contemporary	cities.	In	doing	this	my	research	suggests	it	is	important	to	
include	in	the	analysis	the	role	of	specific	software	applications	that	are	oriented	towards	interactions	
between	people	and	places	such	as	social	media	sites	that	have	locational	properties.	
45	Mobile	technologies	as	used	while	people	move	through	the	city	and	find	information	about	places	as	they	
did	so	were	increasingly	becoming	an	important	part	of	how	some	of	my	respondents’	inhabited	the	city.	Not	
all	of	my	respondents	had	a	smart	phone	at	this	time,	so	some	who	have	since	acquired	one	might	already	be	
taking	up	new	practices.	For	future	studies	that	focus	on	this,	Pink	and	Hjorth’s	fascinating	work	on	doing	
embodied	ethnography	of	mobile	technologies	is	relevant	for	its	approach	to	understanding	the	social	
implications	of	the	materiality	of	mobile	devices	such	as	camera	phones	(see	Pink	&	Hjorth,	2012)	
46 In	a	parallel	way,	taking	photos	of	food	and	posting	them	to	social	media	platforms	is	a	popular	practice	
more	generally.	For	some	of	my	respondents	this	meant	posting	photos	of	Iranian	food	to	Instagram	and/or	
Facebook	(Arash	and	Asa	were	among	those	who	did	this)	while	including	the	Persian	names	of	the	foods	in	
the	postings.	This	was	another	example	of	how	a	currently	popular	style	of	engaging	with	food	with	the	use	of	
social	media	was	deployed	within	a	particular	style	of	being	Iranian	American	for	my	second‐generation	
respondents. 
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“traditional”	 Iranian	 “kabob	 koobideh”	 on	 it	 for	 a	 limited	 time	 at	 the	 Downtown	 LA	
restaurant.	 Arash	 posted	 a	 YouTube	 video	 about	 this	 event	 on	 Facebook.	 The	 second‐
generation	restaurant	owner,	Salmah	Aghah,	was	seen	in	the	video,	speaking	about	how	the	
special‐recipe	 Persian	 Pizza	was	made	 and	 explaining	 that	 the	 “originality”	 of	 this	 Pizza	
was	due	to	the	two	Iranian	American	men	involved	in	the	project	“doing	it	our	way	‐‐	it’s	
different	‐‐	and	putting	our	own	signature	on	it.”	What	struck	me	about	these	instances	was	
how	 these	 food	 places	 innovated	 by	 using	 elements	 of	 “Persian”	 or	 “traditional”	 Iranian	
food	while	also	explicitly	subverting	the	boundaries	of	what	Iranian	food	is	typically	like	in	
LA	 by	 negating	 conventions.	 The	 food	 landscape	 of	 Iranian	 LA	 is	 changing	 with	 the	
developing	 tastes	 of	 (a	 new	 generation	 of)	 local	 Iranian	 Americans	 and	 the	 need	 for	
innovation	among	the	existing	abundance	of	“Persian	food”	places.		
This	 innovation	 does	 not	 always	 imply	 a	 break	 with	 the	 older	 generation’s	 food‐
consumption	practices	 in	 the	 city.	 The	 latter	 is	perhaps	nowhere	more	evident	 than	 in	 a	
particular	kind	of	 food	place	 that	plays	a	part	 in	 the	 lives	of	 so	many	children	of	 Iranian	
immigrants	 growing	 up	 in	 LA:	 the	 “Persian	 Supermarket.”	 Firouzeh	 Dumas	 wrote	 a	
descriptive	piece	titled	The	Real	Supermarkets	of	Orange	County,47	for	the	New	York	Times	
about	a	widely‐known	Persian	Market	 in	Orange	County.	Duma’s	NYT	piece	 is	a	personal	
and	humorous	portrait	of	her	experience	shopping	at	a	 “Persian	supermarket”	 in	Orange	
County	 with	 three	 generations	 of	 her	 own	 family	 (including	 her	 parents	 and	 her	 small	
children)	‐‐	primarily	the	act	of	standing	in	a	long	line	to	wait	for	Sangak	bread.	The	general	
practice	 of	 shopping	 at	 the	 “Persian	 supermarket”	 is	 uniformly	 recognizable	 across	
Iranians	 in	LA.	For	 the	second	generation,	 first	associations	with	 “Persian	supermarkets”	
are	with	memories	of	 accompanying	parents	 to	do	periodical	 shopping	 for	products	 that	
could	not	be	found	in	other	stores,	sometimes	driving	across	long	distances	of	(inter‐)city	
sprawl	to	visit	the	most	well‐stocked	or	high	quality	store.		
																																																								
47Dumas,	Firoozeh,	“The	Real	Supermarkets	of	Orange	County,”		
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/magazine/21lives‐t.html	(accessed,	29/11/14)		
65	
	
The	Persian	supermarket	 is	also	among	the	food	places	that	make	an	appearance	in	Tara	
Bahrampour’s	2010	piece,	Persia	on	the	Pacific,	for	New	Yorker	magazine,	48	which	include	
such	references	as	“a	kabob	restaurant	in	the	Valley”	and	“the	Iranian	market	in	Thousand	
Oaks.”	 Bahrampour’s	 piece	 is	 written	 both	 autobiographically	 and	 also	 around	 the	
protagonist	 and	 acquaintance,	 “Jonathan”	 (the	 character’s	 “Iranian	 name”	 is	 Parshaw),	 a	
second	generation	young	man	living	in	the	Westlake	Village	neighbourhood	near	Thousand	
Oaks,	about	an	hour	drive	west	of	Downtown	LA.	Some	of	my	respondents	shared	this	piece	
via	Facebook	and	are	friends	with	the	protagonist	who	features	in	it.	Bahrampour	quotes	
her	central	character:		
“In	 Iran	 they	 taste	 so	 much	 better.”	 Parshaw	 is	 used	 to	 hearing	 this	 from	 older	
Iranians,	 for	whom	 food	has	become	 the	 touchstone	 for	more	 intangible	 longings.	
“They	 talk	 about	 it	 all	 the	 time,”	 he	 says.	 “The	 lamb	 and	 the	 meat—how	 it	 was	
different	because	the	lamb	had	all	the	fat	on	the	tail.”’		
The	picture	Bahrampour	paints	here	regarding	food,	and	with	her	piece	as	a	whole,	is	about	
what	 she	describes	as	an	 “inherited	nostalgia”49	on	 the	part	of	 the	second	generation.	As	
evident	in	this	example,	many	of	the	second	generation	do	not	have	memory	of	the	tastes	of	
food	from	Iran,	they	are	familiar	with	the	descriptions	of	others,	such	as	their	parents	and	
other	 “older	 Iranians”	 about	 the	 remembered	 tastes.50	 Attachments	 to	 the	 Persian	
supermarket	 by	 younger	 generations,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 pieces	 of	 Dumas	 and	
Bahrampour,	represent	an	inheritance	of	Iranian	American‐ness	by	the	second	generation	
through	family	practices	that	center	around	these	important	food	places	in	the	city.	Their	
representations	of	 food	places	 in	LA	not	only	 tell	 stories	 about	 food,	but	 also	 tell	 stories	
about	experiences	of	migration	and	the	life	of	the	second	generation	as	they	unfold	within	
																																																								
48	Bahrampour,	Tara,	“Persia	on	the	Pacific,”	http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/11/10/031110fa_fact	(accessed	
28/11/14)	 	
49	This	concept	was	first	elaborated	in	academic	work	on	the	second	generation	of	Iranian	Americans	by	Neda	
Maghbouleh	(Maghbouleh,	2010b)	
50	This	is	something	that	changes	when	for	those	who	partake	in	return	visits	to	parts	of	Iran,	as	I	discuss	in	
the	third	and	final	section	of	this	chapter.	
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the	 city	 today.	 I	 noticed	 their	 pieces	 being	 referenced	 and	 circulated	 via	 social	 media	
among	my	respondents,	even	years	after	their	publication.		
In	 part,	 being	 at	 home	 in	 the	 city	 involves	 knowing,	 visiting,	 reviewing,	 and	 protecting	
Iranian	 food	places	 in	 the	city	 through	practices	of	both	moving	within	and	representing	
the	 city	 through	web	applications.	This	 takes	on	particular	 current,	urban	styles	 that	are	
particular	to	the	ways	the	younger	generation	of	Iranian	Americans	inhabit	the	city.	These	
practices	 are	 situated	 within	 friendships	 with	 Iranian	 American	 peers	 and	 the	 use	 of	
certain	web	applications	(like	review	sites,	blogs,	web	magazines,	and	private	email)	helps	
mediate	 the	 localized	yet	 cosmopolitan	sociality	of	being	a	 foodie	 in	 the	 city.	 In	addition,	
websites	 of	 reputable	 American	 publications	 like	 the	 New	 York	 Times	 and	 New	 Yorker	
offer	 a	 context	 where	 second‐generation	 (women)	 writers	 are	 in	 a	 position	 to	 tell	 the	
Magazine	stories	that	showcase	some	of	the	 long‐established	Iranian	food	places	of	LA	in	
widely‐read,	English	 language	publications.51	Hence,	my	respondents’	use	of	this	range	of	
web	applications	takes	place	within	a	context	of	a	contemporary,	specialist,	urban,	literary	
style	of	inhabiting	LA	that	draws	on	both	emergent	and	established	places	for	being	Iranian	
American	within	the	city.	In	the	following,	I	move	on	to	describe	some	of	my	respondents’	
engagement	with	the	well‐known	phenomenon	of	“Persian	Palaces”	in	the	city	of	LA.	
		
Persian	Palaces	
On	UglyPersianHouses.com,52	web	visitors	are	greeted	with	 its	basic	blog	 format	and	 the	
large,	 yellow	 title	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 homepage,	 “Ugly	 Persian	 Houses”	 with	 the	 tagline	
underneath	 it,	 “Ruining	 the	 neighborhood…	 one	 house	 at	 a	 time,”	 together	 with	 a	
photograph	 of	 one	 of	 the	 houses	 in	 question.	 The	 neighbourhoods	 covered	 included	
Beverly	Hills	and	Brentwood,	but	also	Camarillo	 in	Ventura	County,	Century	City,	Encino,	
																																																								
51	Although	it	is	noteworthy	that	both	these	publications	are	New	York‐based,	rather	than	locally‐based	in	LA,	where	the	
authors	are	from	and	write	about.	This	has	some	linkage	to	my	discussion	in	the	final	chapter	regarding	the	exclusion	
perceived	by	some,	of	the	voices	of	LA	Iranians	from	news	coverage,	in	particular	in	the	LA	Times.	
52	The	URL	of	the	site	www.uglypersianhouses.com	(accessed	March	2011)	has	since	become	inactive.		
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and	 Hollywood.	 On	 its	 “About”	 page,	 the	 blog’s	 creators	 have	 included	 the	 following	
description	of	 their	motives,	 followed	by	a	call	 to	visitors	 to	 take	photos	of	 “ugly	Persian	
houses”	in	their	neighborhoods	and	send	them	in	to	be	posted	on	the	site.53	
In	the	late	1970s,	millions	of	Iranians,	fleeing	a	tyrannical	government,	emigrated	to	
the	United	States.		They	brought	with	them	hopes,	dreams	and	a	fondness	for	truly	
hideous	architecture.		Go	into	any	neighborhood	and	you	recognize	the	telltale	signs	
—	and	no	house,	whether	it	be	sweet	bungalow	or	Spanish	is	safe	from	their	notions	
of	 style.	 	Pillars,	 ornate	 rod	 iron	 gates,	 oval	 windows…they	 spare	 no	 expense	 in	
taking	some	of	the	loveliest	homes	and	turning	them	into	some	kind	of	architectural	
freakshow.	 	And	 all	 this	 begs	 the	 question	—	 if	 you	 love	America,	why	 turn	 all	 of	
your	houses	into	reminders	of	the	very	place	you	fled?	
In	 2010	 Sepideh	 used	 her	 blog	 ParsArts.com	 links	 to	 Ugly	 Persian	 Houses	 with	 the	
following	post:		
You	know	what’s	tackier	than	an	ugly	Persian	house?	Using	architectural	critique	as	
a	cover	for	xenophobia	and	racism!	This	site’s	writers	insist	they’re	not	racist	but	in	
the	same	post	drop	the	term	“Ugly	Persian	Creep”	(replace	“Persian”	with	“black”	or	
“Jewish”	–	does	it	still	sound	not‐racist?).	On	their	about	page,	they	ask	“if	you	love	
America,	why	 turn	 all	 of	 your	 houses	 into	 reminders	 of	 the	 very	 place	 you	 fled?”	
(Not	even	gonna	break	down	why	 that’s	 so	messed	up	but	suffice	 it	 to	say	 there’s	
nothing	 remotely	 Irooni	 [Iranian]	 about	 this	 style	 of	 architecture	 whatsoever,	 so	
why	peg	all	of	Persianity	with	this	hideousness?)	Yikes,	dudes.	Just…	yikes.54	
The	 hubbub	 in	 LA	 around	 the	 Persian	 Palace	 phenomenon	 has	 played	 out	 in	 media	
coverage	from	local	and	style	magazines	like	LA	Weekly,	Curbed	and	W	Magazine	and	the	LA	
																																																								
53	While	the	site	was	anonymously	created,	one	second‐generation	observer	of	the	site	informed	me	it	was	set	up	by	real	
estate	professionals	in	LA.	
54	Saremi,	Sepideh,	“Ugly	Persian	Houses,”	http://www.parsarts.com/(accessed	1/12/14).	
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Times,55	to	broadcast	news	of	NBC,	the	phenomenon	of	“Persian	Palaces”	is	one	that	brings	
issues	of	style,	taste,	culture,	and	money	together	with	houses,	homes	and	neighbourhoods,	
pushing	them	all	to	the	forefront	of	a	public	debate	about	Iranian	Americans	and	the	city	of	
LA.	 In	 virtually	 every	 instance	where	 the	 “Persian	 Palace”	 phenomenon	 is	 covered,	 so	 is	
“the	king	of	the	Persian	Palace,”	Hamid	Omrani.	Hundreds	of	his	constructions	are	deemed	
“Persian	Palaces,”	(an	often	pejoratively	used	term)	built	as	residences	and	in	a	typical	style	
which	 has	 come	 to	 dominate	 in	 some	 Beverly	 Hills	 streets,	 as	 well	 as	 spread	 to	 other	
wealthy	neighbourhoods	on	the	West	side	of	the	city.	
A	first‐generation	immigrant	in	his	50s,	Omrani	is	described	in	the	press	as	a	“Persian	Jew”	
who	came	 to	Beverly	Hills	 in	 the	70s	and	 is	part	of	 a	 larger	 flow	of	 Jewish	 Iranians	who	
came	to	LA,	making	Beverly	Hills	a	center	for	Iranian	Americans	of	 Jewish	background	in	
the	 minds	 of	 so	 many	 Los	 Angelinos,	 Iranian	 and	 non‐Iranian	 alike.	 Today,	 high‐profile	
second‐generation	nightclub	magnate,	Sam	Nazarian,	and	his	uncle	are	among	the	“Persian	
Jews”	 who	 have	 enjoyed	 attention	 for	 the	 extravagant	 homes	 Omrani	 has	 designed	 for	
them.	This	has	been	established	as	something	of	a	standard	narrative	about	these	types	of	
houses,	what	kinds	of	people	live	in	them,	and	how	they	came	to	be	a	part	of	LA.		
However,	it	is	noteworthy	that,	on	the	whole,	the	debate	repeatedly	points	to	the	decline	of	
this	style	of	houses,	specifically	as	a	result	of	the	rise	of	the	younger	generation	born	and	
raised	 in	the	US.	This	strikes	an	 interesting	general	 tension	within	the	second	generation	
between	publicly	defending	these	houses	against	ethnic‐based	exclusion	while	at	the	same	
time	not	preferring	this	style	of	the	houses	themselves.	Hassan,	a	friend	who	has	worked	
for	many	years	in	municipal	planning	in	LA,56	makes	a	connection	between	the	dissipation	
of	 the	 “Persian	 Palace”	 style	 of	 construction	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 second	 generation’s	
different	tastes	in	the	following.	
																																																								
55	The	LA	Times	also	published	a	letter	written	in	response	to	one	of	the	articles	covering	the	phenomenon	of	LA’s	
“Persian	Palaces”	written	by	the	Mo	Borghei,	President	of	the	Society	of	Iranian	Architects	and	Planners,	condemning	the	
houses	in	question	as	not	representing	“any	element	of	Persian	architecture”	and	supporting	“the	city	of	Beverly	Hills	for	
putting	a	stop	to	these	unprofessional	architectural	practices.”	Borghei,	Mo,	“Insulted	by	Beverly	Hills’	‘Persian	Palaces’,”	
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/11/magazine/tm‐letters28.2		(accessed	29/11/14)			
56	Hassan	is	currently	working	for	the	City	of	Glendale	as	a	Director	of	Community	Development	
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Iranian	 immigrant	 and	 1st	 and	 2nd	 generation	 Iranian	 American	 architects	 and	
designers	 are	 very	 active	 and	 quite	 influential	 in	 all	 types	 of	 construction	 from	
single	 family	 homes	 to	 70‐story	 high	 rises.	 	So,	 the	 identifiable	 ethnic	 aesthetic	
preferences	become	much	more	subtle,	but	still	identifiable	by	trained	eyes.		In	a	nut	
shell,	 I	 think	 the	 initial	 group	 of	 Iranian	 immigrants,	 much	 like	 their	 European	
counterparts	in	earlier	decades	or	centuries,	brought	with	them	their	interpretation	
of	 what	 constitutes	 status	 and	 symbolizes	 "high	 taste"	 and	 luxury	 and	 tried	 to	
combine	it	all	at	once	in	their	residences.		In	my	experience,	the	generation	that	was	
born	 in	 those	 homes	 is	 quite	 rapidly	 stepping	 away	 from	 those	 symbols	 and	 is	
instead	 incorporating	 some	 of	 the	 visual	 elements	 they	were	 raised	 with	 into	 an	
aesthetic	environment	that	is	much	more	accessible	to	their	non‐Iranian‐American	
friends	and	counterparts.	
A	 similar	 trend	 is	 noted	 in	 the	 following	 excerpt	 from	 a	W	 Magazine	 piece	 about	 the	
“Persian	Palace”	phenomenon	in	LA	from	July	2009	called	The	Persian	Conquest,	by	Kevin	
West.	 It	mentions	 the	possibility	 of	 the	 younger	 generation	 reducing	 the	 proliferation	 of	
this	style	of	housing	through	their	tastes	and	preferences.	
Several	 Persian	 developers	 and	 realtors	 in	 Beverly	 Hills	 suggest	 that	 the	
stereotypical	 Persian	 Palace	may	 be	 going	 out	 of	 style	 among	 the	 city's	 younger,	
more	 assimilated	 generation	 of	 Iranians.	 "My	 younger	 clients	 say,	 'I	 don't	 want	
something	that	screams,	'I	am	Persian,'"	says	designer	Dardashti.	
Of	interest	is	how	the	Iranian‐ness	or	Persian‐ness	of	the	houses	is	being	dealt	with	in	the	
public	 debate.	 While	 these	 statements	 suggest	 that	 the	 second	 generation	 is	 distancing	
themselves	 from	 what	 has	 been	 defined	 as	 Iranian	 in	 LA	 and,	 thus,	 making	 themselves	
more	accessible	 to	American	peers.	However,	 to	my	second‐generation	respondents,	 it	 is	
neither	a	desire	to	be	seen	as	more	American,	nor	a	desire	to	be	seen	as	less	Iranian	that	
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motivates	them	to	reject	these	houses.	Rather,	they	acknowledge	the	connection	between	
this	style	of	houses	and	Iranian	Americans57	but	site	their	personal	style	preferences.		
For	 instance,	 Sepideh	 sees	 this	 as	 a	 typical	 preference	 of	 some	 LA	 Iranians	 who	 have	
houses	that	are	flashy	on	the	outside	and	contain	gaudy	furniture	and	decorations	inside.	
And	Shiva	 says	 she	associates	 the	 recognizable	design	with	a	particular	 type	of	 Iranians’	
houses	both	inside	Iran	and	the	US	‐‐	A	taste	for	ostentation,	according	to	her,	comes	with	a	
culture	of	status	that	many	in	Iran	participate	in	by	accruing	symbols	of	wealth.	However,	
both	 these	 young	women	 describe	 this	 style	 of	 house	 as	 not	 fitting	 with	 their	 personal	
tastes	–	particularly	with	regard	to	any	house	they	would	live	in,	themselves	‐‐	and	reject	
the	notion	that	there	is	something	necessarily	Iranian	about	what	have	come	to	be	known	
as	Persian	Palaces.		
This	 position	 overlaps	 with	 the	 response	 posted	 by	 Iranian	 American	 architects	 to	 the	
critical	piece	from	2004,	published	in	the	LA	Times.	That	position	also	took	distance	from	
these	 constructions	 in	 LA.	However,	 it	 did	 so	mainly	 on	 grounds	 that	 their	 building	was	
unprofessional	and	did	not	represent	the	range	of	styles	and	projects	used	in	by	all	Iranian	
American	home	owners	and	architects.	The	architects	questioned	professional	rigors	and	
the	broader	skills	of	 Iranians	 in	 their	business.	 Indeed,	Shiva	and	Sepideh	were	similarly	
concerned	with	broadening	 associations	with	 Iranian‐ness	 in	LA	beyond	 these	houses	 in	
the	 public	 debate.	 However,	 for	 these	 young	 women,	 the	 personal	 tastes	 they	 express	
reflect	both	a	generational	and	a	class	difference	 from	the	kind	of	 Iranian	American‐ness	
they	associate	with	these	houses,	based	on	the	common	narratives	about	their	owners.58		
																																																								
57	I	did	not	speak	to	anyone	who	was	“born	in	those	homes,”	Hassan	suggests.	Of	course,	many	of	the	first	generation	were	
not	part	of	the	elite	who	brought	copious	enough	amounts	of	capital	with	them	from	Iran	and/or	worked	their	way	into	
one	of	these	houses	over	their	time	in	the	US,	so	their	children	would	and	could	not	be	born	and	raised	in	such	houses.	
Although	it	is	undoubted	that	part	of	the	second	generation	of	Iranian	Americans	in	LA	were	indeed	born	and	raised	in	
such	houses,	these	were	not	people	I	had	more	substantive	contact	with.	
58 To	a	lesser	extent	a	religious	difference	is	also	evident	in	the	fact	that	these	women	are	not	Jewish,	while	the	common	
image	of	these	houses	is	that	they	are	owned	by	Jewish	Iranian	Americans.	While	the	associations	with	royalists	and	“new	
money”	Iranians	in	LA	are	also	strong,	the	names	of	certain	high	profile,	self‐identified	Jewish	Iranian	Americans	are	
publicly	associated	with	these	types	of	houses.	This	certainly	is	not	to	say	that	these	houses	are	typical	of	Jewish	Iranian	
American	lifestyles	in	LA	as	a	whole.		
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Their	own	lives	and	those	of	most	people	around	them	are	far	removed	from	the	lifestyles	
that	 these	houses	 are	 commonly	 associated	with	 in	LA.	Most	 of	my	 respondents	 lived	 in	
apartments,	university	housing,	or	bungalows,	and	mostly	rental	housing,	which,	while	no	
doubt	 comfortable	 and	 in	 line	 with	 their	 middle‐class	 backgrounds,	 were	 certainly	 no	
Palaces,	Persian	or	otherwise.	Sepideh	joked	about	the	incidental	use	of	white	marble	stone	
and	 gold‐colored	 taps	 and	 fixtures	 in	 the	 bathroom	 of	 her	 otherwise	 modest,	 one	 two	
bedroom	rental	house	as	typically	“Persian.”	Shiva	lived	in	a	shared	rental	apartment,	but	
also	joked	on	one	occasion	that	her	guest	bathroom	was	so	elaborately	decorated	because	
Iranians	especially	put	their	best	foot	forward	for	guests.	I	took	these	comments	to	reflect	
these	 young	women’s	 experience	 of	 growing	 up	 in	 LA	 –	with	 an	 acute	 awareness	 of	 the	
visibly	wealthy	and	sometimes	caricatured	Iranians	in	the	city,	but	also	with	the	experience	
of	recognizing	parts	of	those	characteristics	as	typifying	Iranian‐ness.	Theirs	seemed	to	be	
a	distanced	recognition,	one	which	could	perhaps	best	be	expressed	through	humor/irony.	
The	latter	is	done	in	more	intimate	spaces,	clearly	separated	from	spaces	where	the	more	
serious	 tensions	 around	 the	 ethnicization	of	 these	houses	 is	 discussed,	 and	mainly	 takes	
place	exclusively	among	the	second	generation	themselves.		
Much	 of	 the	 framing	 of	 Persian	 Palaces	 by	 journalists	 and	 commentators	 expressed	
concerns	 over	 an	 architectural	 “heritage”	 of	 an	 LA	 with	 charm	 and	 whimsy	 against	 a	
“foreign,”	 brashly	 modernizing	 influence	 some	 saw	 as	 with	 the	 deterioration	 of	
neighbourhoods	linked	with	a	rise	in	Iranian	immigration.59	“Persian	Palaces”	are	thought	
not	to	fit	in	with	the	Spanish	colonial	style	housing	that	is	an	early	20th	century	revival	of	
the	 architectural	 styles	 first	 introduced	by	 the	Spanish	 colonizers	of	 the	North	American	
continent	in	the	15th	century.	What	Kropp	and	others	(see	Kropp,	2001)	call	the	“Spanish	
fantasy	past”	created	 for	Los	Angelinos	since	 the	1930s,	was	an	oversimplified	 life	of	 the	
past,	 untouched	 by	 modernity	 and	 a	 romanticization	 that	 the	 author	 argues	 led	 in	 the	
following	 decades	 to	 “restoring	 crumbling	missions	 and	 building	 red‐tile	 roofed	 homes”	
																																																								
59	See	Alexander,	Karenm		,	“The	Big‐Box	Battle	of	Beverly	Hills,”	
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/13/magazine/tm‐bevhills24/4	(accessed,	28/11/14)	
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(2001:	 36).60	 This	 concern	 apparently	 carried	 weight	 among	 city	 authorities	 as	 an	
ordinance	was	passed	to	restrict	the	construction	of	these	houses,	but	only	by	prohibiting	a	
combination	of	characteristics	and	style	traits	being	deployed	in	a	single	construction.	
There	is	pressure	for	the	city	not	to	be	changed	in	this	way.	And	press	and	broadcast	media	
representations	of	LA	and	its	Iranian	American	presence	contribute	to	making	these	houses	
a	 source	 of	 a	 local	 contention	 between	 the	 preservation	 of	 LA’s	 image	 and	 immigrants	
shaping	the	city	with	their	presence.	In	doing	so,	they	form	themselves	through	claiming	an	
ethnically	demarcated	status	of	Iranian	Americans	in	the	city	that	is	continuous	with	that	of	
older	Iranians.	But	they	also	reject	a	style	that	is	situated	at	the	intersection	of	generation	
and	class,	which	they	see	as	representing	a	way	of	being	Iranian	American	that	is	not	their	
own.		
Here	 I	have	described	my	 respondents’	ways	of	 being	at	 home	 in	 the	 city	 as	 reflecting	 a	
lifestyle	 that	 is	 rather	 distinct	 from	 the	 stereotypical	 and	 controversial	 images	 of	 LA	
Iranian‐ness.	This	is	due	to	the	limits	of	my	respondents’	financial	situations,	but	it	is	also	
due	 to	 the	 more	 general	 divergence	 of	 second‐generation	 preferences	 from	 the	 styles	
associated	with	parts	of	the	first	generation.	Nevertheless,	home	is	also	claimed	in	the	city	
through	 defense	 against	 ethnically‐marked	 (mis)representations	 of	 neighborhoods	
associated	 with	 Iranian	 wealth	 in	 LA.	 The	 particular	 website	 in	 question,	 coupled	 with	
personal	 blog	 and	 other	 social	 media	 responses,	 creates	 possibilities	 for	 mediated	
contestations	 and	 collective	 self‐representation,	 even	 if	 among	 audiences	 of	 peers	 and	
direct	social	contacts.	In	what	follows	I	link	together	the	three	instances	of	being	at	home	in	
the	city	I	have	discussed	in	this	section.	
		
																																																								
60	“Missions”	refers	to	the	Spanish	religious	and	military	outposts	set	up	in	California	during	the	18th	and	19th	
centuries.	
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Inhabiting	the	city	as	second‐generation	Iranian	Americans	
My	respondents	engage	with	places	in	particular	ways	as	part	of	their	practices	of	being	at	
home	in	LA	as	Iranian	Americans.	In	so	doing,	they	construct	diaspora	home(s).	I	have	tried	
to	show	how	this	happens	by	using	examples	of	my	respondents’	practices	of	inhabiting	LA.	
I	have	shown	how	their	use	of	web	applications	as	part	of	these	practices	of	inhabiting	the	
city.	 They	 are	 taken	up	 to	 create	 and	 contest	 representations	 of	 the	 city	 from	 their	 own	
vantage	point,	and	to	map	reference	points	into	their	social	maps	of	LA.	They	do	this	with	
attention	for	established	places	associated	with	being	LA	Iranian,	but	also	with	an	eye	for	
emergent	styles	and	habits	that	fit	into	new	ways	of	living	in	the	city	more	generally.		
LA	 enables	 them	 to	 be	 Iranian	 American	 in	 very	 particular	ways.	 That	 is,	 the	 city	 is	 not	
simply	the	backdrop	against	which	these	young	people	live	their	lives,	but	acts	upon	their	
ways	of	doing	so,	particularly	by	offering	them	styles	of	inhabitation	they	can	choose	from.	
The	city	they	live	in	is	therefore	an	important	part	of	how	their	Iranian	American	selves	are	
formed,	 and	 LA	 Iranian‐ness	 is	 analogous	 with	 Sreberny’s	 use	 of	 the	 category	 “Iranian	
living	in	London,”	which	highlights	the	specificities	of	urban	location	(Annabelle	Sreberny,	
2005).	 Even	 as	 my	 respondents	 diversify	 and	 expand	 which	 places	 constitute	
“Tehrangeles,”	 the	 city	 offers	 them	 particular	modes	 of	 being	 Iranian	 American	 that	 are	
specific	to	LA,	with	 its	 intimacy	with	celebrity	lifestyles,	 its	extremely	diverse	ethnic	food	
culture(s),	and	its	ambiguous	relationship	with	material	affluence.		
Open	claims	by	Iranians	to	LA	as	a	place	of	home	are	relatively	recent,	and	such	claims	have	
historically	been	difficult.	Naficy	describes	LA	 Iranians	 in	decades	past	as	not	 living	 in	 “a	
single	ethnic	enclave	that	can	provide	a	measure	of	ethnic	safety	for	insiders.	Instead	they	
live	 in	 small	 pockets,	 usually	 in	 prosperous	neighbourhoods	 across	 Southern	 California,”	
(Naficy,	1993).	This	dispersion	throughout	the	city	characterizes	Iranian	American	current	
patterns	 of	 residence	 as	 well.	 Nevertheless,	 those	 “pockets”	 of	 residence	 seem	 to	 be	
growing,	and	commercial	concentration	has	also	become	a	source	of	public	 identification.	
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In	 2010	 the	 City	 of	 Los	Angeles	 officially	 recognized	 a	 commercial	 quarter	 of	Westwood	
Boulevard	as	 “Persian	 Square”61	 –	 it	 is	 sometimes	 also	 referred	 to	 in	 the	press	 as	 “Little	
Persia”	 ‐‐	 and	 in	 2012,	 Google	 Maps	 labeled	 the	 neighborhood	 around	 Westwood	
Boulevard	 as	 “Tehrangeles”	 on	 its	 maps.	 Given	 these	 examples,	 the	model	 of	 the	 ethnic	
enclave	seems	to	be	the	path	to	collective	recognition	in	the	city,	even	though,	in	the	case	of	
Iranians,	one	did	not	emerge	through	patterns	of	concentrated	residence	historically.	The	
official	 incorporation	 of	 LA	 Iranians	 seems	 to	 be	 taking	 place	 along	 the	 same	 lines	 that	
gained	so	many	of	LA’s	other	ethnic	minorities	a	degree	of	recognition.		
While	this	can	be	seen	as	a	localization	of	Iranian	American‐ness,	it	is	not	simply	that.	Some	
aspects	of	a	chic,	urban	lifestyle	have	more	in	common	with	styles	of	living	in	other	global	
cities	where	Iranian	migration	is	concentrated	than,	for	instance,	with	the	first	generation	
in	LA.	Some	of	my	respondents	who	have	spent	time	living	in	other	major	US	metropolis	on	
both	 East	 and	West	 coasts,	 have	 ongoing	 connections	 to	 places	 like	 New	 York,	 the	 San	
Francisco	Bay	Area	and	 the	 Iranian	Americans	 living	 there.	This	 is	reflected	both	 in	 their	
urban	 styles	 of	 living	 as	 much	 as	 in	 actual	 social	 networks.	 They	 engage	 in	 (second	
generation)	collaborative	projects,	and	set	up	and	run	organizations	involving	other	young	
Iranian	 Americans	 (B|ta’arof	 (digital)	 magazine	 mentioned	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 this	
chapter	is	just	one	example	thereof).	Therefore,	localization	also	connects	them	to	an	inter‐
urban	Iranian	American‐ness.		
The	combination	of	social	media	practices	and	certain	urban	styles	also	reflects	how	pop	
music,	food	consumption,	and	housing	tastes	cross‐cut	the	ethnic	identifications	that	come	
with	claiming	 Iranian	American	quarters	of	LA.	This	supports	an	understanding	of	media	
and	migration	that	sees	media	use	as	not	being	“determined	ethnically	but,	rather,	socially”	
(Madianou,	2011:	22).	Likewise,	web	usage	 in	 the	examples	 I	discussed	reflect	how	web‐
																																																								
61	Press	Release	from	the	office	of	council	member	Paul	Koretz,,	“Persian	Square	approved	for	Los	Angeles,	thanks	to	
Paul	Koretz	motion”	
http://cd5.lacity.org/stellent/groups/ElectedOfficials/@CD5_Contributor/documents/Contributor_Web_Con
tent/LACITYP_012835.pdf	(accessed,	28/11/14) 
75	
	
mediated	 spaces	 have	 been	 opened	 up	 for	 continued	 struggles,	 thus	 representing	 “an	
embattled	space	for	becoming	‘at	home’	in	the	world”	(Shohat,	2011:	224).		
However,	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 accurate	 to	 see	 this	 as	 a	 “cyberspace”	 that	 constitutes	 the	
“digital	undermining	of	territoriality”	through	a	simultaneous	“virtual	re‐territorialization”	
(Shohat,	1998:	227).	Scholars	who	highlight	this	dimension	of	digital	media	tend	to	focus	
more	on	the	condition	of	exile	when	proposing	arguments	of	“re‐territorialization”	(such	as	
that	 by	 Naficy	 presented	 earlier	 in	 the	 Introduction	 and	 Shohat	 here).	 In	 such	 work,	
internet	is	viewed	as	a	way	to	overcome	exile	displacement.	 In	the	absence	of	needing	to	
overcome	 such	 a	 condition,	 my	 second‐generation	 respondents	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 use	
internet	 for	 this	 purpose.	 And	 as	 internet	 technologies	 further	 differentiate	 with	 the	
proliferation	of	 various	Web.20	and	 social	media	 applications,	 as	well	 as	mobile	devices,	
they	arguably	become	increasingly	a	part	of	everyday	practices	of	inhabiting	the	city	in	the	
ways	 I	 have	 described,	 rather	 than	 being	 limited	 to	 being	 a	 window	 onto	 a	 distant	
homeland.	Having	discussed	the	role	of	the	city	as	an	influential	place	for	being	at	home	for	
my	respondents,	I	now	move	on	to	discuss	my	respondents’	engagement	with	another	kind	
of	 location	 that	 has	 significance	 in	many	of	 their	 lives	 as	 a	 place	 of	 home:	 their	 parents’	
house.		
	
Moving	out	to	stay	at	home	
Shiva’s	trip	
Shiva	had	accrued	some	savings	over	the	four	years	she	had	spent	working	and	living	in	her	
parents’	 house	 after	 graduating	 from	 college.	 She	 talked	 about	 how	 her	 mother	 had	
encouraged	her	to	“buy	a	home	[house]”	with	the	money,	now	that	she	was	in	her	late	20s	–	
one	near	her	parents’	house	in	Orange	County,	where	Shiva	was	born	and	raised.	But	Shiva	
was	unenthusiastic	about	the	idea.	“I	don’t	want	to	buy	a	house	in	a	place	where	I	don’t	feel	
at	home,”	she	said.	Despite	having	spent	her	upbringing	in	the	area,	as	well	as	having	spent	
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the	past	 few	years	 living	 there	while	working	 in	Downtown	LA,	Shiva	was	determined	to	
find	 an	 alternative	 place	 for	 herself.	 Her	 feelings	 about	 this	 place	 of	 her	 upbringing	 had	
changed	over	time.		
Back	 in	 the	 day	 I	 loved	 Southern	 California.	 I	 felt	 there	was	 a	 huge	multicultural	
community.	When	I	was	growing	up	I	 felt	 it…	Orange	County	was	great.	But	now	I	
have	to	mentally	prepare	myself	when	I	go	there.		
Shiva	 described	 the	 over‐full	 parking	 lots	 at	 the	 shopping	 centers	 during	 the	 day,	 her	
detachment	from	people	who	lived	in	the	neighborhood,	and	her	sense	that	Orange	County	
was	 becoming	 more	 homogenous	 –	 in	 her	 eyes	 her	 neigbourhood	 used	 to	 be	 more	
ethnically	 diverse	 and	 less	 densely	 populated	while	 she	was	 growing	 up.	 For	 Shiva,	 this	
meant	 a	 deterioration	 in	 her	 relationship	 with	 those	 living	 in	 her	 Orange	 County	
neighborhood,	 including	Iranian	Americans.	Although	she	returned	there	often	to	see	her	
immediate	 family	and	stay	at	her	parents’	house	–	a	place	 in	which	she	still	 said	she	 felt	
very	much	at	home	–	she	would	not	choose	this	area	to	live	in	more	permanently.	This	was	
the	 home	 of	 her	 past,	 and	 as	 she	 had	 grown	 to	 the	 age	 of	 independence	 alongside	
neighborhood	changes	over	time,	it	could	not	serve	as	the	home	of	her	future.		
This	feeling	was	what	gave	her	the	drive	to	use	her	savings	to	undertake	a	year‐long	road	
trip	across	the	United	States.	“Instead	of	using	the	money	to	buy	a	home	[house],	I	decided	
to	use	it	to	find	one,”	she	said.	This	meant	a	journey	to	find	and	settle	into	a	house	in	a	place	
that	gave	her	the	same	feeling	she	once	had	about	Orange	County,	and	taking	a	trip	like	this	
fit	with	the	curiosity	and	independence	of	Shiva’s	character.	She	explained	her	motivations	
in	the	following	way.	
A	journey	was	necessary	because	I	hear	people’s	experiences,	but	I	find	that	what	I	
get	out	of	a	place	is	different.	Researching	places	on	the	internet	doesn’t	work	for	me	
either.	 I	want	 to	 feel	 a	 sense	of	 community	where	 I	 live.	That	people	 are	 aware	of	
each	other	and	care	about	each	other	and	that	they	somehow	adopt	a	culture.	They	
create	a	culture.	I	want	to	feel	 like	people	are	friendly.	In	Southern	California	and	a	
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lot	of	big	cities,	people	don’t	make	eye	contact.	Strangers	don’t.	I	noticed	I	was	doing	
that	 too	 and	 I	 didn’t	 like	 it.	 As	 though,	 if	 I	 smiled	 at	 people	 it	would	 be	 too	much	
emotion.	I’ve	found	now	that	many	other	cities	are	not	like	that.	
The	search	for	an	ideal	house	and	place	to	live	was	combined	with	a	need	to	“feel	a	sense	of	
community”	 in	 a	 particular	 “place,”	 something	 that	 could	 not	 be	 ascertained	 through	 a	
search	via	internet	as	only	physical	presence	–	however	temporary	‐‐	could	allow	Shiva	to	
discern	whether	a	place	gave	her	the	right	“feeling”	of	home.	Shiva’s	web	usage,	however,	
was	 indeed	 important	 for	 the	 way	 she	 maintained	 communication	 with	 those	 she	 left	
behind	in	Southern	California.	And	she	started	a	blog	with	this	purpose	in	mind.		
I	 started	my	 blog	 because	mainly	 other	 people	were	 asking	me	 if	 I	would	 start	 a	
blog.	 I	thought	that	was	their	way	of	telling	me	they	wanted	to	keep	in	touch	with	
me.	I	felt	like	it	would	be	like	me	keeping	in	touch	with	all	my	friends	and	colleagues	
who	wanted	 to	 be	 involved	 in	my	 experience.	 And	 the	 Twitter	 I	 did	 because	my	
parents	are	not	phone	people.	None	of	us	enjoy	 talking	on	 the	phone.	They	didn’t	
use	text	messaging	before,	but	now	they	do.	I	could	do	Twitter	updates	much	faster	
than	blog	updates.	 I	wanted	to	make	sure	they	wouldn’t	have	any	excuse	to	worry	
about	me.	They	can	subscribe	so	 that	 they	get	 it	 straight	 to	 their	phone.	My	aunts	
and	uncles	did	it	too.	And	then	some	other	people	as	well.	They’re	scattered,	but	my	
family	that’s	following	me	are	all	in	Southern	California.		
Alongside	 her	 blog,	 Twitter	 was	 a	 way	 for	 Shiva	 to	 quickly	 update	 family	 in	 Southern	
California	on	a	daily	basis	in	ways	that	were	more	convenient	and	conducive	to	her	existing	
family	relationships	than	talking	on	the	telephone.	As	she	travelled	across	the	country	by	
car,	Shiva	used	mobile	internet	communications	on	a	daily	basis	 in	order	to	stay	in	touch	
with	the	people	who	care	about	her.	More	specifically,	her	phone	allowed	her	to	update	her	
Twitter	 status	 on	 the	move,	 and	 her	 parents,	 in	 turn,	 would	 receive	 notifications	 of	 her	
updates	 on	 their	mobile	 phones.	 Her	 blog	was	 also	 set	 up	 to	 post	 a	 link	 to	 Twitter	 and	
Facebook	 every	 time	 she	 posted	 a	 new	 entry.	 Her	 contact	 with	 her	 parents	 during	 this	
period	 allowed	her	 use	 her	mobile	 phone	with	 roaming	 internet	 connectivity	 (for	which	
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she	 had	 to	 get	 an	 affordable	 plan,	 to	 avoid	 extra	 out‐of‐state	 charges	 for	 this	 particular	
purpose)	to	reassure	her	parents	about	her	safety	every	day,	while	allowing	her	not	to	feel	
bound	by	their	concerns.		
Despite	 the	 contact,	 Shiva	described	missing	her	 family	 and	Southern	California	 at	 times	
during	 her	 period	 on	 the	 road,	 particularly	 mentioning	 her	 mother’s	 home‐cooked	
Ghormeh	 Sabzi	 or	 the	 Iranian	 food	 she	 had	 access	 to	 by	 virtue	 of	 living	 in	 Southern	
California	 where	 Iranian	 restaurants	 are	 abundant	 and	 serve	 what	 she	 considered	 high	
quality	 Iranian	 food	 compared	 to	 other	 places	 she	 had	 tried	 Iranian	 food.	 In	 some	ways	
these	 changes	 are	 indistinguishable	 from	 the	 same	processes	 in	other	American	 families	
(indeed)	navigating	 the	 spatial	 dynamics	of	no	 longer	 “living	at	home.”	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
sociality	 of	 family	 life	 is	 similar	 for	 Shiva	 to	 what	 is	 typically	 the	 case	 for	 other	 young	
Americans	 moving	 out.	 Shiva	 engages	 with	 the	 place	 of	 her	 upbringing	 by	 through	 her	
mobile	 device	 and	 social	 media	 applications	 as	 she	 moves	 away,	 which	 allows	 her	 to	
combine	 her	 family	 relationships	 and	 obligations	with	 her	 need	 for	 feeling	 at	 home	 at	 a	
physical	distance	from	her	family	house	and	that	neighbourhood.	
At	the	same	time,	for	Shiva	as	for	other	members	of	the	second	generation	I	spoke	with,	the	
move	from	the	 family	house	 is	connected	with	a	shift	 in	ways	of	being	 Iranian	American.	
Especially	in	stories	they	recalled	from	their	childhoods,	my	respondents	associated	being	
Iranian	 with	 family	 life,	 while	 American‐ness,	 by	 contrast,	 was	 part	 of	 a	 world	 outside.	
Increased	 independence	 from	 the	 family	 house	 therefore	 signifies	 an	 important	 inter‐
generational	 turning	 point	 as	 young	 people’s	 movement	 comes	 with	 navigating	 Iranian	
American‐ness	 under	 new	 circumstances.	 This	 move	 also	 makes	 them	 aware	 of	 certain	
elements	of	 their	 Iranian	American‐ness	that	 their	place	of	upbringing	offered,	but	which	
they	may	not	have	been	 aware	of	 before	 (e.g.	 being	used	 to	 eating	home‐cooked	 Iranian	
food,	or	having	always	grown	up	around	establishments	that	serve	“good”	Iranian	food).	I	
also	heard	from	some	that	it	made	them	aware	of	certain	ways	of	being	Iranian	American	
that	may	have	 though	were	 idiosyncratic	of	 their	household,	 but	which	 turned	out	 to	be	
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more	widespread	among	Iranians.	Later	 in	this	section,	 I	elaborate	on	how	the	shift	 from	
parental	to	peer‐relations	works	with	a	particular	case.		
What	I	want	to	note	here	is	that	Shiva’s	web	usage	allows	her	the	possibility	of	maintaining	
a	connection	with	her	parental	house	and	the	places	she	left	behind	in	Orange	County.	The	
particular	 dynamic	 within	 her	 family	 contributes	 to	 this	 because	 they	 are	 “not	 phone	
people.”	 And	 so,	 a	web‐mediated	 sociality	 develops	 in	which	 she	 stays	 in	 touch	without	
going	 out	 of	 her	way	 to	 do	 so	while	 on	 the	 road.	Moving	 away	 from	her	 parental	 house	
shapes	 Shiva’s	 web	 usage	 because	 of	 the	 family	 obligation	 it	 places	 on	 Shiva	 to	 stay	 in	
touch.	 Her	 particular	 setup	 of	 linked	 web	 applications	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 meet	 that	
obligation,	while	her	web	searches	did	not	allow	her	to	experience	a	sense	of	home	while	
reading	about	and	seeing	photos	of	a	new	place.	In	following,	I	use	the	example	of	another	
young	woman	and	her	Facebook	use	to	elaborate	on	the	point	about	fulfilling	obligations	to	
family.	
	
Beeta’s	mom	on	Facebook		
Shiva	was	not	alone	in	setting	up	“social	media”	networks	as	a	way	of	keeping	in	touch	with	
family	over	distances.	Beeta,	another	young	woman	in	her	20s,	set	up	a	Facebook	account	
for	her	mother	so	she	could	keep	in	contact	with	her	by	posting	photos	of	the	things	she	
does	and	places	she	goes.	Beeta	lives	near	her	college	campus	in	LA,	while	her	parents	live	
in	her	familial	home	in	Palos	Verdes	with	her	5‐year‐old	sister	whose	life	Beeta	tries	to	be	
an	active	part	of,	albeit	 from	a	distance	and	through	irregular	visits	when	possible.	Beeta	
says	her	connection	with	her	family	has	been	an	important	part	of	how	she	has	been	able	to	
maintain	 her	 values	 throughout	 the	 changes	 of	 moving	 to	 college	 and	 becoming	 more	
independent.	 She	 describes	 her	 family	 as	 being	 religious	 and	 an	 important	 source	 of	
support	for	her	religious	practices,	alongside	the	Muslim	student	organization	of	which	she	
is	a	part,	and	 the	 IMAN	Cultural	Center	she	and	her	siblings	grew	up	around,	a	place	she	
still	visits	at	times.	By	setting	up	a	Facebook	account	for	her	mother	and	linking	it	 to	her	
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own	via	 a	Facebook	 “friendship,”	Beeta	 is	 comforted	by	 the	 fact	 that	her	mother	 can	 see	
what	she	does	via	her	Facebook	profile.	She	experiences	 it	as	a	 form	of	pleasant	security	
and	form	of	(self)	control/discipline:		
I	 opened	my	mom	 a	 Facebook	 because	 I	 was	 like,	mom,	 I	 want	 you	 to	 see	 these	
pictures	and	I	want	you	to	see	what’s	going	on.	It’s	so	much	easier.	And	it’s	cute	that	
I	know	that	my	mom	can	keep	 tabs	on	me	 ‐	which	 for	 some	reason	really	doesn’t	
bother	me	‐	and	also	it	keeps	me	in	line.	I	feel	like	if	I	would	do	anything	that	I	would	
lie	 about	 I	 really	 shouldn’t	be	doing	 it.	 So	 I	made	my	mom	a	Facebook,	 so	 I	 could	
keep	myself	to	that.	I’m	really	weird.		
While	 Beeta	 is	 only	 an	 hour	 and	 a	 half	 drive	 away	 from	 her	 parents,	 she	 is	 not	 able	 to	
maintain	the	daily,	face	to	face	contact	with	her	family	she	so	values	as	part	of	family	life.	
She	 uses	 the	 “social	media”	 application	 Facebook	 to	 post	 photos	 of	 herself	with	 friends,	
articles,	and	links	to	her	personal	blog,	which	features	pieces	on	anything	from	her	favorite	
interior	designers,	 to	Persian	poetry	she	 likes,	 to	 the	 topic	of	debate	 in	a	class	on	Middle	
Eastern	history	that	week,	or	a	reflection	on	her	practice	of	Islam.	The	linkage	of	the	blog	to	
Facebook	 parallels	 Shiva’s	 linkage	 between	 her	 blog	 and	 her	 Twitter	 and	 Facebook	
accounts	 as	 postings	 on	 the	 latter	 sites	 notified	her	 contacts	 of	 new	blog	 content.	 In	 the	
case	 of	 both	 these	 young	women,	 family	members	 and	 friends	 are	 included	 together	 as	
audiences	 for	 her	 postings.	 For	 Beeta,	 this	 connection	 with	 her	 family	 represents	 an	
expression	of	her	 religion	as	well.	When	she	moved	away	 to	college	she	saw	Islam	as	an	
important	way	to	stay	focused	on	her	priorities	in	light	of	widespread	LA	and	college	party	
lifestyles	among	those	around	her.	She	recounted	stories	about	friends	that	she	said	made	
her	wonder	what	 they	are	doing	with	 their	 lives.	Beeta’s	Facebook	 relationship	with	her	
mother	 solidifies	 this	 connection	 to	maintaining	 a	moral	 lifestyle.	 However,	 it	 also	 goes	
beyond	her	family’s	expression	of	religion	because	of	her	decision	to	wear	a	headscarf	and	
pray	five	times	a	day.		
Other	 women	 I	 spoke	 to	 also	 mentioned	 the	 significance	 of	 social	 media	 for	 keeping	 in	
touch	with	 family	 locally.	Thirty	year	old	medical	 intern,	Anita,	 used	Facebook	 to	 stay	 in	
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contact	with	the	many	extended	family	members	on	both	hers	and	her	husband’s	sides	of	
the	 family,	 also	 describing	 internet	 communications	 as	 a	 way	 for	 her	 to	 fulfill	 her	
obligations	to	the	extensive	family	network	located	in	the	area,	a	task	that	could	be	difficult	
at	times,	with	some	living	as	far	as	Ventura	County,	and	given	her	busy	work	schedule	and	
wide	family	network	living	in	Southern	California.	The	practices	of	my	respondents	uphold	
the	 parental	 house	 as	 a	 place	 of	 home,	 a	 place	 to	 which	 affective	 relationships	 are	
maintained	 through	 the	 family	members	who	 continue	 inhabit	 it.	 As	 these	 young	people	
move	back	and	forth	to	their	respective	parental	houses,	they	contest	the	feeling	of	home	it	
can	 give/keep	 giving	 them,	 either	 because	 of	 changes	 in	 themselves	 or	 changes	 in	 those	
places.	While	they	enter	life	phases	of	moving	out,	their	ways	of	being	at	home	and	as	part	
of	a	family	change.	As	they	come	to	feel	at	home	in	new	places,	they	have	anchors	to	social	
and	sometimes	religious	discipline,	obligation,	and	fulfillment.	And	their	web	usage	helps	
them	to	remain	anchored	in	this	way.		
The	 three	 women	 described	 here	 all	 call	 themselves	 Muslim.62	 Although	 their	 religious	
practices	are	divergent	from	one	another,	their	lives	look	very	different	from	one	another’s,	
and	they	do	not	know	one	another,	their	use	of	Facebook	to	engage	with	family	life	in	light	
of	local	distances	from	their	family	houses	share	important	elements	in	common.	Namely,	
they	 are	 at	 home	 between	 their	 parental	 homes	 and	 the	 new	 places	 they	 develop	
connections	to,	and	their	web	usage	supports	them	in	positioning	themselves	in	this	way.	
These	women	use	Facebook	to	be	part	of	their	respective,	relatively	pious	Iranian	families	
by	staying	a	part	of	everyday	family	life	while	living	at	a	distance	from	the	household.	Their	
(mostly	 local)	mobility	 combines	with	 their	 internet	 usage	 to	 sustain	 pre‐existing,	 close,	
social	 relationships	 with	 family	 members.	 In	 the	 following,	 I	 will	 use	 examples	 of	
relationships	of	Iranian	American	peers	outside	the	parental	house	to	show	how	elements	
																																																								
62	For	each	of	these	young	women,	being	Muslim	intertwined	with	their	Iranian	American‐ness.	While	
growing	up,	they	are	introduced	to	Islam	through	their	parents	and	are	immersed	in	the	social	contacts	of	the	
family	around	mosques	or	in	other	religious	gatherings	that	other	Iranians	in	their	environment	participate	
in,	thus	becoming	part	of	Iranian	Muslim	social	practices,	both	within	their	families	and	among	other	
Muslims.		
82	
	
of	 family	 relationships	 are	 maintained	 through	 peer	 relationships	 outside	 the	 parental	
house,	and	how	web	usage	becomes	part	of	the	process	of	making	new	places	of	home.		
	
Student	mailing	lists	
Aash	Night	 is	 the	yearly	welcoming	activity	that	the	Iranian	Student	Group	(ISG)	puts	on.	
This	is	when	(new)	members	of	the	student	organization	are	welcomed	(back)	to	campus	
by	 sharing	a	home‐cooked	portion	of	aash.	The	aash	 is	 announced	as	being	made	by	 the	
mother	of	Aida	–	one	of	the	board	members	of	ISG	–	and	the	recipients	of	the	portions	being	
dished	 out	 by	 the	 ISG	 board	 members	 are	 welcomed	 into	 their	 new	 peer	 group.	 The	
courtyard	is	filled	with	a	flurry	of	chatter	as	a	long	line	forms	in	front	of	the	table	where	the	
dish	is	being	served,	and	a	great	many	of	those	here	are	of	the	second	generation.	Across	
the	path,	 large	Persian	rugs	are	 laid	over	the	grassy	patch	 in	 the	middle	of	 the	courtyard	
and	the	bodies	of	Aash	Night’s	attendees	sit,	recline,	and	eat	on	them	as	the	sun	goes	down.	
This	 activity,	 organized	 within	 the	 spaces	 of	 the	 university,	 is	 meant	 to	 form	 cohesion	
among	 Iranian	 American	 peers.	 The	 connection	 with	 family	 is	 made	 through	 a	 parent’s	
homemade	aash	(as	the	young	organizers	claim	not	being	able	to	make	the	dish	to	the	same	
standard	 themselves).	 With	 the	 symbolic	 presence	 of	 an	 absent	 mother	 and	 notions	 of	
“home	 cooking”	 and	practices	 sharing	 Iranian	 food	 as	 though	at	 home	with	one’s	 family,	
notions	of	being	Iranian	American	among	peers	becomes	ambiguously	entwined	with	the	
parents,	family,	and	experiences	of	inhabiting	a	parental	house.		
Equally,	some	of	these	students	express	the	close	connections	they	build	with	one	another	
as	 reflecting	 a	 figurative	 “family.”	 In	 particular,	 a	 number	 of	 ISG	members	 refer	 to	 their	
collective	travel	experience	during	a	collective	ski	trip	as	a	crucial	moment	in	the	building	
of	this	 feeling	of	 family	or	surrogate	family.	Pardis	describes	how	she	sees	her	 fellow	ISG	
board	members	as	being	her	new	 family	away	 from	her	parental	home.	Additionally,	 the	
term	 “family”	was	also	used	with	 reference	 to	 the	 special	bonds	built	 among	campers	 at	
IAAB’s	 yearly	 youth	 leadership	 camp	 called	 Camp	 Ayandeh	 (Camp	 Future).	 The	 student	
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organization	also	holds	an	annual	camp	(albeit	less	elaborate	in	terms	of	pedagogical	goals	
and	more	 focused	on	 social	bonds),	which	participants	described	as	 central	 to	 the	 initial	
formation	 of	 their	 friendships	 with	 other	 Iranian	 Americans	 at	 their	 university.	 These	
camps	are	framed	by	their	second	generation	organizers	and	participants	as	being	as	much	
about	independence	as	forming	a	collective	sense	of	Iranian	American‐ness	among	peers.		
Social	 media	 applications	 (mostly	 Facebook)	 and	 email	 lists	 are	 a	 central	 mode	 of	
communication	 for	 these	 student	 organizations,	 as	 are	 they	 use	 the	 Google	 applications	
Groups	and	Documents	among	members	of	 the	organization’s	board.	They	also	use	email	
and	their	website	to	publicize	their	events	to	all	members,	as	well	as	for	documenting	them	
afterwards.	 But	 their	 events	 and	 gatherings	 themselves	 allow	 physical	 proximities	 that	
these	media	forms	do	not	allow,	and	which	participants	find	particularly	important.	This	is	
clear	 from	 the	 collective,	 embodied	 experience	 of	 Aash	 Night,	 but	 also	 other	 interactive	
group	 activities	 I	 observed	 among	 this	 student	 organization’s	members.	 This	 is	 how	my	
respondents	create	the	surrogate	families	mentioned	above.		
The	places	in	which	these	young	people	gather	allow	them	to	make	visible	to	one	another,	
their	 members,	 and	 other	 students	 (as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Aash	 Night),	 their	 collective	 and	
organized	 presence	 on	 campus,	 demonstrating	 co‐ordination	 and	 co‐operation	 but	 also	
closeness	and	friendships.	For	many,	these	activities	create	a	family	of	peers	that	offers	a	
feeling	of	belonging.	They	consume	their	aash	together	and	participate	in	a	large	and	lively	
group	 of	 interpersonal	 interactions,	 and	 meet	 new	 people.	 These	 sometimes	 involve	
expressions	 of	 both	 verbal	 physical	 closeness	 and	 affection,	 including	 among	 board	
members	 like	 Pardis,	 Beeta,	 Atiya,	 Yasi,	 and	 Kourosh,	 who	 are	 comfortable	 around	 one	
another,	each	 leaning	with	an	arm	around	the	other	as	 they	describe	 the	development	of	
their	friendships.		
As	their	relationships	go	through	troubles	and	repeated	moves	over	time,	not	 to	mention	
graduation,	these	friends	remain	connected	with	one	another,	including	through	their	uses	
of	 social	media	such	as	 Intragram	and	Facebook.	These	close	 friendships	offer	a	sense	of	
intimacy	around	practices	of	being	Iranian	American.	And	despite	mentioning	the	time	and	
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energy	demands	of	the	organization	and	the	challenges	of	balancing	it	with	their	studies	as	
well	as	the	occasional	“drama”	of	teamwork	and	difficulties	of	working	with	other	Iranian	
American	 organizations,	 they	 underscore	 the	 value	 these	 activities	 have	 added	 to	 their	
college	lives	and	their	Iranian	American‐ness.		
The	places	 in	which	 college	 life	 unfolds	 are	 important.	The	 closeness	of	 sharing	physical	
proximity	–	whether	by	living	on	or	near	campus	together,	studying	and	attending	classes	
together,	or	attending	organized	social	events	with	the	Iranian	student	group	–	means	that	
close	peer	relationships	develop	and	maintained	between	Iranian	American	peers.	The	act	
of	 gathering	 in	 these	 face‐to‐face	 settings,	within	 the	 spaces	of	 the	university	 campus,	 in	
habitual	 and	 sometimes	 ritualistic	 ways	 (particularly	 with	 the	 annually‐repeated	 and	
symbolic	 events	 like	aash	night)	 that	makes	places	of	 peer	 gathering	 a	peer‐based	home	
away	from	the	parental	home.		
College	life	on	campus	also	demands	of	my	respondents	that	they	work	behind	computers	
(most	often	laptops)	for	large	parts	of	their	days.	Hence,	the	interactions	of	student	board	
members	via	email	and	instant	chat	with	one	another	are	just	another	part	of	a	seemingly	
ever‐ongoing	flow	of	exchanges	around	studies,	organizing,	and	student	life	more	generally.	
For	 those	who	 are	 subscribed	 to	 the	 email	 list	 of	 the	 organization,	 the	 reminders	 about	
events	 and	 gatherings	 are	 a	 frequent	 and	 casual	 prompt	 to	 come	 to	 events	 and	 to	 bring	
others.	 Mailing	 lists	 and	 social	 media	 are	 a	 key	 part	 of	 publicizing,	 organizing,	 and	
mobilizing	for	student	events	where	surrogate	families	form	through	embodied	collective	
experience.		
Use	 of	 particular	web	 applications	 become	 embedded	 in	 activities	 of	 student	 organizing	
around	Iranian	American‐ness,	 foster	communication	within	social	groups,	 facilitate	 face‐
to‐face	gatherings,	and	are	shaped	by	the	conventions	of	contemporary	student	life	(i.e.	the	
constancy	of	being	both	behind	 the	 computer	and	around	other	 students).	 I	have	argued	
here	 that	 an	 Iranian	 American	 (peer‐based)	 home	 away	 from	 (the	 parental)	 home	 is	
formed	in	places	like	college	campuses	through	a	combination	of	the	experiences	that	the	
places	themselves	make	possible	and	the	practices	that	web	usages	make	possible.	 I	now	
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move	 on	 to	 bringing	 this	 example	 together	 with	 those	 recounted	 earlier	 in	 this	 section	
about	the	family	house.		
	
Finding	new	families,	keeping	old	ones	
In	the	previous	section	I	demonstrated	how	my	respondents’	respective	familial	house,	and	
their	 movement	 away	 from	 it,	 is	 significant	 for	 the	 ways	 they	 feel	 at	 home	 as	 Iranian	
Americans.	 Parental	 houses,	 as	 locations	 of	 growing	 up,	 shape	 the	 development	 of	
particular	styles	of	being	Iranian	American.	The	moral	practices	of	Shiva,	Anita,	and	Beeta	
were	examples	of	this.	Others	also	had	their	ways	of	being	Iranian	American	rooted	in	the	
moralities	of	their	family	relationships	(that	is,	this	was	not	only	in	Muslim	families).	63	 	 I	
saw	this	in	the	accounts	of	two	young	women	who	knew	one	another	from	growing	up	in	
Oklahoma.	Sarah	and	Negar	 said	 that	 they	maintained	 their	mid‐Western	ways	 (how	are	
these?)	 of	 being	 Iranian	American	while	 living	 LA.	 That	 is,	 their	 families	 and	 children	 of	
family	 friends	practiced	their	 Iranian	American‐ness	 in	 low	key,	 “laid‐back”	ways	 that,	as	
Sarah	described	them.	This	did	not	involve	getting	dressed	up	and	going	to	clubs	with	peers	
like	LA	Iranian‐ness	did,	but	staying	at	home,	watching	films	together,	chatting,	and	playing	
cards	 (Sarah	 was	 an	 avid	 player	 of	 the	 Iranian	 card	 game,	 hokm,	 with	 other	 Iranian	
Americans).		
Sarah	attributed	her	modest	style	of	being	Iranian	American	to	the	families	which	she	had	
grown	 up	 around,	 especially	 her	 friendships	 with	 her	 generational	 counterparts	 within	
those	 families,	who	 she	 felt	were	 like	brothers	 and	 sisters	 to	her.	 It	 is	 the	moral	 style	of	
these	social	relationships	that	provides	a	feeling	of	home,	and	evidently	this	sense	of	home	
continues	to	shape	Iranian	American‐ness	as	these	young	people	make	moves	further	into	
																																																								
63	In	a	way,	private	family	life	and	relationships	become	more	public	through	the	use	of	blogs	and	Facebook	
pages	to	update	family.	This	is	a	point	I	do	not	have	the	means	to	elaborate	upon	in	this	discussion,	but	is	
relevant	to	the	ways	in	which	internet	media	shapes	these	family	relationships	as	they	are	influenced	by	
particular	forms	of	mobility.	
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adulthood.	At	the	same	time,	distance	is	necessary	for	this	to	take	effect.	In	both	Beeta	and	
Sarah’s	 cases	 it	 was	 necessary	 for	 them	 to	 make	 a	 move	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	
differences	 between	 their	 family	 lives	 of	 being	 Iranian	 American	 and	 the	ways	 this	was	
done	 outside	 that	 place	 of	 home.	 The	 ways	 the	 young	 women	 I	 discussed	 social	 media	
platforms	were	 in	 line	with	 their	moral	 responsibilities	 of	 being	 good	 Iranian	 American	
daughters.	 As	 Madianou	 and	 Miller	 have	 argued,	 people’s	 choices	 to	 use	 certain	 media	
forms	illuminate	the	social,	moral,	and	emotional	responsibilities	they	have	as	part	of	what	
the	authors	call	relationship	management	(2012).		
Valuable	work	that	attends	to	internet	practices	within	households	has	tended	not	to	focus	
on	 notions	 of	 migrant	 identity	 (see	 Lievrouw	 &	 Livingstone,	 2006).	 Nevertheless,	 such	
work	 offers	 relevant	 insights	 for	 understanding	 web	 usage	 among	 young,	 second‐
generation	 migrants.	 Namely	 that	 family	 life,	 leisure,	 and	 social	 values	 shape	 how	 web	
applications	 are	 taken	 up.	 Livingstone	 pertinently	 argues	 that	 “media	 culture,	 youth	
culture,	 consumer	 culture,	 are	 increasingly	 intertwined,	 creating	 generation	 gaps	 and	
gender	differences	in	everyday	culture”	(Livingstone,	2003:	21),	and	shows	this	by	solidly	
focusing	 on	 web	 usage	 within	 the	 household.	 I	 have	 suggested	 that	 the	 use	 of	 web	
applications	 may	 be	 equally	 socially	 shaped	 by	 exit	 from	 the	 household	 and	 the	
changing/maintenance	 of	 social	 values	 associated	 with	 that.	 To	 some	 extent,	 my	
respondents’	practices	are	not	specifically	shaped	by	their	migrant	backgrounds	but	their	
social	circumstances.	When	it	comes	to	 life	cycle	changes,	 the	web	usage	of	 their	broader	
cohort	 of	 American	 (chronological)	 generational	 counterparts	may	 be	 shaped	 by	 similar	
milestones.	 This	 furthers	what	migration	 scholarship	 arguing	 for	 attention	 to	 “life	 cycle”	
factors	has	suggested	(Levitt,	2002).		
But	in	addition	to	being	socially	shaped,	my	respondents’	web	usage	reflects	how	specific	
web	applications	are	used	towards	specific	purposes	due	to	what	they	allow.	For	instance,	
a	social	media	application	that	sends	phone	notifications	and	helps	share	photos	is	used	to	
keep	in	touch	with	parents,	while	a	mass	mailing	list	is	useful	for	student	organizations	to	
make	first	contact	with	 their	constituency.	Likewise,	 it	 is	evident	what	even	this	range	of	
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applications	does	not	appear	 to	allow.	For	 instance,	 the	 formation	of	home	 feelings	 for	a	
new	place,	or	a	sense	of	familial	relationship	with	peers	with	whom	face	to	face	friendships	
have	not	yet	been	built.		
The	 case	 of	 these	 young	 people	 offers	 interesting	 insights	 for	 research	 on	migrants	 and	
media.	Research	on	the	media	usage	of	migrants	within	their	families	has	tended	to	focus	
on	 how	 relationships	 are	 mediated	 by	 internet	 transnationally.	 This	 work	 includes	 the	
discussion	 of	 how	 family	 members’	 roles	 (Madianou	 &	 Miller,	 2012)	 and	 “social	 and	
cultural	contexts	of	family	life”	(Wilding,	2006:	125)	shape	the	kinds	of	transnational	digital	
media	 usage	 that	 transmigrants	 engage	 in.	 Because	 of	 the	 focus	 on	 transnational	
interactions	among	diaspora	groups,	the	kind	of	movement	and	transition	I	have	discussed	
in	the	cases	of	Sarah,	Beeta,	and	Shiva	is	not	something	that	has	gained	much	attention	in	
migration	 research.	 Nagle	 and	 Staeheli	 have	 sought	 to	 complicate	 this	 persistent	
“homeland”	 focus	 in	 migration	 and	 internet	 research	 by	 dealing	 with	 migrant	 political	
activism	in	a	way	that	“avoids	privileging	any	single	geographical	scale	or	location”	(Nagle	
&	Staeheli,	2010).		
In	line	with	this,	I	have	shown	the	importance	of	also	focusing	on	web	usage	among	mobile,	
migrant	 family	 members	within	 the	 country	 of	 “settlement.”	 By	 focusing	 on	 one	 pivotal	
moment	of	the	life‐cycle	of	the	second	generation	–	moving	out	of	the	family	house	–	I	show	
how	 web	 usage	 becomes	 a	 way	 to	 shape	 one’s	 family	 and	 peer	 relationships	 that	 are	
oriented	around	 Iranian	American‐ness.	Web	usage	here	mediates	normative	obligations,	
changing	 preferences,	 and	 life‐cycle	 stages.	 And	 these	 require	 fluctuating	 degrees	 and	
forms	of	proximity	and	distance	from	family	in	order	for	my	respondents’	to	feel	at	home.	
The	instances	I	have	discussed	reflect	the	significance	of	web	usage	in	how	my	respondents	
carefully	 negotiate	 proximity	 and	 distance	 from	 their	 family	 members	 as	 their	 lives	
develop.		
My	 respondents	 also	 repeatedly	 raised	 issues	 of	 family	 comforts,	 but	 also	 pressures.	
However,	these	pressures	were	not	presented	as	publicly	as	the	positive,	common	picture	
of	Iranians	as	“family‐oriented”.	This	was	particularly	framed	with	relation	to	the	pressures	
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to	perform,	achieve,	and	be	successful,	in	the	ways	comparable	to	the	pressures	that	other	
second‐generation	 immigrant	 Americans	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 experience	 via	 parents	
(Levitt	&	Waters,	2006).	Among	my	particular	group	of	respondents,	the	issue	was	raised	
much	less	on	their	own	behalves,	but	strongly	as	a	general	problem	in	“the	community,”	or	
as	 something	 temporary	 that	 a	 respondent	had	 overcome	 individually,	 for	 instance	 after	
realizing	where	her/his	individual	passions	lie.64		
The	 family	 households	 where	 my	 respondents’	 grew	 up	 seem	 to	 be	 neither	 simply	
oppressive	nor	perfect,	and	 leaving	 them	was	neither	a	clear	escape	nor	a	complete	 loss.	
Yet	 family	 relations	 seemed	 to	 serve	 as	models	 or	metaphors	 for	 feelings	 of	 home.	 This	
appeared	 to	 remain	 so,	 even	 as	 connections	 to	 the	 family	 house	were	 evidently	 a	 set	 of	
dynamic	 relations	 subject	 to	 change	and	movement	as	young	people’s	 Iranian	American‐
ness	 is	 practiced	 in	 new	 contexts.	 The	 parental	 home,	 as	 a	 place	 of	 home,	 remained	 a	
reference	 point	 in	 specific	 ways	 as	 my	 respondents	 exercised	 their	 connected	 mobility	
through	 practices	 of	 being	 at	 home	 in	 new	 places.	 In	 the	 following,	 families	 remain	
pertinent	to	my	discussion	as	I	move	on	to	discuss	circuits	of	transnational	movement	to,	
and	communication	with,	places	and	family	members	in	Iran.		
	
Embodying	visions	of	return	
Blogging	return	
Ali	made	 a	 film	 during	 one	 of	 his	 first	 trips	 to	 Tehran.	 Having	 been	 born	 in	 the	 US	 and	
grown	up	in	LA,	Ali	traveled	to	Tehran	as	a	21	year	old	film	school	student	for	the	first	time.	
The	title	of	his	self‐funded	documentary	film	is	Tehran:	Another	Side,	and	it	spells	out	his	
																																																								
64	Overall	I	did	not	observe	family	pressures	around	success,	wealth,	and	profession	among	my	respondents	
to	be	more	significant	than	exceeding	pressures	that	came	with	more	wide‐spread	factors	such	as	job	scarcity,	
work	pressures,	and	questions	about	interests	and	career	goals.	However,	the	fact	that	so	many	of	my	
respondents	refer	to	generalized	pressures	to	succeed	professionally	and	financially,	suggests	that	this	
pressure	is	nevertheless	something	that	young	people	see	as	defining	Iranian	American‐ness,	and	perhaps	
comes	from	sources	outside	the	family	as	well	such	as	other	Iranian	Americans.		
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purpose	of	 disclosing	 to	his	 audience	 a	 side	of	 Iran	 and	 its	 capital	 city	 that	 are	 different	
from	the	dominant	media	representations	focusing	on	the	Islamic	regime	and	nuclear	issue.	
His	 film	 frames	 certain	 elements	 of	 urban	 life	 in	 Tehran	 in	 terms	 of	 his	 own	 personal	
journey,	 discoveries,	 and	 reflections	 about	 it.	 It	 centralizes	 elements	 of	 the	 urban	
environment,	with	 its	 skyscrapers	 and	 thoroughfares.	 It	 includes	 interview	 segments	 on	
bustling	streets,	as	well	as	coverage	of	the	city’s	underground	rap	scene	and	its	key	artists.	
Ali	made	it	clear	that	he	had	a	particular	audience	in	mind	when	making	the	film,	and	had	
the	object	of	changing	 their	perceptions	about	what	 Iran’s	urban	environments	 look	 like.	
This	is	how	he	described	that	audience:	
People	who	you	go	to	school	with,	people	who	we	walk	the	streets	with	every	day,	
people	who	I	get	into	elevators	with	every	day,	who	are	wearing	a	suit	and	a	tie	and	
looking	wonderful	and	super	professional	on	their	way	to	work…	normal	people	just	
like	you	and	I…	Iranians!	My	own	friends,	who	haven’t	been	to	Iran	since	they	were	
a	year	old…	when	I	tell	them	that	people	drive	Mercedes	Benz	in	Iran,	or	that	Iran	
has	 30	 story	 high‐rises	 with	 penthouse	 apartments	 that	 are	 huge,	 exquisite,	 and	
luxurious,	they	don’t	believe	me	at	all…	They’re	my	friends,	they’re	Iranian,	and	they	
don’t	 believe	 me.	 So	 this	 is	 why	 visuals	 need	 to	 be	 shown	 and	 film	 is	 a	 perfect	
medium	to	be	used	for	that	purpose.		
Ali	 sees	 it	 as	 his	 task	 to	 portray	 places	 in	 Iran	 as	 developed,	 urban,	 modern,	 and	 even	
wealthy	 to	 audiences	 like	 the	people	 he	has	 contact	with	 in	 LA.	And	 these	 include	other	
Iranian	Americans	who	are	his	friends.	On	multiple	occasions	in	the	film	‐‐	in	the	voiceover	
and	in	the	interview	questions	he	poses	‐‐	Ali	explicitly	refers	to	images	that	“Westerners”	
have	about	 Iran	as	a	 rural,	backward,	 and	underdeveloped	country,	and	contrasts	 this	 to	
the	film’s	visuals	and	his	own	impressions	of	the	city	of	Tehran.	He	uses	the	portrayals	of	
the	modernity	of	the	Tehran	as	a	means	to	discredit	myths	about	Iran	as	being	behind	in	its	
development.	For	him	this	 is	a	way	to	show	the	city	 in	a	different	 light	than	his	audience	
usually	sees.	It	is	intended	to	offer	an	element	of	discovery	to	his	audience,	including	other	
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members	of	the	second	generation,	one	which	represents	a	parallel	to	his	own	discovery	of	
Tehran	as	what	he	calls	his	“second	home”	in	the	film.		
Showing	“another	side”	of	Iran	in	this	way	was	a	task	more	of	my	respondents	took	upon	
themselves.	Especially	 those	who	returned	 to	 Iran	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 their	adult	 lives.65	
And	most	 of	 them	engaged	 in	media	production	–	whether	 through	a	personal	 blog	or	 a	
documentary	 film	–	both	during	and	after	 their	return	travels.	The	significance	of	second	
generation	travel	to	Iran	is	evident	in	the	rising	attention	for	amateur	documentary	films	
and	blogs	produced	by	returnees	as	well	as	publication	of	novels	like	Lipstick	Jihad,	Soul	of	
Iran,	To	 See	 and	 See	Again,	 (Darznik,	 2008;	Whitlock,	 2008)	 that	 are	 written	 by	 second	
generation	authors,.	The	theme	also	emerged	in	IAAB’s	conference	on	Iranian	diaspora	in	
2009	 that	 included	 a	 panel	 about	 second‐generation	 return	 to	 Iran	 from	 various	
perspectives.	 The	 question	 of	 return	 is,	 therefore,	 very	 much	 a	 part	 of	 the	 lives	 of	 my	
respondents,	 regardless	 of	 how	 they	 answer	 this	 question	 at	 different	moments	 of	 their	
lives.	 And	 the	 use	 of	 various	media	 forms	 to	 formulate,	 share,	 and	make	 sense	 of	 these	
experiences	of	and	desires	for	return	(or	lack	thereof)	in	their	second‐generation	lives	is	an	
important	part	of	this.	
Like	 Ali,	 Justin’s	 film,	Warring	 Factions	 was	 also	 a	 documentary	 film	 about	 this	 second	
generation	individual’s	discovery	of	Iran	as	an	Iranian,	Muslim	American,	and	b‐boy	dancer	
(or	break	dancer).	Justin	was	also	the	protagonist	of	this	story	of	first‐time	return	to	Iran	–	
the	country	of	his	father’s	birth	–	and	he,	too,	felt	he	had	developed	relationships	over	the	
period	 of	 his	 visit	 that	 gave	 him	 a	 sense	 of	 being	 in	 a	 surrogate	 or	 second	 home.	 For	
instance,	he	responds	to	a	question	about	whether	he	felt	at	home	in	Iran	in	the	following	
way.	
One	moment	that	probably	stands	out	the	most	was	during	my	last	trip	to	Iran	while	
I	 was	 making	 my	 film.	 I	 was	 in	 the	 metro	 with	 the	 group	 of	 B‐boys	 [male	
																																																								
65	To	reiterate,	these	return	journeys	are	travel	experiences,	and	not	return	undertaken	with	the	intention	of	
repatriation	to	Iran	as	a	resident.	Perceptions	of	Iranians	in	Southern	California	about	return	has	been	
researched	by	Hossein	Abdi	(Abdi,	2003).	
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breakdancers]	that	I	was	practicing	with	in	Iran,	speaking	less	than	perfect	Persian.	
A	man	standing	near	us	rudely	barked	at	me	to	"speak	properly,"	prompting	my	5	
friends	 to	stand	up	and	get	 in	his	 face	 in	my	defense,	saying	 that	 I	was	an	 Iranian	
visiting	from	America	and	that	I	was	their	guest.	 I	 felt	as	 if	 this	was	something	my	
own	B‐boy	friends	would	do	for	me	in	the	US	and	truly	felt	like	I	was	at	home	even	
though	I	was	so	far	from	my	real	home.	
Like	Ali’s	experience,	Justin’s	anecdote	refers	to	an	experience	that	made	him	feel	at	home	
in	Iran,	while	also	referring	to	his	“real	home”	as	the	US.	It	is	a	new	and	discovered	sense	of	
home	as	an	outsider	to	a	new	place.	Engaging	with	Iran	in	this	way	is	specific	to	the	second	
generation	 because	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 discovering	 a	 place	 of	 home	 that	 was	 hitherto	
unfamiliar.		
Another	example	of	a	debut	documentary	about	an	experience	of	return	is	Nooshin	Navidi’s	
Young	Republic.	While	her	film	focuses	on	the	perceptions	of	young	people	in	Esfahan,	Iran,	
it	also	 features	her	own	observations	and	personal	experiences,	and	 is	accompanied	by	a	
website	with	video,	photographic,	and	written	documentation	of	her	observations	as	well	
as	historical	information	about	the	places	she	visited	in	Iran.	Nooshin	has	also	made	a	host	
of	podcasts	 that	are	 for	 sale	on	 iTunes	under	 the	 title,	Discover	 Iran,	 and	are	categorized	
predominantly	 by	 place,	 and	 cover	 the	 cities	 of	 Shiraz,	 Bandar	 Abbas,	 Kish	 Island,	
Southeastern	Iran,	etc.		
When	 posting	 on	 Iranian.com	 to	 promote	 her	 podcast	 series,	 Nooshin	 writes	 that	 she	
shows	a	 side	of	 Iran	 that	 “is	ALWAYS	 left	 out	 by	mainstream	media,”	 	 As	 producers,	my	
respondents’	 audience	 is	 imagined	 primarily	 as	 an	 American	 one,	 which	 they	 want	 to	
inform	in	new	and	audiovisual	ways.66	They	also	include	an	audience	of	friends	and	family	
																																																								
66 However,	there	are	sometimes	unforeseen	and	important	consequences	because	of	the	use	of	internet	for	
dissemination	of	return	stories	(what	do	you	want	to	argue	here?).	For	instance,	Justin’s	film,	Warring	
Factions,	had	received	more	orders	from	Iran‐based	customers	than	US‐based	ones	when	he	spoke	about	
sales	in	2009.	I	discuss	the	implications	of	this	unanticipated	audience	in	Justin’s	case	in	Chapter	4.	The	point	
here	is	that	creating	informative	yet	humanized/humanizing	images	of	Iran	and	Iranians	are	made	with	
American	audiences	in	mind	who	lack	exposure	to	such	representations. 
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who	have	been	left	temporarily	and	are	made	part	of	one’s	life	experiences	through	these	
media	products.	While	Nooshin	and	other	filmmakers	I	have	mentioned	are	explicit	about	
the	 importance	 of	 the	 visual	 element	 of	 film	 in	 showing	 another	 side	 of	 Iran,	 Shiva	
expresses	a	similar	motive	when	speaking	about	why	she	started	writing	her	a	blog	upon	
her	 first‐time	return	to	 Iran.	On	 it	she	documents	her	experiences,	and	gives	 information	
about	the	places,	ritual	practices,	and	everyday	occurrences	that	come	her	way	during	her	
stay	in	Esfahan	and	travels	to	different	parts	of	the	country.	These	young	people	use	digital	
film	and	web	applications	to	share	visual,	audio,	and	textual	content	that	documents	their	
explorations	 of	 Iran	 in	 the	 style	 of	 an	 individual	 travel	 diary.	 In	 contrast	 to	 memoirs	
published	 about	 women	 whose	 lives	 span	 between	 the	 diaspora	 and	 Iran,67	 these	
productions	do	not	highlight	 experiences	 around	 the	 revolution,	but	are	 instead	 situated	
firmly	 in	 the	protagonists’	 first‐time	experiences	of	 Iran	 that	do	not	bring	a	 sentimental,	
narrative	to	stories	told	about	 Iran’s	past,	and	do	so	with	heavy	reliance	on	visual	rather	
than	textual	forms.		
Their	 sense	of	home	 is	 formed	 through	 the	 combination	of	 physical	 travel	 and	mediated	
story‐telling	 about	 that	 experience.	 Web	 applications	 like	 blogs	 and	 the	 social	 media	
platform,	 YouTube	 allow	 them	 to	 generate	 interest	 in	 their	 productions	 and	 spin	 off	
additional	 content	 from	 their	 trips,	 offering	 supplements	 to	 these	 productions	 that	 fit	
within	 the	established	 film	genre.	These	applications	 fit	 into	 a	wider	 trend	of	 promoting	
media	 productions	 via	 the	 web	 and	 offering	 the	 possibility	 for	 young	 filmmakers	 to	
disseminate	 their	 work	 to	 audiences	 more	 readily.	 US‐based	 audiences	 are	 the	 primary	
target	 for	 the	products	my	respondents	make.	While	 Iran	becomes	a	discovered	national	
place	 of	 home,	 the	 US	 becomes	 the	 taken‐for‐granted,	 primary	 reference	 point.	 My	
respondents	 narrate	 their	 experiences	 of	 return	 travel	 as	 a	 discovery	 of	 home.	 But	 this	
feeling	also	has	limits.	Shiva	says,	for	instance,	that	her	time	spent	in	Iran	during	the	year	
she	studied	Persian	language	there	at	a	private	institute	showed	her	how	comfortable	she	
																																																								
67	See,	for	instance,	Persepolis	2:	The	Story	of	a	Return	by	Marjan	Satrapi	(2004)	and	To	See	and	See	Again:	A	
Life	in	Iran	and	America	by	Tara	Bahrampour.		
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could	feel	among	her	family	in	Esfahan.	But	she	also	said	it	sometimes	her	feel	that	at	times	
she	was	 “hanging	by	a	 thread”	when	 it	 came	 to	daily	 situations	 that	 she	did	not	 feel	 she	
grasped	or	could	clearly	 follow	socio‐culturally	and	 linguistically.	My	respondents	do	not	
shed	their	outsider	status;	Justin’s	anecdote	of	feeling	at	home	among	friends/relatives	in	
Tehran	was	also	preceded	by	an	experience	of	 social	 exclusion.	The	position	of	being	an	
outsider	is	useful	for	some.	Nooshin	even	says	she	uses	this	position	of	being	an	outsider	‐‐	
specifically	 as	 an	 American	 but	 also	 a	 half‐Japanese	woman	who	 acknowledges	 that	 she	
does	 not	 look	 typically	 Iranian	 ‐‐	 to	 ask	 more	 questions	 and	 get	 responses	 from	 the	
characters	in	her	film.		
Traveling	 to	 and	 being	 present	 in	 Iran	 affords	 the	 possibility	 of	 (audio‐visually)	 and	
narrating	how	they	are	at	home	in	Iran.	 It	 is	 less	 the	representations	of	 important	places	
and	 more	 the	 embodied	 undertaking	 of	 going	 to	 and	 being	 in	 Iran	 as	 a	 new	 place	 that	
underpin	 their	 experiences.	 The	 stories	 they	 use	 web	 applications	 to	 tell	 (while	
incorporating	 various	 digital	media	 forms)	 are	 specifically	 their	 own,	 second‐generation	
stories,	 as	 their	 personal	 journeys	 of	 discovery	 reflect.	 Their	 use	 of	 the	 genres	 of	
documentary	 film	 and	 travel	 diary/travelogue‐writing	 afford	 them	 the	 possibility	 of	
representing	 Iran	 and	 their	 own	 transformation.	 These	 productions	 frame	 their	
experiences	for	primarily	American	audiences,	and	for	most,	reinforces	and	makes	explicit	
the	 taken‐for‐granted	 American	 home.	 Yet	 through	 this	 combination	 of	 travel	 and	
representation,	Iran	becomes	a	place	of	home,	albeit	an	ambiguous,	found,	“second	home,”	
which	 is	 encountered	differently	 than	 the	US	 (after	 all,	 they	do	not	make	documentaries	
about	everyday	life	in	the	US	and	sense	of	home).	My	respondents’’	travel	between	the	US	
and	Iran,	and	their	use	of	certain	web	applications	in	the	process,	become	part	of	how	these	
young	people	are	at	home	both	in	Iran	and	the	US	in	different	ways.	
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Pardis’	taste	of	two	homes	
Pardis’	parents	have	always	been	the	source	of	stories	about	Iran	for	her.	Below,	she	speaks	
about	 the	 well‐known	 location	 of	 Darband	 right	 outside	 the	 city	 of	 Tehran,	 which	 is	
associated	with	leisure	and	free	time	in	the	outdoors.		
Everybody	used	to	talk	about	Darband	and	how	beautiful	it	was	and	how	it’s	in	the	
mountains.	I	could	never	really	put	a	picture.	But	seeing	that	then,	it	kind	of	brought	
everything	a	 little	closer.	 I	wouldn’t	say	that	 the	puzzle’s	 totally	complete,	but	 just	
putting	a	lot	of	images	to	a	lot	of	the	stories,	it	just	makes	everything	so	much	more	
real.	 A	 lot	 of	 that	 also	 came	 from	 seeing	my	mom	 interact	with	 her	 siblings,	 and	
where	 she	 lived	 and	 all	 of	 that.	 It	 helps	 bring	 everything	 closer.	 Because	 all	 the	
stories	I	heard	about	this	or	that	baagh,	and	we	used	to	pick	shaatoot	and	eat	it	off	
the	trees,	I	actually	saw	them	do	that	and	I	actually	ate	that	shatoot,	and	I	know	what	
it	is,	and	it’s	a	lot	of	bringing	closer	together	of	two	different	lives.	And	it	was	really	
nice.	
For	Pardis,	the	imagery	of	Iran	as	a	place	had	been	instilled	by	her	parents	from	when	she	
was	very	young.	She	refers	to	this	as	a	consistent	counterweight	to	the	upheaval	in	Tehran	
during	the	time	she	was	visiting	in	the	summer	of	2009.		
My	image	of	Iran	didn’t	really	change	even	though	I	did	see	all	that	stuff.	I	still	see	
Iran	 as	 the	 beautiful,	 perfect	 place,	 and	 I	 think	 it	will	 really	 take	 a	 lot	 to	 actually	
change	the	image	in	my	brain,	and	maybe	it’ll	never	really	change.	
Through	the	stories	of	other	returnees	and	 the	memories	handed	down	by	their	parents,	
images	of	places	in	Iran	take	shape	for	the	second	generation.	Visiting	sites	bestowed	with	
significance	 through	 these	 stories	 and	 images,	 makes	 them	 “more	 real”	 for	 Pardis,	
reinforcing	 pre‐existing	 images,	 and	 confirming	 her	 affective	 attachment	 to	 them.	 It	 is	
noteworthy	that	Pardis	describes	visual,	tactile,	and	gustatory	experiences	as	central	to	the	
way	 these	 places	 are	 enforced	 as	 important	 references	 points	 for	 her	 national	
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identification.	 The	 intersection	 of	 the	 ideally	 imagined	 places	 and	 the	 embodied	
experiences	 of	 physically	 being	 there	 is	 significant	 to	 this	 process	 of	 making	 emotional	
attachments	to	Iran.		
But	Pardis	did	not	only	get	her	images	about	places	in	Iran	from	her	parents.	Pardis	listens	
to	the	music	of	Iranian	pop	artist	Sassy	Mankan.	She	plays	the	songs	at	home	and	in	her	car	
when	she	is	driving.	Recounting	her	experience	of	visiting	Tehran	for	the	first	time	in	the	
summer	of	2009,	Pardis	speaks	of	the	excitement	she	experienced	having	recognized	places	
and	 things	 in	 Iran	 that	 she	knew	from	Sassy	Mankan	songs.	Attention	among	 the	 Iranian	
American	diaspora	rose	for	this	musical	genre	as	it	was	noticeably	played	on	internet	radio	
channel,	 Radio	 Javan,	 and	 written	 about	 (in	 English)	 by	 the	 web‐based	 San	 Francisco	
Iranian	 American	 music	 magazine,	 Beyond	 Persia.	 The	 electronic	 “6/8”	 (pronounced	 as	
sish‐o‐hasht	 in	 Persian)	 beats	 of	 this	 pop	 genre	 gained	 recognition	 as	 a	 quintessentially	
urban	 music	 style	 that	 found	 its	 way	 to	 the	 diaspora	 through	 individuals	 making	 mp3	
copies	 for	one	another.	Then,	 stored	 in	digital	memory	devices	and	disks,	 the	 recordings	
made	 their	way	 through	underground	music	circuits	 in	Tehran	and	eventually	out	of	 the	
country	 with	 travelers,	 finally	 being	 openly	 disseminated	 abroad	 through	 (web)	 radio	
stations	like	Javaan.		
Pardis	mentions	 a	 Sassy	Mankan	 song	 that	 refers	 to	 a	 Pizza	 store	 and	 youth	 hangout	 in	
Tehran.	She	was	excited	to	finally	see	the	store	and	eat	the	Pizza	there,	saying	that	it	tasted	
just	as	good	as	she	had	expected	it	would.	These	songs	create	reference	points	in	particular	
places	inside	Iran,	even	for	people	like	Pardis	who	are	not	familiar	with	the	city.	The	Sassy	
Mankan	songs	 take	on	a	similar	 role	 to	Pardis’	parents’	 stories,	and	 in	both	cases,	Pardis	
describes	 sensory	 experiences	 –	 visual/	 tactile/gustatory	 ‐‐	 as	 central	 to	 the	 way	 these	
places	are	enforced	as	 important	references	points	 for	belonging	and	attachment	 to	 Iran.	
Both	parents’	passed‐down	memories	and	contemporary	popular	media	coming	out	of	Iran	
and	circulating	in	among	diaspora	youth	are	both	part	of	how	some	of	someone	like	Pardis	
imagines	and	feels	connections	to	places	in	Iran.		
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	Digital	copies	and	online	radio	stations	is	how	some	pop	cultural	production	coming	out	of	
Iran	 finds	 its	 way	 to	 second	 generation	 living	 in	 LA.	 The	 styles	 coming	 out	 of	 Iran	 are	
interesting	to	a	number	of	my	respondents,	who	express	intrigue	as	to	what	young,	urban	
Iranians	are	doing.	Houshi	described	his	delight	at	finding	out	how	much	US/international	
popular	cultural	tastes	shared	in	common	with	young	Iranians	he	met	on	his	first	visit	to	
Iran	as	an	adult.	But	he	also	mentioned	having	an	interest	 in	 learning	about	the	styles	or	
that	were	particular	to	contemporary	youth	living	in	Tehran.	Arash	also	recounted	fondly	
his	 experiences	 of	 finding	 out	 how	 Esfahani	 party/nightlife	 was	 practiced	 on	 one	 of	 his	
visits.	Often	the	Iranian	American	visitors’	interlocutors	were	their	own	family	members	of	
the	same	age	(mostly	cousins),	and	friends	thereof.	This	image	of	Iran	as	urban,	hip,	trendy,	
but	also	underground,	raw,	and	expressive	is	in	line	with	the	image	of	Tehran	that	many	of	
my	second‐generation	respondents	had	of	Tehran	as	a	modern	place	and	haven	of	youth	
culture.		
This	engagement	with	urban	Iranian	cultural	scenes	was	evident	in	the	interest	among	my	
respondents	in	art	made	by	Iranian	artists	shown	in	LA	settings,68	 including	among	those	
who	 had	 not	 travelled	 to	 Iran.	 Transnational	 media	 circuits	 allow	 my	 respondents	 to	
develop	 images	 of	 Iran,	 the	 experience	 of	 physical	 return	 in	 particular	 allows	 people	 to	
create	their	own	stories	about	Iran	and	discover	their	own	feeling	of	home	there.	The	role	
of	web	usage	in	the	examples	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	section	on	return	were	about	
making	 one’s	 own	 productions	 around	 return	 experiences.	 The	 return	 experiences	 of	
Pardis	and	others	discussed	here	show	how	internet	becomes	part	of	pop	cultural	circuits	
between	the	US	and	Iran,	which	help	my	respondents	make	sense	of	their	discoveries	and	
experiences	of	 return	visits	 to	 Iran	and	 feel	a	 sense	of	home	 through	a	 certain	degree	of	
recognition	 of	 places	 and	 practices.	 Both	 parental	 stories	 and	 youth	 cultural	 styles	 offer	
such	connections.	
	
																																																								
68 I	see	LA	exhibits	such	as	Urban	Iran	(various	artists)	that	Amitis	curated	in	2009	and	the	Icy	and	Sot	exhibit	
in	2013	that	Aryana	was	enthusiastic	about	as	part	of	this. 
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Staying	in	touch	
Pardis,	like	others,	stays	in	touch	with	her	family	in	Iran	after	having	come	back	to	LA	from	
her	travels	to	Iran.	She	says	she	does	this	primarily	through	text	messages	with	her	family	
members,	her	aunt	and	uncle,	describing	how	her	phone	bill	 is	extremely	high	because	of	
this.	She	says	she	sends	messages	on	a	weekly,	 sometimes	daily	basis	 to	keep	up	 to	date	
with	the	lives	of	her	family	members,	especially	to	keep	track	of	how	they	are	doing	since	
the	recent	death	of	her	uncle,	which	was	the	main	reason	that	she	returned	with	her	family	
in	the	summer	of	2009.	A	friend	of	Pardis’,	Atiya,	similarly	describes	keeping	in	touch	with	
her	family	through	telephone	calls.	Like	Pardis,	since	her	 first	return	trip	as	an	adult,	her	
relationship	with	her	aunts,	uncles,	and	cousins	was	dramatically	strengthened,	such	that	
everyday	contact	with	them	has	become	normal.		
Before	having	made	her	most	recent	trip	to	 Iran,	Atiya	says,	she	would	talk	to	her	 family	
members	in	Iran	on	the	phone	at	her	parents’	house,	but	it	would	be	more	of	a	formality.	
But	after	the	trip,	she	speaks	with	her	uncle	because	she	wants	to.		
We	have	this	calling	plan	where	 it’s	really	cheap	minutes	and	you	get	billed	every	
month	and	it	works	out	really	good…	None	of	my	family	members	use	the	internet	
that	 much,	 at	 least	 if	 they	 do,	 they	 don’t	 talk	 to	 me	 through	 it.	 It’s	 all	 through	
telephone.	
It	 is	 striking	 how	 (mobile)	 telephone	 use	 overshadows	 internet	 communications	 in	 the	
ways	 these	relationships	are	upheld.	Pardis	mentions	an	obstacle	 to	her	communications	
via	internet	media	when	she	describes	a	moment	when	she	wanted	to	share	photographs	
with	her	family	in	Iran,	and	her	immediate	idea	was	to	post	them	on	Facebook	where	her	
whole	 family	would	 see,	 but	 she	 caught	herself	 not	 knowing	whether	 surveillance	of	 the	
internet	 would	 make	 it	 unsafe	 to	 do	 so	 for	 her	 family	 members.	 In	 that	 case,	 a	 lack	 of	
security	was	 the	 reason	 for	 her	 to	 refrain	 from	 internet	 communications.	 Atiya	 said	 her	
own	 preference	 for	 telephone	 contact	 was	 because	 internet	 in	 Iran	 was	 slow	 and	
unreliable.	For	many	it	 is	common	knowledge	that	faster	 internet	speeds	are	 impeded	by	
98	
	
the	government’s	efforts	to	control	content,	therefore	making	it	difficult	to	use	applications	
that	use	higher	levels	of	bandwidth	inside	Iran.		
Young	 women	 like	 Pardis	 and	 Atiya	 cultivate	 relationships	 with	 family	 in	 Iran	 from	 a	
distance.	Yet	the	day	to	day	practice	of	being	in	touch	in	this	way	does	not	quell	their	strong	
desires	to	return	again	soon.	Like	more	of	my	respondents,	their	plans	for	more	frequent	
return	 are	 impeded	 by	 time	 and	 monetary	 limitations	 due	 to	 studies,	 work,	 or	
unemployment.	While	 these	 two	 young	 women	 speak	 fondly	 of	 their	 visits	 to	 Iran	 as	 a	
country	and	 a	whole,	 their	 practices	 ensure	 that	 they	are	 strongly	 attached	 to	particular	
places	 in	the	country.	For	Atiya	the	 locus	of	emotional	attachment	 is	 the	city	of	Rasht,	by	
the	 Caspian	 coast,	 where	 her	 mother’s	 side	 of	 the	 family	 still	 lives.	 She	 contrasts	 her	
experiences	of	 visiting	Rasht	with	her	 time	 spent	 in	Tehran	with	her	 father’s	 side	of	 the	
family	on	her	first	return	trip,	saying	“we	went	there	[Tehran]	and	I	cried	for	like	5	hours…	
I	said	“why	are	were	here?”	I’d	rather	be	with	my	cousins.	I’d	rather	be	in	Rasht,	with	my	
uncle.”	Interestingly,	any	experience	of	homecoming	for	Nastaran	takes	place	in	Rasht	and	
not	Tehran,	yet	it	no	less	of	a	national	homecoming	and	she	is	no	more	Rashti	than	Iranian	
in	the	context	of	this	return	story.	
For	 Atiya,	 Rasht	 is	 nevertheless	 the	 place	 where	 she	 goes	 to	 be	 close	 to	 her	 mother’s	
youngest	sister	during	the	last	stages	of	her	pregnancy,	where	she	was	present	for	the	birth	
of	 her	 cousin	 and	held	 the	baby	 for	 the	 first	 time.	Her	mother’s	 side	of	 the	 family	 is	 her	
strongest	 association	 with	 feeling	 at	 home	 in	 Iran.	 But	 she	 expresses	 her	 attachment	
through	 a	 love	 for	 Rasht	 as	 a	 locale	 of	 national	 homecoming	 and	 return,	 and	 sees	 this	
attachment	 as	 an	 important	 part	 of	 what	 makes	 her	 Iranian.	 The	 deep	 importance	 of	
physical	 presence	 and	 attachment	 to	 place	 through	 embodied	 experience	 is	 apparent	 in	
many	 of	 my	 respondents’	 accounts,	 and	 perhaps	 nowhere	 more	 so	 than	 in	 Beeta’s	
statement	that	she	wants	to	be	buried	in	Iran	after	her	death.	Sitting	in	her	car	in	a	UCLA	
parking	lot	before	we	say	goodbye	after	having	met	for	lunch	one	afternoon,	Mina	confides	
that	although	she	finds	it	difficult	as	a	young	person	to	express	this	wish	in	any	open	way	
(she	 thinks	 it	 would	 be	 considered	 unconventional	 or	 morbid	 for	 someone	 her	 age	 to	
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consider	 such	 a	 thing).	 Nevertheless,	 she	 resolutely	 expresses	 her	wish	 to	 be	 buried	 on	
Iranian	soil	when	she	passes	away.		
For	these	young	women,	their	emplaced	experiences	and	attachments	are	essential	to	their	
relationship	with	 Iran.	 These	 connections	 are	 to	 the	 people	 and	 places	with	which	 they	
associate	 their	 familial	 homecoming	 and	 temporary	 national	 repatriation.	 In	 terms	 of	
maintaining	 these	 transnational	 relationships	 with	 family	 members,	 telephone	
communications	 seem	 to	 eclipse	 internet	 communications	 as	 a	 meaningful	 and	 regular	
media	practice69	for	women	like	Pardis	and	Atiya	with	the	people	they	are	closest	to	in	Iran	
–	 older	 relatives	 such	 as	 aunts	 and	 uncles.	 In	 the	 following	 I	 bring	 the	 examples	 I	 have	
discussed	 about	 return	 travel	 so	 far	 together	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 embodied	 experience	 of	
return	travel	to	Iran	intersects	with	web	usage	to	given	my	respondents	a	sense	of	home.		
	
Going	back	for	more	
In	existing	research	on	second	generation	migrants,	the	role	of	the	parental	generation	is	
often	pointed	out	as	arbitrating	and	instilling	in	the	younger	generation	the	importance	of	
the	cultural	maintenance	of	the	country	of	origin.	This	work	highlights	the	role	of	parents	
as	guardians	of	cultural	“authenticity”	of	the	home	country	(Blunt	&	Dowling,	2006;	Levitt	
&	Waters,	2006).	Or	it	argues	that	a	“cultural	transnationalism”	plays	itself	out	in	the	realm	
of	 the	emotions	when	values,	 expectations,	and	 “family	 ideologies”	 that	are	rooted	 in	 the	
country	of	origin	are	applied	by	parents	to	their	children	growing	up	in	the	US	(Wolf,	2006:	
275‐279).70	 This	 pays	 less	 attention	 to	 how	members	 of	 the	 second	 generation	 actively	
authenticate	their	own	feelings	of	being	at	home.	Practices	of	return	and	the	search	for	a	
“real”	 sense	 of	 home	 through	 one’s	 own	 experience,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 a	 second	 home	 or	 an	
																																																								
69	I	also	noticed	in	the	field	that	others	have	experiences	of	internet	telephony	with	relatives	back	in	Iran,	but	
my	impression	was	that	the	issues	of	low	bandwidth	internet	connections	of	relatives	inside	Iran	outweigh	
the	low	cost	advantage.	
70 See	Wolf’s	concept	of	“emotional	transnationalism,”	which	she	develops	based	on	study	of	second‐
generation	Filipino	Americans	in	California.		 
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ambivalent	 relationship	 to	 it,	 still	 speaks	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 particular	 travel	
practice.		
My	respondents	experience	transformative	feelings	of	discovery	by	being	in	certain	places	
in	 Iran.	 This	 shapes	 their	 understandings	 of	 Iranian	 home,	 however	 ambivalent.	 This	
reflects	what	Brah	discusses	 as	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 interaction	between	 the	 body	 and	
locality,	particularly	through	the	senses,	in	producing	a	ways	of	“being	at	home.”	In	the	first	
instance,	 this	 quote	 indicates	 how	 places	 act	 upon	 people,	 which	 is	 relevant	 to	
understanding	the	processes	of	discovery	and	transformation	I	have	discussed.		
Being	at	home	involves	the	‘immersion	of	a	self	in	a	locality’.	The	locality	‘intrudes’	
upon	 the	 self	 through	 the	 senses,	 defining	 ‘what	 one	 smells,	 hears,	 touches,	 feels,	
remembers’.	 Equally	 the	 self	 penetrates	 the	 locality.	 Accordingly	 the	 boundaries	
between	home	and	self	and	between	home	and	away	are	permeable.	As	such	when	
one	moves	 away	 from	home	 the	movement	 itself	 occurs	 in	 relation	 to	 home,	 it	 is	
part	of	the	very	‘constitution’	of	home	itself.	
In	addition,	movement,	as	described	here,	 is	pertinent	to	the	“constitution”	of	a	US	home.	
The	act	of	moving	away	from	home	in	the	US	by	going	to	Iran	makes	the	former	the	center	
of	attention	in	my	respondents’	productions	of	media;	 it	clearly	becomes	the	“first	home”	
by	 implication	 of	 the	 discovery	 of	 a	 “second”	 one.	 Communication	 of	 this	 experience	 of	
discovery	 and	 transformation	 (for	 largely	 American‐based	 audiences)	 not	 only	 helps	
maintain	the	connection	to	Iran	after	people	have	returned	to	their	lives	in	the	US	through	
the	 document,	 but	 also	maintains	 the	 connection	 to	 the	US	while	 they	 are	 in	 Iran.	 Their	
experience	also	reinforces	the	status	of	their	American	home.	This	is	evocative	of	Blunt	and	
Dowling’s	discussion	of	second‐generation	Chinese	and	Korean	American	returnees,	which	
finds	that	returnees	express	an	explicit	sense	of	closer	affinity	to	the	United	States	as	home	
due	to	their	return	experiences	and	the	ambivalence	that	comes	with	it	(Blunt	&	Dowling,	
2006).		
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While	there	is	an	element	of	this,	it	is	not	the	whole	story.	My	respondents	also	experience	
their	 return	 as	 transforming	 Iran	 from	 nostalgic	 stories	 passed	 down	 from	 parents	 or	
others,	into	a	place	they	incorporate	into	their	own	practices	of	maintaining	transnational	
social	contacts.	The	experiential	aspects	of	their	relationship	to	places	inside	Iran	and	their	
own	feeling	of	being	at	home	there	upon	embodied	return	are	central.	These	experiences	
are	particular	to	their	second‐generation	status	as	they	do	not	have	their	own	recollections	
of	these	places	as	many	of	the	first	generation	who	fled	or	otherwise	left	Iran	do,	and	their	
encounters	are	therefore	untouched	by	such	(often	difficult)	memories.		
Research	 on	 the	 formation	 of	 transnational	 social	 fields	 perspective(refs?)	 has	 made	
mention	 of	 internet	 as	 operating	 alongside	 telephone	 calls	 and	 international	 aviation	 in	
helping	second	generation	Indian	Canadians	in	“maintaining	cross‐border	communication”	
within	 transnational	 family	 relations,	 allowing	 them	 to	 remain	 both	 physically	 and	
emotionally	embedded	in	both	country	of	“settlement”	and	“origin”	(Somerville,	2001:	30).	
My	 discussion	 supports	 this,	 as	my	 respondents’	 use	web	 applications	 alongside	 various	
other	media	 practices.	 In	 certain	 relationships	with	 family	members	 in	 Iran,	 phone	 calls	
remain	the	central	means	for	staying	in	touch.	Evidently,	web	applications	do	not	offer	the	
same	social	possibilities	for	maintaining	these	cross‐border	family	relationships.		
Nevertheless,	 their	use	of	web	applications	 reflects	 a	 combination	of	 (mediated)	ways	of	
engaging	 with	 notions	 of	 return	 and	 homeland.	 That	 is,	 their	 web	 usage	 reflects	
mobilization	 of	 established	 genres	 of	 cultural	 production	 such	 as	 documentary	 film	 and	
travel	 writing,	 and	 this	 styles	 their	 representations	 of	 Iran	 and	 Iranian‐ness.	 Yet,	 web	
applications	 also	 come	 with	 their	 own	 particular	 possibilities.	 That	 is,	 my	 respondents’	
web‐based	productions	make	their	stories	of	return	accessible	to	wider	audiences,	notably,	
other	members	of	the	second	generation.	And	they	also	allow	young	people	to	narrate	their	
own	stories	digitally,	and	thus	authenticate	their	own	homeland	discovery	experiences.		
It	 should	be	noted	here	 that	not	all	my	respondents	returned	regularly	 to	 Iran,	and	most	
did	 so	 only	 a	 few	 times	 in	 their	 lives.	 Those	 who	 have	 not	 returned	 develop	 their	 own	
imaginaries	of	Iran,	even	if	they	do	not	 imagine	Iran	as	home.	Both	Sarah’s	and	Sepideh’s	
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ideas	 about	 Iran	 are	 a	 testament	 to	 this;	 Sarah	 imagines	 Iran	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 status	 as	 a	
developing	country,	in	which	she	thinks	she	would	feel	out	of	place,	and	Sepideh	says	she	
does	 not	 feel	 the	 desire	 to	 visit.	 Both	 of	 them	 acknowledge	 that	 this	 feeling	 has	 not	
remained	static	for	them	over	time,	and	that	it	may	change	at	another	point	in	their	lives.	
But	these	sentiments	are	in	contrast,	for	instance,	with	Asa’s	imagination	of	Iran.	Although	
she	 is	 also	 a	 non‐returnee,	 Asa	 was	 born	 in	 Iran,	 and	 unlike	 Sarah	 and	 Sepideh,	 has	
childhood	 memories	 of	 moments	 and	 places	 swathed	 in	 nostalgic,	 sensory	 impressions	
such	 as	 the	 sight	 and	 smell	 of	 her	 grandmother	 and	 mother	 in	 the	 kitchen,	 chopping	
fragrant	herbs	for	the	elaborate	traditional	dishes	they	made.		
For	 some	 not	 returning	 is	 a	 choice	 made	 based	 on	 their	 uninspiring	 imaginaries	 of	 a	
country	they	have	never	been	in	and	do	not	miss.	Whereas	for	many	others	‐	despite	their	
young	 age	 of	 migration	 ‐	 their	 nostalgia	 for	 an	 Iran	 of	 their	 childhood/past	 resembles	
elements	 of	 exile	 longing	 and	 remembering	 rooted	 in	 emotive,	 sensory	 experience	 (see	
Serematakis,	 1996).	 Whether	 it	 is	 through	 the	 return	 travel	 as	 an	 adult	 or	 through	
remembering	 sensory	experience	 from	childhood,	embodied	experiences	of	being	 in	 Iran	
are	central	to	how	my	respondents	relate	to	it	as	home	(or	not).	This	informs	their	use	of	
web	 applications,	 and	 as	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 show	 in	 this	 section,	 these	 forms	 of	web	 usage	
configure	new	possibilities	for	forming	diaspora	home	through	experiences	of	return.	
	
Conclusion	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 discussed	 how	my	 respondents’	 digital	 media	 usage	 is	 integrated	 into	
their	oscillations	between	dwelling	in,	and	being	mobile	between	the	places	in	which	they	
live	their	lives.	In	each	of	the	chapter’s	sections	respectively,	I	showed	how	trends	of	urban	
living	 in	 LA,	 the	 types	 of	 moral	 sociability	 emanating	 from	 the	 parental	 house,	 and	 the	
genres	 of	 representing	 transformative	 travel	 experiences	 all	 constitute	 styles	 of	 being	
Iranian	American.	In	being	at	home,	my	respondents	seek	out	emotional,	experiential,	and	
personalized	approaches	to	representing	and	engaging	with	places	that	have	relevance	to	
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their	 second‐generation	 lives.	While	 they	 do	 this	 in	ways	 that	 at	 times	 invoke	 and	 build	
upon	 the	 first	generation’s	movements	and	 traces,	my	respondents’	own	 inhabitations	of	
particular	 places	 crisscross	 the	 places	 that	 their	 parents’	 generation	 bestow(ed)	 with	
meaning	through	their	(continued)	inhabitation,	thus	re‐shaping	home.		
As	I	have	shown	in	this	chapter,	these	places	are	important.	Many	people	tend	to	derive	a	
sense	of	intimate	connection	to	these	places	and	the	other	people	who	they	co‐inhabit	them	
with.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	through	their	engagement	with	these	places	that	my	respondents	
are	offered	particular	possibilities	 (typical	 cultural	 trends,	 social	 and	moral	 expectations,	
transformative	 experiences)	 for	 being	 Iranian	American.	 These	 engagements	with	 places	
shape	my	respondents’	ways	of	being	at	home	as	diaspora	Iranian	Americans.	 In	a	sense,	
“the	house	comes	to	occupy	us	as	we	come	to	occupy	it,”	as	Miller	argues	of	home	(2001).	
That	is,	home	is	not	simply	how	people	come	to	live	in	a	place	and	what	they	make	of	it.	It	is	
also	what	that	place	makes	of	them.	As	I	have	shown,	practices	of	being	at	home	are	shaped	
by	life	in	amidst	places	in	the	city,	between	the	family	house	and	homes	away	from	home,	
and	between	the	US	and	in	destinations	of	return	travel	in	Iran.	These	places	for	being	at	
home	each	shape	certain	styles	of	being	Iranian	American	in	their	own	ways.		
My	 respondents’	 connections	 to	 place	 are	 certainly	 not	 mediated	 by	 web	 applications	
alone,	but	their	web	usage	is	a	significant	part	of	the	changing	ways	in	which	these	places	
are	engaged	with	and	inhabited	by	a	new	generation.		Their		web	usage	is	embedded	within	
these	practices	of	being	Iranian	American.	And	in	each	of	the	cases	I	discussed,	web	usage	
comes	with	certain	affordances,	and	certain	convergences/divergences	with	other	kinds	of	
mediation.	Web	applications	are	is	combined	with	face‐to‐face	interactions	and	abandoned	
for	 telephone	 communication,	 they	 remediate	 film	 and	 photography,	 and	 coalesce	multi‐
platform,	 digital	 news	media	 and	 social	media	 sharing.	My	 respondents’	media	 practices	
reflect	 the	kinds	of	 connections	 they	want	 to	make	 in	a	certain	 instance,	and	 they	reflect	
how	internet	is	better	at	doing	some	things	than	others.	
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Chapter	2	Re‐presenting	the	Past	
	
	
	
Introduction	
“The	internet	 is	 full	of	garbage,”	the	elderly	bookstore	owner	said	to	me	from	behind	the	
desk	in	his	store.	He	went	on:	
I	 don’t	 even	 really	 use	 the	 computer.	 But	 that’s	 where	 young	 people	 look	 for	
information.	The	youth	don’t	know	the	history	and	geography	of	their	country	[Iran]	
from	books	 anymore.	And	 I	will	 stop	 selling	 altogether	 at	 some	point.	 But	 I	 don’t	
mind;	I’ve	retired	and	do	this	because	I	enjoy	it.	
The	grey‐haired	bookstore	owner	got	up	from	his	desk	and	moved	slowly	towards	a	table	
of	 books	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 store.	 He	 picked	 up	 a	 thin	 pamphlet.	 Its	 glossy	 paper	was	
emblazoned	 with	 color	 photographs	 of	 iconic	 images	 of	 Takhte	 Jamshid	 (the	 ruins	 of	
Persepolis,	 capital	 of	 the	 ancient	 Achemaenid	 empire)	 and	 the	 outside	 of	 an	 intricately	
decorated	mosque	dome.	 “Iran”	was	printed	 in	Persian	and	Roman	 script	along	with	 the	
title,	 “From	 Ancient	 Persia	 to	 contemporary	 Iran:	 selected	 historical	milestones.”	 “It’s	 in	
English,”	 he	 said,	 handing	 the	 colorful	 pamphlet	 to	me.	 “This	 is	 the	 kind	 of	 thing	 young	
people	like	you	might	read.”	He	continued	describing	his	business:	
Eighty	five	percent	of	our	books	are	in	Farsi,	and	many	of	them	were	written	before	
or	 during	 the	 revolution.	 Young	 people	 are	 not	 interested	 in	 these	 books.	 The	
customers	I	have	are	from	my	own	generation	–	we	sometimes	sit	in	the	store	and	
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have	some	tea	and	talk	about	politics.	These	books	are	unique,	and	most	of	them	are	
out	of	print	now.	
As	 he	 spoke,	 the	 man	 motioned	 with	 an	 aged	 hand	 towards	 the	 ceiling‐high	 shelves	 of	
books	 in	 his	 quaint	 store	 on	 Westwood	 Boulevard,	 the	 long‐standing	 and	 well‐known	
center	 of	 the	 Iranian	 American	 presence	 in	 LA.	 The	 book	 store	 owner	 was	 a	 respected	
figure	in	LA	Iranian	circles,	greeted	with	much	esteem	and	deep	courtesy	when	arriving	at	
a	high‐profile	“community	event”	in	his	dark	suit	and	polished	shoes.	From	time	to	time	he	
would	give	an	interview	on	locally‐based	Persian	language	radio	in	which	he	would	draw	
on	his	knowledge	of	Iranian	political	history	for	an	LA‐based	Iranian	audience	close	to	his	
age,	 he	 presumed.	 Today,	 in	 the	 store,	 he	 turned	 his	 gaze	 to	 the	 boxy,	 grey	 computer	
monitor	on	his	desk	as	he	described	his	disinterest	in	“the	internet.”		
He	was	well	aware	that	some	Iranian	book	stores	had	embraced	online	sales	in	efforts	to	
adapt	and	continue	their	businesses,	but	that	was	not	 for	him.	The	computer	on	the	desk	
was	turned	off,	and	the	monitor	half‐covered	by	a	cloth	printed	with	a	traditional	Iranian	
Paisley71	 design.	 A	 short	 walk	 up	 the	 Boulevard	 to	 another	 Iranian	 bookstore,	 and	 the	
mood	about	the	local	future	of	the	Persian	language	book	business	was	hardly	different.		
It	won’t	be	too	long	before	I’m	out	of	business.	My	books	are	almost	all	in	Farsi	and	
the	younger	generation	doesn’t	even	speak	it.	My	own	daughter	doesn’t	understand	
me	sometimes.	My	wife	tells	me	to	speak	slower	to	her	in	Farsi.		
The	second	bookstore	owner	picked	up	a	book,	comparatively	thin	beside	the	others	on	the	
shelf.	“This	is	the	direction	it’s	going	in.	It’s	what	sells	now,”	he	said,	holding	up	a	copy	of	
Firouzeh	Dumas’	Funny	in	Farsi:	A	memoir	of	growing	up	Iranian	in	America,	the	humorous	
and	intimate	story	of	a	second‐generation	Iranian	American	woman	and	her	family.	“I	don’t	
blame	the	youth	for	turning	to	the	internet	for	information	instead	of	books,”	he	added.	“If	I	
																																																								
71 In	Persian,	botteh	jegheh 
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ask	him,	my	 son	 can	 look	up	 and	print	 historical	 and	 geographic	 information	 about	 Iran	
from	the	computer	quicker	than	I	can	find	in	a	book.	And	it’s	in	their	language,	English.”	
To	these	bookstore	owners,	the	future	is	at	stake.	Not	only	the	futures	of	their	respective	
businesses,	 but	 perhaps	more	 importantly	 to	 them	 the	 future	 of	 knowledge	 about	 Iran’s	
past.	They	see	their	books	as	holding	this	knowledge,	able	to	pass	 it	on.	But	they	see	this	
transmission	as	being	interrupted	by	the	changes	going	on.	Limited	print	editions	of	books,	
international	shipping,	language	barriers,	competition	on	the	book	market,	and	the	coming	
of	age	of	the	second	generation	together	make	up	a	cocktail	of	changes,	and	these	men	are	
concerned	 about	what	 the	 next	 generation	 knows	 about	 Iran	 and	 its	 past.	 The	 concerns	
they	expressed	intensified	my	interest	in	finding	out	what	the	relevance	of	the	past	was	for	
the	 younger	 generation	 they	 talked	 about.	 I	 was	 interested	 in	 young	 people’s	 own	
perspectives	 about	 the	 future	of	 the	 Iranian	past.	 I	wanted	 to	 know	how	 this	 generation	
saw	their	 lives	as	connected	to	a	past.	How	did	the	past	become	appealing	to	them?	How	
did	this	past	make	them	Iranian	American?	And	how	did	their	web	usage	play	into	all	this?		
Hamid	 Naficy	 (1993)	 describes	 exile	 LA	 Iranians	 as	 holding	 on	 to	 a	 pristine	 Iranian	
homeland	from	the	past	by	fetishizing	it	(with	the	help	of	media).	Naficy	has	discussed	the	
past	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 distance	 and	 pain	 of	 exile,	 the	 nostalgia	 for	 a	 homeland	 objectified,	
imagined,	 and	 fetishized	 in	 souvenirs,	 photos,	 etc.	 He	 understands	 this	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	
protect	the	past	against	further	loss.	Whether	in	personal	memories,	national	glorifications,	
or	 both,	 the	 past	 is	 understood	 as	 synonymous	 with	 an	 Iranian	 homeland	 that	 can	 be	
remembered	or	 forgotten;	both	options	equally	painful	under	 conditions	of	 exile	 (Naficy,	
1993).	 Halleh	 Ghorashi’s	 more	 recent	 work	 also	 describes	 how	 the	 Iranian	 past	 is	
remembered	 among	 LA	 Iranians,	 but	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 used	 more	 to	 claim	 diasporic	
belonging	 in	 the	US	 than	 reify	 a	 lost	 national	 homeland.	 As	 Ghorashi	 shows,	 the	 ancient	
Persian	 past	 has	 been	 used	 as	 a	 discourse	 or	 source	 of	 possibility	 in	 the	 diaspora;	
mobilized,	used,	 and	adapted	as	a	means	of	both	distancing	 from	the	 Islamic	 regime	and	
laying	 claims	 in	 the	 American	 present	 through	 identity	 politics	 (Ghorashi,	 2004).	 She	
argues	 that	 the	past	 is	 not	 engaged	with	 in	 terms	of	 national	 boundaries	 (American	 and	
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Iranian)	 alone,	 but	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 diasporic	 belonging	 in	 the	 US	 that	 goes	 beyond	 such	
boundaries	(ibid.).		
In	light	of	Naficy	and	Ghorashi’s	work	on	first‐generation	LA	Iranians,	my	fieldwork	in	LA	
allowed	me	to	address	the	question	of	what	the	second	generation	is	doing	with	the	past.	
Are	they	using	the	past	to	reify	a	distant	nation	of	which	they	are	a	part?	Are	they	seeking	
diasporic	belonging	 in	 the	place	 their	parents	 settled?	And	how	 is	 this	 influenced	by	 the	
ubiquity	of	digital	media,	in	its	many	forms,	in	the	lives	of	my	respondents?	In	this	chapter,	
I	present	an	account	of	people’s	everyday	practices	of	remembering	the	past	and	web	usage	
to	provide	some	answers	to	these	questions.	I	do	so	within	the	wider	frame	of	research	on	
memory,	specifically	that	which	draws	attention	to	the	fact	that	 it	 is	almost	impossible	to	
study	how	the	past	is	remembered	without	studying	media	and	representations	of	the	past	
(Connerton,	2006).72	
I	argue	in	line	with	Ghorashi	that	my	respondents	choose	and	shape	the	narratives	of	the	
past	they	want	to	represent	based	on	their	claims	in	the	(diasporic)	present.	However,	they	
also	 feel	 the	 responsibility	 to	 conserve	 the	 past	 as	 something	 that	 is	 not	 of	 their	 own	
making,	but	rather	something	inherited.	In	this	way,	their	practices	align	with	a	notion	of	
cultural	heritage:	 the	production	of	 the	past	 for	a	collective	 in	the	present,	while	 framing	
that	past	as	inherited	from	antecedent	others	(Lowenthal,	1996:	23;	1985:	331).	It	is	in	this	
sense	that	I	find	literature	on	heritage	formation	useful	for	understanding	my	respondents’	
engagements	with	 the	past.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 responsibility	 to	 conserve	 the	past	 presents	
itself	 to	my	 respondents	 as	 an	 appealing	one,	 in	particular	because	of	 the	ways	 they	are	
able	 to	style	 their	engagements	with	 the	past.	This	 is	 the	case	whether	 their	engagement	
with	 the	past	 through	web	applications	 fits	 into	 the	“edutainment”	genre	(Buckingham	&	
Scanlon,	2005),	an	activist	position,	or	a	scholarly	endeavor.	The	particular	affordances	of	
																																																								
72	The	charting	of	this	field	owes	much	to	the	seminal	works	of	Pierre	Nora	(1984)and	Maurice	Halbwach	
(1928),	the	work	of	whom	anthropologist	Paul	Connerton	refers	to		when	sketching	the	developments	in	the	
study	of	memory	(2006).	David	Berliner’s	(2005)	critical	tracking	of	the	notion	of	memory	in	anthropology	
also	explored	and	nuanced	the	importance	of	the	of	study	memory	for	understanding	culture	and	identity.	
(See	also	Connerton,	1989	in	which	he	discusses	the	role	of	embodied	practices	of	remembering	that	are	not	
limited	to	representation).	
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web	 applications	 (creating	 blogs,	 sites,	 games,	 teach‐ins,	 hyperlinks,	 digital	 photos)	 help	
these	young	people	style	their	engagements	in	ways	that	make	the	past	their	own.		
I	see	heritage	as	a	process	of	making	and	communicating	meaning	about	the	past,	which	is	
used	in	the	present	(L.	Smith,	2006).	I	draw	on	the	work	of	Barbara	Kirshenblatt‐Gimblett	
who	suggests	that	heritage	is	experienced	anew	with	each	new	mediation;	in	other	words,	
heritage	 is	 (re‐)experienced	 through	 its	 every	 performance	 or	 showing.	 Kirschenblatt‐
Gimblett	is	attentive	to	the	historicity	of	media	forms	through	which	heritage	is	mediated.	
About	the	development	of	new	(digital)	media	forms	for	new	audiences,	she	states	that	“the	
very	 forms	and	media,	 not	 just	 the	 content,	 need	 to	be	 reinvented	 for	 they	 are	powerful	
instruments	with	their	own	agency”	(Kirshenblatt‐Gimblett,	2000:	14).		
This	idea	is	crucial	to	how	I	try	to	understand	what	the	role	of	digital	media	is	in	the	ways	
the	past	 is	mediated	 for	my	respondents.	 I	 show	that	 the	use	of	certain	web	applications	
offers	 particular	 capacities	 for	 mediating	 the	 past.	 That	 is,	 web	 usage	 allows	 people	 to	
collate,	 curate,	 and	 present	 historical	 narratives,	 often	 for	 the	 niche	 audiences	 that	 they	
themselves	shape	through	their	digital	(re)productions	of	the	past.	At	the	same	time,	items	
such	as	books,	historical	objects,	and	other	physical	 items	play	necessary	 roles	alongside	
and	 in	 conjunction	 with	 these	 web	 usages.	 I	 argue	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 my	 respondents’	
(discursive)	 practices	 that	 this	 convergence	 of	 different	 media	 forms	 as	 well	 as	 the	
incorporation	 of	 various	 media	 forms	 within	 certain	 web	 uses	 is	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	
mediate	the	past	into	the	present,	as	well	as	preserve	it	for	the	future.	It	also	facilitates	the	
formation	 of	 emergent	modes	 of	 remembering,	 styled	 in	ways	 appealing	 to	 the	 younger	
generation.		
I	add	to	work	on	Iranian	diaspora	remembering,	but	extend	my	focus	beyond		life	histories	
around	 pre‐	 and	 post‐migrational	 experiences	 in	 the	 Iranian	 diaspora	 (for	 this,	 see	
Ghorashi,	2002;	Sullivan,	2001).	Within	my	focus	on	practices	of	remembering,	I	include	my	
respondents’	own	living	memories,	the	older	generation’s	passed‐on	living	memories,	and	
an	 Iranian	 national	 memory	 (of	 a	 pre‐national	 past).	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 perspective	 of	 an	
understudied	generation	of	Iranian	diaspora	and	their	use	of	web	applications	in	everyday	
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practices	 of	 engaging	 with	 the	 past.	 As	 mentioned,	 this	 draws	 on	 notions	 of	 heritage	
formation	 and	 the	 literature	 on	 digital	 heritage.	 But	 some	 argue	 for	 more	 attention	 for	
everyday	web	usage	as	part	of	remembering	practices	to	supplement	the	current	focus	on	
the	 practices	 and	 epistemologies	 of	 institutions	 like	 museums	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	
professionals	working	in	them	(Cameron	&	Kenderdine,	2007;	Cameron,	2008;	Kalay,	Kvan,	
&	Affleck,	2008;	Malpas,	2008).		
I	have	 focused	on	three	main	practices	of	remembering	that	emerged	as	 important	 in	my	
findings:	1.	Remembering	Iranian	and	American	national	pasts	in	overlap	with	one	another,	
2.	 	Remembering	 the	ancient	Persian	 (Achamaenid)	period,	3.	Remembering	 the	modern	
pre‐revolutionary	past	of	Iran’s	60s	and	70s.	This	is	how	they	weave	together	a	past	that	
both	belongs	to	them	and	gives	them	a	sense	of	belonging.	In	this	way,	engaging	with	the	
past	is	a	facet	of	how	being	Iranian	American	is	given	meaning	by	this	new	generation.	This	
is	 particularly	 interesting	 to	 investigate	 given	 the	 changing	media	 environment	 that	 this	
generation	is	growing	up	in	and	the	shifting,	contemporary	possibilities	for	(re)presenting	
the	past.		
	
Intersecting	histories	
Renewing	Norooz	in	the	US		
As	part	of	their	Norooz	celebration	practices,	many	of	my	respondents	shared	photos	and	
“status	 updates”	 on	 Facebook,	 as	 well	 as	 “tagging”	 (and	 being	 “tagged”	 by)	 friends	 and	
family	members.	Within	this	thoroughly	social,	yearly	practice,	the	use	of	web	applications	
increasingly	became	a	part	of	the	rituals	around	Norooz.	Before	looking	more	closely	at	the	
emergent	 practice	 of	 “sharing”	 these	 Norooz	 photographs	 via	 Facebook,	 I	 first	 sketch	 a	
more	general	picture	of	 the	meaning	and	role	of	Norooz	and	how	 it	was	practiced	 in	my	
field	site.		
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Norooz	 translates	 from	Persian	as	New	Day.	 It	 is	 the	Persian	New	Year	and	a	 celebrated	
time	of	renewal.	In	LA,	it	is	by	far	the	most	widely‐enjoyed	Iranian	festivity,	and	is	marked	
each	 year	 by	 celebrations	 on	 the	 first	 astronomical	 day	 of	 spring	 (or	 Spring	 Equinox),	
which	 takes	 place	 around	 March	 21st.	 Malek’s	 work	 on	 contemporary	 celebration	 of	
Norooz	in	the	US	describes	the	tradition	as	an	“ancient	Zoroastrian	festival”	marking	“the	
arrival	of	spring	and	the	end	of	the	dark	season,”73	and	signaling	new	beginnings.	Norooz	is	
celebrated	by	a	great	many	Iranian	Americans	across	religious	and	ethnic	denominations	
and	has	gained	the	status	of	a	truly	inclusive	celebration	among	Iranian	diaspora,	viewed,	
as	Malek	states,	“as	a	cultural	event	that	can	serve	a	unifying	purpose”	(Malek,	2011:	393).		
Malek’s	study	also	expounds	upon	an	 important	 facet	of	how	Iranian‐ness	 is	practiced	 in	
the	US	through	celebrations	around	Norooz,	namely,	they	are	not	only	celebrations	among	
Iranian	Americans	but	 also	 “performances”	 for	non‐Iranian	 (American)	 audiences.	 In	 LA,	
too,	non‐Iranian	audiences	are	a	key	part	of	how	practices	around	Norooz	take	shape	–	in	
the	 public	 domain	 but	 also	 in	 the	 ways	 internet	 is	 used	 around	 this	 celebration.	 The	
engagement	with	these	audiences	is	something	I	come	back	to	in	my	discussion	of	Norooz	
photo‐sharing.	
The	 Persian	 New	 Year	 has	 its	 origins	 in	 the	 Zoroastrian	 festival	 from	 the	 Achaemenid	
Empire	of	the	fourth	century	BC,	and	is	currently	celebrated	in	Iran	and	a	number	of	Middle	
Eastern/Central	 Asian	 countries.	 In	 LA,	 Eid‐e	 Norooz	 and	 the	 celebratory	 practices	 that	
take	 place	 around	 it	 are	 the	 most	 prominently	 and	 publicly	 acknowledged	 celebration	
associated	with	 the	 Iranian	American	population	 living	 in	 the	 city.	And	 the	 annual	 ritual	
typically	 involves	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 preparation	 and	 celebration,	 both	 in	 public	 spaces	 and	
																																																								
73	In	the	paper	mentioned,	Malek	goes	on	to	give	background	to	the	historical	celebration,	explaining	that	it	is	
“traced	variously	to	the	Persian	King	Jamshid	(of	Firdawsi’s	Shahnamah	[Book	of	Kings])	and	to	the	
Zoroastrian	prophet	Ahura	Mazda	[note:	though	some	consider	the	prophet	to	be	Zardosht,	while	Ahura	
Mazda	is	the	god	of	good	and	Ahriman	the	god	of	bad],	from	whom	many	of	the	traditions	and	celebrations	
that	commemorate	Norooz	arose.	Because	Norooz	is	the	New	Year	celebrated	not	only	by	all	Iranians	but	also	
by	Tajiks,	Afghans,	Turks,	and	a	large	number	of	ethnic	groups	spread	across	the	lands	of	the	former	Persian	
Empire,	it	is	often	viewed	as	a	cultural	event	that	can	serve	a	unifying	purpose.	Beginning	on	the	vernal	
equinox,	during	the	thirteen	days	of	Norooz,	families	and	friends	pay	each	other	visits,	exchange	gifts,	and	
spend	as	much	time	together	as	possible”	(Malek,	2011,	note	inserted	by	Alinejad).		
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within	 homes,	 including	 khooneh	 tekooni	 (traditional	 spring	 cleaning	 undertaking	 in	
preparation	 for	 the	 new	 year),	Haft	 sin	 (the	 ritual	 altar	 assembled	 in	 people’s	 houses),	
Chahar	Shambe	Soori	(which	takes	place	on	the	Wednesday	leading	up	to	the	new	year	in		
which	people	jump	over	a	fire	at	night	–	either	in	public	spaces	or	on	their	back	yards	–	in	a	
purification	 rite),	 Sizdah	 be	 dar	 (an	 outdoor	 celebration	 that	 takes	 place	 in	 open	 spaces	
during	the	full	day,	usually	public	parks,	and	ceremoniously	marks	the	thirteenth	day	of	the	
new	year,	which	is	otherwise	seen	as	a	bad	omen	due	to	the	number	thirteen),	and	Eid‐e‐
Norooz	 (the	celebration	 that	 comes	at	 the	moment	of	Sale	Tahvil,	 the	 turning	of	 the	new	
year).		
In	the	US,	although	the	relevant	dates	are	not	public	holidays	like	in	Iran,	special	television	
and	 radio	programming	 at	 the	New	Year’s	 commencement	 are	 consistently	 produced	on	
Persian	 language	 broadcasts,	 wishing	 their	 viewers	 and	 listeners	 a	 happy	 new	 year.	
Sometimes	these	take	place	in	the	middle	of	the	night,	local	time.	In	LA,	Eid‐e	Norooz	(the	
Norooz	celebration)	has	become	a	common	celebration.	Festivities	have	taken	on	publicly	
visible	proportions	over	the	years.	Apart	from	the	longer‐running	Sizeh	be	Dar	gatherings	
in	 large	parks	 in	Southern	California	with	attendees	often	 in	 the	 thousands,	and	at	 times	
parts	of	Westwood	Boulevard	are	closed	down	to	make	room	for	the	events,	complete	with	
a	stage,	audiences,	and	festive	programming.	University	student	groups	put	on	events,	and	
banners	are	hung	throughout	parts	of	the	city	by	Iranian	American	organizations	wishing	a	
happy	 New	 Year	 to	 passers‐by,	 while	 Norooz	 programming	 is	 adopted	 by	 some	 LA	
museums.	 The	 most	 notable	 of	 which	 is	 LACMA	 (Los	 Angeles	 County	 Museum	 of	 Art),	
whose	yearly	program	since	2009	has	been	one	of	the	largest	Norooz	events	in	the	county,	
with	sponsoring	 from	Farhang	Foundation	–	an	influential	 local	organization	that	funds	a	
great	deal	of	the	Iranian	cultural	programming	in	LA.		
The	 use	 of	 public,	 city	 spaces	 and	 county	 institutions	means	 that	 the	 reception	 of	 these	
events	by	non‐Iranian	audiences	is	an	increasingly	important	facet	of	the	practice.	And	the	
ritual’s	 entry	 into	 cultural	 programming	 brings	 with	 it	 an	 intention	 to	 educate	 broader	
audiences	 about	 the	 content	 and	 meaning	 of	 the	 tradition,	 as	 well	 as	 shed	 light	 on	 the	
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Iranian	(American)	populace	who	celebrates	it.	Norooz	celebrations	have	taken	on	layered	
goals	 that	 implicate	 various	 publics,	 and	 this	 reflects	 something	 similar	 to	 what	 Malek	
argues	of	the	Persian	Day	Parade,	which	is	usually	held	in	the	month	after	Norooz	in	New	
York	City.	
Organizers	 of	 such	 events	 are	 motivated	 by	 goals	 of	 educating	 the	 American	
population	 about	 Iranian	 history	 and	 culture	 but	 also	 of	 passing	 an	 appreciated	
Iranian	 culture	 and	 identity	 on	 to	 the	 second	 generation,	 who	 have	 experienced	
post‐9/11	 hostility,	 while	 re‐educating	 those	 first‐generation	 Iranian	 Americans	
who	have	experienced	assimilation.	(Malek,	2011)	
Malek	 argues	 that	while	 processions	 or	 parades	 are	 not	 a	 traditional	 element	 of	 Iranian	
celebrations,	 these	 celebrations	 are	 repurposed	 as	 a	 performative	 public	 practice	within	
the	 context	 of	 American	 tradition	 of	 the	 city	 parade	 (2011).	While	 no	 such	 single	 public	
Norooz	event	stands	out	in	LA	in	quite	the	same	way	as	the	street	parade	does	in	New	York,	
the	various	bases	 for	Norooz’s	 recognition	by	different	bodies	has	brought	 it	 a	degree	of	
public	acknowledgement	in	LA	that	goes	far	beyond	it	being	known	simply	within	Iranian	
American	 family	 settings.	 The	 public	 celebration	 of	 Norooz	 in	 LA	 and	 the	 US	 becomes	
increasingly	 entwined	 into	 the	 local	 and	 national	 institutions,	 such	 that	 its	 cultural	 and	
political	elements	make	it	an	institutional	performance	of	Iranian	American‐ness.		
The	most	significant	instance	of	institutional	recognition	for	Norooz	came	in	the	form	of	the	
national‐level	 “Norooz	 Resolution.”74	 The	 below	 excerpts	 are	 taken	 from	 the	 Norooz	
Resolution	 H.Res.267	 that	 was	 introduced	 in	 2009	 by	 Democratic	 Representative	 Mike	
Honda,	and	passed	in	March	2010	by	the	House	of	Representatives.	In	the	same	month,	the	
US	Senate	 then	passed	a	 similar	 resolution	 (S.Res.463).	This	move	was	celebrated	by	 the	
Iranian	 American	 organizations,	 National	 Iranian	 American	 Council	 (NIAC),	 and	 Public	
																																																								
74	Another	example	from	the	local	level	of	the	city	of	LA	was	in	2011,	when	the	City	Council	hosted	a	Norooz	
celebration	and	the	Mayor	of	Los	Angeles	gave	a	speech	at	City	Hall	in	Downtown	LA	for	Norooz.	This	yearly	
local	ceremony	reflects	the	political	sway	of	“the	community”	of	Iranian	Americans	in	LA.	This	was	reported	
by	the	LA	Times	in	March	2011	
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Affairs	 Alliance	 of	 Iranian	 Americans	 (PAAIA).	 These	 organizations	 publicized	 their	
Washington	representatives’	involvement	in	the	bill’s	progression.	The	bill’s	many	Iranian	
American	 supporters	 had	 participated	 in	 the	 letter‐	 and	 email‐writing	 campaigns	 in	 the	
run‐up	to	this	event.	
In	539	B.C.,	Cyrus	the	Great	established	one	of	the	earliest	charters	on	human	rights,	
which	 abolished	 slavery	 and	 allowed	 for	 freedom	 of	 religion,	 and	 this	 marker	 in	
Iranian	 history	 has	 had	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 respect	 for	 human	 rights	 that	
Iranian‐Americans	carry	today…	
The	 United	 States	 is	 a	 melting	 pot	 of	 ethnicities	 and	 religion[s]	 and	 Nowruz75	
contributes	 [to]	 the	 richness	 of	 American	 culture	 and	 is	 consistent	 with	 our	
founding	principles	of	peace	and	prosperity	for	all.	
In	 parallel	 to	 the	 successful	 national	 campaign	 for	 the	Norooz	 Resolution,	 October	 2009	
saw	the	Norooz	festival	proclaimed	by	UNESCO	as	part	of	“Intangible	Cultural	Heritage	of	
Humanity.”	Within	this	 framework,	Norooz	was	designated	as	the	“heritage	of	humanity,”	
while	in	parallel	the	Resolution	claimed	Norooz	as	the	heritage	of	people	of	Iranian	descent	
currently	 living	 in	 the	 US.	 For	 nationally‐oriented	 Iranian	 American	 organizations	 like	
PAAIA	and	NIAC,	 the	UNESCO	decision	was	used	to	additionally	bolster	the	campaign	for	
the	Norooz	Resolution.76		
																																																								
75	The	different	spellings	of	Norooz	are	chosen	by	different	organs	and	individuals.	In	direct	quotes	I	use	the	
spelling	of	the	source	I	use.	In	all	other	instances	I	use	what	I	think	is	the	closest	English	transliteration	to	the	
Farsi	pronunciation	and	a	commonly	used	version	of	the	spelling	i.e.	Norooz.	This	is	also	one	of	the	ways	in	
which	I	saw	the	word	being	spelled.	While	UNESCO	sanctions	the	use	of	various	spellings,	these	also	refer	to	
diverse	pronunciations	of	the	word	by	various	practitioners	of	this	ritual	across	the	region	and	not	
necessarily	different	spellings	of	the	same	word	used	by	Iranians.	The	official	and	everyday	spellings	of	
Norooz	remain	a	moderate	source	of	contention,	which	I	also	noticed	in	the	field.	BM:	Does	this	work?	Could	
you	not	still	take	one	spelling,	acknowledging	that	there	are	different	ones	around?	
76	Norooz	is	practiced	as	part	of	interpersonal	relationships,	in	private	settings,	and	in	groups	of	Iranian	
Americans	with	shared	practices	and	understandings	of	the	celebration.	It	hearkens	to	an	ancient	past	that	
predates	both	the	Iranian	nation‐state	and	the	introduction	of	Islam	and	is	therefore	a	relatively	successful	
unifier	of	Iranians	of	different	political	and	religious	denominations.	This	is	an	important	part	of	why	it	was	
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The	 Norooz	 Resolution	 draws	 a	 discursive	 link	 between	 the	 ancient	 Persian	 King,	 the	
values	 of	 Iranians	 in	 the	 US	 today,	 and	 the	 “founding	 principles”	 of	 the	 US	 nation‐state	
evident	 in	 “American	 culture.”	 77	 The	 adoption	 of	 the	 Norooz	 Resolution	 integrates	 an	
ancient	 Persian	 past	 into	 an	 American	 national	 past.	 This	 reflects	 what	 Baumann	 calls	
“encompassment,”	 one	 of	 the	 “grammars	 of	 alterity”	 he	 identifies	 (Baumann,	 2004).	 He	
defines	this	as	a	hierarchical	modaility	of	inclusion	in	which	self‐styled	others	(in	this	case,	
Iranian	immigrants)	become	part	of	the	identity	doing	the	encompassing	of	their	difference	
(Americans).78	In	so	doing,	 it	subsumes	Iranian‐ness	under	the	“melting‐pot”	of	American	
nationhood	in	the	present.	79	
Iranian	American	organizations	themselves	also	contribute	to	and	reinforce	this	grammar	
of	 encompassment	 by	 increased	 orientation	 of	 institutionalized	 practices	 of	 Iranian	
American‐ness	 towards	 American	 audiences.	 Ghorashi	 has	 pointed	 out	 a	 similar	
orientation	 with	 the	 Mehregan	 Festival	 in	 Orange	 County	 (Ghorashi,	 2004).	 As	 she	 also	
suggests,	this	choice	by	the	organization	reflects	a	gain	in	collective	minority	recognition	as	
well	as	absolving	Iranians	of	 links	to	“terrorism,”	so	as	not	to	jeopardize	being	subsumed	
into	 American‐ness	 as	 an	 Iranian	 subgroup.	 As	 Iranian‐ness	 becomes	 subsumed	 into	
American‐ness	through	utilizations	of	Norooz,	Iranian	American‐ness	also	comes	to	enjoy	
greater	and	broader	public	recognition.80	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
and	is	an	effective	node	around	which	to	mobilize	support	for	collective	recognition	in	the	public	realm	for	
Iranians	in	the	diaspora.		
77 Leaving	aside	the	questions	raised	by	the	American	nation	encompassing	a	set	of	principles	that	are	framed	
as	predating	the	nation	itself	
78	This	is	reminiscent	of	the	recognition	that	other	minority	groups	receive	in	designations	such	as	Jewish	
Heritage	month,	Black	history	month,	and	other	accreditations	by	the	US	government	that	acknowledge	the	
lineage	of	particular	minority	groups	in	conjunction	with	the	history	of	the	American	nation.	The	Resolution	
lends	credence	to	American	nationhood	and	its	narrative	of	being	consistently	inclusive	over	time.	
79	All	the	terms	quoted	here	are	taken	from	the	original	text	of	the	Resolution	
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hres267/text		
80	Kirshenblatt‐Gimblett	writes	about	heritage	in	the	form	of	“festivals	devoted	to	the	traditions	of	a	single	
ethnic	group”	and	sponsored	by	various	state,	local,	and	federal	agencies,	as	running	the	risk	of	promoting	a	
“banality	of	difference,”	neutralizing	difference	and	rendering	it	inconsequential,	while	participating	in	a	
“discourse	of	pluralism	and	unity	in	diversity.”	She	describes	“Americanization	organizations”	in	the	US	of	the	
early	20th	century	as	using	festivals	in	this	way	by	design	(Kirshenblatt‐Gimblett,	1998).	It	could	be	argued	
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The	phenomenon	of	Norooz	photo‐sharing	on	Facebook	is	set	in	this	broader	context	of	the	
ritual	celebration.	I	turn	now	to	describing	this	phenomenon	and	discussing	its	relation	to	
the	 wider	 setting.	 Many	 of	 my	 respondents’	 postings	 included	 photographs	 and	 home	
videos	 of	 themselves	 with	 family	 and	 others.	 But	 by	 and	 large	 these	 photos	 were	
specifically	 taken	 of	 the	haft	 sin.	 Haft	 sin	 is	 a	 decorative	 and	 symbolic	 altar81	 that	 is	 the	
central	 part	 of	 the	 celebration	of	Norooz	 and	what	much	of	 the	preparation	of	 the	 affair	
goes	into.	A	family’s	Haft	Sin	arrangement	is	typically	situated	in	a	central	living	area	of	the	
house	during	the	weeks	preceding	the	turn	of	the	New	Year.82	Like	the	rest	of	the	Norooz	
seasonal	celebrations,	haft	sin	 is	a	practice	transported	from	Iran	to	the	US	via	migration.	
And	the	posting	of	haft	sin	photos	on	Facebook	and	using	social	media	platforms	to	wish	
family	and	friends	happy	New	Year	more	seemed	to	be	increasingly	common.		
For	instance,	Shideh,	a	student	in	her	early	20s,	used	an	“app”	to	share	a	photograph	of	a	
sabzeh83	 with	 a	 group	 of	 about	 15	 friends.	 Sabzeh	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 of	 the	
objects	arranged	on	the	haft	sin	table.84	The	text	accompanying	Shideh’s	message	sent	with	
the	 app	 read:	 “I've	 sent	 you	 a	 هزبѧѧѧѧѧѧس	 [sabzeh]	 using	 عیدی	 [eidi]	 (the	 seasonal	 gift‐giving	
app)!	Accept	this	gift	and	send	one	back!”	Aside	from	the	app	that	allowed	elements	of	the	
altar	 to	be	sent,	Haft	sin	photos	 taken	by	people	of	 their	own	haft	sin	 tables	were	mostly	
posted	via	Facebook	or	emailed	among	 friends	and	acquaintances.	Aryana	sent	a	haft	sin	
photograph	to	a	 list	of	recipients	during	 the	run‐up	to	the	 festive	season,	having	adapted	
the	photograph	into	a	digital	postcard	that	appeared	as	an	attachment	visible	in	her	email.	
The	 text	 across	 the	 top	 of	 the	 photo	 read:	 “Noroozetan	 Pirooz!”	 (“Merry	 Norooz!”	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
that	festivals	like	Mehregan	and	initatives	like	the	Norooz	Resolution	do	as	much	to	include	difference	as	they	
do	to	render	it	a	banal	part	of	American	nationhood.	
81 Haft	Sin	is	a	ritual	altar	that	is	prepared	for	the	celebration	of	the	Persian	new	year.	It	consists	of	a	table	
with	seven	(in	Persian	haft	means	seven)	objects	beginning	with	the	Persian	alphabet	letter	S	(pronounced:	
sin).		
82	The	turn	of	the	year	occurs	at	the	yearly	spring	equinox	which	takes	place	on	a	day	in	the	late	March.	
83	Sabzeh	is	a	dish	of	wheat	germ	that	is	decoratively	tied	in	ribbon,	usually	a	red	one,	as	in	the	case	of	
Shideh’s	photograph	
84	It	was	not	clear	in	all	cases	whether	the	photographs	had	been	taken	in	one’s	own	family	house,	one’s	place	
of	residence,	or	whether	their	posters	had	taken	these	photos	themselves	at	all	or	(re)used	them	from	
elsewhere	on	the	internet.		
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transliterated	in	English	script).	At	the	bottom	of	the	photo	was	a	text	 in	English	wishing	
the	recipient	a	happy	new	year,	under	which	her	name	was	signed.	The	photo	signaled	a	
new	trend	that	Aryana	kept	up	in	following	years.	The	photos	with	text	incorporated	into	
them	replaced	the	previous	year’s	purely	text‐based	email	message	for	the	same	occasion.	
The	 photographs	 added	 a	 visual	 element	 to	 the	 widespread,	 ritual	 well‐wishing	 on	 and	
email	Facebook	that	is	typical	of	this	period.	And	this	visual	addition	fit	well	with	conveying	
the	 visual	 components	 of	 the	 ornamental	 haft	 sin	 altars,	 each	 decorated	 with	 care	 and	
elaborately	arranged	to	into	colorful	and	attractive	compositions.		
	
Figure	3	Photograph	posted	by	Atiya	via	Instagram	application	with	caption:	
“Happy	New	Year!	Eid	mobarak!	لاѧѧس	وѧѧن	کراѧѧѧبم”	
It	became	apparent	with	the	annual	repetition	that	my	respondents’	practices	of	“tagging”,	
emailing,	 using	 a	 specific	 Norooz	 “app”	 on	 Facebook,	 or	 posting	 photographs	 to	 their	
profiles	were	 becoming	 part	 of	 the	 Norooz	 celebration	 itself.	 Some	 even	 commented	 on	
Facebook	about	the	experience	–	or	anticipation	of	the	experience	–	of	seeing	so	many	haft	
sin	photographs	in	their	Facebook	“news	feeds.”	The	haft	sin	altar	is	typically	situated	in	my	
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respondents’	 parental	 houses,	 and	 often	 not	 something	 they,	 themselves,	 take	 part	 in	
assembling.	 However,	 this	 photo‐posting	 practice	 was	 a	 way	 in	 which	 my	 second‐
generation	 respondents	 played	 an	 active	 part	 in	 perpetuating	 Norooz.	 The	 practice	 of	
sharing	haft	 sin	 altar	photos	 is	by	no	means	 limited	 to	 the	 second	generation	or	 even	 to	
those	 living	 outside	 Iran.	However,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 practice	 in	 this	 context	 brings	with	 it	
particular	implications.		
For	instance,	investing	preparation	into	personalized	messages	and	imagery	for	circulation	
such	 as	 selecting	 a	 list	 of	 email	 recipients,	 preparing	 a	 personalized	message	 and	 edited	
image,	or	crafting	a	posting	for	one’s	Facebook	“timeline”/“wall,”etc.	bring	a	more	personal	
side	to	the	practice.	This	was	most	clearly	evident	with	Atiya’s	haft	sin	table	as	shared	via	a	
photograph	 on	 the	 Instagram	 social	media	 platform,	 and	 resposted	 to	 Facebook.	 Atiya’s	
photograph	is	stylized	with	a	filter	from	the	Instagram	program	and	features	a	haft	sin	that	
includes	a	framed	photograph	of	her	father.	Atiya’s	father	passed	away	since	I	first	met	her	
in	2009	and	the	portrait	of	him	included	in	the	celebratory	Norooz	altar	was	a	way	for	her	
and	 her	 family	 members	 to	 remember	 him	 as	 part	 of	 the	 family	 during	 a	 time	 that	 is	
typically	dedicated	to	being	around	loved	ones.	Placing	photographs	of	family	members	on	
the	Norooz	altar	was	not	uncommon	among	my	 respondents.	 In	Aitya’s	 case,	 the	 framed	
photo	on	the	altar	celebrates	Norooz	not	only	by	remembering	and	perpetuating	an	ancient	
ritual,	 but	 also	 by	 remembering	 an	 absent	 family	member	whose	presence	 is	 invoked	 in	
spirit.85	Atiya’s	 family’s	haft	sin	altar	 is	 customized	with	her	 father’s	photograph,	but	 she	
both	personalizes	 it	and	participates	 in	 its	making	herself	 through	posting	 the	 Instagram	
photograph	of	the	haft	sin	(also	on	Facebook).	
																																																								
85	I	also	noticed	that	in	Shiva’s	living	room	at	her	parents’	house,	the	haft	sin	altar	was	arranged	in	front	of	an	
array	of	family	photos	of	herself	and	her	siblings.	The	practice	of	using	photos	of	people	in	or	around	the	haft	
sin	display	is	a	demonstration	of	family	ties,	especially	in	spite	of	the	absence	of	some	family	members.	This	
absence	can	be	due	to	death	in	the	case	of	Atiya’s	father,	or	because	of	migration	and	transnational	families.	
Though	these	are	diverse	modes	of	remembering	family	members/relationships	through	Haft	Sin,	connecting	
to	an	ancient	past	becomes	a	practice	through	which	the	specific	sociality	of	Iranian	family	relations	is	
ceremoniously	reinforced.		
118	
	
In	addition	to	the	personalization/customization	of	the	photograph,	this	practice	of	posting	
photos	of	haft	sin	also	translates	them	from	the	private	space	of	people’s	homes,	in	which	
they	are	typically	situated,	to	the	format	of	a	digital	media	platform.	What	would	otherwise	
have	been	a	sight	only	for	those	in	the	physical	presence	of	the	altar	in	the	domestic	setting	
is	 extended	 into	 a	 different	 social	 sphere	when	 shared	on	 Instagram	 and	Facebook.	 In	 a	
way	comparable	to	other	public	renditions	of	Norooz,	this	use	of	social	media	extends	the	
practice	 to	broader	audiences	of	social	 contacts,	 including	non‐Iranian	Americans.	 In	 line	
with	this	practice,	Turmeric	and	Saffron	is	a	popular	food	blog	run	by	an	Iranian	American	
woman	 that,	 over	 the	 past	 few	 years,	 has	 provided	 basic	 explanations	 that	 are	 easily	
accessible	 to	 non‐Iranian	 audiences	 while	 focusing	 on	 the	 culinary	 side	 of	 the	 seasonal	
celebration.	The	site	also	posts	many	haft	sin	photos	each	year	that	are	continuous	with	the	
style	 of	 the	 photographs	 it	 posts	 of	 food	on	 a	 regular	 basis.	 The	blog’s	Norooz	 post	was	
shared	on	Facebook	by	one	of	my	respondents	and	reposted,	for	instance,	by	the	Facebook	
page	of	another	Iranian	American	digital	publication.		
I	 see	 the	 sharing	 of	 Norooz	 photos	 as	 reflecting	 claims	 to	 Iranian‐ness	 through	 public	
celebration	for	a	mixed	audience.	 In	this	sense,	 they	are	similar	 to	the	Norooz	Resolution	
and	 celebrations	 of	 Norooz	 as	 Iranian	 heritage.	 The	 American	 audience	 is	 present	 and	
important	here	as	well,	although	it	is	defined	less	as	local‐	and	national‐level	policymakers,	
or	 Los	 Angelino	 museumgoers,	 but	 more	 in	 terms	 of	 blog	 followers/readers,	 Facebook	
friends,	 and	 email	 recipients.	 The	 practice	 parallels	 the	 dually	 intimate	 and	 public	
orientations	 that	 Norooz	 has	 more	 generally,	 and	 seems	 to	 merge	 them	 into	 a	 single	
practice.	It	is	neither	a	private/intimate	family	setting,	nor	an	official	public	campaign.	The	
disparity	 is,	 however,	 that	 it	 reflects	 a	 more	 diffuse	 and	 unofficial	 modality	 of	 claiming	
difference.	Norooz	photo‐sharing	among	my	respondents	 reflects	a	much	more	effortless	
and	 circumstantial	 overlap	 between	 Iranian‐ness	 and	 American‐ness	 through	 ritual	
remembering.	 This	 performance	 neither	 seems	 to	 ask	 for	 Iranian‐ness	 to	 be	 subsumed	
under	American‐ness,	nor	to	be	excluded	or	distinct	from	it.	It	seems	to	propose	a	grammar	
of	 inclusion	 that	 is	 different	 than	 the	 “encompassment”	 that	 official	 and	 formalized	
celebrations	emphasize.		
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This	 web	 usage	 produces	 a	 particular	 mode	 of	 claiming	 difference.	 Digital	 objects	 have	
their	 own	 physical	 and	 aesthetic	 qualities	 that	 produce	 their	 “affectual	 tone”	 (Cameron,	
2007).	They	are	more	 than	merely	a	referent	 that	 is	 “a	servant	 to	 the	 ‘real.’”	 (ibid).	They	
represent	a	facet	of	how	much	respondents	become	“do‐ers”	of	heritage	performance	with	
the	help	of	web	applications.86	Nevertheless,	while	digital	objects	appear	to	produce	their	
own	 kind	 of	 reality,87	 physical	 objects	 still	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 ways	 people	 seek	
engagement	with	the	past.	This	web	practice	of	photo‐sharing	reinforces	the	significance	of	
the	 material	 practice	 of	 heritage	 ritual	 performance	 in	 families	 that	 is	 being	 digitally	
referenced.	I	also	elaborate	on	this	point	later	in	the	chapter.	Here	I	have	taken	Norooz	as	a	
collective	ritual	practice	of	connecting	with	the	past	to	describe	how	my	second‐generation	
respondents	 use	 internet	 to	 actively	 adapt,	 style,	 and	 extend	 this	 ritual	 to	make	 it	 their	
own.	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 my	 respondents	 use	 internet	 to	 produce	 their	 own	 stylized	
adaptation	 of	 established	 versions	 of	 the	 past,	while	 using	 it	 to	 claim	 difference	 in	 their	
own	way.	 In	 the	 following	 I	 show	how	my	respondents	also	do	 this	with	 the	 Iranian	and	
American	national	histories	they	learn	about.	
	
	“Heritage	learners”	
At	college,	my	respondents	sometimes	 learn	about	an	Iranian	past	 that	overlaps	with	the	
learning	that	happens	within	their	families.	Sarah	is	an	undergraduate	 law	student	in	her	
20s	 who	 has	 graduated	 from	 college	 since	 I	 met	 her.	 As	 she	 explains	 in	 the	 following	
passage,	 learning	 about	 Norooz	 within	 the	 context	 of	 an	 elective	 college	 course	 was	
different	than	learning	about	it	via	her	parents.		
																																																								
86 As Smith argues, the “idea of performativity highlights the emotional and physical experience of heritage and 
stresses the idea of ‘doing’” (L. Smith, 2006). Seeing heritage as performance emphasizes how something becomes 
heritage through the process of being part of the doing of the performance. Hence, the way Norooz becomes 
heritage for the second generation also includes internet mediation. 
87 When I state that digital objects produce their own kind of reality I refer to Cameron’s reference to Gordon 
Graham’s 1999 notion of the “virtual” not being “a semblance of something else, but an alternative type of entity 
with properties similar and dissimilar to those with which it is contrasted” (Cameron, 2007).  
120	
	
I	knew	there	was	a	Persian	empire,	but	I	didn’t	know	details,	I	never	considered	the	
strategy	and	art	of	it.	But	now	I	studied	it	formally…	I	was	telling	my	parents	about	
the	 Persian	 Empire.	 Even	 things	 like	 Eid	 and	 Norooz.	 I	 finally	 considered	 the	
importance	behind	them.	
Someone	 like	 Sarah	 learns	 about	 the	 Iranian	 past	 from	 a	 different	 vantage	 point	 than	
students	without	 an	 Iranian	 background	 in	 the	 same	 class,	 but	 also	 differently	 than	 her	
fellow	 students	who	 grew	 up	 in	 Iran.	 In	 American	 higher	 educational	 institutions,	 some	
students	are	defined	as	“heritage	learners.”	These	are	students	who	learn	either	a	language	
that	 their	 family	members	are	native	speakers	of	or	a	 language	 that	 they	have	grown	up	
with	 linguistic/cultural	 exposure	 to.	 Debates	 over	 “heritage	 languages”	 and	 “heritage	
learners”	 in	 the	US	 education	 system	have	 received	much	 scholarly	 and	policy	 attention.	
And	there	has	been	a	shift	within	institutions	towards	curricula	that	cover	the	languages	of	
the	 dominant	 immigrant	 populations	 in	 the	 US.	 A	 degree	 of	 exposure	 to	 the	 language	 is	
assumed	among	“heritage	learners,”	while	also	acknowledging	that	the	“heritage	language”	
is	 their	second	 language	after	English	(Van	Deusen‐Scholl,	2003).88	The	discourse	around	
“heritage	 learners”	 is	 also	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 “right”	 to	 learn	 the	 language	 of	 one’s	
forefathers	 alongside	 English,	 thus	 being	 a	 pedagogical	 term	 that	 also	 highlights	 certain	
students’	distinctiveness	in	the	American	context.		
I	see	the	status	of	“heritage	learner”	as	useful	for	the	particular	case	of	understanding	the	
second	 generation,	 and	 more	 broadly	 applicable	 to	 those	 second‐generation	 Iranian	
Americans	who	show	an	interest	in	learning	about	Iran	within	their	formal	institutions	of	
higher	 learning	 in	 the	 US.	 I	 thus	 borrow	 the	 term	 and	 take	 it	 beyond	 the	 sphere	 of	
language‐learning,	 applying	 it	 to	 learning	 about	 the	 Iranian	 past.	 For	 Sarah,	 as	 for	many	
others	 I	 spoke	with,	 the	 interest	 in	 learning	 about	 her	 Iranian	background	became	most	
																																																								
88	Teaching	heritage	languages	in	established	American	institutions	of	higher	learning	is	different	in	terms	of	
these	debates	from	the	teaching	of	heritage	languages	in	dedicated	language	schools	(often	restricted	to	
younger	children	of	high	school	age	and	younger),	which	tend	to	be	set	up	as	private	businesses.	Regardless,	
the	significant	involvement	of	some	of	my	respondents	in	the	projects	for	setting	up	and	developing	language	
resources	and	teaching	to	younger	heritage	learners	was	something	I	observed	as	part	of	their	(professional)	
service	to	“the	community”	but	is	not	something	I	discuss	in	this	book.		
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pronounced	during	their	college	years.	The	passage	quoted	above	is	how	she	spoke	about	a	
course	she	took	early	on	in	her	program	about	the	Achaemenid	Empire	(559‐330	BC).	The	
additional	“importance”	she	now	associates	with	the	Persian	Empire	and	Eid‐e	Norooz	as	a	
result	 of	 learning	 “the	 details”	 leaves	 an	 impression	 on	 her.	 This	 is	 an	 impression	 she	
subsequently	conveys	to	her	parents,	extending	her	role	from	that	of	learner	to	teacher	in	
the	home.	As	Sarah’s	comment	suggests,	 the	university	as	a	new	source	of	 learning	about	
Iran	reshapes	her	 relationship	with	 the	 Iranian	past.	As	Sarah’s	example	suggests,	young	
members	 of	 the	 second	 generation	 are	 not	 only	 on	 the	 student/learning	 end	 of	 these	
academic	settings.	Some	of	my	respondents	became	active	curators	of	knowledge	as	they	
cross‐cut	 formal	 educational	 and	 activist	 goals	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 shaping	 heritage	
learning	trajectories	and	agendas.		
For	 instance,	 the	 annual	 “Iranian	 diaspora”	 conferences	 organized	 by	 Iranian	 American	
Alliances	 Across	 Borders	 (IAAB)	 devotes	 attention	 to	 pedagogical	 approaches	 that	 serve	
the	 second	 generation	 as	 “heritage	 learners.”89	 The	 2012	 panels	 on	 teaching	 at	 the	
conference	 held	 in	 LA	 included	 “Education	 in	 Diaspora:	 Pedagogical	 Questions	 and	
Possibilities”	 and	 included	 experts	 in	 immigrant	 education	 like	 Shirin	 Vossoughi,	 post‐
doctoral	fellow	at	Stanford	University,	among	the	panelists.	IAAB’s	investment	in	tailoring	
pedagogical	 approaches	 to	 heritage	 learners	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 its	members’/participants’	
academic	work,	but	is	also	applied	in	their	projects	such	as	their	leadership	camps	for	(pre‐
)college	 age	 groups	 (including	 Camp	 Ayandeh,	 Camp	 Javan).	 Former	 LA‐based	 second‐
generation	 Iranian	 American,	 Dr.	 Vossoughi’s	 involvement	 with	 IAAB’s	 projects	 reflects	
these	 interlocking	 academic	 and	 applied	 roles	 in	 her	 involvement	 with	 directing	 and	
advising	 camp	 activities	 and	 curricula	 alongside	 and	 in	 conjunction	 with	 her	 academic	
pursuits.	In	2011,	Shirin	wrote	a	piece	for	the	Middle	East	current	affairs	analysis	website,	
Jadaliyya.com,	about	the	pedagogical	philosophy	behind	Camp	Ayandeh.	In	it,	she	discusses	
a	number	of	goals	behind	the	approach	this	camp	adopts.	One	of	them	is	the	following:	
																																																								
89	By	and	large	the	panel	only	used	the	term	in	the	linguistic	sense,	largely	because	learning	history	and	
Iranian	culture	tends	to	be	incorporated	into	language	classes	in	the	curricula	being	discussed	at	the	
conference	
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[L]earning	about	oneself	and	one’s	history	 is	 fundamentally	 connected	 to	building	
solidarity	 with	 others.	 At	 Camp	 Ayandeh,	 we	 emphasize	 the	 world	 of	
diversity	within	the	terms	“Iranian”	and	“American,”	making	explicit	reference	to	the	
rich	histories	of	 communities	of	 color	 in	 the	United	States.	Many	camp	organizers	
are	 students	 of	 Ethnic	 and	Women’s	 Studies,	 borrowing	 and	 refashioning	 tools	 to	
make	 sense	 of	 our	 experiences	 as	 Iranian	 Americans(…)	 Many	 students	 express	
frustration	at	the	negative	portrayal	of	Muslim	and	Middle	Eastern	communities	in	
the	 media.	 Almost	 all	 can	 relay	 a	 personal	 experience	 of	 discrimination,	 from	
teachers	mockingly	mispronouncing	their	names	to	being	attacked	and	labeled	as	a	
“terrorist.”	Camp	Ayandeh	seeks	to	provide	a	safe	space	for	critically	analyzing	and	
healing	from	these	experiences.90	
This	passage	makes	clear	the	ways	history	learning	is	approached	as	part	of	being	Iranian	
American.	History	 is	put	to	use	 in	the	context	of	a	summer	 leadership	camp	by	and	 large	
made	up	of	second‐generation	high	school	students,	and	run	by	second‐generation	college	
and	 graduate	 students.	 Its	 purpose	 is	 countering	 experiences	 of	 racial/ethnic	
discrimination	that	Iranian	American	students	are	said	to	face.	And	this	goal	is	furthered	by	
forging	connections	to	groups	with	different	but	parallel	immigrant	histories	in	the	US;	that	
is,	“building	solidarity”	with	“communities	of	color	in	the	US.”	Emphasizing	the	connections	
that	cross	Iranian	and	other	immigrant	experiences	is	also	something	Dr.	Neda	Maghbouleh	
pleads	for.	Neda	is	also	a	second‐generation	Iranian	American	who	spent	a	significant	part	
of	her	life	in	Southern	California.	Her	dissertation	in	sociology,	completed	at	the	University	
of	 California	 Santa	Barbara,	draws,	 in	part,	 on	 fieldwork	 conducted	at	Camp	Ayandeh.	 In	
her	work,	she	calls	for	further	contextualizing	and	historicizing	the	experiences	of	Iranian	
Americans	within	the	broader	context	of	US	immigration.	The	impetus	to	connect	with	the	
other	 immigrant	histories	 in	America	thus	emerges	as	an	important	part	of	being	Iranian	
American.	But	 in	order	 to	make	this	connection,	some	feel	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 first	 tell	and	
																																																								
90	Vossoughi,	Shirin,	“Inhabiting	the	Possible:	Pedagogy	and	Solidarity	at	Camp	Ayandeh,”	(accessed	1/12/14)	
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record	 the	 stories	 of	 Iranian	Americans	 about	 their	own	experiences.	 Some	people	 see	 a	
lack	in	the	extent	to	which	such	stories	have	been	collected	and	seek	to	remedy	it.		
Projects	like	IAAB’s	Oral	History	Initiative,	set	up	as	a	way	to	document	the	wide	range	of	
Iranian	American	migration	experiences	through	storytelling,	is	a	way	in	which	personal	or	
family	 histories	 are	 seen	 as	 filling	 the	 gaps	 in	 knowledge	 about	 Iranian	 Americans’	
presence	 in	 the	 US	 over	 time.	 This	 remembering	 is	 used	 as	 a	 way	 to	 establish	 Iranian	
Americans	 as	 an	 immigrant	 group	 and	 build	 a	 sense	 of	 collective	 presence.	 To	 this	 end,	
IAAB’s	 2012	 Diaspora	 Conference	 also	 had	 a	 panel	 on	 “the	 various	 oral,	 visual,	 and	
multimedia	histories	being	collected	by	Iranian	diaspora.”	The	Oral	Histories	Initiative	also	
uses	digital	audio	visual	recordings	of	interviews	and	statements	as	part	of	the	project.	The	
use	of	 digital	media	 as	part	of	 storytelling	 about	 immigrant	 experiences	 is	perhaps	most	
evident	 in	 the	 2013	 release	 of	 Iran	 Ardalan’s	 The	 Persian	 Square,	 an	 e‐book	 for	 iPad.	
Ardalan’s	 “digital	 book”	uses	 text,	music,	 audio,	 and	video	material	 “to	 illustrate	 the	 rich	
history	 that	Americans	 and	 Iranians	 share	 together.”	Working	 collaboratively	with	 other	
authors	 and	 other	 Iranian	 American	 contributors,	 including	 those	 from	 the	 second	
generation,	Ardalan	pieces	 together	 a	book	designed	 as	 a	multimedia	 collage	of	 snippets	
touching	on	the	various	artistic,	 journalistic,	and	scientific,	work	as	well	as	public	service	
and	other	efforts	of	Iranian	Americans.	It	also	captures	historical	information,	both	pivotal	
and	seemingly	trivial,	 that	marks	the	 intersections	between	Iranian	and	American	people	
and	“culture.”		
This	 project	 further	 illustrates	 the	 interest	 in	 telling	 and	 recording	 what	 are	 largely	
considered	 under‐documented	 histories	 by	 the	 most	 active	 and	 invested	 of	 my	
respondents.	 These	 projects	 call	 for	 recognition	 and	 self‐knowledge	 in	 the	 present,	
suggesting	 that	 “[t]he	 contents,	 interpretations	 and	 representations	 of	 the	 [past	 as	 a]	
resource	are	selected	according	to	the	demands	of	the	present”	(Graham	&	Howard,	2012:	
2).	 In	 this	 case,	 those	 demands	 implicitly	 revolve	 around	 inclusion.	 In	 an	 NPR	 radio	
interview,	Ardalan	expressly	states	that	an	important	purpose	of	the	book	‐‐	in	line	with	the	
other	 initiatives	 mentioned	 –	 is	 to	 help	 young	 people	 overcome	 the	 shame	 or	
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embarrassment	they	have	about	being	Iranian	American	and	to	build	connections	with	one	
another.	Creating	a	 collaborative	 record	of	who	 Iranian	Americans	are	 is	part	of	 shaping	
the	contents	and	interpretations	of	the	past	in	order	to	use	it	as	a	resource	for	establishing	
young	Iranian	Americans	as	part	of	 the	history	of	the	US,	and	particularly	LA.	The	title	of	
Ardalan’s	 book	 testifies	 to	 LA’s	 importance	 with	 its	 reference	 to	 the	 Westwood	
intersection’s	 common	 name,	 “Persian	 Square”91	 (a	 play	 on	 the	 Downtown	 Pershing	
Square),	where	 the	oldest	 Iranian	business	 in	 the	 city	 is	 located.	The	 commemoration	of	
people,	 sites,	 and	 their	 stories	 establishes	 an	 Iranian	 immigrant	 past	 in	 the	 US	 to	 draw	
upon	through	a	digital	multimedia	product.		
This	kind	of	project	 can	be	seen	as	a	 form	of	 “community	 co‐creation,”	 to	use	Russo	and	
Watkins’	 term	 (2007).	 The	 authors	 see	 “community	 co‐creation”	 as	 coming	 about	 when	
there	 is	 a	 shift	 from	 professional	 curators	 working	 with	 digital	 media	 in	 cultural	
institutions	that	tell	stories	about	communities,	 toward	community	members	telling	their	
own	stories	through	digital	media.	According	to	them,	this	shift	also	marks	change	in	“the	
audience	experience	 from	cultural	consumption	to	cultural	production”	(2007:	152).	This	
takes	place	through	the	development	of	“new	literacies”	that	require	a	range	of	interactive	
participation	 (Russo	 &	 Watkins,	 2007).	 In	 this	 case,	 key	 (second	 generation)	 Iranian	
American	 actors	 are	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 producing	 digital	 renditions	 of	 Iranian	American	
history	and	 thus	partaking	 in	 “community	 co‐creation.”	They	 take	up	 the	 role	of	 cultural	
curators	on	their	own	behalf.92		
Personal	histories	are	evidently	an	important	vehicle	for	documenting	diasporic	pasts.	But	
they	are	not	alone.	A	very	different	but	equally	important	example	of	documenting	the	past	
																																																								
91	See	also	mention	of	“Persian	Square”	in	Chapter	1.	
92	Indeed,	in	addition	to	taking	up	the	role	of	cultural	curators	on	their	own	behalf,	other	examples	have	
shown	how	they	then	seek	out	institutional	support	for	recognition	and	access	to	wider	audiences.	In	this	
way,	they	essentially	do	what	Russo	and	Watkins	describe	and	advocate,	but	then	in	the	opposite	order.	This	
is	because	of	the	general	experience	that	cultural	institutions	were/are	not	playing	an	active	role	in	telling	
their	stories	in	the	absence	of	their	self‐advocacy	through	their	own	story‐telling.	A	repeated	phrase	I	heard	
was,	“if	we	don’t	tell	our	own	stories,	who	will	tell	them	for	us?”	
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that	 also	 emerged	 in	 recent	 years	 is	 Encyclopædia	 Iranica93	 .	 Iranica	 is	 a	 project	 of	 Dr.	
Ehsan	 Yarshater,	 director	 of	 the	 Center	 for	 Iranian	 Studies	 at	 Columbia	 University.	 It	
receives	funding	from	the	National	Endowment	for	Humanities,	and	includes	work	from	a	
wide	range	of	academic	disciplines	studying	“Persian	life	and	culture.”	The	project	is	largely	
concerned	with	the	study	of	the	past,	and	it	describes	itself	in	the	following	way:		
The	Encyclopædia	Iranica	is	a	comprehensive	research	tool	dedicated	to	the	study	of	
Iranian	 civilization	 in	 the	Middle	 East,	 the	 Caucasus,	 Central	 Asia,	 and	 the	 Indian	
subcontinent.	
The	 project	 was	 widely	 supported	 among	 Iranian	 Americans,	 including	 many	 of	 my	
respondents.	 It	 represented	 an	 attempt	 to	 create	 a	 comprehensive	 and	 authoritative	
academic	document	produced	with	the	ambitious	aim	of	encompassing	Iranian	culture	and	
history	 in	 as	 much	 of	 its	 entirety	 as	 possible,	 enlisting	 the	 work	 of	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
experienced	scholars	from	relevant	areas.		
Every	four	months,	a	new	fascicle,	and	every	18	months,	a	new	volume	of	the	encyclopedia	
is	 published.	 In	 this	way,	 Iranica	 goes	 through	 the	 alphabet,	 printing	 volume	by	 volume.	
The	project	was	started	in	the	early	70s	by	Yarshater,	and	in	the	early	80s	the	first	fascicle	
was	 printed.	 In	 2011,	 when	 Iranica	 was	 covered	 by	 the	New	 York	 Times,	 Aryana	 wrote	
about	 Iranica	 on	her	 blog,	 describing	 it	 as	 “an	 encyclopedia	 of	 all	 things	 Iranian.”	But	 as	
Aryana	also	points	out,	it	is	not	only	a	printed	encyclopedia.	Iranica	is	interesting	because	it	
also	publishes	the	original	articles	on	the	Encyclopædia	Iranica		website.	The	website	was	
started	 in	1996	at	 iranica.com,	but	since	 then	 the	site’s	 features	and	 functions	have	been	
enhanced	 to	 resemble	 less	of	an	encyclopedic	 catalogue	with	pdf	 files	of	 the	entries,	 and	
more	 of	 an	 accessible,	 well‐designed,	 and	 typical	 website.	 To	 this	 end,	 it	 was	moved	 to	
iranicaonline.com,	 search	 and	 browsing	 functions	were	 enhanced,	 featured	 articles	were	
added	 to	 the	 homepage,	 a	 Facebook	 page	 was	 created,	 and	 content	 was	 added	 to	 the	
website	 that	 was	 not	 included	 in	 the	 printed	 version.	 The	 site	 also	 launched	 a	
																																																								
93	Encyclopædia	Iranica	http://www.iranicaonline.org/	(accessed	1/12/14).	
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crowdsourcing	 initiative	 to	 repair	 the	 broken	 links	 (hyperlinks	 that	 do	 not/no	 longer)	
work,	and	the	Facebook	page	is	set	up	to	encourage	interactive	usage	through	commenting,	
sharing,	 etc.	 The	 focus	 of	 the	 project,	 therefore,	 shifted	 over	 time	 toward	 making	 the	
content	accessible	via	the	website	in	a	conventional	and	navigable	web	format,	and	making	
use	of	the	interactive	affordances	of	social	media.	Interestingly,	however,	the	paper	version	
is	 still	 printed,	 even	 though	 this	 is	 done	 at	 a	 financial	 loss.	 The	 website	 offers	 this	
explanation	for	the	changing	relationship	between	the	two	arms	of	the	project.		
During	the	last	decade,	the	project's	priorities	have	moved	from	the	publication	of	a	
printed	 encyclopedia	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 free	 online	 database.	 The	 print	
edition,	 however,	 is	 being	 continued	 since	 the	 long‐term	 preservation	 of	 digitally	
born	contents	remains	a	challenge.			
While	web	usage	affords	 important	means	of	active	participation	and	reaching	audiences	
for	the	scholarly	material,	 the	“long‐term	preservation”	 is	done	through	the	printed	book	
volumes	 that	 encyclopedias	 remain	 known	 for.	 Through	 embedded	 hyperlinks	 via	 blogs	
and	websites,	 some	 of	my	 respondents	 cover	 and	 draw	 positive	 attention	 to	 the	 Iranica	
project,	as	well	as	integrate	its	information	into	their	own	projects.	For	instance,	the	site	of	
Ajam	 Media	 Collective,	 a	 site	 set	 up	 by	 second	 generation	 Iranian	 Americans,	 links	 to	
Iranica	on	its	homepage	via	the	picture	of	a	painted	Persian	miniature	depicting	two	men	in	
the	right	side	column.	It	is	a	link	to	the	Iranica	entry	“Homosexuality	in	Persian	Literature,”	
an	entry	that	highlights	the	gap	between	the	treatment	of	homosexuality	in	Islamic	law,	and	
in	 the	 Persian	 poetry	 including	 that	 of	 the	 Islamic	mystics.	 The	 same	 use	 of	 the	 printed	
historical	material	 is	 not	possible	 in	 the	 same	way	with	 the	physical,	 bound	and	printed	
version	of	 the	encyclopedia.	 I	discuss	 the	mission	and	content	of	Ajam	Media	Collective’s	
website	 further	 in	 the	 following	 section.	For	now,	 this	 example	 illustrates	how	using	 the	
knowledge	resources	of	a	comprehensive,	English	language	scholarly	canon	on	Iran	such	as	
Iranica	does	not	sit	at	odds	with	the	drive	toward	documenting	informal	personal	histories	
or	more	 activist	 awareness‐raising	 about	 certain	 Iranian	 pasts	 by	my	 second‐generation	
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respondents.	In	fact,	both	seem	to	mobilize	the	past	as	a	(re)source	for	self‐knowledge	as	
(diaspora)	Iranians.		
The	past	is	used	to	claim	recognition	via	a	combination	of	formal	educational	curricula	and	
scholarly	 authorities,	 and	 more	 emotionally‐informed	 and	 collectively‐oriented	 personal	
histories.	 Web	 usage	 allows	 information	 design	 and	 access	 that	 can	 be	 used	 in	 my	
respondents’	own	productions,	for	instance,	through	web‐linking	to	Encyclopædia	Iranica	,	
via	a	website	produced	by	some	of	my	respondents.	This	illustrates	how	“history	teaching	
and	heritage	education	–	in	the	fullest	sense	–	are	then	complementary	activities”	(Hamer,	
2005:	168).	 	Web	applications	become	implicated	in	these	activities	as	 information	about	
the	past	 is	 styled	 for	 and	by	 second‐generation	members,	 in	ways	 that	 contribute	 to	 the	
endeavor	for	engaging	with	the	past	as	a	path	to	self‐knowledge.94		
Previous	research	has	argued	that	second‐generation	youth	primarily	find	flaws	with	their	
academic	 learning,	 for	 instance,	 because	 it	 includes	 “little	 information	 on	 critical	 Iranian	
historical	 events”	 including	 coverage	 of	 the	 Persian	 Empire	 (Daha,	 2011:	 559).	 Daha	
characterizes	the	learning	in	“Persian	clubs”	or	other	students	groups	and	organizations	as	
a	 response	 to	 a	 “lack	 of	 curricular	 inclusion”	 that	 second	 generation	 Iranian	 Americans	
note	(2011).95	The	second‐generation	students	I	spoke	with	were	college	students	and	not	
in	 high	 school	 like	 Daha’s	 respondents.	 Their	 student	 organization	 activities	 and	
encounters	 with	 college	 curricula	 reflect	 enlightening	 experiences	 during	 their	 college	
education	periods	 regarding	 their	 relationships	 to	 Iranian	history,	politics,	 and	 language.	
																																																								
94	In	the	context	of	digital	learning,	the	role	of	digital	media	in	the	lives	of	youth	has	been	oriented	
understood	in	terms	of	children	‐‐	as	learners,	in	the	home	and	in	school	(Livingstone;	Buckingham;	
Buckingham	and	Scanlon).	In	the	cases	and	settings	I	discuss	in	this	section,	learners	are	not	easily	
distinguished	from	teachers.	This	gives	the	notion	of	“interactivity”	–	often	considered	important	if	not	key	
for	learning	with	the	help	of	digital	media	(see	Buckingham	&	Scanlon,	2005)	–	a	new	dimension.	Though	
valuable,	work	on	second‐generation	migrant	learning	with	the	use	of	digital	media	has	also	focused	on	
children	rather	than	second‐generation	adults	(e.g.	Leurs	&	Ponzanesi,	2011).	Yet	importantly	it	argues	for	
migrant	youths’	digital	learning	to	be	understood	in	conjunction	with	their	identity	formation	and	the	variety	
of	forms	of	digital	media	usage	through	which	this	takes	place.	The	focus	on	children	as	learners	rather	than	
teachers	means	less	attention	is	paid	to	the	ways	second‐generation	young	adults	take	up	and	use	digital	
media	elaborately	(and	sometimes	professionally)	to	teach	and	educate	their	younger	counterparts.	
95	Indeed,	some	of	my	respondents	advocate	further	broadening	of	Middle	Eastern	studies	and	Iranian	Studies	
university	curricula.	
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Their	 learning	 in	 Iranian	 student	 clubs	 often	 utilized	 literature	 from	 the	 curriculum	 and	
sometimes	 involved	 some	 of	 their	 more	 interested	 Iranian	 professors.	 While	 appeals	
among	 the	most	 involved	 students	 (including	 graduate	 students)	 for	 greater	 coverage	 of	
Iran	and	 Iranian	diaspora	 in	university	curricula,	 there	was	more	of	a	 synthesis	between	
the	existing	curricula	and	the	activities	of	Iranian	student	organizations.	Hence,	in	contrast	
with	Daha’s	account,	 less	of	an	opposition,	and	more	of	a	synthesis	was,	evident	between	
academic	learning	and	learning	as	part	of	a	more	explicitly	identity	politics‐driven	project.	
In	what	follows,	I	go	on	to	bring	together	the	points	made	so	far	in	this	section	about	the	
possibilities	and	limitations	of	web	applications	for	mobilizing	the	past	for	these	members	
of	the	second	generation.		
	
Securing	the	past	through	socially	(inter)active	remembering		
My	 respondents	 are	 fascinated	 and	 affectively	 invested	 in	 learning	 and	 teaching	 about	
intersecting	Iranian	and	American	pasts.	These	include	a	casual	yet	ritualized	performance	
of	 Iranian	 American‐ness	 on	 one’s	 own	 terms	 and	 a	 past	 that	 aligns	 their	 status	 as	
immigrant	 ethnic	minorities	with	 the	 histories	 of	 other	minority	 groups	 in	 the	US.	 From	
this	 it	 is	evident	that	“[h]eritage	is	not	only	a	social	and	cultural	resource	or	process,	but	
also	 a	 political	 one	 through	which	 a	 range	 of	 struggles	 are	 negotiated”	 (L.	 Smith,	 2006).	
They	 are	 actively	 involved	 in	 selecting	what	 past	 is	worthy	 of	 their	 engagement,	 and	 at	
times	that	means	challenging	dominant	systems	of	remembering/forgetting.		
These	struggles	and	negotiations	over	the	past	are	pivotal	to	processes	of	self‐making.	This	
reflects	Stuart	Hall’s	the	claim	that	“[i]dentities	are	the	names	we	give	to	the	different	ways	
we	are	positioned	by,	and	position	ourselves	within,	the	narratives	of	the	past”	(1996).	But	
it	 also	 seems	 to	 go	 further,	 illustrating	 the	 mutual	 construction	 of	 the	 past	 and	 selves	
through	practices	of	remembering.	As	Lowenthal	states,	“as	we	remake	it,	the	past	remakes	
us”	(Lowenthal,	1985:	xxv).	This	points	to	how	remembering	not	only	allows	people	to	use	
the	past	as	a	resource	for	forming	selves	but,	indeed,	remake	it.	Through	their	projects	of	
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documentation,	 critical	 engagement,	 and	 curation,	 members	 of	 the	 second	 generation	
appear	to	be	doing	precisely	that.	
While	my	respondents	often	present	what	 they	do	as	passive	preservation,	what	 they	do	
nevertheless	also	serves	to	demarcate	clear	boundaries	to	Iranian‐ness	–	to	remake	it	in	a	
certain	way.	Furthermore,	as	the	sustained	significance	of	the	Iranica	printed	volumes	and	
Norooz	physical	altars	show,	mediation	of	the	past	is	bound	to	the	power	and	aesthetics	of	
certain	physical	forms	and	institutions.	Relying	on	scholarship,	ritual,	and	documentation,	
practices	of	 remembering	conjure	up	an	objectified	and	comprehensive	 Iranian‐ness	 that	
can	be	preserved	against	change	or	degradation	over	time.	And	physical	things	are	thought	
to	carry	on	the	past	in	an	apparently	more	secure	way.	
The	use	of	web	applications,	though,	is	not	simply	to	reinforce	the	role	of	physical	objects.	
Its	affordances	in	this	context	also	include	helping	to	(re)inscribe	Iranian	American	cultural	
heritage	 with	 public	 significance	 in	 the	 American	 context,	 both	 officially	 and	 on	 an	
interpersonal	 level	 among	 social	 contacts.	 It	 also	 allows	 for	 customization	 of	 ritual	
practices	like	haft	sin,	and	encourages	independent	understanding	and	sense‐making	in	the	
cases	 of	 creative	 learning	 and	 teaching.	 These	 practices	 involve	 styling	 the	 past	 into	
formats	 that	 are	 appealing	 and	 relevant	 to	 my	 respondents,	 and	 that	 breed	 forms	 of	
sociality	into	which	they	feel	included.	They	style	unique	spaces	for	collective	learning	and	
ritual	 remembering,	 while	 interactively	 and	 socially	 making	 use	 of	 internet	 and	 various	
digital	media	 forms	 in	 doing	 so.	Hence,	 although	notions	 of	what	 constitutes	 the	 Iranian	
past	 are	 defined,	 bounded,	 objectified,	 and	 preserved	 (Naficy,	 1993)	 by	 some	 of	 these	
members	of	 the	second	generation,	 it	 is	more	based	 in	a	diasporic	positioning	(Ghorashi,	
2004;	Ghorashi,	2002)	than	an	unchanging	link	to	a	distant	and	single	Iranian	homeland.	In	
the	 following	section	I	discuss	the	use	of	 the	ancient	and	modern	past	of	Persia	and	Iran,	
with	a	 focus	on	how	this	 is	being	explicitly	reframed	by	my	respondents	with	the	help	of	
their	web	use.		
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Re‐politicizing	Persia	
Perspolis	Tablets	
The	dispute	over	the	Perspolis	Fortification	Tablets	case	 is	 long‐running,	convoluted,	and	
politically	charged.	On	the	basis	of	archaeological	evidence,	Perspolis	has	been	identified	as	
the	 ceremonial	 capital	 of	 the	 Acheamenid	 Empire,	with	 UNESCO	 declaring	 the	 citadel	 of	
Perspolis	a	World	Heritage	site	in	January	1979.96	The	palaces	at	this	site	were	looted	and	
burned	by	Alexander	the	Great	in	330	BC	as	he	invaded	and	defeated	the	ancient	Persian	
Empire,97	meaning	 that	much	 of	 the	 capital	 could	 not	 be	 preserved.	 In	 the	 early	 1930s,	
American	 researchers	 excavated	 remnants	 of	 the	 documents	 in	 this	 ancient	 civilization's	
administrative	archives.	These	have	since	been	kept	primarily	at	the	University	of	Chicago,	
Maryland98.	 The	 major	 archaeological	 significance	 of	 the	 Tablets	 is	 that	 until	 their	
discovery,	 understanding	 of	 the	Achamaenid	 empire	 had	 relied	 on	 the	 documentation	 of	
other	civilizations	(Roman	and	Greek),	rather	than	its	own.	
The	physical	preservation	of	the	artifacts	came	under	threat	during	a	battle	against	selling	
the	tablets	to	private	owners,	which	pushed	the	issue	into	public	debate	for	many	Iranian	
Americans.	The	issue	arose	when	a	US	law	was	passed	in	the	late	1990s	to	allow	American	
victims	 of	 terrorism	 restitution	 in	 US	 courts.	 Since	 then,	 American	 victims	 of	 a	 Hamas‐
claimed	suicide	bombing	in	Jerusalem	that	took	place	1997,	sued	the	Iranian	government	in	
a	Washington	D.C.	 court	 in	2003,	and	won	upward	of	400	million	dollars	 in	damages	 (in	
addition	to	millions	in	punitive	damages)	in	the	case,	Rubin	versus	Iran.	This	was	won	on	
the	grounds	 that	 Iran	 is	designated	by	 the	US	as	a	 “state	sponsor	of	 terrorism,”	and	 thus	
shares	responsibility	for	the	attack.99	It	was	a	legal	precedent.		
																																																								
96 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/114	
(accessed	29/14/14)	
97 Encyclopaedia Iranica, http://www.iranica.com/articles/persepolis	(accessed	29/11/14)	
98The Oriental Institute, The University of Chicago, “Persepolis Fortification Tablets,” 
http://oi.uchicago.edu/research/pubs/catalog/oip/oip92.html	(accessed	29/11/14)	
99In	addition,	NIAC	reports	that	another	American	lawyer	has	trying	to	seize	the	Persepolis	collection	and	
other	Iranian	assets	to	compensate	more	than150	families	of	241	U.S.	service	members	killed	in	a	suicide	
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Unable	 to	 collect	 their	 payment	 from	 the	 Iranian	 government,	 however,	 the	 plaintiff’s	
lawyers	demanded	that	the	Fortification	Tablets,	in	possession	of	American	institutions,	be	
sold	on	the	open	market	with	the	proceeds	going	to	their	clients.100	They	have	also	sued	the	
University	 of	 Chicago	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 confiscate	 the	 artifacts	 for	 sale.	 Harvard	
University	and	the	Boston	Museum	of	Fine	Arts	(MFA)	have	also	become	embroiled	in	the	
issue	alongside	the	University	of	Chicago.	In	2011,	an	appeals	court	rejected	the	plaintiff’s	
claims	 to	 seize	 the	 artifacts	 from	 the	 University	 of	 Chicago	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 Foreign	
Sovereign	Immunities	Act	of	1975	that	makes	the	objects	immune	to	seizure	because	they	
are	used	for	non‐commercial	purposes.101		
In	 response	 to	 the	 possible	 transfer	 of	 the	 Tablets	 (whether	 in	 line	 with	 the	 plaintiffs’	
request	 or	 the	 Iranian	 government’s	 possible	 intervention	 to	 reclaim	 the	 tablets),	 the	
Oriental	Institute	of	the	University	of	Chicago,	with	the	help	of	the	University	of	Southern	
California	(USC),	undertook	an	extensive	project	of	digitally	documenting	the	pieces.	This	
project	 also	 gained	 repeated	 funding	 from	 PARSA	 Community	 Foundation.	 The	 project	
means	 adding	 the	 Tablets	 to	 the	 Online	 Heritage	 Research	 Environment	 (OHRE)	 of	 the	
University	 of	 Chicago.102	 The	 Perspolis	 Fortification	 archive	 project	 has	 used	 electronic	
media	 to	 compile	 almost	 two	 and	 a	 half	 thousand	 high	 resolution	 digital	 images	 of	 the	
Fortification	 tablets	 and	 other	 documents	within	 a	 data	 structure	 for	 recording,	 linking,	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
bombing	of	a	Marines	barracks	in	Beirut	in	1983.	The	families	hope	to	collect	a	$2.6	billion	default	judgment	
against	Iran,	which	has	been	blamed	for	supporting	the	militant	group,	Hezbollah,	believed	responsible	for	the	
Beirut	attack.	
100Story	as	reported	by	Associated	Press	in	February	2009.	The	progression	of	the	ongoing	developments	
around	the	Persepolis	Archive	can	be	followed	on	the	following	blog	that	has	been	set	up	by	the	official	
Project	at	Chicago.	Persepolis	Fortification	Archive	http://persepolistablets.blogspot.nl/	(accessed,	
29/11/14) 
101The	connection	between	ancient	Persia	and	the	modern	nation	state	of	Iran	has	been	made	somewhat	
straightforward	among	the	Iranians	in	this	part	of	the	diaspora,	although	the	boundaries	of	the	various	eras	
of	the	Persian	Empire	did	not	resemble	those	the	present‐day	Iran,	but	included	several	of	Iran’s	neighboring	
nation	states.	Perhaps	ironically,	given	the	details	of	this	case,	the	period	of	the	Persian	Empire	that	these	
ancient	archives	documented	included	the	area	now	known	as	Israel.	
102 University of Chicago News, “Technology brings new insights to ancient languages,” 
http://news.uchicago.edu/news.php?asset_id=1732	(accessed	29/11/14)	
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analyzing,	 and	 presenting	 the	 documents	 and	 images.103	 The	 project’s	 agreements	 for	
cooperation	with	the	University	of	Southern	California,	UCLA,	and	Collège	de	France	means	
the	data	will	be	distributed	through	at	least	three	other	online	sources.104		
A	 few	 Iranian	 American	 organizations	made	 public	 efforts	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 case	
along	with	the	participation	of	Iranologists	at	key	American	academic	institutions.	On	their	
website	set	up	as	part	of	 the	campaign	 to	protect	 the	artifacts,	NIAC	publicly	stated	 that,	
“the	Persepolis	Tablets	are	a	part	of	our	rich	heritage	that	should	continue	to	be	shared	at	
museums	 and	 universities.”	 Parsa	 Community	 Foundation,	 from	 which	 NIAC	 receives	
significant	 funding,	 is	 another	 prominent	 Iranian	 American	 organization	 supporting	 the	
preservation	of	 the	 tablets	 at	Chicago.	The	director	of	 the	Perspolis	Fortification	Archive	
expressed	gratitude	for	Parsa’s	support	when	said	the	following	in	a	public	video	address	
as	part	of	the	campaign	the	organization	launched	around	the	Tablets.		
[I]t	 is	 absolutely	 wonderful	 that	 PARSA	 Community	 Foundation	 has	 been	 able	 to	
mobilize	 so	 much	 support	 for	 the	 Oriental	 Institute's	 Persepolis	 Fortification	
Archive	 project	 and	 has	 used	 it	 towards	 not	 only	 Iranian‐Americans	 but	 for	 the	
heritage	of	all	Iranians	worldwide…105		
Both	Parsa	and	NIAC106	posted	online	materials	concerning	the	case	and	the	campaign	on	
their	 website	 including	 video,	 news	 articles,	 additional	 documents,	 and	 links	 to	 email	
campaigns	to	raise	awareness	among	members,	subscribers,	and	the	general	public.	Events	
have	been	organized	and	experts	and	scholars	 from	relevant	 fields	have	helped	establish	
the	 significance	 of	 preservation	 and,	 in	 turn,	 the	 legitimate	 possession	 of	 the	 objects	 by	
American	 academic	 institutions.	 Since	 the	 online	 documentation	 project	 was	 initiated,	
																																																								
103 Online Cultural Heritage Research Environment, http://ochre.lib.uchicago.edu/PFA_Online/	(accessed	
29/11/14)	
104	The	Oriental	Institute,	The	University	of	Chicago,	“Persepolis	Fortification	Archive,”	
http://oi.uchicago.edu/research/projects/pfa/	(accessed	29/11/14)	
105	See	link	for	textual	transcript	of	the	video	on	the	Parsa	site	
106	In	addition,	UK‐based	Iran	Heritage	Foundation	also	worked	with	the	Persepolis	Fortification	Archive	
project.	Parsa	Community	Foundation,	“Hitting	$1,000,000	Grant	Mark,”	http://www.parsacf.org/Page/228,	
(accessed	29/11/14)	
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defenders	have	launched	media	campaigns	alongside	appeals	to	the	President	Obama.107	In	
addition,	NIAC	launched	the	“Perspolis	Center,”	which	was	described	as		
[A]n	 online	 resource	 that	 will	 not	 only	 serve	 as	 a	 clearinghouse	 for	 background	
information	about	 the	Persepolis	Tablets	but	will	also	provide	a	direct	connection	
between	 NIAC	 and	 members	 with	 the	 latest	 updates	 on	 our	 efforts,	 new	
opportunities	for	members	to	mobilize,	tools	for	contacting	elected	representatives,	
and	profiles	of	endangered	collections.108		
The	work	on	 the	OHRE	project	 can	be	seen	as	an	urgent	effort	 to	digitally	document	 the	
pieces	 thoroughly	before	 the	 threat	of	 seizure	becomes	a	reality.	This	 is	meant	 to	ensure	
that	 study	 and	 digital	 access	 to	 the	 artifacts	 can	 continue	 regardless	 of	 the	 objects’	
whereabouts.	 However,	 the	 emphasis	 of	 the	 campaign	 NIAC	 has	 embarked	 on	 has	
consistently	 been	 to	 defend	 the	 university’s	 possession	 and	 preservation	 of	 the	 objects,	
regardless	 of	 the	 digital	 documentation	 possibilities.	 For	 NIAC	 and	 supporters	 of	 the	
campaign,	this	dispute	about	the	physical	preservation,	ownership,	and	public	access	to	the	
historical	objects	revolves	around	the	possession	and	whereabouts	of	the	material	objects	
and	not	the	digitally‐molded	and	internet‐accessible	replicas.		
While	 the	work	of	 the	OHRE	at	 the	University	of	Chicago	continues,	 the	public	 campaign	
utilizes	 internet	 among	other	media	 to	 emphasize	 the	 importance	 of	 preservation	 to	 the	
public	and	members	of	the	organizations	in	question.	Through	email	notifications	and	the	
launch	of	an	online	resource	like	the	“Perspolis	Center”	internet	is	utilized	to	emphasize	the	
																																																								
107	NIAC’s	President,	Trita	Parsi,	urged	Barack	Obama	to	enact	the	commitment	to	diplomacy	with	the	Middle	
East	that	he	made	the	beginning	of	his	term	‐‐	and	to	avoid	the	Iranian	government’s	retaliation	and	
escalation	of	the	matter	‐‐	by	issuing	an	executive	order	to	stop	this	seizure.	Likewise	President	Obama	has	
been	publicly	urged	by	Parsi	to	put	into	action	the	“respect”	he	professed	having	for	Iranian	cultural	heritage	
in	his	Presidential	address	to	the	Iranian	people	during	Persian	New	Year	celebrations	and	the	respect	he	
expressed	for	“Persian	civilization”	in	an	interview	for	Arabic	news	service	Al‐Hurra.	NIAC	additionally	
launched	a	legislative	campaign	to	press	US	Congress	to	close	a	legal	loophole	that	allowed	for	the	sale	of	the	
artefacts	under	US	law	(see	National	Iranian	American	Council,	“Inside	Washington:	NIAC’s	Battle	to	Save	
the	Persepolis	Tablets”	
http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6203	(accessed	29/11/14)).	
108	(http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6203).	
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urgency	of	preservation	and	ownership	and	the	 linked	threats	of	 improper	valuation	and	
physical	 degradation	 of	 the	 objects	were	 they	 to	 be	 translated	 purely	 to	 their	monetary	
value.	The	use	of	websites	and	social	media	reflects	how	some	of	my	respondents	entered	
the	 picture	with	 their	 own	 actions	 around	 this	 issue.	 Some	 of	 them	worked	 together	 to	
organize	a	meeting	at	the	UCLA	campus	back	in	2007,	when	the	University	of	Chicago	and	
others	were	in	the	process	of	resisting	the	sale	of	the	objects.109		
A	 Facebook	 group	 was	 set	 up	 for	 the	 mobilization	 and	 Beeta	 and	 Pouneh	 were	 made	
“hosts”	thereof	along	with	about	15	other	mostly	Iranian	American	students.	The	initiative	
had	 the	 intent	 of	 ensuring	 the	 campaign’s	 success,	 and	 the	 “Event”	 page	 also	 became	 a	
space	 for	 some	 comments	 and	 interaction.	 Like	 the	 broader	 campaign,	 statements	 by	
students	repeatedly	invoked	the	importance	of	cultural	preservation.	They	also	invoked	the	
imagined	“future	generations”	that	had	been	used	more	widely	in	the	campaign.	The	latter	
were	those	for	whom	the	objects	were	ostensibly	being	preserved.			
																																																								
109	The	website	of	the	Oriental	Institute	at	Chicago	university	has	a	weblog	set	up	to	update	about	the	events	
surrounding	the	legal	fate	and	scholarly	significance	of	the	artefacts.	See	http://persepolistablets.blogspot.nl/	
for	the	most	updated	information,	including	the	latest	ruling	in	the	Rubin	vs.	Iran	case	in	which	an	Illinous	
judge	denied	the	right	to	the	plaintiffs	to	seek	reparations	from	the	Hamas	attack	(mentioned	earlier)	through	
the	auctioning	of	the	Persepolis	Tablets	in	March	2014.		
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Figure	4	Event	Page	of	“Iranian	Persepolis	Tablets	and	Controversy	with	Israel”	created	in	2007	
	
The	 campaign’s	 emphasis	 on	 maintaining	 the	 University	 of	 Chicago’s	 possession	 of	 the	
artifacts	was	 intended	not	 to	 challenge	official	 Iranian	ownership	of	 the	artifacts.	 In	 fact,	
former	 Iranian	 President,	 Mohammad	 Khatami’s	 visit	 to	 Chicago’s	 Oriental	 Institute	 in	
2006,	 where	 the	 artifacts	 are	 kept,	 publicly	 underlined	 this	 point.110	 In	 line	 with	 the	
campaign,	 the	 emphasis	 was	 on	 the	 objects	 as	 cultural	 heritage	 rightfully	 belonging	 to	
Iranian	Americans,	Iranians	worldwide,	and	to	a	globally	defied	public111	rather	than	US	or	
																																																								
110	News	coverage	of	Khatami’s	visit	from	Payvand	news	http://www.payvand.com/news/06/sep/1055.html	
111	According	to	updates	concerning	the	court	cases	underway,	it	appears	that	part	of	the	legal	strategy	is	also	
to	ascertain	that	the	pieces	are	not	and	were	never	property	of	the	Islamic	Republic	and	therefore	it	is	
inaccurate	to	treat	them	as	though	they	were	property	being	confiscated	from	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran.	
See	official	Project’s	blog	entry	citing	the	court	proceedings	that	indicating	that	“Iran	itself	has	not	articulated	
any	claim	to	the	property	in	question”	http://persepolistablets.blogspot.nl/2012/07/news‐illinois‐district‐
court‐gets‐case.html.	Nevertheless,	in	2004,	a	number	of	the	artefacts	were	returned	to	Iran,	though	still	
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Iranian	 governments,	 states,	 or	 private	 parties.	 For	 example,	 as	 one	 of	 the	 second	
generation	 Iranian	 Americans	 student	 organizers,	 Combiz,	 states	 under	 the	 event’s	
description:	
These	 tablets...	 should	 not	 be	 auctioned	 off	 to	 pay	 for	 victims	 of	 terror	 in	 Israel.	
Governments	come	and	go;	these	tablets	have	been	around	for	thousands	of	years.	
They	belong	to	the	people	of	Iran	
Their	importance	as	part	of	global	heritage	and	civilization	was	invoked	with	reference	to	
the	UNESCO	designation	of	Persepolis	as	a	protected	material	site.	And	the	familiarity	and	
significance	of	Perspolis	to	Iranians,	including	in	the	diaspora,	existing	strongly	long	before	
this	issue	arose,	was	mobilized	in	support	of	protective	intervention.	Another	commenter	
on	the	page	states:	
[T]he	artifacts	belong	to	the	Iranian	people	and	not	the	Government.	The	USA	courts	
and	Israeli	government	has	no	rights	over	the	artifacts	as	they	belong	to	the	world	
as	well.		
The	student	commenters	and	organizers	of	the	event	used	this	web	platform	–	in	line	with	
the	way	the	broader	campaign	made	use	of	multiple	web	applications	‐‐	to	emphasize	the	
importance	of	the	objects	in	question.	Through	taking	this	stance,	members	of	the	second	
generation	introduce	their	stake	in	the	preservation	of	the	tablets,	both	as	a	national	good,	
and	a	global	one.	The	mobilization	of	heritage	discourses	 frees	 the	heritage	objects	 from	
being	 designated	 simply	 as	 the	 property	 of	 the	 Iranian	 government	 –	 rather,	 this	
assumption	is	what	the	plaintiff’s	case	is	built	around.	Heritage	discourses	are	used	to	help	
the	 objects	 transcend	 their	 status	 as	 Iranian	 government	 or	 state	 property.	 For	 the	
participating	 students,	 this	 campaign	 involves	 social	 media	 as	 a	 means	 of	 publicizing	
information	in	a	narrative	about	the	objects.	The	example	of	the	Perspolis	Tablets	confirms	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
leaving	thousands	remaining	in	the	US	for	study	purposes.	2004	was	also	when	the	Rubin	family	began	their	
lawsuit	against	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran	in	an	American	court.		
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a	sustained	primacy	of	physical	objects	over	their	digital	counterparts	in	an	instance	where	
the	physical	objects	in	question	are	not	only	historical	objects	but	are	also	under	a	specific	
threat	to	their	preservation.	The	role	of	 internet	and	digital	media	for	in	my	respondents	
consist	 of	 reinforcing	 the	 material	 status	 of	 the	 physical	 objects	 through	 the	 (digitally‐
mediated)	cross‐generational	campaign	to	preserve	them.		
Malpas	has	argued	that	“the	web	and	the	digital	technologies	associated	with	it”	remove	the	
significance	of	physical	objects	when	they	are	represented	digitally	because,	as	he	argues,	
these	objects	are	taken	out	of	place.		
This	capacity	to	release	things,	and	not	only	works	of	art,	from	the	places	in	which	
they	 are	 is	 perhaps	 the	 key	 element	 in	 the	 transformative	 power	 of	 modern	
communication	and	information	technologies	–	although	it	is	equally	crucial	to	older	
technologies	also,	 the	printing	press	being	an	excellent	example.	The	web,	and	the	
digital	 technologies	associated	with	 it,	 re‐present	 the	most	 radical	 instantiation	of	
this	 capacity	–	here,	place	no	 longer	seems	 to	have	any	significance	at	all	 and	has	
instead	been	replaced	by	a	network	of	equally	accessible	 locations	within	a	 single	
‘space’	(Malpas,	2007:	21).	
The	campaign	I	described	seeks	to	release	the	objects	from	their	status	as	property	of	the	
Islamic	 Republic	 i.e.	 status	 that	 originally	 made	 them	 a	 target	 of	 appropriation	 by	 the	
plaintiffs	in	the	court	case.	However,	while	web	usage	is	involved	in	this	reframing	project,	
it	 is	 equally	 involved	 in	 the	parts	 of	 a	nationally‐bound	 campaign	 in	 the	US	dedicated	 to	
preserving	the	heritage	objects,	to	reinforcing	the	importance	of	where	they	physically	are	
and	who	 is	 responsible	 for	 their	 physical	 preservation.	Hence,	while	 certain	 applications	
are	 important	 in	 disseminating	 the	 key	 narrative	 to	 release	 the	 objects	 from	 their	
threatened	status,	others	are	used	to	help	maintain	the	significance	of	the	materiality	of	the	
objects.	This	enforces	the	importance	of	the	institutional	ownership,	location,	and	physical	
condition	of	the	objects.	The	objects’	materiality	prevents	them	from	being	released	from	
“the	places	in	which	they	are.”		
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As	 Russo	 and	Watkins	 suggest,	 any	 instance	 of	media	 usage	 can	 only	 go	 so	 far.	 As	 they	
suggest	of	digital	media	and	heritage,	mediation	is	about	people’s	strategies	for	achieving	
an	unmediated	authentic	experience	(Russo	&	Watkins,	2007).112	Achieving	this	experience	
–	according	to	those	involved	in	this	campaign	–	apparently	relies	on	the	artifacts	in	their	
physical	form.	My	respondents	develop	a	relationship	with	the	ancient	Iranian	past	within	
a	context	where	various	web	applications	and	their	particular	affordance	are	available	to	
them.	Their	choices	in	the	case	discussed	reflect	an	investment	in	historical	objects.	They	
also	 develop	 this	 relationship	 with	 the	 past	 within	 a	 context	 where	 exiled	 loyalists	 set	
themselves	against	the	Islamic	authority	of	Iran’s	current	leaders	with	invocations	of	a	pre‐
Islamic	 national	 past	 that	 symbolizes	 stark	 political	 opposition	 to	 the	 Islamic	 regime.	
Within	 this	 context	my	 respondents	 seek	 to	position	 themselves	with	 relation	 to	various	
actors	 around	 them.	 In	 the	 following	 I	move	on	 to	discuss	how	 some	of	 the	 same	young	
people	 involved	 in	this	event	organize	and	express	themselves	against	particular	ways	of	
drawing	the	Persian	Empire	for	nationalist	purposes.	
Reframing	the	ancient	past	
A	speaking	event	was	held	at	 the	University	of	 Irvine	 in	May,	2009.	The	speaker	was	 the	
eldest	son	of	the	late	Mohammad	Reza	Pahlavi.113	During	the	question‐and‐answer	section	
of	 the	 program,	 an	 older	 gentleman	 near	 the	 front	 of	 the	 auditorium	 asked,	 “through	
history	we	 have	 been	 peaceful	 people.	 How,	 through	 your	 leadership,	 can	we	 show	 our	
culture	to	the	world?”	The	would‐be	monarch	responded	by	stating:	“our	current	behavior	
should	carry	on	that	heritage	and	pride	to	the	second	generation.”	The	brief	 incident	was	
interesting	for	what	it	clarified	about	the	goal	of	transmitting	national	“pride”	to	the	second	
generation	at	events	 like	 this	one,	namely,	 that	 the	second	generation	are	bestowed	with	
																																																								
112	See	also	the	research	program	on	Heritage	Dynamics:	Politics	of	Authentication	and	Aesthetics	of	Persuasion	
in	Brazil,	Ghana,	South	Africa	and	the	Netherlands,	which	was	based	primarily	at	the	cultural	anthropology	
department	of	the	Vrije	Universiteit	Amsterdam,	funded	by	the	Dutch	Scientific	Organization	(NWO)	and	
concluded	in	November	2013.	The	program	highlighted	the	role	of	“experiences”	in	allowing	heritage	to	
become	claimed	and	felt	as	a	“real”	and	essential	basis	for	constructed	socio‐cultural	identities.		
113	Mohammad	Reza	Shah	Pahlavi	was	the	last	Shah	of	Iran,	taking	the	throne	after	his	father	in	September	
1941,	and	ruled	until	1979	when	he	was	overthrown	by	the	Islamic	Revolution.		
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the	 role	 of	 carrying	 on	 and	 presenting	 positive	 attributes	 to	 Iranian‐ness	 to	 the	 world	
based	on	a	positive	“history.”	Audience	members	like	the	older	gentleman	in	the	audience	
and	 other	 older	members	 of	 the	 first	 generation	 were	 evidently	 loyalists	 to	 the	 Pahlavi	
royal	 family.	 There	were	 also	many	 second‐generation	 audience	members	 attending	 the	
event.	Presumably,	many	of	them	were	students	of	the	University	of	Irvine,	born	after	the	
fall	 from	 power	 of	 the	 Pahlavi	 regime	 and	 the	 family’s	 subsequent	 exile	 in	 the	 US,	 but	
present	in	large	numbers	to	hear	the	speech.		
As	 we	 exited	 the	 hall,	 Farhang,	 a	 young	 man	 who	 was	 an	 active	 member	 of	 Iranian	
American	 student	 organizing	 and	 involved	with	 other	 Iranian	 American	 events,	 told	me	
that	he	had	enjoyed	Pahlavi’s	speech	very	much	and	applauded	the	man’s	diplomatic	tone.	
To	Farhang,	Pahlavi	was	a	 figure	that	exuded	the	civil	 level‐headedness	that	was	missing	
from	current	Iranian	heads	of	state.	As	we	moved	out	of	the	hall,	a	young	woman	standing	
nearby	 told	 her	 friend	 a	 story	 from	 earlier	 in	 the	 day	 when	 she	 had	 accidentally	 came	
across	Pahlavi	in	street.	She	animatedly	described	her	excited	reaction	upon	sighting	him,	
describing	 the	 experience	 with	 the	 gushing	 energy	 of	 someone	 who	 had	 come	 across	
famous	celebrity	they	admire.		
The	event	as	a	whole	was	swathed	in	an	air	of	ceremony	and	celebrity	around	the	former	
royal	 family,	 over	 30	 years	 on	 from	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 republic.	 Despite	 being	
deposed	from	royalty,	the	family	had	apparently	not	lost	its	national	symbolic	status.	And	
the	 second	generation’s	 coming	of	age	does	not	necessarily	 seem	to	pose	a	 threat	 to	 this	
status.	 Nevertheless,	 an	 important	 debate	 that	 preoccupied	 many	 of	 my	 respondents	
concerned	the	contemporary	remnants	of	the	Pahalvi	Dynasty’s	glorification	of	the	Persian	
Empire.	 The	 public	 use	 of	 the	 ancient	 Persian	 past	 by	 Iranians	 in	 the	 US	 has	 not	 been	
limited	 to	 loyalists	 to	 the	 Shah.	 Ancient	 Persia	 is	 also	 used	 in	 the	 diaspora	 as	 a	 way	 of	
celebrating	Iranian	nationhood	while	avoiding	invoking	the	Islamic	Republic.	Malek’s	work	
has	 dealt	 with	 this	 tendency	 in	 cultural	 productions	 among	 Iranian	 American	 groups	
describing	public	Iranian	American	events	as	reflecting	a	focus	on:	
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[T]he	 Iranian	 homeland	 and	 its	 ancient	 pre‐Islamic	 history	 (part	 of	 a	 strong	
nationalist	 sentiment	 that	 echoes	 Pahlavi‐era	 rhetoric),	 which	 serves	 to	minimize	
the	privileging	of	internal	ethnic	difference	in	the	face	of	a	favored	Iranian	identity.	
(Malek,	2011:	389).	
On	the	one	hand,	pre‐Islamic	history	 is	used	to	emphasize	national	unity	 in	 the	diaspora.	
And	on	 the	other,	 this	particular	ancient	 symbolism	also	summons	a	particular	notion	of	
nationhood	that	many	of	my	respondents	associate	with	narratives	of	national	unification	
from	 the	 Pahlavi	 era.	 Student	 organizer,	 Pouneh,	 was	 a	 vocal	 critic	 of	 the	 legacy	 of	
glorifying	an	ancient	Persian	past	by	the	Mohammad	Reza	Pahlavi’s	predecessors,	as	well	
as	those	she	claimed	were	influenced	by	these	narratives	in	her	environment.		
It’s	important	to	educate	young	Iranian	Americans	about	all	parts	of	Iranian	history.	
Not	 just	 romanticizing	 the	 ancient	 Achamaenid	 period,	 but	 all	 of	 it.	 They	 are	 all	
important	to	learn	about.	And	it’s	not	just	about	talking	about	the	pride	you	take	in	
your	history	so	you	can	 feel	good	about	yourself.	You	have	 to	 learn	the	good	with	
the	bad.	Not	just	look	at	the	good	things	so	you	can	be	proud…I	feel	like	people	use	
the	Achamaenid	period	as	a	perfect	period.	Reza	Shah	brought	that	back	in	Iran.	He	
brought	 back	 how	 great	 of	 a	 civilization	 the	 Persian	 Empire	was.	 But	 today	 they	
definitely	romanticize	the	idea	of	what	it	was	back	then.	Sure,	there	are	impressive	
things	that	I	learn	when	I	study	the	history…	but	whether	or	not	it’s	good	or	bad	you	
should	 be	 proud	 of	 what	 your	 country	 has	 gone	 through	 to	 come	 to	 where	 it	 is	
today.		
Pouneh	 felt	 invested	 in	 how	 young	 Iranian	 Americans	 learn	 about	 the	 Iranian	 past.	 Her	
approach	 does	 not	 eschew	 a	 notion	 of	 national	 pride,	 but	 positions	 her	 against	 the	
romanticization	 of	 a	 “perfect”	 national	 past	 within	 a	 particular	 national	 ideology.	 The	
emphasis	is	on	learning	comprehensively	and	Pouneh	contended	with	selections	of	the	past	
that	reinforce	the	national	ideology	she	is	critical	of,	but	which	she	saw	as	dominant	in	her	
surroundings.	 Instead,	 together	 with	 Beeta,	 she	 took	 the	 initiative	 of	 self‐styling	 quasi‐
academic	spaces	for	learning	within	the	university	environment	to	educate	themselves	and	
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their	peers	about	the	Iranian	past.	This	approach	was	put	into	practice	on	the	occasion	of	a	
meeting	the	two	put	together	at	the	university.	On	a	summer’s	afternoon,	we	filed	into	the	
air‐conditioned	 classroom	on	 campus	 and	 sat	 at	 our	 desks,	 facing	 the	blackboard	on	 the	
front	wall.	Almost	all	of	those	present	already	knew	one	another,	either	as	friends	or	fellow	
members	of	the	Iranian	student	group	or	both.	We	had	been	invited	via	a	Facebook	event	
invitation	from	the	two	coordinators.		
We	were	given	photocopied	handouts	with	timelines	and	lists	of	facts	as	Pouneh	explained	
from	 the	 front	 of	 the	 room	 that	 she	 had	 gathered	 the	 printed	 information	 from	 a	
combination	of	previous	course	materials	and	internet	searches.	We	looked	at	our	handout	
sheets	with	dates	spanning	from	ancient	history	of	the	Persian	dynasties	to	modern	history	
of	the	Iranian	nation	state.	After	Pouneh’s	introductory	lecture,	we	were	invited	to	gather	
on	 the	 carpeted	 floor	 in	 the	 center	 of	 the	 room	 to	watch	 an	 online	 video	 from	Pouneh’s	
laptop.	 It	was	a	documentary	piece	 from	 the	National	Geographic	 channel	 about	modern	
Iranian	history,	focusing	mainly	on	the	years	from	the	early	1900s	to	the	present	day.		
Some	of	the	students	stretched	out	on	the	floor,	some	leaning	on	others.	Others	sat	cross‐
legged	on	 the	 floor	 or	 on	 top	 of	 desks,	 legs	 dangling.	 Pouneh	 scrolled	 through	 the	 video	
here	 and	 there,	 at	 one	 point	 stopping	 to	 ask	 the	 group	whether	 they	were	 interested	 to	
continue	 watching.	 We	 were.	 A	 whispered	 comment	 from	 time	 to	 time	 between	 the	
participants	set	the	informal	mood	as	we	watched	the	luminous	screen	in	the	darkness	of	
the	classroom,	listening	to	the	dry,	detached	tone	of	the	narrator’s	voice	in	the	light	of	the	
computer	screen.	The	classroom,	the	location,	the	course	materials,	and	the	structure	of	the	
meeting	 (lecture,	 then	discussion)	which,	 somewhat	mimicking	a	college	 class,	 all	 leant	a	
certain	 academic	 credence	 to	 the	 exercise.	 Yet,	 the	 informality	 and	 intimacy	 of	 the	
relationships	between	the	students	shone	through	in	their	interactions.	
The	critical	positioning	with	respect	 to	 secular	 (anti‐Islamic)	nationalist	narratives	about	
the	 ancient	 Persian	 past	 that	 Beeta	 and	 Pouneh	 express	 is	 important.	 This	 is	 evident	 in	
Beeta’s	use	of	 internet	 as	 one	of	 the	 editors	 and	 founders	of	Ajam	Media	Collective.	One	
piece,	 written	 by	 her	 and	 the	 other	 editors	 and	 posted	 to	 the	 Ajam	 website,	 was	 very	
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interesting	in	this	regard.	It	was	entitled	Ferdowsi’s	Legacy:	Examining	Persian	Nationalist	
Myths	of	 the	Shahnameh.	The	piece	 took	a	myth‐busting	stance	 towards	claims	to	secular	
nationalist	 Persian	 cultural	 purity	 by	 laying	 out	 an	 argument	 based	 on	 a	 historical	
examination	 of	 the	 cultural	 mixes	 between	 Persian,	 Turkic,	 and	 Arabic	 linguistic	 and	
cultural	 influences	 from	 the	 7th	 century.	 They	 based	 their	 argument	 around	 how	 the	
Shahnameh,	 mentioned	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter,	 is	 interpreted	 through	 a	 culturally	 and	
linguistically	purist	lens,	attributing	this	to	the	“politicization	of	the	Shahnameh”	in	the	19th	
century	by	modern	Iranian	nation‐building	projects	by	the	Pahlavi	Dynasty.		
The	Shahnameh	suited	the	Pahlavi	dynasty’s	goals	in	two	key	ways.	First,	by	linking	ancient	
pre‐Islamic	 Persia	 and	 today,	 the	 Pahlavis	 sought	 to	 distinguish	 themselves	 from	 the	
Semitic	Arab	World	by	underlining	Iran’s	uninterrupted	“Aryan”	linguistic	and,	thus,	racial	
credentials.	Second,	by	portraying	Ferdowsi	as	an	anti‐Arab	figure,	the	Pahlavis	created	an	
icon	of	secular	Persian	nationalism	that	opposed	Islam’s	“corrupting”	 influence,	 justifying	
the	contemporary	political	projects	of	forcible	secularization.	According	to	the	new	pseudo‐
academic	Shahnameh	scholarship,	Ferdowsi	symbolized	opposition	 to	Arab	 influence	and	
helped	spread	the	three	major	myths	outlined	above	 in	Iranian	schools.	 In	the	comments	
section	under	the	piece,	second‐generation	Rustin,	a	friend	of	Beeta’s	and	one	of	the	three	
co‐authors	 of	 the	 piece,	 responds	 to	 a	 query	 about	 the	 piece’s	 focus	 on	 debunking	
nationalist	myths	with	the	following	comment:	
Iranians	 growing	up	 in	 the	 diaspora	 (myself	 included)	have	been	 raised	with	 this	
nationalist	narrative,	and	thus	have	been	co‐opted	by	it	unwillingly.	The	purpose	of	
this	 article	 is	 a	 response	 to	 a	 particular	 narrative	 that	 has	 been	 pushed	 upon	 us	
without	any	critical	examination.	
Rustin’s	comment	reflects	the	particular	position	from	which	the	young	Iranian	Americans	
who	wrote	this	piece	are	speaking.	They	argue	for	an	interpretation	of	the	Shahnameh	that	
highlights	 multicultural	 exchange	 and	 are	 invested	 in	 an	 understanding	 of	 this	 literary	
work	that	eschews	Persian	national	chauvinism	or	ideological	readings.	As	Rustin	writes	in	
another	comment:	
143	
	
[T]he	 Shahnameh	 is	 often	 selectively	 read	 out	 of	 context	 to	 prove	 an	 ideological	
point,	when	 in	reality	 the	 text	has	multiple	 interpretations,	not	all	of	 them	overtly	
nationalistic.	
The	piece	on	the	Ajam	site	is	similar	in	its	goals	to	the	teach‐in	on	campus.	Both	reflect	how	
these	young	people	use	narratives	of	the	Iranian	past	as	part	of	claiming	a	position	amidst	
the	narratives	that	dominate	in	the	environments	in	which	they	live.	They	do	this	by	setting	
up	 collectives	 and	 teach‐ins	 that	 are	 based	 around	 peer	 relationships	 and	 common	
interests.	 It	 references	a	 common	experience	of	being	exposed	 to	dominant	narratives	of	
nationhood	 that	 draw	 on	 the	 ancient	 Persian	 past.	 But	 rather	 than	 emphasizing	 its	
nationally	unifying	effect,	my	respondents	reject	the	aspects	of	ethnic	purism	that	reside	in	
notions	of	Iranian	nationhood	defined	by	Persian‐ness.	They	are	wary	of	the	rifts	this	pre‐
Islamic	past	enhances,	in	contrast	to	typical	mobilizations	of	this	past	that	emphasize	unity.		
These	projects	re‐politicize	ancient	Persia	in	a	way	that	challenges	Persian‐centered	ethno‐
nationalism.	It	rejects	ethnic	exclusion	of	those	who	identify	as	non‐Persian,	such	as	Turkic	
and	 Arab	 ethnicities	 in	 Iran	 and	 the	 diaspora.	 This	 politics	 of	 ethnic	 inclusion	 is	 waged	
against	nationalist	narratives	about	 the	Shahnameh	mobilized	since	Pahalavi	rule	 in	 Iran,	
and	persisting	today	in	the	diasporic	environments	in	which	these	young	people	live.	Some	
respondents	note	the	chauvinistic,	racist,	and	expressly	anti‐Arab	expressions	these	ideas	
take	on,	including	among	the	second	generation.	For	instance,	some	of	my	respondents	talk	
about	 a	 “Persian	 Pride”	 phenomenon	 among	 young	 people	 around	 them	 that	 sometimes	
includes	these	sentiments.	Daha’s	research	on	second‐generation	Iranian	Americans	argues	
that	 the	 label	“Persian”	and	the	history	 it	 is	associated	with	boosts	pride,	self‐confidence,	
and	 other	 positive	 feelings	 for	 her	 research	 group.	 She	 states:	 “the	 adolescents	 viewed	
identification	 as	Persian	as	warranting	 cultural	 pride	 due	 to	 ancient	 Persian	 history,	 but	
Iranian	as	connected	to	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran”	(Daha,	2011).	The	notion	of	“pride”	is	
mentioned	 in	 her	 work	 a	 number	 of	 times	 in	 the	 context	 of	 ethnic	 identification	 as	 a	
sentiment	to	be	valued	positively.		
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During	my	 fieldwork	 I	 encountered	 people	 using	 “pride”	 in	 different	 senses.	 On	 the	 one	
hand,	 Pouneh	 expressly	 encourages	 a	 sense	 of	 pride	 in	 one’s	 history,	 and	 this	 is	 part	 of	
seeing	 the	 past	 as	 a	 source	 of	 equal	 inclusion,	 recognition	 and	 countering	 shame	 or	
embarrassment	about	being	 Iranian.	On	 the	other	hand,	Pouneh	and	others	also	point	 to	
the	anti‐Muslim	elements	of	 this	 same	pride.	This	 is	 something	 they	 see	as	 rooted	 in	 the	
way	“Persian	history”	tends	to	be	mobilized	by	parts	of	the	older	generation	and	is	has	also	
emerged	among	some	of	their	peers	as	well.	The	latter	is	something	they	express	wariness	
about	as	they	conduct	their	own	emotionally‐invested	historiography	and	forge	a	politics	of	
inclusion	 and	 against	 secular‐nationalist/chauvinist	 interpretations	 of	 the	 past.	 This	 is	
what	 a	 blog	 like	 Ajam	 does.	 It	 is	 also	 interesting	 to	 understand	 how	 some	 second‐
generation	blogs	do	this.	
I	 contend	 that	 they	do	 this	 by	 placing	 discussions	 about	 the	 past	 and	 the	 current	 use	 of	
narratives	about	it	in	a	new,	stylized	context.	In	this	regard,	the	blog,	iPouya	(a	blog	that	has	
been	running	 for	much	 longer	 than	Ajam)	 can	be	seen	as	another	 illustrative	example.114	
Like	Ajam,	 it	 is	English‐language	and	self‐edited.	 It	 is	also	 implicitly	out	to	give	voice	and	
credence	 to	 less	 dominant	 perspectives	 on	 history	 and	 current	 affairs	 implicating	 the	
Middle	East	while	also	making	a	connection	to	mainstream	cultural/media	production	such	
as	Hollywood	films,	international	Iranian	cinema,	(Iranian)	pop	music,	as	well	as	references	
to	academic	literature	and	literary	writing	(English	language).	iPouya	focuses	on	news	and	
political	 analysis	 but	 also	 pop	 cultural	 elements.	 These	 blog	 projects	 produce	 written	
content	that	has	the	consequence	of	making	these	young	people	“a	source”	of	sorts.	As	the	
tagline	on	Pouya’s	site	states:	“A	Source	on	Politics,	the	Middle	East,	Film,	and	Humor.”		
Their	 choices	 of	 topics	 and	 perspectives	 to	 cover	 reflects	 their	 author’s	 own	 intellectual	
interests,	but	also	what	I	would	call	–	to	use	a	term	Pouya	uses	in	his	writing	–	a	“diasporic	
politics	of	solidarity.”	He	uses	this	term	to	describe	what	he	sees	as	a	productive	political	
positioning	 of	 diaspora	 actors	 taking	 critical	 stances	 against	 the	 Islamic	 Republic	 while	
																																																								
114	iPouya.com	(accessed	10/5/14)	
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critically	 claiming	 belonging	 to	 an	 Iranian	 nation,	 but	 also	 resisting	 discrimination	 and	
exclusion	in	the	US‐based	diaspora.	,	These	websites	are	constituted	by	a	vibrant	practice	of	
producing	 (mostly	 written)	 original	 content,	 rather	 than	 a	 reproduction	 (of	 primary	
documents,	objects,	or	archives,	like	what	digital	heritage	is	often	considered	as	doing).	But	
one	that	draws	on	other	sources	on	history	and	politics	in	order	to	make	their	own,	while	
facilitating	their	expressions	of	political	positioning	as	diaspora	members.	
This	 encourages	 interpretations	of	 the	 ancient	 past	 that	 are	 critical	 and	 seek	 to	 credibly	
stand	 alongside	 or	 even	 dislodge	 existing	 narratives.	 It	 also	 promotes	 a	 message	 of	
diversity	 and	 inclusion,	 which	 these	 respondents	 see	 lacking	 in	 some	 dominant	
interpretations.	 There	 is,	 therefore,	 a	 moral	 aspect	 to	 their	 interpretations,	 and	 this	 is	
something	I	return	to	in	this	chapter’s	conclusion.	Malpas	argues	that	digital	media	should	
be	 acknowledged	 as	 not	 only	 enhancing	 or	 extending	 “the	 experiential	 or	 interpretative	
engagement	with	 cultural	 heritage”	 but	 as	 actually	 changing	 those	 very	 experiences	 and	
interpretations	of	 the	past:	 “perhaps	a	change	 in	 the	way	 in	which	cultural	heritage	itself	
appears	 to	us,	 and	so	also	a	 change	 in	 the	way	we	understand,	experience,	and	 interpret	
ourselves”	(Malpas,	2007:	19).	This	raises	the	possibility	of	seeing	these	blogs	as	new	kinds	
of	sources	of	cultural	heritage.	While	this	may	be	seen	as	digital	media	usage	opening	the	
floodgates	 to	 supposed	 unauthorized	 interpretations	 (Kalay,	 2008),	 I	 contend	 that	 such	
interpretations	are	shaped	more	by	the	social	settings	of	collective	heritage	learning	than	
the	 mere	 act	 of	 engaging	 with	 information	 about	 the	 past	 through	 the	 use	 of	 web	
applications	.	Rather,	the	way	these	applications	are	used	to	produce	and	promote	certain	
interpretations	 of	 the	 past	 depends	 on	 the	 ways	 it	 is	 integrated	 into	 a	 locally	 situated	
initiative	or	project.	 In	what	 follows,	 I	discuss	another	 instance	of	 internet	usage	through	
which	my	respondents	position	themselves,	 this	 time	at	the	 intersection	between	Iranian	
cultural	heritage	and	American	nationhood.	
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Cultural	heritage	and	international	diplomacy	
Since	the	beginning	of	the	first	term	of	his	presidency,	Barak	Obama	and	his	administration	
gave	a	 special	 significance	 to	 the	Norooz	 celebration	 (metioned	above)	by	 including	 it	 in	
official	 US	 discourse	 around	 diplomacy	 with	 Iran.	 This	 was	most	 evident	 in	 the	 Norooz	
address	 that	 US	 President	 Obama	 released	 for	 the	 first	 time	 on	 the	 evening	 of	 Norooz	
celebrations	in	2009.	The	following	is	an	excerpt	from	the	address.	
This	holiday	is	both	an	ancient	ritual	and	a	moment	of	renewal…	Norooz	is	just	one	
part	 of	 your	 great	 and	 celebrated	 culture…	 Here	 in	 the	 United	 States	 our	 own	
communities	 have	 been	 enhanced	 by	 the	 contributions	 of	 Iranian	 Americans.	We	
know	that	you	are	a	great	civilization,	and	your	accomplishments	have	earned	the	
respect	of	the	United	States	and	the	world.	
The	speech	was	released	as	a	video	recording	of	3	minutes	and	36	seconds.	The	video	was	
posted	on	YouTube	on	March	19th,	2009	and	showed	President	Obama	officially	extending	
his	 best	 wishes	 to	 “all	 who	 are	 celebrating	 Norooz	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 around	 the	
world.”	 The	 YouTube	 video	 was	 also	 embedded	 on	 the	Whitehouse	 official	 blog.115	 The	
speech	also	addressed	the	Iranian	government	by	referring	to	the	shared	“future”	of	the	US	
and	the	Islamic	Republic	and	emphasized	“mutual	respect”,	a	sign	that	was	read	by	many	
commentators	 as	 a	move	 towards	 diplomacy.	 Trita	 Parsi,	 President	 of	 NIAC	 and	 foreign	
policy	analyst,	was	among	those	who	publicly	welcomed	the	speech,	calling	it	an	“historic”	
gesture	and	a	possible	“new	beginning	 for	US‐Iran	relations.”116	Those	I	spoke	with	were	
positive	and	welcoming	regarding	the	video	and	this	appeared	to	be	a	cross‐generational	
sentiment	 at	 a	 time	 when	 Norooz	 celebrations	 were	 practiced	 widely	 within	 families	
including	both	first	and	second	generations.		
																																																								
115	Rhodes,	Ben	“On	Nowruz,	President	Obama	Speaks	to	the	Iranian	People,”	
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/03/20/nowruz‐president‐obama‐speaks‐iranian‐people	(accessed	
29/11/14)		
116	Parsi,	Trita,	“Will	Tehran	Tango:	Obama’s	historic	Christmas	greeting,”	
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/trita‐parsi/will‐tehran‐tango‐obamas_b_177222.html	(accessed	3/2/15).	
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The	 first	 YouTube	 video	 address	 (from	 2009)	 was	 circulated	 broadly	 among	 Iranian	
Americans	 in	 LA	 as	 well	 as	 internationally	 via	 email,	 Facebook,	 and	 blogs.	 It	 was	 also	
broadcast	in	full	on	local	and	satellite	Iranian	television	stations.	In	the	context	of	families	
and	individuals	celebrating	and	commemorating	the	coming	of	a	new	year,	the	video	was	
viewed	 on	 computer	 and	 television	 screens	 in	 houses	 where	 this	 yearly	 celebration	
collectively	 took	 place.	 The	 video	 was	 “shared”	 and	 commented	 upon	 on	 the	 Facebook	
pages	 of	 a	 number	 of	 my	 respondents	 as	 they	 celebrated	 the	 event	 and	 on	 the	 days	
following.	With	each	successive	year	and	Norooz	address,	the	embracing	and/or	criticizing	
of	the	address	on	the	part	of	Iranian	Americans	becomes	something	of	a	ritual	in	itself.		
The	 YouTube	 video	 in	 question	 shows	 the	 US	 President	 in	 close	 and	 mid‐range	 shots,	
sitting	 in	 a	 chair,	 speaking	 directly	 into	 the	 camera.	 Another	 official	 version	 was	made,	
which	 included	 Persian	 language	 subtitles,	 and	 was	 also	 posted	 on	 YouTube.	 The	
uniqueness	of	this	gesture	was	evident	from	its	contrast	with	the	previous	year’s	address	
by	then	US	President	George	W.	Bush,	who	had	given	a	much	shorter	address	via	the	Voice	
of	America	(VoA)	satellite	television	broadcast.	The	difference	in	the	content	and	intended	
audience	of	the	two	men’s	messages	was	reflected	in	the	difference	in	the	choice	of	media	
used	 to	disseminate	 the	message.	That	 is,	 Bush’s	message	was	addressed	 “to	 the	 Iranian	
people”	 and	was	 disseminated	 via	 a	 satellite	 broadcast	 that	was	 officially	 banned	 in	 the	
Islamic	 Republic	 of	 Iran,	 and	 has	 significant	 numbers	 of	 viewers	 inside	 Iran	 despite	 its	
signal	being	subject	to	electronic	jamming	by	the	Iranian	government.		
This	action	symbolically	circumvented	the	Iranian	regime,	and	carried	with	it	associations	
with	VoA	having	been	set	up	during	WWII	by	a	US	government	agency,	 later	 functioning	
under	 the	 US	 State	 Department	 during	 the	 Cold	War,	 during	which	 its	 radio	 broadcasts	
directed	at	citizens	of	the	Soviet	Union	were	part	of	US	foreign	policy.	President	Obama’s	
choice	not	to	use	VoA	but	YouTube	signifies	a	break	with	undermining	the	 leaders	of	the	
Islamic	Republic,	an	approach	reiterated	by	him	directly	addressing	Iranian	leaders	in	his	
speech.	 Some	 commentators	 saw	 this	 as	 a	 possible	 opening	 for	 diplomatic	 exchange.		
Internet	takes	on	a	role	as	part	of	the	diplomatic	message	itself.	The	political	overtones	of	
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avoiding	 tendentious	 broadcast	 channels	 and	 reliance	 on	 self‐distribution	 via	 Iranian	
Americans	 themselves	 shape	a	different	political	 connection	 than	Bush	 sought.	However,	
while	Obama’s	Norooz	address	was	given	each	year	 in	his	Presidency,	 each	new	address	
came	 with	 stronger	 condemnation	 of	 the	 Iranian	 regime	 and,	 as	 some	 commentators	
observed,	a	distinct	shift	towards	the	Bush	era	approach	of	speaking	solely	to	the	“people	
of	Iran”	as	friends	and	allies	and	circumventing	Iran’s	leaders	as	a	diplomatic	partner.117			
The	message	was	seen	and	heard	by	both	younger	and	older	audiences,	via	both	television	
broadcast	and	 internet.	An	 important	yet	 implicit	reason	why	Norooz	can	be	used	 in	 this	
way	 is	 because,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 an	 official	 holiday	 recognized	 by	 the	 Islamic	
Republic,	for	many	Iranians	it	represents	the	resistance	of	Iran’s	citizens	against	the	Islamic	
state.	That	is,	Norooz	was	officially	instated	in	Iran	only	after	the	celebration	came	under	
fire	from	the	clerical	regime	for	being	anti‐Islamic	and	citizens	responded	with	widespread	
public	 celebrations	 in	 defiance	 of	 government	 efforts	 to	 control	 the	 public	 influence	 of		
Norooz	 celebrations.	 It	 therefore	 stands	 for	 a	 certain	 ambiguity	 or	 inconsistency	 in	 the	
Islamic	 state’s	 rule	over	 its	people	–	 it	 implicitly	 refers	 to	 a	 rift	between	 Iranian	 leaders’	
prescriptions	and	citizens’	practices	–	but	 can	also	be	 invoked	without	openly	detracting	
from	the	authority	of	an	Islamic	regime	that	openly	recognizes	it.		
Obama’s	 	public	Norooz	statement	can	be	understood	 in	symbolic	dialogue	with	 the	New	
Year’s	 statement	 that	 Supreme	Leader,	Ali	Khamenei,	 gives	 to	 the	 Iranian	nation	 around	
this	 same	 time	 each	 year.	 Aside	 from	 being	 a	 significant	 political	 moment	 for	 Iranian	
audiences	 nationally,	 it	 is	 also	 covered	 in	 international	 news.	 The	 implicit	 ritual	 of	
international	 diplomacy	 has	 become	 increasingly	 significant	 for	 international	 audiences	
with	the	sustained	tensions	between	Iran	and	the	US,	particularly	around	the	negotiations,	
threats,	 and	actions	 related	 to	 the	 Iranian	nuclear	enrichment	program.	And	mainstream	
																																																								
117	As	the	American	Presidential	election	of	2012	draws	near	the	rhetoric	of	war	with	Iran	is	increasingly	a	
part	of	Obama’s	repertoire,	making	more	(Iranian	American)	commentators	grow	increasingly	critical	of	his	
congratulations	on	Norooz.	(see,	for	example,	Shirin	Sadeghi’s	piece	in	the	wake	of	Norooz,	2012	Sadeghi,	
Shirin,	“The	War	on	Iranian	New	Year,”	http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shirin‐sadeghi/the‐war‐on‐iranian‐
new‐ye_b_1360875.html	(accessed,	29/11/14)).	
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news	 and	 analysis	 in	 the	US	 reflects	 this	 interest.	 Increasingly,	 those	 of	my	 respondents	
who	follow	these	public	debates	are	vocal	about	criticism	of	US	and	EU	sanctions	against	
Iran.	 Beeta,	 Pouneh,	 and	 Pouya	 are	 among	 those	 who	 use	 their	 respective	 Facebook	
accounts	to	make	postings	that	express	their	support	for	a	cessation	of	Obama’s	sanctions	
on	Iran.	The	issue	also	generates	face‐to‐face	discussions	among	my	respondents	and	those	
(Iranian	Americans)	around	them.		
Some	of	my	respondents	react	to	and	participate	in	discussions	around	this	appropriation	
of	Norooz	by	a	head	of	state	as	part	of	international	diplomacy.	Some	have	grievances	with	
this	 tradition	 is	 being	 symbolically	 used.	 In	 2009,	 Pouya	 posted	 the	 link	 to	 the	 first	 of	
Obama’s	Norooz	messages	on	his	blog.	Pouya	 is	a	 second‐generation	graduate	student	 in	
Middle	Eastern	Studies	in	his	late	twenties	and	has	been	writing	his	blog	for	several	years.	
It	covers	various	topics,	particularly	current	affairs	in	Iran	and	the	Arab	world.	His	entries	
include	opinion	and	analysis,	as	well	as	light	or	entertaining	posts,	and	postings	in	which	he	
asks	 his	 readers	 to	 discuss	 a	 certain	 topic.	 The	 latter	 was	 what	 he	 did	when	 he	 posted	
Obama’s	 Norooz	 video	 link,	 leading	 to	 comments	 ranging	 from	 cautious	 approval	 to	
suspicion	or	dismissal.	Three	years	on,	in	the	wake	of	Obama’s	latest	Norooz	address,	one	
of	Pouya’s	second‐generation	friends,	Lawrence,	wrote	the	following	as	part	of	a	Facebook		
“status	update”	in	response	to	the	yearly	video	message	in	2012:		
Obama’s	Norooz	message	to	Iranians?	I	never	 listened	to	 it	and	quite	frankly,	who	
cares?	Look,	 for	as	long	as	Obama	threatens	to	bomb	Iran	with	his	continuation	of	
the	Bush	administration	"all	options	are	on	the	table"	talk	(which	constitutes	a	war	
crime	‐	the	very	threat	of	attacking	Iran	is	itself	a	"crime	of	aggression")	and	as	long	
as	he	continues	to	do	things	like	place	the	lives	of	innocent	air	travelers	in	danger	by	
the	continuation	of	the	sanctions	on	the	sale	of	civilian	aircraft	parts	to	Iran,	never	
mind	 the	 sanction	on	 the	 sale	of	medical	diagnostic	 equipment,	 then	he	 frankly	 is	
hardly	in	a	position	to	wish	the	Iranian	people	a	happy	New	Year.		
Each	 year,	 alongside	 the	 family	 celebrations,	 interested	 young	 Iranian	 Americans	 of	 the	
second	 generation	 like	 Pouya	 and	 Lawrence	 listen	 to	 the	 words	 of	 the	 American	
150	
	
president.118	While	 Pouya	 and	 Lawrence’s	 opinions	were	 by	 no	means	 shared	 uniformly	
among	my	respondents,	 they	are	examples	of	how	some	of	my	 respondents	use	 internet	
media	to	position	themselves	within	public	debates	in	the	US	around	diplomacy	with	Iran.	
In	2013,	this	is	part	of	what	Pouya	had	to	say	on	his	blog.	
At	a	time	when	US‐led	sanctions	are	creating	an	artificial	shortage	of	medicine	and	
contributing	 to	 soaring	 inflation	 in	 Iran,	 the	Norooz	message	has	become	a	handy	
public	 diplomacy	 technique	 for	 the	 US	 government,	 and	 another	 juncture	 where	
culture	is	leveraged	as	foreign	policy.	
The	 amicable	 and	 intimate	 style	 of	 Obama’s	 Presidential	 address	 follows	 suit	 from	 the	
mood	 in	 which	 Norooz	 is	 generally	 celebrated	 among	 my	 respondents	 and	 in	 LA	 more	
generally.	 Increasingly,	 however,	 the	 emerging	 diplomatic	 rituals	 around	 the	 internet‐
mediated	address	and	its	interpretation	are	becoming	part	of	how	some	of	my	respondents	
try	 to	 re‐appropriate	 the	 public	 messages	 concerning	 Iran	 each	 year	 around	 this	 time.	
Some	of	my	respondents	are	vocal	about	the	way	Norooz	comes	to	be	explicitly	associated	
with	symbolic	maneuvers	towards	the	Iranian	national	government	in	the	political	context	
of	the	Norooz	address.	The	ways	they	involve	themselves	in	debates	around	this	issue	goes	
against	 the	 more	 common	 and	 longer‐running	 tendency	 among	 Iranian	 American	
representation.	Namely,	the	identity	politics	waged	here	claims	Norooz	as	cultural	heritage	
while	separating	it	from	the	Iranian	nation‐state.		
Similar	 to	 the	 older	 generation	 they	 initiated	 the	 use	 of	 cultural	 heritage	 to	 publicly	
distance	 from	 the	 Iranian	 regime	 and	 Iran‐based	 political	 frameworks	 within	 a	 new	
cultural	political	context	in	the	US.	But	in	contrast,	for	these	and	other	second‐generation	
young	people,	cultural	heritage	 is	a	way	to	also	wage	identity	politics	with	respect	 to	the	
American	 government’s	 actions	 from	 the	 position	 of	 American	 citizens.	 This	 re‐
politicization	of	Norooz	on	these	respondents’	own	terms	is	part	of	how	some	of	the	second	
																																																								
118	Events	have	developed	since	then	–	from	the	address	after	the	2009	uprising	in	Iran	and	its	bloody	put‐
down,	to	the	ebb	of	this	event	in	international	media,	to	the	tightened	US	sanctions	on	Iran,	to	the	
reintroduced	possibilities	of	military	strikes	on	nuclear	facilities.	
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generation	involve	themselves	 in	the	public	discussion.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Presidential	
Norooz	 address	 shows	 how	 successful	 the	mainstream	 establishment	 of	 Iranian	 cultural	
heritage	 through	 the	 largely	 de‐politicized	 Norooz	 ritual	 has	 been	 in	 the	 US	 public	
discourse.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 it	 reflects	 how	 its	 political	 utilizations	 and	
interpretations	 are	 contested.	 In	 the	 following	 I	 draw	 out	 and	 elaborate	 on	 some	 of	 the	
main	points	 from	 the	 examples	 discussed	 in	 this	 section	 regarding	how	my	 respondents	
(re‐)politicize	ancient	Persia	in	new	ways	through	their	practices	of	remembering.		
	
Past	empire,	current	positionings	
My	respondents	 actively	 reframe	 the	past.	 In	doing	 so,	 they	 reassert	 the	 correspondence	
between	an	ancient	empire,	modern	Iranian	nation,	and	a	diaspora	“community,”	signaling	
a	sense	of	continuity	with	the	past,	a	past	of	which	they	are	a	part.	They	invoke	the	Persian	
past	 in	a	vast	variety	of	ways	and	contexts,	which	allows	them	to	position	themselves	on	
various	political	axes.	First,	they	position	themselves	against	certain	nationalist	ideologies	
of	 interpreting	 the	 ancient	 past;	 something	 they	 associate	 with	 the	 first	 generation	 –	
though	 not	 exclusively.	 They	 contest	what	Moallem’s	 research	 has	 argued	 is	 a	 tendency	
among	“Persian	national	chauvinists”	to	mobilize	the	“Persian”	past	as	part	of	“inventing	a	
golden	 pre‐Islamic	 age	 of	 racial	 and	 cultural	 superiority”	 (Moallem,	 2005).119	 They	 treat	
such	 notions	 as	 flawed	 and	 outdated.	 Indeed,	 positioning	 with	 relation	 to	 Islam	 in	 the	
diaspora	context	 is	central	 to	the	ways	connections	to	the	past	are	shaped,	and	I	address	
this	point	further	in	the	context	of	the	racialization	of	Islam	in	Chapter	3.		
																																																								
119	As	Moallem	also	writes:	“Under	the	Pahlavi	regime,	the	construction	of	a	civilized	and	uncontaminated	
pre‐Islamic	Persian	was	essential	in	extending	this	age	of	ignorance	to	include	the	time	of	the	conquest	of	Iran	
by	the	so‐called	barbaric	Muslims,	a	gesture	intended	to	reinforce	anti‐Arab	and	anti‐Semitic	ideologies.”	The	
age	of	ignorance	she	refers	to	is	a	reference	to	the	work	of	Tavakoli‐Taraghi	who’s	1998	work	Moallam	states	
shows	that	the	period	before	the	constitutional	revolution	of	1904	was	framed	by	some	historians	as	an	age	
of	“ignorance	(bikhabari),	stagnation,	and	despotism”	(Moallem,	2005).		
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Second,	despite	their	contestations	of	how	the	past	is	used,	these	young	people	also	use	the	
past	as	a	source	of	pride	and	dignity.	For	my	respondents,	“Persian”	is	not	simply	dismissed	
as	 a	 label	 commonly	 used	 to	 obscuring	 negative	 connotations	with	 Iran	 and	 the	 Islamic	
Republic.	Rather,	they	are	concerned	about	the	implications	of	privileging	particular	ethnic	
boundaries	within	 Iranian	nationhood.	 Instead	of	 a	 source	of	 claiming	 ethnic	 superiority	
towards	 other	 ethnic	 minorities	 among	 Iranian	 diaspora	 populations	 or	 toward	 other	
(Middle	 Eastern)	 immigrant	 minorities,	 pride	 takes	 on	 the	 purpose	 of	 recognition	 and	
equal	 inclusion	 by	 American	 society.	 Third,	 they	 appear	 ready	 to	 politically	 appropriate	
Iranian	cultural	heritage,	at	 least	more	so	compared	to	past	diasporic	tendencies	towards	
upholding	 de‐politicized	 Iranian	 “culture”	 as	 a	 means	 for	 neutralized	 collective	 self‐
mobilization	and	‐presentation.			
Inter‐generational	 solidarities	 emerge	 here	 in	 instances	 of	 mobilization	 around	 public	
issues.	This	was	evident	in	the	case	of	the	student	group’s	support	for	the	Perspolis	Tablets	
campaign.	And	 it	was	also	evident	 in	 the	way	support	 for	 the	 former	royal	 family	of	 Iran	
was	continued	by	many	young,	second‐generation	Iranian	Americans.	 	While	many	of	my	
respondents	 mentioned	 correlations	 between	 Iranian	 secular	 nationalism	 and	 an	 older	
generation	of	exiled	loyalists,	it	is	clear	from	the	examples	I	have	discussed	in	this	section	
that	 this	 inter‐generational	 relationship	 is	 too	 crisscrossed	 by	 shared	 or	 conflicting	
national	 ideologies	 to	 represent	 a	 clear	 generation	 gap	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 politics	 of	
remembering.	
The	examples	I	have	discussed	illustrate	how	people	use	the	genres	of	writing	and	styles	of	
web	 content	 production	 that	 digital	 textual/visual	media	make	 possible	 as	 part	 of	 their	
projects	of	 engaging	with	 the	past.	 In	 these,	 internet	becomes	 integrated	 seamlessly	 into	
campaigns	and	social	settings	via	social	styles	typical	of	student	activism.	As	such,	internet	
becomes	 an	 important	 (though	 often	 invisible	 or	 unacknowledged)	 part	 of	 informal	
heritage	(re‐)education	practices.	At	the	same	time,	the	way	my	respondents	use	internet	
helps	 to	 enrich	 learning	 in	 face‐to‐face	 social	 settings.	 It	 also	 exposes	 the	 importance	 of	
contestations	over	the	contemporary	location	and	possession	of	certain	tangible	historical	
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objects.	As	stated,	my	respondents	use	the	past	to	position	themselves.	But	they	seem	to	do	
this	not	 simply	 for	 fear	 that	 they	will	otherwise	have	no	past	and	 therefore	be	excluded.	
They	also	do	it	because	otherwise	the	pasts	they	question,	challenge,	and	do	not	claim	or	
want	 as	 Iranian	Americans	will	 have	 power	 over	 them	 through	 the	 dominant	 narratives	
that	circulate	already.		
The	genres	and	styles	of	writing	and	organizing	that	these	young	people	take	to	with	the	
help	 of	 internet	 help	 them	 posit	 themselves	 as	 sources	 on	 particular	 experiences	 of	
remembering	 informed	 by	 their	 activism,	 engagement,	 and	 the	 events	 that	 have	 shaped	
their	lives.	As	such,	their	practices	go	beyond	“transcoding”	of	historical	sources	in	the	way	
some	digital	heritage	literature	has	discussed	questions	raised	by	networked	digital	media	
and	 the	 past.	 Rather,	 their	 internet	 usage	 positions	 them	 as,	 themselves,	 niche	 sources.	
Pouya,	 for	 instance,	 cultivates	 this	 status	 around	 films	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 multimedia	
content	that	is	based	on	preferences,	tastes,	interests,	and	experiences.	This	illustrates	how	
people	 place	 politicized	 rituals	 alongside	 contemporary	 pop	 cultural	 and	 current	 affairs	
content.	 The	 sociality	 of	 (potential)	 peer	 relationships	 gives	 rise	 to	 this	 as	 a	 new	
environment	for	interpretation.	While	I	have	highlighted	especially	the	role	of	written	text	
on	 websites,	 in	 the	 following	 section	 I	 discuss	 examples	 that	 bring	 to	 light	 the	 more	
auditory	and	visual	elements	of	remembering	with	the	help	of	digital	media.		
	
Pop	cultural	pasts	
	Taking	record	of	old	records	
One	evening,	as	we	browsed	the	shelves	in	Mahssa’s	favourite	bookstore,	she	picked	up	a	
recently	published	photo	memoir	about	Iran.	It	was	a	thick,	hardcover	book,	and	as	Mahssa	
began	paging	through	it	we	saw	the	large	color	photographs	on	its	glossy	pages.	“See,	this	is	
what	I	mean,”	she	muttered.	Many	of	the	photographs	portrayed	an	Iran	during	the	days	of	
the	 Shah,	 depicting	 him	 in	 ceremonious	military	 garb,	 his	 queen	by	his	 side,	 her	 fashion	
style	 recognizable	 for	 the	 period	 and	 barely	 distinguishable	 from	 iconic	 Western	
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equivalents	 from	 the	 60s	 and	 70s.	 These	 photos	 were	 followed	 by	 the	 black	 and	 white	
photos	 of	 throngs	 of	 people	 in	 the	 streets,	 iconic	 imagery	 from	 the	 Islamic	 revolution,	
which	was	 in	 turn	 followed	by	photographs	of	 the	work	of	Shirin	Neshat,	 featuring	black	
and	white	photos	of	veiled	women	wearing	black	chadors.	Mahssa	had	earlier	mentioned	
being	tired	of	 images	of	 Iran	that	perpetuated	what	she	 thought	were	clichés	of	pre‐	and	
post‐Revolution	 Iran	without	 the	nuance	 that	would	appeal	 to	or	 interest	her.	She	closed	
the	large	book	and	we	moved	on.	
On	another	night	in	a	Silverlake	wine	bar	Mahssa	brought	up	an	idea	she	wanted	to	share.	
It	was	for	a	book;	a	sort	of	photo	journal	documenting	the	lives	of	“our	parent’s	generation”	
through	family	photographs.	A	vehicle	for	putting	Iranian	pop	culture	on	display	through	a	
glimpse	of	everyday	life	before	the	revolution,	Mahssa	described	the	idea	as	being	“like	the	
idea	 of	 Pomegranates	 but	 then	 in	 book	 form.”	 Pomegranates	 was	 the	 title	 of	 the	music	
compilation	she	was	putting	together	with	a	friend,	Arash,	whom	she	had	met	because	of	
their	 shared,	 deep	 interest	 in	 music	 and	 the	 music	 of	 this	 Iranian	 era	 in	 particular.	
Pomegranates	became	a	mix	of	digitally	 re‐mastered	pop	music	 from	 the	60s	and	70s	of	
Iran,	made	up	mostly	of	funk,	psychedelic,	and	folk	songs.	Mahssa’s	idea	for	representing	a	
pre‐Revolutionary	 Iran	 she	 had	 not	 lived	 in	 to	 an	 audience	 of	 young	 peers	 through	 pop	
culture	 was	 striking,	 and	 her	 book	 idea	was	 interesting	 for	 its	 parallels	 and	 differences	
from	the	book	we	had	previously	happened	upon	together	in	the	book	store.	The	LA	Times	
article	that	covered	the	release	event	of	the	Pomegranates	album	in	2010	quoted	Mahssa	as	
saying:	
I've	 co‐opted	 the	nostalgia	 that	 surrounds	 this	music	 as	my	own,	 in	 a	way,	 as	my	
parents'	 memories	 of	 their	 past	 and	 the	 disconnection	 that	 has	 occurred	 post‐
revolution	lent	in	a	lot	of	ways	to	my	struggle	in	identifying	myself.120	
																																																								
120	Hundley,	Jessica,	“Persian	folk,	funk,	psychadelia	winn	new	generation	of	fans,”	
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/04/entertainment/la‐ca‐persian‐funk4‐2010apr04	(accessed	
1/12/14).	
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The	nostalgia	inherited	from	parents	is	an	important	part	of	the	meaning	of	a	project	like	
Pomegranates.	Indeed,	Arash’s	contribution	to	the	Pomegranates	project	had	included	the	
collection	of	LP	music	records	he	had	acquired	from	his	mother.	The	memories	of	parents	
are	 an	 important	 source	 of	 information	 and	 inspiration	 for	 members	 of	 the	 second‐
generation	 like	Mahssa	and	Arash.	Yet	 they	do	not	ultimately	 shape	 the	product	 the	 two	
have	 created	 together	 –	 that	 is	 a	 product	 of	 other	 influences	 and	 inspirations	 as	 well.	
Mahssa	 and	 Arash	 are	 driven	 not	 only	 by	what	 they	 inherit	 from	 parents	 but	 also	 their	
stylistic	 tastes	and	respective	 interests	 in	production,	as	well	as	a	desire	 to	 share	 it	with	
others.		
Since	 the	 release	of	 the	Pomegranates	 album,	 a	 growing	 interest	 in	 the	preservation	and	
archiving	 of	 music	 and	 video	 material	 from	 the	 decades	 directly	 preceding	 the	 Islamic	
Revolution	was	evident	among	digital	databases	and	websites	set	up	by	organizations	like	
Bidoun	 and	 Iran	 Heritage	 Foundation	 to	 compile	 extensive	 catalogues	 of	 radio	
programmes,	music	videos,	and	songs	from	Iran	in	the	period	between	the	50s	to	late	70s.		
Aryana	was	among	those	who	enthusiastically	recommended	the	Iran	Heritage	Foundation	
project,	Golha,	 to	her	friends,	bringing	it	to	their	attention	via	a	 link	posting	on	Facebook.	
The	Golha	Project	Website	is	a	searchable	database	of	Iranian	poetry	and	music,	accessible	
via	internet	by	the	public,	and	contains	over	1000	hours	of	audio	material.	The	project’s	co‐
sponsor	(along	with	the	PARSA	Fondation),	Iran	Heritage	Foundation,	describes	it	as	such	
on	their	website:		
The	musical	and	 literary	 repertoire	of	 the	programmes	known	generally	as	Golha,	
‘Flowers	[of	Persian	Poetry	and	Song]’	was	a	[series]	of	weekly	radio	programmes	
aired	on	Iranian	radio	between	1956	and	1979	which	covered	the	entire	history	of	
classical	 as	 well	 as	 contemporary	 Persian	 poetry,	 giving	 expression	 to	 the	 whole	
gamut	of	traditional	Persian	music	and	poetry.121			
																																																								
121	Iran	Heritage,	“The	Golha	Project:	Digital	Archive,”	http://www.iranheritage.org/golha_project/	(accessed	
1/12/14).	
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Similarly,	 Bidoun’s	 project	 is	 one	 that	 also	 digitally	 archives	 audio,	 but	 includes	 visual	
material	(films)	as	well,	and	is	available	for	public	access	via	their	website.	In	2009,	Bidoun	
entered	 a	 long‐term	 collaboration	 with	 UbuWeb,	 an	 award‐winning	 online	 archive	 for	
avant‐garde	media.	To	date,	Bubu	has	hosted	rare	and	hard	to	find	sound	and	audio	works	
from	 the	 likes	 of	 filmmakers	 Forough	 Farrokhzad	 and	 Artavazd	 Peleshian,	 as	 well	 as	
composers	 Ali	 Reza	 Mashayekhi,	 Halim	 El‐Dabh,	 and	 Dariush	 Dolat‐Shahi,	 among	 many	
others.	In	many	cases,	Bubu	has	documented	the	western	avant‐garde’s	encounter	with	the	
East;	 films	by	Claude	LeLouch,	Pier	Paolo	Pasollini,	and	Agnes	Varda	are	also	 included	 in	
this	growing	collection.	
These	 archives	 represented	 a	 reproduction	 of	 the	 original	 songs.	 However,	 the	 curating,	
promoting,	 and	 creating	 the	 technological	 infrastructure	 necessary	 for	 making	 these	
archives	were	productive	practices.	Different	organizations	and	individuals	were	engaged	
with	these	different	tasks	in	order	to	make	these	repositories	possible.	In	the	case	of	Arash	
and	 Mahssa’s	 curation	 of	 the	 Pomegranates,	 the	 project	 was	 laden	 with	 the	 personal	
attributes	 each	 of	 them	 brought	 to	 the	 project,	 drawing	 from	 Arash’s	 family	 heirloom	
albums		that	were	invested	with	deep	sentimental	value	,	and	Mahssa’s	niche	expertise	and	
long‐running	experience	of	searching	 for	and	finding	vintage	records.	The	volunteer	time	
and	energy	these	two	put	into	the	process	of	gathering	and	annotating	these	tracks	for	the	
album	ultimately	generated	a	product	ready	for	contemporary	sale	and	distribution.	
A	similar	mode	of	compilation	was	reflected	in	Arash’s	2013	podcast	for	B|ta’arof	Magazine	
with	 a	 set	 of	 Iranian	 pop	 tracks	 from	 the	 same	 period,	 drawn	 from	 the	 same	 inherited	
collection.	B|ta’arof	is	a	print	magazine	with	a	connected	website	Arash	as	a	co‐founder	of,	
and	 which	 I	 come	 back	 to	 later	 on	 in	 this	 section.	 The	 following	 is	 part	 of	 how	 Arash	
describes	the	podcast	on	the	B|ta’arof	site,	where	it	was	released.		
Here	are	fifteen	Persian	Pop	songs	from	the	sixties,	seventies,	and	eighties.	The	mix	
includes	 thirteen	 chehel‐o‐panj‐dorehs	 released	 on	 the	 Iranian	 imprints	 Ahange	
Rooz,	 Apollon,	 Fine	Music,	 Harmony	 Apollon,	 Juliet,	 Monogram,	 Pars	 Record,	 and	
Royal,	bookended	by	 two	 long	player	 tracks	produced	 in	 the	United	States	 for	 the	
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labels	 Mainstream	 and	 Soundex.	 It	 is	 fitting,	 for	 a	 magazine	 of	 Iranian	 culture	
produced	 in	 diaspora,	 to	 begin	 and	 end	 with	 records	made	 by	 Iroonis	 [Iranians]	
working	abroad	with	non‐Iranians.	
Efforts	 to	 eradicate	 Persian	 popular	 music	 have	 made	 the	 preservation	 of	 pre‐
revolutionary	 Iranian	 records	 difficult	 and	 necessary.	 I	 am	 forever	 grateful	 to	my	
mother,	Efat	Sanai,	 for	saving	her	records.	A	collector	by	nature,	most	of	what	you	
hear	—	torch	songs,	beat	rock,	soundtrack	vignettes	—	originate	from	a	cache	kept	
in	 a	 red	 suitcase,	 stowed	 for	 over	 thirty	 years.	 Though	 many	 were	 carefully	
preserved	in	crisp	picture	sleeves,	most	bear	the	marks	of	heavy	use.	
Here	 are	 fifteen	 songs	 that	 tell	 a	 story.	 The	 story's	 theme	 is	 longing,	 which	 is,	 of	
course,	the	primary	obsession	of	Persian	Pop.	Enjoy.122	
Creating	and	making	available	these	digital	archives	means	creating	a	repository	from	this	
particular	 time	 and	 place.	 As	 a	 guest	 on	 SWANA	 (South	 Asian,	 West	 Asian,	 and	 North	
African)	Radio	 in	a	piece	dedicated	 to	Persian	Pop,	Arash	explains	 the	 importance	of	 the	
project	of	documenting	this	music	by	highlighting	the	destruction	it	has	faced	in	the	context	
of	post‐revolution	Iran.	“No	systematic	discography	has	been	assembled	and	published.	No	
comprehensive	 survey	 exists	 in	 print.	We’re	 doing	 this	work	because	 it	 has	 to	 be	 done.”	
While	 the	 musical	 compilation	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	 album	 is	 different	 from	 the	 digital	
repositories	 mentioned	 earlier	 (in	 form,	 and	 curative	 production	 process,	 for	 instance),	
there	appear	 to	be	similarities	 in	the	drive	behind	these	projects	to	document,	showcase,	
and	 disseminate	 musical	 material	 from	 pre‐revolution	 Iran,	 particularly	 of	 the	 60s	 and	
70s.123	
																																																								
122	Saedinia,	Arash,	“Podcast,”	http://www.btaarof.com/podcast.html	(accessed	1/12/14).	
123	Ajam	Media’s	Mix	Tape	is	another	example	of	a	digitized	compilation	disseminated	via	a	website.	
Jarahzadeh,	Kamyar,	“Ajam	Mixtape	#2:	Psychedelic	Sounds	from	Iran	and	Beyond,”		
http://ajammc.com/2014/02/16/ajam‐mixtape‐2‐psychedelic‐from‐iran‐and‐beyond/	(accessed	29/11/14)	
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In	Arash’s	description	of	the	podcast	on	the	site,	the	theme	of	(romantic)	longing,	including	
Persian	words	in	his	writing,	the	reference	to	diaspora,	and	the	connections	to	the	story	of	
Iran’s	pre‐revolution	years	told	through	its	music	together	implicitly	speaks	to	others	who	
recognize	 his	 positioning.	 It	 spreads	 a	 layer	 of	 familiar	 nostalgia	 over	 what	 would	
otherwise	be	a	record,	an	archive.	It	draws	on	the	recognition	of	young	Iranian	Americans	
like	himself	of	a	period	that	is	familiar	to	them	through	their	parents’	memories.	Even	if	the	
songs	 are	 not	 familiar,	 the	 context	 in	 which	 they	 are	 being	 remembered	 most	 likely	 is.	
These	practices	not	only	recall	 the	past,	but	also	 implicitly	refer	to	how	this	past	 is	often	
recalled	among	Iranian	Americans,	that	is,	nostalgically.	Nostalgia	becomes	a	repertoire	in	
the	sense	that,	as	Giaccardi	describes,	drawing	on	Kirshenblatt‐Gimblett	(2004),	it	is:	
[N]ot	merely	that	of	a	digital	archive	meant	to	collect	and	preserve	in	time	and	space	
the	 representation	 of	 a	 specific	 heritage.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 a	 “repertoire”	 –	 meant	 to	
sustain	 the	 whole	 system	 of	 knowledge	 and	 social	 relations	 responsible	 for	 a	
heritage	 creation,	 transmission,	 and	 reproduction	 as	 a	 living	 system	 (Giaccardi,	
2007:	118).	
I	would	argue	that	this	“living	system”	is	animated	by	the	associations	with	this	period	and	
the	styles	it	represents.	The	podcast,	like	the	album,	are	forms	more	closely	associated	with	
contemporary	 musical/audio	 production	 than	 historical	 archives	 or	 databases.	 These	
projects	seem	to	align	this	part	of	Iranian	musical	history	with	present	trends	in	order	to	
make	it	appealing.	At	the	same	time,	they	tend	to	produce	a	sense	of	reverence	about	that	
past.	 There	 is	 a	 blurring	 of	 the	 lines	 between	 the	 task	 of	 transcoding/remediating	 the	
musical	material	 in	order	to	keep	it	 in	tact,	and	the	task	of	socially	transmitting	nostalgia	
and	a	feeling	of	wonder	about	this	past.	
The	 interest	 in	 this	 era	 is	 wrapped	 in	 nostalgia	 passed	 down	 from	 parents.	 But	 these	
archiving	 and	 preservation	 projects	 are	 started	 up	 by	 the	 second	 generation.	 The	
passionate	 interests	of	my	respondents	draw	on	 their	parents’	memories	and	knowledge	
but	 go	 beyond	 it	 to	 other	 sources	 of	 living	 memory	 and	 other	 enthusiasts.	 Drawing	 on	
Maghbouleh’s	 notion	 of	 “inherited	 nostalgia”	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 see	 how	 first‐generation	
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parents’	 “authentic	 relationships	 and	 histories”	 connecting	 them	 to	 “the	 homeland”	 is	 in	
effect	 (Maghbouleh,	 2010a).	 However,	 equally	 important	 is	 understanding	 how	 this	
practice	 of	 remembering	 opens	 avenues	 for	 creative	 production	 and	 notions	 of	 diaspora	
that	go	beyond	a	homeland	nostalgia	of	the	first	generation.		
More	specifically,	the	appeal	of	this	period	in	Iranian	music	not	only	characterized	by	the	
connection	 to	 the	 first	 generation	 through	 nostalgia,	 but	 also	 by	 a	 particular	mixture	 of	
Eastern	 and	 Western	 stylistic	 elements.	 “I	 don’t	 really	 experience	 it	 like	 that	 [i.e.	
nostalgically],”	 Kourosh	 told	 me.	 He	 liked	 the	 hairstyles,	 the	 clothes,	 the	 songs,	 and	 the	
dances	that	are	characteristic	of	a	time	in	Iran’s	recent	history	that	he	feels	a	connection	to.	
Some	of	my	respondents	saw	engaging	with	this	past	as	less	as	a	nostalgic	experience	and	
more	one	that	allows	them	to	learn	about	an	Iran	they	did	not	know	about.	The	value	of	the	
“East‐West	 encounter”	 described	 on	 the	 Bidoun	 website	 is	 reminiscent	 of	 some	 of	 my	
respondents’	 interest	 in	 this	 period	when	 Iranian	music	was	 in	 an	 area	 of	 strong	 cross‐
border	 collaboration	 and	mutual	 influence,	 when	 Iranian	 artists	 and	media	 productions	
received	 regular	 international	 praise.	 This	 interest	 in	 Iranian	music	 through	 the	 lens	 of	
international	appreciation	fascinated	Arash	particularly.	He	told	me	about	a	song	Googoosh	
had	sung	entirely	 in	Spanish	–	to	him	this	signified	an	era	 in	 Iranian	music	history	when	
pop	 influences	 flowed	 to	 and	 from	 Iran,	 and	 Iranian	 talent	 and	 creativity	 enjoyed	
international	recognition.		
He	and	Mahssa	were	interested	in	the	ways	the	Shah’s	“modernization”	policies	had	been	a	
forceful	push	for	Iran	to	enter	international	music	scenes.	The	particular	abruptness	of	that	
shift	 alongside	 the	 longer‐entrenched	 traditions	 of	 Iranian	 musical	 production	 in	 Iran	
constitute	a	particular	process	of	blending,	one	shaped	by	the	musical	practices,	tastes,	and	
traditions	of	the	time,	as	well	as	by	the	imposed	cultural	policies	of	the	then‐monarchy.	At	
the	 same	 time,	 the	 influences	 from	 Iranian	 classical	 and	 folk	 music	 and	 longer‐running	
regional	 influences	were	 an	 element	 that	 Arash	 and	Mahssa	 both	 emphasized.	 For	 them	
and	 the	 many	 who	 shared	 their	 fascination,	 it	 was	 these	 particular	 circumstances	 of	
production	and	the	mixture	of	 familiar	Western	and	Eastern	musical	and	style	 influences	
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that	were	as	important	a	part	of	this	cultural	memory	as	the	musical	products	themselves.	
In	 this	way,	 a	 range	of	 Iranian	 listeners	but	also	others	are	also	envisioned	as	audiences	
and	 appealed	 to.	 Keeping	 record	 of	 these	 old	 records	 in	 the	 ways	 described	 here	 is	
something	 that	 not	 only	 makes	 these	 members	 of	 the	 second	 generation	 producers	
themselves.	Their	productions	are	also	a	way	for	them	to	position	themselves	with	relation	
to	 other	 dominant	 ways	 of	 representing	 the	 past	 (as	 the	 one	 Mahssa	 was	 disappointed	
with,	 which	 I	 described	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 section)	 and	 with	 relation	 to	 wider	
audiences	of	Iranians	and	non‐Iranians	with	similar	tastes.	
In	addition,	the	broader	qualities	of	the	“vintage”	style	appears	to	be	making	a	resurgence	
through	these	young	people’s	practices	of	remembering.	It	also	tells	us	about	the	need	and	
sensibility	 among	 these	 young	 people	 to	 make	 connections	 to	 this	 style,	 and	 make	
connections	 to	 one	 another	 in	 the	 process	 of	 doing	 so.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 fact	 that	 this	
period	is	remembered	in	this	particular	way	by	this	generation	illuminates	a	value	invested	
in	 retro,	 vintage,	 and	 nostalgic	 sensibilities	 that	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 interest	 in	 Iranian	
pasts.	 The	 fact	 that	 Mahssa	 runs	 a	 record	 store	 called	 Mount	 Analog	 that	 stocks	 music	
primarily	on	vinyl	and	tape	is	a	testament	to	this.	The	meanings	of	Iranian	American‐ness	
are	 compounded	 by	 the	 contemporary	 “cool”‐ness	 of	 nostalgic	 musical	 scenes	 more	
generally.	As	a	 result,	 the	appeal	of	 this	genre	among	members	of	 the	second	generation	
hinges	 in	 part	 on	 its	 designation	 as	 “cool”	 by	 wider	 standards,	 particularly	 in	 youth	
cultures.	This	appeal	seems	to	lie	not	only	in	the	popularity	of	musical	“oldies,”	but	also	in	
vintage	records	as	a	niche	 area	of	 interest,	 such	 that	 the	 (re)discovery	of	 the	music	 itself	
becomes	 part	 of	 the	 creative	 process	 because	 of	 its	 rarity	 and	 age.	 And	 as	 Nedelcu	 has	
argued	 of	 migrants	 ways	 of	 using	 internet	 to	 find	 home	 and	 belonging,	 it	 can	 help	
underscore	and	defend	particularistic	values	(Nedelcu,	2012b).		
(Re)Discovered	 in	 a	 context	 where	 niche	 musical	 styles	 are	 trendy	 among	 American	
audiences,	Iranian	nostalgia	music	seems	to	strike	a	balance	between	the	popular	power	of	
“cool”	and	the	air	of	connoisseur	appeal	that	comes	with	being	“rare.”	Hence,	both	nostalgia	
enthusiasts	 and	 casual	 listeners	 find	 themselves	 among	 wider	 American	 and	 perhaps	
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international	music	audiences	with	similar	tastes.124	The	“cool”	of	this	musical	style	to	my	
respondents	is	difficult	to	define;	such	is	the	nature	of	“cool.”	This	is	what	Lewis	MacAdams	
suggests	 in	 his	 cultural	 history	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 “cool,”	 studying	 artists	 and	musicians	 the	
American	 1940s	 and	 50s	 (MacAdams,	 2001).	 “Cool”	 is	 evasive.	 Not	 only	 because	 the	
standard	for	what	is	“cool”	changes	as	styles	change	(i.e.	as	soon	as	something	is	deemed	
“cool”	 by	 enough	people	 it	 ceases	 to	have	 the	 same	power	 and	 is	hence	 less	 “cool”).	But	
also,	it	is	defined	by	an	impossibility	to	place	(i.e.	explaining	what	“cool”	is	defies	“cool”	as	it	
is	something	one	must	simply	know,	be	attuned	to).	And	it	is	this	latter	quality	that	makes	
it	such	a	strong	and	common	contemporary	notion	around	which	community	(and	youth	
subcultural	communities	involving	musical	genres	and	scenes)	is	implicitly	formed.		
“Cool”	 is	 also	 an	 un‐communicated	 yet	 shared	 understanding	 that	works	 to	 bind	 people	
around	certain	tastes	and	styles.	What	I	try	to	show	here	is	that	the	rich	past	of	Iranian	pop	
culture	 offers	my	 respondents	 important	 elements	 to	work	with	when	 it	 comes	 to	 using	
web	applications	as	part	of	digitizing	and	disseminating	their	(re)productions	of	the	past.	
And	 they	utilize	 these	pasts	while	paying	homage	 to	 them	and	 raising	 their	 relevance	 to	
contemporary	audiences	(including	the	second	generation).	The	websites	and	pages	being	
used	 also	 offer	 particular	 ways	 to	 engage	 with	 this	 past.	 In	 the	 following	 I	 discuss	 this	
further.	
	
Mediating	the	past	
Kourosh	describes	the	experience	of	listening	to	the	old	records	in	vinyl	form	as	a	special	
experience.	He	describes	the	first	time	he	did	this	as	an	especially	memorable	incident.	As	
with	most	of	the	five	hundred	albums	he	had	collected	and	kept	in	his	room,	he	had	bought	
																																																								
124	The	vintage	music	genre	and	the	wider	popular	fascination	with	rediscovering	music	from	the	past	has	
parallels	to	World	Music	as	a	broader	genre	that	may	also	interact	with	ethnic/diaspora	music	tastes.	
Although	the	music	in	question	could	be	categorized	as	vintage	world	music	I	do	not	enter	the	discussion	
about	world	music	(and	the	commercialization	of)	minority/ethnic	cultural	production	here.	
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the	record	second	hand	online,	and	was	excited	to	listen	to	it	for	the	first	time.		He	carried	
the	album	with	excitement	to	the	record	playing	equipment	in	the	university	library	as	he	
did	not	have	his	own	sound	system	that	played	LPs.	The	sound	quality	was	so	remarkable	
that	the	experience	of	sitting	by	himself	in	the	UCLA	library,	listening	with	headphones	to	
this	 album	 in	 a	 sound	booth,	became	a	meaningful	 connection	with	his	piece	 of	 the	 past	
after	years	of	listening	to	downloaded	songs	or	CD	albums.	It	was	an	interface	that	required	
effort,	 but	 for	 Kourosh	 it	was	more	 than	worth	 it.	 It	was	 also	 an	 experience	 of	 how	 the	
original	product	was	consumed	and	intended	to	be	consumed	in	when	it	was	first	made	by	
the	artist.	
	It	was	his	“own	sense	of	being	in	place	and	experiencing	the	moment	of	‘heritage’”	(Smith,	
2006:	 2).	 This	 experience	 solidified	 Kourosh’s	 emersion	 in	 the	 music	 genre.	 It	 was	 a	
memorable	experience	with	nostalgia	music	 for	him	after	having	only	 listened	 to	 Iranian	
pop	music	via	internet	downloads	or	digital	recordings.	Kourosh’s	use	of	internet	bolstered	
his	 hobby	 and	 interest	 of	 collecting	 and	 listening	 to	 nostalgia	 music.	 However,	 as	 his	
account	 illustrates,	 the	 mediation	 through	 LP	 and	 the	 embodied	 circumstances	 of	 the	
listening	experience	he	recalls	is	not	achieved	through	internet.		
For	Kourosh	retro	associations	with	the	music	are	most	strongly	felt	when	consuming	it	in	
the	original	media	form.	Interestingly,	this	value	for	the	original	media	form	is	replicated	in	
the	production	of	Pomegranates	in	LP	format.	Not	simply	that	they	can	be	accrued,	but	that	
they	have	the	status	of	a	collector’s	item	because	of	their	rarity	and	historical	significance	
both	 as	 musical	 productions	 valuable	 to	 niche	 audiences	 quite	 independent	 from	 their	
status	 as	 remnants	 from	 an	 Iranian	 past.	 Although	 new	 productions	 are	made,	 they	 are	
subject	 to	 the	same	rigors	of	preservation	as	older	ones.	 In	 fact,	 they	are	made	with	 this	
purpose	in	mind.	This	reflects	the	 limits	of	 these	websites	 in	mediating	these	sounds	and	
tactile	 remnants	 of	 recordings	 of	 the	 past.	 These	 digital	 repositories	 do	 not	mediate	 the	
whole	breadth	of	experiencing	the	past	 that	old	records	do,	and	 its	role	 is	evident	 in	this	
comparison.	It	does	not	seem	to	mediate	the	weight	(in	both	senses	of	the	word)	of	these	
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important	artifacts,	whether	they	are	objects	from	the	past	that	have	survived	over	time,	or	
newly‐made	objects	intended	and	designed	to	survive	into	the	future.	
Kourosh	enjoys	the	special	thrill	of	finding	rare	records	from	this	period.	These	objects	are	
rare	 not	 only	 because	 many	 have	 not	 withstood	 degradation	 over	 time,	 but	 specifically	
because	 of	 the	 calculated	 destruction	 and	 banning	 of	much	 of	 this	music	 by	 the	 Islamic	
regime.	 For	 some,	 this	makes	 the	 project	 of	 preservation	 all	 the	more	 urgent.	 Kourosh’s	
excitement	 at	 having	 obtained	 an	 original	 record	 is	 heightened	 when	 he	 has	 the	
opportunity	 to	 meet	 the	 artist	 at	 a	 concert.	 “Then	 I	 show	 them	 their	 records	 that	 they	
haven’t	even	seen	 in	decades.	They	really	 like	 it.	And	 I	get	 their	autographs,”	he	explains	
with	a	satisfied	smile.	He	confesses	that	although	he	introduces	many	of	his	close	friends	to	
the	music	he	is	passionate	about,	he	is	reluctant	to	encourage	people	to	become	enthusiasts	
and	 start	 collecting	 records,	 as	 this	would	 only	 create	more	 competition	 on	 a	market	 of	
already	rare	collector’s	items.	
There	are	similarities	here	with	the	case	of	the	magazine,	B|taarof.	B|taarof	was	set	up	in	
2012	 by	 second‐generation	 Iranian	 Americans	 based	 on	 both	 American	 coasts.	 On	 its	
website	 the	 tagline	 read:	 “Print	magazine	&	website	 featuring	 visual	 arts,	 critical	 essays,	
curated	 archives,	 &	 oral	 histories	 of	 Iran/Iranians	 across	 generational	 &	 geographic	
borders.”	It	was	also	described	by	one	of	its	founding	editor’s,	Arash	D,	in	the	following	way	
in	an	email	he	circulated	to	contacts	around	the	magazine’s	inception:	“B|ta'arof	is	a	niche	
publication,	meant	to	be	published	in	limited	numbers	for	a	limited	amount	of	time.”	When	
I	spoke	to	Arash	D	about	their	choice	to	put	out	a	print	publication	he	emphasized	the	value	
he	saw	in	carefully	creating	and	distributing	a	high	quality	physical	product	with	original	
content	 rather	 than	having	a	 fully	web‐based	project.	For	B|taarof,	 the	website	plays	 the	
role	of	a	shop	window	for	 the	magazine,	showcasing	some	of	 the	visual	elements	used	in	
the	print	 publication.	 It	was	never	meant	 to	be	 a	website	 alone,	 but	 as	 a	 quarterly	 print	
publication	 with	 a	 website	 addendum	 where	 some	 of	 the	 design	 content	 was	 posted	
digitally	online,	as	well	as	subscriptions	to	the	print	version	being	made	available	for	order	
through	the	site.		
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Figure	5	Photograph	I	made	of	a	spread	from	B|taarof	Magazine,	Issue	2,	July	2013	
This	collaboration	is	another	one	that	involves	a	number	of	second‐generation	contributors	
(and	 others),	 many	 of	 whom	 are	 contacts	 of	 the	 editors.	 I	 see	 the	 parallels	 with	 the	
production	 of	Pomegranates	 in	 the	 attention	 paid	 to	 creating	 a	 certain	 tactile	 and	 visual	
experience	of	appreciation.	The	aesthetic	experience	of	 leafing	 through	a	printed	copy	of	
B|taarof	 that	 one	 has	 received	 in	 the	 mail	 offers	 a	 different	 experience	 of	 the	 rich	
photographic	 and	 graphic	 design	 elements	 the	magazine	heavily	 includes.	 Close	 to	 every	
page	 has	 formatting	 that	 includes	 text	 as	 well	 as	 color‐printed	
illustration/design/photography	on	the	semi‐glossy	paper.	It	 is	a	product	that	 is	sold	and	
promoted	online	and	the	Indigogo.com	crowdsourcing	website	is	use	for	fundraising.	It	is	
also	stocked	by	selected	(Iranian)	book	stores	in	various	east	and	west	coast	cities.		
The	pages	of	the	second	issue	boast	prints	of	historical	posters,	stamps,	and	photographs.	
The	past	is	captured	as	a	stylized,	artistic	rendition	that	displays	a	retro	aesthetic.	There	is	
an	artisan	aura	about	 the	consumption	of	a	niche	product	 that	eschews	mass	production	
and	is	concerned	with	the	care	and	detail	that	goes	into	the	styling	of	the	thing.	As	Cameron	
writes	of	historian	Graeme	Davidson’s	view	on	heritage:	
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According	 to	Davison,	heritage	 represents	 a	preoccupation	with	material	 remains,	
elevates	 materiality	 along	 with	 the	 unique	 and	 handmade	 as	 more	 valuable,	 and	
articulates	a	distaste	for	mass	production	(Cameron,	2008:	178).	
The	 digital	 and	 the	 tactile	 alongside	 being	 used	 together	 as	 part	 of	 the	B|taarof	 project	
allows	for	a	different	experience	with	the	content	of	the	magazine.	Somewhat	similar	to	the	
relationship	 of	 the	 Pomegranate	 album	 to	 its	 promotional	 site,	 the	 digital	 version	 is	 a	
teaser,	an	 introduction,	a	necessary	access	point	 to	audiences,	and	a	channel	 to	sales	and	
promotion.	Having	a	physical	production,	however,	reinforces	the	embodied	experience	of	
engaging	 with	 those	 objects	 through	 touch,	 sight,	 and	 sound	 in	 ways	 that	 cannot	 be	
experienced	 in	 the	 same	 way	 through	 listening	 to	 the	 music	 online.	 Nor	 would	 it	 be	
precisely	 the	 same	 in	 the	 case	 of	 printed	 design	 as	 part	 of	 a	 magazine	 versus	 digitally	
displayed	on	a	webpage.		
The	magazine	can	be	laid	on	a	coffee	table,	picked	up	and	flicked	through	as	a	talking	piece	
–	it	brings	with	it	a	certain	kind	of	sociality.	And	this	apparently	fits	the	niche	objective	the	
editors	 started	 out	 with.	 Web	 applications	 are	 used	 here	 in	 a	 supportive	 function	 to	
communicate	about	the	physical	productions	in	question,	but	not	to	be	the	central	conduit	
for	 the	content.	The	cultural	repository	created	through	these	digital	archives	establishes	
the	memory	 of	 pop	 cultural	 pre‐Revolution	 Iran,	 and	 it	 gives	 it	 a	 certain	materiality	 by	
designating	 a	 certain	 page	 or	 archiving	 infrastructure.	 Websites	 are	 central	 to	 these	
emerging	efforts	to	curate	and	create	the	groundwork	for	setting	up	archives.125		This	has	
clear	differences	from	the	materiality	of	a	magazine	on	a	coffee	table	or	an	original	record	
that	can	be	signed	by	its	artist	decades	after	its	release.		
																																																								
125	The	creation	of	such	repositories	as	discussed	here	raises	issues	concerning	how	digital	archives	can	
themselves	become	incorporated	into	institutionalized	heritage	discourses	and	practices.	As	Cameron	writes,	
“Interestingly,	current	definitions	of	digital	heritage	in	the	UNESCO	charter	admit	new	work	in	different	
media	as	heritage	and	give	them	equal	standing…	[T]hese	new	products	are	tethered	to	systems	of	
significance	and	discourses	of	preservation	and	conservation.	Digital	materials	include	texts,	databases,	still	
and	moving	images,	audio,	graphics,	software	and	web	pages,	among	a	wide	and	growing	range	of	formats.	…	
Many	of	these	resources	have	lasting	value	and	significance,	and	therefore	constitute	a	heritage	that	should	
be	protected	and	preserved	for	current	and	future	generations”	(Cameron,	2008:	173).	
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But	 this	 is	 also	 a	 social	 aspect	 to	 the	 purpose	 that	web	 applications	 serve.	 For	 instance,	
Kourosh	used	certain	websites	and	social	media	platforms	to	find	other	people	who	were	
interested	 in	 the	 genre	 of	 nostalgia	music	 and	 vintage	 records.	 Finding	 an	 old	 video	 on	
YouTube	 can	 have	 something	 of	 a	 similar	 feeling.	 For	 instance,	 I	 could	 hear	 Arash’s	
excitement	as	he	invited	me	to	“Check	this	out”	as	he	showed	me	a	YouTube	video	as	he	sat	
behind	his	desk	in	his	room.	Sitting	on	the	bed	behind	him	I	could	see	the	screen	on	which	
the	music	video	played,	 the	woman	singing	 in	 it	had	feathered	hair	and	she	swayed	back	
and	forth	as	the	shot	stayed	on	her	for	noticeably	longer	than	contemporary	music	videos	
conventionally	do.	Though	I	did	not	recognize	her,	the	look	and	feel	of	the	clip	was	clearly	
one	 of	 a	 different	 time	 in	 music	 video	 production.	 We	 watched	 and	 listened	 while	
commenting	with	 recognition	on	 the	 style	of	 a	bygone	 time.	A	 seemingly	 endless	pool	of	
Iranian	 music	 videos	 from	 decades	 past	 have	 been	 uploaded	 to	 YouTube,	 especially	 of	
entertainment	 shows	 that	 featured	 Iranian	 artists’	 musical	 performances.	 This	 allowed	
young	people	like	Arash	and	others	who	had	been	too	young	to	engage	with	this	music	at	
the	 time	 of	 its	 release	 access	 to	 the	material.	 And	 that	 at	 any	moment	when	 they	 have	
access	to	a	computer	or	mobile	devise	with	internet.		
While	video	uploads	were	easily	 searchable,	 internet	was	also	used	 to	make	connections	
with	those	who	uploaded	such	content.	Kourosh	described	developing	a	friendship	around	
a	shared	 interest	 in	rare	vintage	records	 from	Iran	with	another	Iranian	American	young	
man	 who	 also	 lived	 in	 Southern	 California.	 Having	 come	 into	 contact	 via	 the	 website	
Iranoldies.com,	the	two	repeatedly	met	up	face‐to‐face,	eventually	becoming	friends	in	the	
process.	Kourosh	had	also	been	in	contact	with	Arash	through	a	MySpace	page	that	Arash	
had	 started	 up	 entitled	 FarsFunk.	 FarsFunk	 was	 a	 site	 that	 posted	 images,	 information	
about,	and	samples	of	vintage	Iranian	records,	including	album	cover	art	and	photographs.	
Since	the	relative	decline	of	MySpace	and	rise	of	Facebook	since	then,	Arash	set	up	a	similar	
Facebook	page	entitled	“Pop	Irani”	(Iranian	Pop).	Arash	and	Kourosh	had	conducted	email	
correspondence	with	one	another	but	never	met	in	person.		
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The	use	of	Facebook	allows	“sharing”	that	brings	with	it	a	certain	sociality	that	adds	to	the	
direct	contact	between	enthusiasts	 like	Arash	and	Kourosh.	On	 the	page	of	Pop	 Irani,	 the	
photographs	and	videos	with	accompanied	textual	annotation	(written	in	a	combination	of	
English	and	Persian	script	as	well	as	transliteration	of	Persian	words)	are	posted.	While	the	
format	 is	 that	 of	 a	 standard	 Facebook	 page,	 it	 is	 interesting	 that	 the	 original	 context	 in	
which	 the	products	were	 formerly	consumed	stays	partially	 intact.	For	 instance,	much	of	
the	 time,	 the	 television	 shows	 in	 which	 the	 videos	 appeared	 are	 named,	 like	 the	 show	
Rangarang.	 The	 photographs	 that	 are	 taken	 from	 magazine	 covers	 are	 presented	 as	
“Iranian	Old	Magazine	Covers”	via	the	Facebook	page	of	that	name,	with	the	dates	and	titles	
of	 the	 publications	 included.	 Hence,	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 the	 materiality	 of	 the	 digital	
reproductions	 is	 embedded	 in	 the	 sociality	 built	 around	 sharing	 and	 consuming	 in	 the	
context	 of	 a	 social	 media	 platform.	 Yet	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	materiality	 of	 the	 original	
media	objects	–	the	television	show	or	the	magazine	–	(and	not	just	loose	visual	images)	is	
referenced	 as	 part	 of,	 and	 adding	 to,	 the	 experience	 of	 remembering.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	
materiality	 of	 the	 older	 media	 forms	 is	 part	 of	 the	 remembering	 experience.	 While	 the	
sociality	of	the	new,	digital	media	through	which	it	is	“shared”	gives	a	new	social	veneer	to	
the	experience.		
Another	 social	 media	 platform,	 MySpace,	 was	 how	 Arash	 and	 Mahssa	 had	 come	 into	
contact.	 The	 common	 interest	 in	 Iranian	 Funk	 music	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 first	
encounters.	At	this	time	Mahssa	was	a	DJ	living	in	New	York.	However,	following	a	personal	
decision	 to	move	 to	 and	 live	 in	 LA,	 she	 and	 Arash	 had	met	 face	 to	 face	 and	 started	 the	
Pomegranates	 project	 together.	 These	 connections	 were	 made	 through	 the	 MySpace	
platform	when	it	was	becoming	largely	music‐oriented.	Social	exchanges,	relationships,	and	
collaborations	 developed	 around	 contact	 made	 because	 of	 a	 shared	 niche	 interest.	 Yet,	
evidently,	 in	 their	development	and	maintenance	 these	connections	 required	 face‐to‐face	
upkeep,	 which	 internet	 communications	 could	 not	 provide.	 Mahssa	 and	 Arash’s	
collaboration	 was	 a	 longer‐running	 affair,	 but	 Kourosh’s	 contact	 with	 his	 new	 friend	
dwindled	over	a	longer	period	of	not	seeing	one	another	as	their	regular	daily	activities	got	
in	 the	 way	 of	 opportunities	 to	 meet.	 The	 main	 affordance	 of	 internet	 in	 this	 regard	 is	
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allowing	 a	 small	 pool	 of	 enthusiasts	 to	 find	 one	 another.	 The	 local	 distances,	 people’s	
schedules,	 and	 their	 social	 propensities	 shape	 whether	 this	 initial	 contact	 develops	 into	
longer‐term	 exchanges.	 It	 also	 shapes	whether	 or	 not	 the	 shared	 interest	might	 develop	
into	shared	production	–	as	 it	did	 in	 the	case	of	 the	Pomegranates	project.	Alongside	 the	
websites	that	promote	other	media	productions,	these	social	media	sites	are	used	to	make	
connections	around	niche	interests.		
	
Framing	and	contesting	style	
The	 popularity	 of	 this	 period	 and	 its	 styles	 seemed	 to	 be	 rooted	 in	 the	 rarity	 of	 its	
endangered	 status	 –	 a	 period	 of	 cultural	 products	 and	 lifestyle	 that	 had	 fallen	 victim	 to	
eradication	 and	 oppression	 by	 the	 Islamic	 Republic.	 Its	 appeal	 was	 also	 rooted	 in	 the	
familiarity	of	styles	that	were	similar	to	those	recognizable	from	the	same	period	on	the	US	
and	 its	 close	 fit	 with	 trends	 contemporary	 trends	 towards	 “vintage	 cool”.	 Second	
generation	filmmaker	and	artist	Maryam,	who	made	an	 intimate	documentary	 film	about	
the	 journey	 of	 her	 father	 and	 his	 friends	 to	 the	 United	 States	 and	 their	 lives	 in	 70s	
California,	made	a	point	about	this.	She	claimed	that	current	interest	in	the	Iran	of	the	60s	
and	70s	seems	to	overlap	with	a	broader	American	nostalgia	about	that	same	period	in	the	
US,	a	sentiment	that	she	said	was	prevalent	in	the	cultural	references	that	this	generation	
of	young	Americans	are	exposed	to	as	well.		
Duyvendak	writes	 about	 the	meanings	 of	 nostalgia	 in	 America	 (which	 he	 contrasts	with	
Europe)	 as	 a	 longing	 for	 “better	 times,”	 a	more	 cohesive	 and	 familiar	 nation	of	 the	past.	
(2011).	 He	 argues	 that	 this	 looking	 back	 also	 creates	 notions	 of	 collectivity,	 feelings	 of	
home,	and	inclusion/exclusion	of	certain	people.	In	contrast	to	his	description	of	the	rather	
culturally	conservative	past	that	revolves	around	the	cohesion	of	the	ideal	nuclear	family	as	
the	scaled‐down	nation,	Maryam’s	comment	above	suggests	that	a	more	specific	nostalgia	
for	 the	period	of	 the	60s	and	70s	 in	contemporary	American	popular	culture	 is	part	of	a	
more	politically	progressive	national	sentiment.	And	the	nostalgic	collective	remembering	
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of	 this	 specific	 American	 past	might	 work	 to	 include	 Iranian	 Americans	 who	 remember	
both	the	atmosphere	of	protest	and	social	 freedom,	and	the	appearance	of	popular	styles	
attributed	to	this	period	in	both	countries.	
Drawing	 from	 Maryam’s	 above	 comment,	 remembering	 this	 period	 has	 a	 more	 general	
appeal.	It	is	not	only	about	recalling	Iran	before	the	Islamic	revolution	in	order	to	contrast	
it	 to	 the	present	day.	 It	 is	equally	about	an	era	when	new	and	 influential	styles	of	music,	
fashion,	and	politics	took	on	global	appeal.	It	is	a	time	that	is	also	remembered	in	American	
pop	 culture	 for	 the	 same	 styles.	 This	 this	 is	 the	 recognizable	 thing	 about	 it	 in	 the	
contemporary	resurgence	of	that	era’s	“cool.”	This	remembering	can	be	seen	as	not	simply	
being	 about	 recalling	 (collective)	 experiences,	 but	 about	 cultivating	 a	 sense	 of	 shared	
experience	 as	 a	 way	 of	 forming	 social	 connections.	 Smith	 argues	 of	 memory’s	 role	 in	
heritage	formation,	that	heritage	is	not	just	an	aid	to	memory,	but	is	“about	the	creation	of	
shared	 memories	 that	 work	 to	 help	 create	 and	 maintain	 bonds	 between	 family	 and	
community	members”	 (L.	 Smith,	2006).	As	new	generations	are	 raised	and	develop	 their	
selves,	 how	 this	 process	 of	 memory	 creation	 takes	 shape	 is	 important	 as	 a	 means	 of	
regenerating	community	over	time.	
Remembering	cultivates	a	taste	for	certain	art	forms	and	styles,	drawing	on	a	nostalgia	for	
a	 time	that	 is	associated	with	 the	youth	of	their	parent’s	generation	–	an	implicit	parallel	
between	 the	 two	 generations.	 My	 respondents	 tailor	 this	 past	 to	 contemporary,	 young	
audiences,	framing	styles	of	the	past	as	recognizable	yet	specialized	reference	points.	They	
desire	appreciation	 for	 the	products	of	 Iran’s	pop	cultural	past	not	only	by	other	 Iranian	
Americans	 of	 the	 first	 and	 second	 generation,	 but	 connoisseur,	 hip,	 and	 interested	 non‐
Iranian	publics	as	well.	Their	role	as	curators	and	producers	comes	to	the	fore,	sometimes	
overshadowing	the	interest	or	knowledge	of	the	average	person	with	living	memory	of	the	
time.	For	instance,	Kourosh	says	that	even	though	he	can	enjoy	LA	concerts	by	some	of	the	
old	pop	stars	with	his	parents	these	days,	his	parents	are	nevertheless	“not	good	sources	of	
information”	when	 it	 comes	 to	music	of	 the	period.	His	 interest	 goes	 further	 than	 theirs,	
and	 so	 he	 can	 no	 longer	 rely	 on	 their	 memories	 to	 uncover	 the	 musical	 pasts	 he	 is	
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interested	 in.	 Through	 this	 active	 role,	 and	 through	 their	 specialized	 interests,	 my	
respondents	 define	 imaginations	 of	 pre‐revolutionary	 Iran	 by	 choosing	 what	 to	
include/exclude	 in	 their	 remembering	 and	 their	 (re)productions	 and	 how.	 Nostalgia,	 as	
Boym’s	seminal	work	mentions,	does	not	rely	on	“virtual	realities”	created	by	technology,	
but	relies	on	“the	capacity	to	awaken	multiple	planes	of	consciousness”	(Boym,	2001:	50).	
Web	 usage	 is	 an	 important	 means	 of	 doing	 the	 production	 and	 promotion	 that	 this	
involves.	 But	 in	 some	 instances	 it	 lacks	 the	 necessary	 capacity	 to	 mediate	 bodily	
experiences	 and	 the	 materiality	 of	 tangible	 production	 of	 a	 record	 that	 awakens	 the	
necessary	planes	of	 consciousness	 that	 engagement	with	physical	 objects	 are	 able	 to	 do.	
For	this	reason,	web	usage	takes	place	within	the	context	of	other	media	usages	in	order	to	
mediate	the	past.	
My	respondents	combat	the	official	forgetting	of	this	past	by	Islamic	government,	and	also	
seek	 to	 address	 a	 wider	 lack	 of	 comprehensive	 documentation.	 Despite	 the	 nostalgic	
associations,	 they	 contest	 these	 practices	 of	 remembering	 and	 the	 deployment	 of	 these	
styles	 purely	 in	 terms	 of	 symbolizing	 an	 idealistic	 pre‐Islamic	 past.	 Instead,	 by	 making	
work	 of	 showcasing	 specific	 style	 elements	 in	 the	 products	 they	 seek	 to	 preserve,	 they	
create	a	contemporary	frame	for	engagement	with	this	past	for	their	own	generation.	They	
do	 this	 in	 a	 way	 that	 goes	 beyond	 the	 boundaries	 of	 their	 migrant	 generation	 and	
encompasses	generation	as	a	broader	cohort.	The	role	of	internet	here	is	to	allow	people	to	
find	 products,	 to	 produce	 within	 collaborative	 projects,	 and	 access	 audiences,	 drawing	
them	 into	purchases	or	 other	 interpersonal	 exchanges	around	niche	 interests.	As	part	of	
the	production	process,	internet	enhances	the	ability	of	my	respondents	to	set	up	projects	
in	which	they	collate	and	curate	digital	material	and	create	social	connections.	In	this	way,	
their	web	 usage	 becomes	more	 refined	 and	 bounded	 because	 of	 the	 niche	 interests	 and	
particular	styles	and	products	 it	 is	organized	around.	Style	brings	about	a	certain	shared	
appreciation	for	a	certain	way	of	being	Iranian.	As	has	been	argued	with	regard	to	heritage,	
remembering,	and	style:		
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The	importance	of	style	is	the	effectiveness	by	which	certain	styles	link	and	revive	
shared	sentiments	and	instigate	strong	feelings	of	togetherness.	Seen	this	way,	style	
is	not	something	given.	To	be	recognized	and	unfurl	its	effects,	style	has	to	appear,	
and	in	order	to	appear	it	has	to	be	appropriated,	animated,	and	embodied	by	people	
who	identify	with	it	(Probst,	2009:	119).		
Going	further,	Meyer	(2009)	argues	that	style	has	a	central	significance	in	the	formation	of	
communities	and	subjects.	She	emphasizes	that	 the	study	of	media	must	pay	attention	to	
the	adoption	of	shared	styles,	as	these	“modes	of	doing	things”	are	essential	for	“processes	
of	subjectivation.”	In	this	sense,	styles	are	seen	as	at	once	shaping	people	and	giving	them	a	
shared	 identity	 (Meyer,	 2009).	 In	 this	 and	 the	 previous	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	
shown	 that	 the	 way	 in	 which	 things	 are	 remembered	 is	 just	 as	 important	 as	 what	 is	
remembered	because	this	shapes	who	the	practices	of	remembering	include,	appeal	to,	and	
belong	to.		
	
Conclusion	
The	past	is	used	and	made	relevant	to	my	respondents	through	the	claims	it	allows	them	to	
make	 to	 collective	 inclusion,	 pride,	 recognition,	 and	 appreciation.	 Yet,	 beyond	 this	
instrumentality,	 an	 Iranian	 past	 has	 power	 over	my	 respondents	whether	 they	 like	 it	 or	
not.	 It	haunts	them	with	a	sense	of	ambivalence	if	they	do	not	know	“enough”	about	it,	 it	
instills	 them	with	 a	 sense	of	 loss/subjugation	 in	 the	 absence	of	 institutional	 recognition,	
and	it	ignites	their	action	when	they	see	it	as	being	used	in	morally	and	politically	odious	
ways	 by	 others.	 In	 one	 way	 or	 another,	 the	 way	 my	 respondents	 engage	 with	 the	 past	
makes	 it	 seem	 like	 an	 unquestionable	 link	 between	 Iran	 and	 themselves.	 Indeed,	 they	
actively	give	this	link	various	meanings.	Yet	the	fact	that	the	Iranian	past	implicates	them,	
and	who	they	are,	is	treated	as	a	given.		
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It	 provides	 a	 discourse	 for	 links	 between	 identity	 and	 the	 past	 to	 become	 self‐evident;	
something	 that	 “just	 is.”	 So	 powerful	 is	 this	 effect	 that,	 as	 Smith	 has	 pointed	 out,	 one	
shortcoming	in	heritage	research	itself	is	that:		
The	 idea	 of	 ‘identity’	 tends	 to	 be	 unproblematically	 linked	 with	 concepts	 of	
‘heritage,’	 taking	 the	 link	 between	 identity	 and	 heritage	 for	 granted…	 the	 actual	
processes	 and	 activities	 that	 are	 enacted	 to	 forge	 links	 between	 heritage	 and	
identity	are	often	not	identified	in	the	literature	(Smith,	2006:	301)	
The	 link	with	 the	 Iranian	 past	 is	 treated	 as	 a	 given	 despite	 it	 being	 actively	 forged	 and	
continually	 remade,	 in	 this	 case	 by/for	 the	 second	 generation.	 For	 different	 reasons	 and	
under	different	conditions	 than	 their	parents’	generation,	my	respondents	also	submit	 to	
the	power	of	their	own	productions	and	reproductions	of	the	past.	For	most	of	them,	the	
connection	to	Iranian‐ness	is	not	something	made	but	the	excavation	of	something	that	has	
always	been	there;	something	inherited.	And	the	appeal	this	has	to	them	exposes	a	need	for	
authenticity	 in	 their	 modes	 of	 belonging,	 the	 need	 for	 a	 stable	 and	 incontestable	
relationship	with	 Iranian‐ness	–	something,	 it	 should	be	mentioned,	 that	has	consistently	
eluded	most	of	them.		
This	 authentic	 relationship	 to	 being	 Iranian	 is	 something	 felt	 and	 experienced	 through	
particular	 engagements	with	 the	past.	 Their	 interactions	with	 artifacts,	 their	momentary	
bodily	 experiences,	 and	 their	 engagements	 with	 the	 materiality	 of	 made	 products	 all	
“enable	the	sensory	experience	of	history”(Serematakis,	1996)	for	those	whom	I	have	given	
accounts	of.	Maffesoli	argues	that	certain	shared	sensibilities	create	a	collective	sentiment,	
and	he	also	suggests	that	these	shared	sensibilities	rely	essentially	on	the	cultivation	of	a	
shared	style	(1996).	I	have	argued	that	my	respondents’	ways	of	re‐politicizing	the	past,	re‐
educating	 themselves,	 and	 re‐defining	 diaspora	 together	 are	 part	 of	 how	 collective	
sentiments	 are	 attuned.	 And	 their	 styles	 of	 remembering	 the	 Iranian	 past	 are	 how	 they	
appeal	to	other	members	of	the	second	generation,	and	particular	groups	of	people	therein.		
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Used	 in	 this	 way,	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 past	 can	 also	 reify	 and	 frame	 Iranian‐ness,	
reinforcing	 that	 taken‐for‐granted	 link	 between	 identity	 and	 the	 past.	 A	 link	 that	 is	
recognized	by	established	social	and	institutional	forces	on	various	scales	local	museums,	
global	 heritage	 discourses,	 national	 government	 discourses.	 However,	 this	 past	 is	 not	 as	
nationally	bounded	as	it	may	seem	at	times.	The	Iranian	past	that	my	respondents	mobilize	
is	 multifacted,	 dynamic,	 highly	 politicized	 and	 caught	 between	 local	 and	 international	
forces.	It	is	at	once	a	national	past	and	one	that	seeps	through	the	symbolic	boundaries	of	
the	 nation.	 It	 overlaps	 and	 intersects	 with	 the	 American	 national	 past,	 as	 well	 as	 local	
immigration	 histories,	 and	 regional	 histories	 of	 the	 Middle	 East.	 In	 this	 way	 my	
respondents	 contest	 and	 supplement	 existing	 and	 dominant	 practices	 and	 narratives	
perpetuated	by	those	around	them	by	taking	active	roles	in	remembering.		
What	 is	 the	 role	 of	 their	 web	 usage	 in	 mediating	 and	 hence	 enabling	 this	 “sensory	
experience	of	history”	I	have	discussed?	When	it	comes	to	discursive	practices	of	posterity,	
conservation,	 ownership,	 rarity,	 and	 origins,	 physical	 objects	 are	 seen	 as	 mediating	
elements	of	 the	past	 that	 the	web	applications	used	 cannot.	 In	 this	way,	physical	 objects	
have	a	certain	power	in	practices	of	remembering,	and	as	I	have	shown	in	this	chapter,	web	
usage	 reinforces	 this	 power	 rather	 than	 diminishing	 it	 or	 dislocating	 it	 through	 de‐
contextualization	of	digital	media	productions	as	some	have	suggested	of	digital	heritage.	
The	role	of	web	usage	is	an	important	one.	It	affords	practices	of	production,	curation,	re‐
education,	 and	 political	 contestation	 through	 its	many	different	 technical	 capacities.	 It	 is	
used	as	part	of	efforts	to	frame	and	contest	the	past.	Its	shortcomings	do	not	leading	to	its	
abandonment,	but	supplementation	and	 incorporation	into	other	media	practices	used	to	
mediate	the	past.	
Through	their	internet	usage,	my	respondents	select,	collect,	and	present	certain	elements	
of	the	past	in	order	to	preserve	them,	and	in	doing	so,	style	and	secure	their	own	version	of	
the	 past,	 creating	 what	 Eva	 Lam’s	 work	 on	 globalization	 and	 youth	 media	 cultures	 has	
called	 “affinity	 groups”	 socially	 selected	 around	 niche	 interests	 (Lam,	 2006).	 This	
contributes	to	a	certain	shared	cosmology.	Malkki	states	that	“the	construction	of	a	national	
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past	is	a	construction	of	history	of	a	particular	kind”	(Malkki,	1995:	1),	something	she	calls	
a	mythico‐history,	which	is	concerned	with	“the	constitution	of	an	ontological,	political,	and	
moral	order	of	the	world.”	I	see	the	way	my	respondents	style	the	past	as	representing	such	
a	 concern	 for	ordering	 the	world,	 as	well	 as	 a	 concern	 for	how	 they	position	 themselves	
within	it.		
Web	applications	 facilitate	 access	 to	 the	 copies,	 digitizations,	 and	networks	 that	 feed	 the	
creative	processes	of	producing	and	reproducing	and	bestowing	importance	on	a	past	for	
young	 people	 to	 hold	 on	 to	 both	 literally	 and	 figuratively.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 concerns	
expressed	by	the	older	men	described	at	the	outset	of	this	chapter,	my	second‐generation	
respondents’	practices	reflect	the	ways	they	appropriate	the	past	and	reframe	it	as	they	do	
so.	In	fact,	even	show	a	parallel	concern	for	loss	and	forgetting.	The	particular	affordances	
of	the	web	applications	covered	in	this	chapter	‐	in	conjunction	with	other	media	forms	and	
physical	objects	that	mediate	experiences	of	the	past	–	is	important	for	how	they	come	to	
mediate	the	past.		
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Chapter	3	Race	
	
	
	
Introduction	
“Check	 it	 right,	 you	 aint	 white.”	 This	 was	 the	 slogan	 of	 a	 2010	 census	 campaign	 to	
encourage	Arab	Americans	 to	 fill	out	 the	US	Census	by	answering	 the	 “race”	question	by	
writing	“Arab”	instead	of	checking	the	box,	“White.”	In	the	same	year,	and	also	for	the	first	
time,	a	coalition	of	Iranian	American	organizations	encouraged	Iranian	Americans	to	make	
a	 similar	 decision	 by	 checking	 something	 other	 than	 “white”	 in	 the	 race	 rubric.	 The	
campaign126	encouraged	Iranian	Americans	to	not	only	fill	out	the	census,	but	also	indicate	
their	 “race”	 as	 “other”	 and	 then	 writing	 in	 “Iranian	 American”,	 “Iranian”,	 or	 “Middle	
Eastern.”	On	Facebook,	 some	of	my	 respondents	 also	drew	attention	 to	 the	parallel	Arab	
American	campaign	and	 its	catchy	slogan.	The	Iranian	American	campaign	was	unique	 in	
its	success	at	bringing	together	a	broad	range	of	Iranian	American	organizations	around	a	
single	issue:	the	accurate	counting	of	American	residents	of	Iranian	descent.	Its	somewhat	
more	serious	slogan	was,	“Stand	up	and	be	counted.”127		
Yet	the	campaign	also	had	its	humorous	side,	most	notably	represented	by	a	comical	PSA	
(or	Public	Service	Announcement)	that	was	spread	on	YouTube	in	the	run‐up	to	the	weeks	
																																																								
126	Launched	by	the	new	organization	that	was	also	set	up	in	2010	called	the	Iranians	Count	Census	Coalition	
IraniansCount.org.,	“The	Iranians	Count	Census	Coalition	Releases	the	Special	Tabulation	Results	from	the	
2010	U.S.	Census,”		http://www.iranianscount.org/	(accessed	29/11/14) 
127 This	slogan	is	the	recognizable	from	a	host	of	other	census	campaigns	directed	at	racial	and	ethnic	
minorities	in	the	US,	including	campaigns	for	undocumented	immigrants,	whose	numbers	are	known	to	be	
underestimated	in	official	counts,	just	as	is	the	claim	of	many	about	Iranian	Americans,	especially	in	
California.		
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of	 the	US	 Census’	 administration.128	 The	 short	 video	 starred	 Iranian	American	 comedian	
and	 actor	 Maz	 Jobrani	 and	 was	 a	 collaboration	 with	 the	 Canadian‐based	 organization,	
Iranican,	which	circulates	its	podcasts	and	video	reports	via	its	website.	The	Iranican	site	
has	a	relatively	young	audience,	and	was	popular	among	my	respondents.	The	video	they	
posted	was	quickly	shared	by	a	great	number	of	my	contacts	via	Facebook	while	 Jobrani	
received	much	attention	for	his	 involvement	 in	the	campaign.	This	 included	 international	
news	 coverage	of	 the	phenomenon	of	Middle	Eastern	American	minorities	 claiming	non‐
whiteness	in	an	official	and	organized	way.129		
In	 the	 video,	 Maz	 Jobrani	 plays	 multiple	 characters	 that	 represent	 various	 Iranian	
stereotypes.	These	costumed	and	exaggeratedly	impersonated	characters	depict	a	range	of	
first‐generation,	Iranian	male	types.	Among	them	are	a	self‐important	and	wealthy	doctor,	
a	young	and	showy	lady’s	man	and	very	recent	arrival	from	Iran,	and	an	elderly	man	who	
has	ostensibly	grown	old	 in	the	US.	These	characters	are	approached	at	their	homes	by	a	
census	 worker	 to	 fill	 in	 the	 national	 census	 forms.	 The	 census	 worker	 is	 a	 temperate,	
friendly,	young	second‐generation	Iranian	American	woman.	Humorous	moments	ensue	in	
the	 interactions	 between	 Jobrani’s	 characters	 and	 the	 census	 worker	 in	 each	 case.	 The	
video	cuts	between	the	scenarios	with	the	different	characters	showing	the	viewer,	finally	
showing	a	parallel	between	them	–	and	the	main	comedic	moment	in	the	sketch	–when	it	
comes	 to	 the	question	about	 “race.”	They	all	unequivocally	give	 the	same	response	when	
asked	what	their	race	is:	“Italian.”130		
																																																								
128	Iranican,	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kgoLjFJ0rVg.	(accessed	29/1/14)	The	official	PSA	video	for	
the	campaign	was	a	more	serious	one	than	the	more	humorous	production	Iranican,	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kgoLjFJ0rVg	(accessed	29/1/14) 
129	See,	for	instance	CNN’s	coverage:	Blake,	John,	Arab‐	and	Persian‐American	campaign:	'Check	it	right'	on	
census,”	http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/04/01/census.check.it.right.campaign/index.html	(accessed	
29/1/14) 
130	Racial	covering	on	official	forms	in	particular	was	associated	by	many	with	an	additional	factor	of	Iranian	
Americans	being	reluctant	to	give	information	to	the	US	government.	This	is	a	tendency	associated	especially	
with	the	older	first	generation	who	mistrusted	the	US	government	like	they	mistrusted	the	Iranian	
government,	or	thought	that	the	information	would	not	remain	confidential.	Similar	explanations	were	given	
in	the	context	of	voter	registration	campaigns	targeting	older	Iranian	American	citizens	in	the	2008	
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The	video	draws	attention	to	a	recognizable	trope	among	a	great	many	Iranian	Americans,	
namely,	 the	 Iranian	 American	 who	 practices	 racial/ethnic	 covering	 by	 disguising	 or	
misrepresenting	his/her	origins	as	non‐Iranian	or	non‐Middle	Eastern.131	Interestingly,	the	
video	sketch	also	implicitly	gives	a	generational	characteristic	to	this	trope,	as	is	seen	in	the	
interaction	between	the	second‐generation	census	worker	and	the	various	other	characters	
who	 are	 all	 first‐generation	 immigrants.	 The	 message	 of	 the	 video	 is	 to	 show	 the	
importance	of	filling	out	the	census	accurately	and	with	attention	to	the	“race”	question	by	
poking	gentle	fun	at	the	known	tendency	in	many	Iranian	Americans	to	avoid	claiming	such	
difference	 from	the	white	American	majority.	 I	came	to	see	the	2010	census	campaign	as	
indicative	of	a	broader	change	in	the	way	Iranian	Americans	are	starting	to	see	themselves	
racially,	 and	 also	 in	 how	 they	 want	 to	 be	 seen	 by	 others	 –	 it	 was	much	more	 than	 the	
incidental	use	of	an	official	category	on	the	census.132		
The	 first	 set	 of	 questions	 this	 raised	 for	 me	 concerned	 the	 significance	 of	 race	 for	 my	
respondents.	 Race	 has	 only	 recently	 begun	 appearing	 in	 social	 scientific	 research	 on	
Iranian	migrants	in	the	US	(see	Bakalian	&	Bozorgmehr,	2009;	Mostofi,	2009).	In	particular,	
it	 is	 discussed	 with	 reference	 to	 post‐9/11	 conditions	 of	 Islamophobic	 discrimination	
against	 Iranians	 living	 in	 the	 US.	 A	 larger	 amount	 of	 scholarship	 has	 been	 dedicated	 to	
Muslim	Americans	and	South	Asian	Americans,	 including	 the	second	generation	(Jamal	&	
Naber,	 2008;	 Joshi,	 2006),	 and	 some	have	 included	 Iranian	Americans	 in	 discussions	 	 of	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
presidential	election.	However,	as	I	show	elsewhere	in	this	chapter,	issues	around	racial	covering	extends	
beyond	aversion	to	official	registrations	and	government	data	collections	into	contested	everyday	practices.  
131	Indeed	it	is	pertinent	to	note	that	the	overall	results	of	the	2010	census	did	not	show	any	significant	
increase	in	the	numbers	of	Iranian	Americans	who	indicated	racial	difference.	In	fact	it	indicated	a	decrease.	
For	one	analysis	of	this	phenomenon	see:	Hosseini,	Hossein,	Iranian	Americans	and	the	2010	census:	did	we	
shrink?”	http://www.payvand.com/news/12/may/1170.html	(accessed,	29/11/14)	
132 Formal	racial	categorizations	in	the	US	on	the	Census	are	overseen	by	the	federal	agency,	the	Bureau	of	the	
Census,	which	as	Yanow	states,	first	heard	substantial	opposition	to	the	categorizations	and	ways	people	
were	being	counted	since	the	1990	census(Yanow,	2002).	This	led	to	certain	revisions	in	certain	category	
names	and	definitions.	However,	the	definition	of	“white”	according	to	the	US	Census	has	essentially	
remained	the	same	since	before	the	revisions	were	made	up	until	the	most	recent	census	in	2010.	Namely:	
“’White’	refers	to	a	person	having	origins	in	any	of	the	original	peoples	of	Europe,	North	Africa,	the	Middle	
East	or	North	Africa.	It	includes	people	that	indicated	their	race(s)	as	‘White’	or	reported	entries	such	as	Irish,	
German,	Italian,	Lebanese,	Arab,	Moroccan,	or	Caucasian.”	According	to	the	“Definition	of	Race	Categories	
Used	in	the	2010	Census”	in	a	report	issued	by	the	Census	Bureau	and	compared	to	the	pre‐1990	definition	
given	by	Yanow	(2002). 
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post‐9/11	 lives	 of	 Muslims	 in	 North	 America	 (MacCloud,	 2006;	 Moghissi,	 Rahnema,	 &	
Goodman,	 2009)	 with	more	 of	 a	 focus	 on	 immigrant	 religion	 than	 race.	 Still,	 the	 recent	
racialization	 of	 Iranian	 Americans	 remains	 a	 relatively	 understudied	 area.133	 And	 in	
particular,	few	have	treated	the	racialization	of	Iranians	(and	Middle	Easterners)	in	the	US	
as	part	of	an	ongoing	historical	process	that	far	precedes	9/11	and	continues	dynamically	
for	more	 than	 a	 decade	 in	 its	wake.	 Minoo	Moallem	 sees	 the	 representation	 of	 “Islamic	
fundamentalism”	as	a	discourse	that	has	peaked	after	the	events	of	9/11,	while	having	been	
“a	 discourse	 that	 has	 been	 decades	 in	 the	 making”	 (Moallem,	 2002:	 298)	 before	 these	
attacks.	In	this	chapter	I	focus	on	how	my	second‐generation	respondents	see	themselves	
with	 relation	 to	 the	 present	 atmosphere	 of	 racialization,	 taking	 into	 account	 how	 they	
relate	 to	 their	parents’	 generation’s	ways	of	positioning	 themselves	 racially,	which	spans	
before	9/11.	
In	 the	 example	 of	 Census	 2010,	 the	 importance	 of	 being	 officially	 recorded	 as	 a	 distinct	
“community”	by	way	of	one’s	race	was	explained	in	the	following	way	by	the	authors	of	the	
campaign	literature:		
Numbers	 count!	 Showing	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 community	 translates	 into	 increased	
influence	and	recognition	within	American	society.	1)	Civic	uses:	Ethnic	organizations	
depend	wholly	on	ancestry	data	to	identify,	locate	and	mobilize	their	constituencies;	
civil	 rights	 agencies	 also	 require	 ancestry	 data	 to	monitor	 discrimination	 based	 on	
national	origin.	2)	Political	Influence:	Numbers	translate	into	power.	Elected	officials	
target	 ethnic	 constituencies	 on	 numerous	 occasions	 to	 solicit	 their	 feedback.	 The	
more	 Iranian	 Americans	 take	 the	 census,	 the	 more	 influential	 our	 community	
becomes.	 3)	 Economic	 uses:	 Businesses	 and	 corporations	 depend	 on	 accurate	 and	
reliable	ethnic	data	 for	market	research	and	economic	expansion.	4)	Research	uses:	
Social	 scientists,	 journalists	 and	 other	 researchers	 rely	 on	 census	 and	 ACS	 data	 to	
																																																								
133 This	concept	takes	from	Omi	and	Winant’s	classic	work	first	published	in	1986	on	race	in	American	
society,	which	was	influential	for	seeing	race	as	made	through	a	dynamic	historical	process	of	social	
construction	rather	than	a	static	or	strictly	biological	thing	(Omi	&	Winant,	1994).  
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study	ethnic	population	groups,	demographic	trends,	and	economic	and	educational	
mobility.134	
The	 aims	 of	 documentation,	 “recognition,”	 “influence,”	 and	 the	 countering	 of	
“discrimination”	against	Iranian	Americans	are	central	here.	The	census	is	one	of	the	ways	
used	 to	make	 Iranian	American	 seen	 and	heard	 as	 a	minority	 group.	 	 Doing	 fieldwork,	 I	
encountered	 various	 concerns	 from	my	 respondents	 and	 other	 Iranian	 Americans	 about	
the	(in)visibility	of	Iranian	Americans	as	a	group	in	the	US	–	not	being	counted	or	seen	as	a	
distinct	ethnic	group.	Claiming	racial	difference	on	the	census	was	aimed	to	remedy	this.	It	
also	 started	 discussions	 that	 included	my	 respondents	 that	 covered	 issues	 of	 organized	
ethnic	 and	 racial	 (under‐)representation	 of	 Iranian	 Americans.	 This	 raised	 questions	 for	
me	 about	 how	my	 second‐generation	 respondents	 position	 themselves	 within	 this	 shift	
towards	 increased	 claims	 to	 recognition,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 shift	 towards	 collective	
claims	to	the	racial	difference	of	Iranian	Americans.		
The	circulation	of	digital	videos	 like	the	humorous	“PSA”	mentioned	earlier	suggests	 that	
the	second	generation	and	the	use	of	web	applications	play	important	roles	in	the	changing	
experiences	and	notions	of	race	among	many	Iranian	Americans.	It	also	raises	a	second	set	
of	questions	concerning	 the	 role	of	 the	use	of	web	applications.	How	do	my	respondents	
use	web	applications	in	ways	that	have	to	do	with	race?	How	does	this	reflect	the	ways	they	
want	 to	 be	 seen?	 How	 does	 it	 respond	 to	 existing	 racialized	 media	 representations	 of	
Iranian	 Americans,	 Middle	 Easterners	 and/or	 Muslim	 Americans?	 And	 how	 do	 uses	 of	
particular	 web	 applications	 play	 a	 role	 in	 processes	 of	 racialization	 among	 these	 young	
people?	 I	 largely	 rely	 on	 blogs	 that	my	 respondents	 administer	 and/or	 contribute	 as	 an	
important	form	of	web	usage	in	these	discussions	of	self‐representation.		
																																																								
134 See	NIAC’s	promotional	brochure	for	the	whole	text	Iranian	American	Census	Project	“It’s	in	our	Hands;	
Stand	up	and	be	counted”	
http://www.niacouncil.org/images/PDF_files/census%202010%20brochure%20english..pdf (accessed 
29/11/14) 
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It	has	been	suggested	that	representing	race	and	racialized	bodies	is	more	prevalent	with	
the	 rise	 of	 Web	 2.0	 compared	 to	 previous,	 less	 advanced	 web	 applications	 (Nakamura,	
2007).	This	moves	discussions	of	race	and	internet	away	from	an	understanding	focused	on	
the	absence	of	bodily	cues	(see	Chon,	1999)	“online”	as	opposed	to	“offline”	and	towards	a	
more	complex	understanding	of	 the	relationship	between	web	usage	and	(representation	
of)	bodies.		The	ways	my	respondents	use	web	applications	includes	a	variety	of	Web	2.0’s	
possibilities,	through	which	bodies	are	reframed	and	represented.	This	chapter	focuses	on	
the	many	ways	of	using	internet	to	engage	with	(subverting,	resisting,	and	appropriating)	
racialized	 ways	 of	 seeing	 and	 being	 seen.	 I	 see	 race	 as	 an	 important	 part	 of	 how	 my	
respondents’	 web	 use	 in	 the	 current	 context	 of	 awareness	 about	 racial	 difference	 and	
experiences	with	discrimination.		
It	is	also	important	to	note	that	with	the	changing	landscape	of	racism	in	the	US,	claims	to	
racial	difference	are	at	once	officially	incorporated	through	classificatory	systems	like	the	
census	uses,	while	a	post‐race	shift	toward	the	redundancy	of	racial	differences	neutralizes	
such	 claims.135	 Paradoxically,	 the	 post‐race	 color‐blindness	 that	 makes	 racism	 itself	
invisible	and	obscure	 is	at	work	at	 the	same	moment	 in	which	 this	racialized	minority	 is	
thrust	 into	heightened	visibility.136	For	many	of	my	respondents,	much	of	this	problem	of	
racial	invisibility	also	revolves	around	the	problematic	relationship	that	Iranian	Americans	
have	 (had)	 with	 being	 subsumed	 into	 whiteness.	 I	 use	 Seshadri‐Crooks’	 approach	 to	
whiteness	and	race,	which	sees	race	as	a	regime	of	seeing	the	body	(2000).	This	informs	my	
understanding	 of	 my	 respondents’	 engagements	 with	 changing	 notions	 of	 racialized	
																																																								
135	For	perspectives	on	the	workings	of	contemporary	American	and	Western	European	racism	that	
foreground	this	shift	towards	a	so‐called	post‐racial	world	that	denies	racism	as	a	problem	(or	a	problem	only	
of	a	past	when	racism	was	exercised	through	overt	violence)	see		for	instance	Lentin	&	Titley	(2011),	Bonilla‐
Silva,	(2011),	and	Goldberg,	(2009).	
136	The	election	of	President	Barak	Obama	as	the	US’	first	black	president	has	sparked	this	post‐racial	framing	
of	the	debate	of	racial	discrimination	in	the	US	quite	clearly.	The	fact	that	this	is	a	president	who	has	
furthered	military	intervention	and	sanctions	in	the	Middle	East	under	the	banner	of	the	“war	on	terror,”	
national	security,	and	democracy	has	complicated	implications	for	the	position	of	Middle	Easterners	in	the	
US.	Securitization	and	militarism	are	not	about	race.	But	their	consequences	take	shape	along	racial	lines	on	a	
regional	scale,	which	carries	over	to	experiences	of	racial	discrimination	in	the	US,	to	which	numerous	
examples	from	my	respondents	in	testify. 
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difference	 with	 the	 help	 of	 their	 web	 usage,	 particularly	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 self‐
representation.		
In	the	first	section	of	this	chapter	I	discuss	how	whiteness	is	rejected	and	racial	difference	
claimed	 in	ways	 that	 are	 seen	 as	 contrasting	with	 the	 first	 generation’s	 practices.	 In	 the	
second	section	I	discuss	some	of	the	divergences	within	the	second	generation	as	to	how	
and	under	which	circumstances	such	racial	difference	is	and	can	be	claimed	with	the	use	of	
digital	media.	In	the	third	and	final	section,	I	discuss	the	gendered	aspects	of	racialization	
that	emerged	as	a	significant	part	of	my	respondents’	stories	and	practices.	In	the	course	of	
discussing	these	various	practices,	I	argue	that	my	respondents	present	their	narratives	of	
discrimination	 and	 race	 with	 emphasis	 on	 certain	 unchanging	 characteristics	 located	 in	
their	bodies.	I	also	show	how	they	appropriate	certain	styles	of	claiming	and	framing	these	
bodily	differences	so	as	to	make	them	a	source	of	inclusion	and	even	sometimes	challenge	
the	racial	categories	they	use.		
	
	
Visibly	different	
From	whitewashing	to	wealth‐washing	
The	collective	memory	of	the	Iran	hostage	crisis	that	started	in	Tehran	in	November	1979	
remains	 a	 salient	 one	 among	 LA	 Iranians.	 My	 respondents	 recalled	 this	 as	 a	 time	 of	
discrimination	and	alienation	of	Iranians	in	the	US.	Some	described	direct	recollections	of	
this	 period	 from	 their	 early	 childhoods,	 while	 others	 were	 made	 aware	 of	 it	 through	
narratives	 passed	 down	 from	 older	 relatives	 and	 friends.	 Stories	 of	 social	 exclusion,	
vandalism,	 and	 violence	 against	 individuals,	 their	 property,	 and	 their	 families,	 were	
recounted	 about	 this	 period.	 The	 period	 was	 also	 revived	 in	 Iranian	 American	 director,	
Babak	Shokrian’s	film,	America	So	Beautiful.	The	film	is	set	in	LA	during	the	hostage	crisis.		
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First	released	in	2001,	its	screening	in	2009	in	West	LA	by	the	Levantine	Cultural	Center	‐	
with	 the	 director’s	 presence	 for	 discussion	 following	 ‐	 spoke	 to	 the	 film’s	 sustained	
resonance.	And	so,	 too,	did	 the	well‐filled	 theatre	of	people	attending	 this	screening.	The	
audiences	were	 largely	of	Middle	Eastern	appearance	and	 included	some	members	of	the	
Iranian	American	second	generation.	The	film	tells	the	story	of	a	young	Iranian	man	who	
immigrated	to	LA	in	the	70s	and	became	drawn	in	by	the	promise	and	glamour	of	the	LA	
disco	scene.	This	became	an	escape	from	his	everyday	life	of	working	at	his	uncle’s	Iranian	
grocery	store.	 In	 light	of	 the	worsening	American	perceptions	about	 Iranians	at	 the	 time,	
the	 film	 includes	a	nod	 to	how	techniques	of	racial	 covering	 through	name‐changing	and	
misrepresenting	one’s	national	background	in	the	face	of	discrimination	play	into	the	main	
characters’	techniques	for	being	included	into	American	society	during	this	tense	period.137	
The	 backdrop	 of	 the	 hostage	 crisis	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 film	 almost	 entirely	 through	 the	
American	news	coverage	during	this	period.	Television	screens	and	radio	reports	covering	
the	affair	subtly	but	repeatedly	find	their	way	into	the	main	characters’	lives	at	meaningful	
moments	 in	 the	 story.	 It	 was	 also	 this	 media	 coverage	 that	 many	 of	 my	 respondents	
reported	awareness	of.	 Indeed,	media	scholarship	on	the	period	and	its	consequences	for	
the	 lives	 of	 Iranian	 Americans	 has	 highlighted	 the	 great	 significance	 of	 American	 news	
media	 coverage.	 According	 to	 Sreberny‐Mohammadi,	 the	 coverage	 “equalled	 and	 even	
surpassed	average	nightly	coverage	of	the	Vietnam	war”	(A.	Sreberny‐Mohammadi,	1995).	
The	vast	media	coverage	of	the	event	was	dominated	by	an	ABC	network	television	show	
entitled	 “The	 Iran	 Crisis	 –	 America	 Held	 Hostage:	 Day	 xxx,”138	 which	 would	 begin	 each	
program	with	the	number	of	days	the	crisis	had	been	ongoing,	and	presenting	an	update	on	
the	events	every	evening	at	11.30pm	(Mahdavi,	2005).	The	show	would	“broadcast	scenes	
from	 outside	 the	 Embassy	 in	 Tehran,	 where	 the	 crowd	 burned	 and	 trampled	 American	
flags,	waved	fists,	and	chanted	“Death	to	America…	it	was	against	this	backdrop	that	most	
Americans	formed	their	perceptions	of	 Iran	and	Iranian	Americans,”	writes	Mahdavi.	The	
																																																								
137 See	the	extensive	work	that	Betty	Blair	has	conducted	on	personal	name‐changing	by	Iranian	Americans	in	
the	US,	which	I	return	to	later	in	the	context	of	class	and	racial	categorizations	in	the	US	(Blair,	1991).	
138	The	show	later	became	Nightline.	
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consequences	 immediately	 following	 the	 hostage‐taking	 included	 the	 US	 government	
taking	action	that	affected	Iranians	living	in	the	US.		
On	 November	 13,	 1979,	 Attorney	 General	 Benjamin	 Civiletti,	 issued	 regulations	
requiring	post‐secondary	students	who	were	in	the	US	to	submit	special	proof	of	their	
continued	 eligibility	 for	 student	 visa	 status.	 Failure	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 regulation	
subjected	students	to	deportation...	During	the	period	in	which	the	regulation	was	in	
effect,	 57,000	 Iranian	 students	 were	 screened	 regarding	 their	 legality,	 7,177	
deportation	hearings	were	held,	and	3,088	Iranians	were	ordered	deported	(Mahdavi,	
2005:	216).	
Tehranian	additionally	draws	attention	to	the	state‐level	measures	that	were	taken	against	
Iranians	 in	 the	 US	 and	 in	 particular	 Iranian	 students	 at	 American	 universities	 (see	
(Tehranian,	2008).	Mahdavi	describes	this	as	a	time	when	Iranian	Americans	went	from	“a	
position	 of	 obscurity	 in	 the	 US	 community	 to	 one	 of	 notoriety	 for	 holding	 hostage	 the	
citizens	of	one	of	the	most	powerful	countries	in	the	world”	(2005:	243).	This	shift	signals	
the	stark	increase	in	a	negative	form	of	visibility	for	Iranian	Americans	as	a	group	in	the	US.	
Sreberny‐Mohammadi	 argues	 that	 the	 role	 of	 US	 television	 news	media	 during	 the	 Iran	
hostage	 crisis	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 framing	 events	 in	 terms	 that	 created	 harmful	
stereotypes	 about	 Iranians	 	 and	 shaped	 the	 experience	 of	 Iranians	 in	 the	 US	 (Sreberny‐
Mohammadi,	1995;	see	also	Keshishian,	2000).		
As	 depicted	 in	 Shokrian’s	 film,	 America	 So	 Beautiful,	 the	 response	 of	 many	 Iranian	
Americans	 to	 this	 increasingly	 tense	 atmosphere	 was	 strategies	 of	 racial	 covering.	 The	
term,	“whitewashing,”	was	applied	by	several	of	those	I	spoke	with.	This	was	used	to	refer,	
with	hindsight,	 to	the	practice	of	covering	Iranian	American‐ness	by	attempting	 to	“pass”	
for	white	or	to	try	to	be	indistinguishable	from	the	American	racial	majority.	Whitewashing	
was	a	term	I	heard	many	times,	used	in	slightly	different	ways.	The	term	seemed	central	to	
how	many	Iranian	Americans	of	the	second	generation	gave	meaning	to	their	relationship	
with	being	racialized	in	the	US.		
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John	 Tehranian,	 second	 generation	 Iranian	 American	 author,	 lawyer,	 and	 public	 figure	
among	 Iranian	 Americans	 in	 LA,	 uses	 the	 notion	 of	 whitewash	 centrally	 in	 his	 book,	
Whitewash:	America’s	 invisible	Middle	Eastern	minority.	 In	 the	book,	Tehranian	highlights	
the	 legal	 ways	 in	 which	 Iranian	 Americans,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 category	 of	 Middle	
Easterners,	 have	 been	 subsumed	 under	 the	 category	 of	 white	 (rather	 making	 up	 an	
ethnic/racial	 minority)	 in	 the	 US,	 and	 also	 shows	 how	 Iranian	 Americans	 have	 been	
willingly	allowing	themselves	to	be	racially	categorized	in	this	way	and	why.	He	writes	of	
contemporary	Middle	Eastern	Americans:		
[R]esponding	 to	 the	 rising	 tide	 of	 discrimination,	 many	 Middle	 Eastern	 Americans	
have	embraced	whiteness	and	assimilation	 through	 the	strategic	 implementation	of	
covering	 tactics	 involving	 association,	 appearance,	 affiliation,	 and	 activism	 that	
downplays	 their	 ethnicity	or	 race.	 In	 the	 short	 term	 they	have	benefited	 from	 such	
strategies,	which	enable	them	to	opt	out	of	the	less	factored	racial	category	and	all	its	
accompanying	hardships.	Yet	 this	 tactic	has	also	 left	Middle	Easterner	Americans	at	
the	margins	of	 the	civil	 rights	movement	and	with	 little	collective	social	or	political	
force	(2008).		
Tehranian	outlines	whitewashing	 as	 a	problem.	Not	only	does	 it	 alienate	Middle	Eastern	
Americans	from	historical	struggles	in	the	US	the	rights	of	racial	minorities,	but	it	also	has	
not	worked	 as	 a	means	 to	 protect	 Iranian	Americans	 against	 discrimination	 as	 the	 post‐
9/11	 backlash	 has	 shown.	 Elsewhere	 in	 the	 book,	 however,	 Tehranian	 states	 that	 the	
second	generation	is	signalling	a	shift	away	from	practices	of	racial	covering.	
[T]he	 younger	 generation	 of	 Iranian	 Americans	 is	 much	 more	 likely	 than	 prior	
generations	 to	not	only	eschew	covering	 techniques	but	 to	celebrate	actively	their	
ethnicity	and	even	insist	on	their	non‐whiteness	(2008:	87).	
This	 is	 precisely	 what	 characterizes	 the	 positioning	 of	 many	 of	 my	 respondents.	 Yet	
Tehranian’s	 work	 does	 not	 elaborate	 on	 the	 processes	 behind,	 or	 consequences	 of,	 this	
generational	 shift.	 Tehranian	 describes	 a	 top‐down	 process	 of	 “selective	 racialization”	
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effecting	Iranians	and	other	Middle	Easterners.	It	is	described	as	a	tendency	not	to	see	the	
Middle	Eastern	backgrounds	of	 accomplished	public	 figures,	while	 conversely	 seeing	 this	
background	as	central	to	the	identities	of	social	actors	engaging	in	transgressive	behaviour.		
In	 other	 words,	 selective	 racialization	 takes	 place	 when	 Iranian	 Americans	 who	 are	
successful	are	not	explicitly	identified	by	themselves	or	others	as	Iranian	American	or	this	
is	simply	circumstantial,	but	Iranian‐ness	is	explicitly	named	when	the	Iranian	American	is	
a	criminal,	for	instance	(i.e.	difference	is	made	explicit	only	in	a	negative	sense).	Tehranian	
argues	that	this	tendency	not	to	see	someone’s	Middle	Eastern‐ness	(or	racial	difference)	as	
relevant	 if	 they	 are	 successful	 (but	 to	 see	 it	 as	 relevant	 information	 when	 they	 are	 an	
offender	 of	 some	 kind)	 actually	 exacerbates	 and	 perpetuates	 people’s	 own	 practices	 of	
racial	covering.	When	being	Middle	Eastern	(and	therefore	racially	different)	is	dissociated	
from	being	 from	successful	 in	American	 society,	 then	people	might	 try	not	 to	be	 seen	 as	
Middle	Eastern	in	order	to	become	successful.		
Tehranian	and	others	who	have	focused	on	the	law	in	the	US	point	to	cases	in	which	Middle	
Easterners	 (Arab	 Americans	 in	 particular)	 historically	 made	 claims	 to	 whiteness	 as	 a	
means	to	equal	 inclusion.	They	did	this	in	a	context	where	non‐white	American	residents	
were	denied	access	to	citizenship,	and	they	did	this	in	a	country	where	each	new	immigrant	
group	gained	privileges	from	being	included	into	white	American‐ness.	Hence,	on	the	one	
hand	whitewashing	is	a	phenomenon	that	Iranian	Americans	have	historically	perpetuated	
themselves	and	benefited	from	as	means	to	inclusion	into	white	American	nationhood.	But	
on	 the	 other	 hand	 Iranian	 Americans	 also	 suffer	 from	 and	 are	 limited	 by	whitewashing.	
According	 to	 several	 of	 my	 respondents,	 as	 well	 as	 increasing	 numbers	 of	 Iranian	
Americans,	 whitewashing	 denotes	 (an	 attempt	 at)	 inclusion	 on	 the	 wrong	 terms.	
Embracing	(rather	than	covering)	Iranian	American	difference,	including	racial	difference,	
is	considered	the	more	just	and	effective	option.		
Upon	entering	young	adulthood	some	of	my	respondents	said	they	began	to	realise	that	the	
practice	 of	 changing	 one’s	 name	 to	 sound	Western	 ‐	 which	 was	 familiar	 among	 Iranian	
Americans	in	their	surroundings	‐	was	a	technique	of	covering	difference	that	was	reflected	
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this	kind	of	 inclusion	on	the	wrong	terms.	Name‐changing	 is	something	Tehranian	writes	
about	as	well,	along	with	labelling	oneself	as	“Persian”	instead	of	“Iranian.”		
A	 classic	 form	 of	 covering	 occurs	 when	 you	 ask	 an	 Iranian‐American	 about	 their	
ethnicity.	 Often,	 they	 will	 respond	 “Persian,”	 not	 Iranian.	 The	 reason	 is	 easy	 to	
understand.	Persia	evokes	images	of	an	ancient	empire,	a	proud	history,	magnificent	
rugs	 (and	 cats),	 and	 a	 rich	 culture.	 Iran,	 by	 contrast,	 evokes	 images	 of	 the	 hostage	
crisis,	the	Axis	of	Evil,	radical	fundamentalism,	jihad	and	fatwas	(2008:	83).	
For	young	people	I	spoke	with	who	were	developing	an	awareness	around	the	meanings	of	
naming	 and	 labelling	 practices,	 name‐changing	 and	 avoiding	 being	 called	 “Iranian”	 is	 a	
lingering	practice	 associated	with	whitewashing.	This	 is	 a	 practice	 that	 is	 oftentimes	not	
framed	 in	 terms	 of	 race	 and	 racism	 (or	 avoidance	 thereof),	 but	 instead	 in	 terms	 of	
convenience	or	simple	preference	to	adapt.	However,	for	many	of	those	who	were	critical	
of	this	practice,	there	was	a	connection	to	the	first	generation’s	practices	of	racial	covering	
in	a	context	of	discrimination	against	Iranians	in	the	US.	Indeed,	racial	covering	was	seen	in	
large	part	by	my	respondents	as	a	remnant	of	this	tense	period	in	the	US.	They	pointed	out	
how	the	atmosphere	had	changed	since	the	time	around	the	Iran	hostage	crisis.		
Shahdad,	a	college	graduate	in	his	30s,	notices	changes	since	the	time	of	the	hostage	crisis	
and	 the	 discrimination	 the	 first	 generation	 experienced.	 Among	 a	 group	 of	 peers,	 he	
recalled	 an	 event	 in	 which	 his	 uncle’s	 car	 was	 vandalized	 by	 people	 in	 the	 LA	
neighbourhood	where	he	lived.	Shahdad	reflects	on	the	differences	between	that	time	and	
the	present	LA	in	which	young	Iranians	like	himself	live.		
There	 weren’t	 as	 many	 Iranians	 back	 then.	 It’s	 interesting	 to	 see	 how	 [we	 are]	
growing	up	in	society	and	how	white	people	view	[us].	[Before]	white	people	would	
say	 like,	 they’re	 terrorists,	 they’re	 Arabs.	 Very	 negative	 things.139	 Now	 the	
																																																								
139	I	return	to	the	issue	of	anti‐Arab	sentiment	and	the	positioning	of	my	respondents	later	on	in	the	chapter.	
Here,	I	interpret	the	meaning	of	this	statement	as	referring	to	being	generalized	about	as	Arab	Americans	
because	of	the	stereotypes	that	Arabs	have	been	burdened	with	in	the	context	of	relatively	recent	association	
187	
	
conversation’s	 really	 different.	 It’s	 like,	 Iranians	 are	 very	 family‐oriented.	 They’re	
rich,	they’re	educated,	or	snobby,	or	stuck	up.	It’s	interesting	to	see	how	the	dynamics	
have	changed.	
Shahdad’s	 comment	 reflects	 the	experience	of	 a	 generation	growing	up	and	dealing	with	
new	 stereotypes	 that	 have	 emerged	 over	 a	 period	 of	 Iranian	 Americans	 establishing	 a	
strong	 and	 increasingly	 visible	 presence	 in	 LA.	 Indeed,	 there	 are	 elements	 of	 this	
experience	that	are	likely	to	be	specific	to	living	and	growing	up	in	LA,	given	that	California	
is	 exceptional	 in	 the	 US	 for	 its	 immigrant	 demographic,	 and	 because	 “the	 pace	 of	
demographic	change	is	even	more	intense	in	an	immigrant	metropolis	such	as	Los	Angeles”	
(Alba	&	Nee,	 2005:	 9).	 The	 changes	 Shahdad	 refers	 to	 indicate	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 tensions	
around	stereotypes	of	the	past	based	on	tense	events	inside	Iran,	and	a	shift	towards	a	new,	
more	local	stereotype;	one	of	Iranian	Americans	as	wealthy	and	privileged.	Virtually	all	my	
respondents	were	aware	of	this	way	of	being	seen	as	LA	Iranians	by	others.140	They	often	
expressed	uncertainty	as	to	whether	this	was	a	positive	or	a	negative	stereotype,	and	most	
often	did	not	see	it	as	applying	to	them.		
From	 the	 hostage	 crisis‐perpetrators	 to	 rich,	 LA	 snobs,	 the	 images	 of	 Iranian	Americans	
have	shifted	as	have	 the	televised	media	representations.	 In	2012	this	shift	became	most	
apparent	with	the	release	of	the	long‐anticipated	television	show,	Shahs	of	Sunset.	This	new	
reality	 show	 on	 cable	 television	 broadcaster,	Bravo,	 focuses	 on	 the	 lives	 of	 five	wealthy	
“Persians”	in	LA	and	is	broadcast	nationally.	The	initial	plans	and	casting	class	for	the	show	
and	 certainly	 its	 first	 airing	 early	 in	 2012	 sparked	much	 debate.141	 Discussion	 involved	
Iranian	 American	 observers,	 but	 also	 drew	 coverage	 by	 publications	 like	 the	 New	 York	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
with	terrorism.	The	phrase	may	also	refer	to	ignorance	about	the	fact	that	Iranians	do	not	make	up	the	
linguistic	region	commonly	referred	to	as	the	Arab	world	because	Iranians	speak	Persian.	
140	Some	who	grew	up	outside	the	city	also	help	this	stereotype	about	Iranians	living	in	LA,	and	expressed	
surprise	as	to	how	accurate	these	stereotypes	could	sometimes	be.		
141	One	of	the	main	reasons	why	this	show	was	able	to	cause	such	opposition	even	before	its	casting	was	due	
to	it	being	made	on	the	model	of	an	earlier	program	by	the	same	network	called	Jersey	Shore,	show	known	
internationally	for	its	low	brow	entertainment	factor	and	portrayals	of	negative	stereotypes	associated	with	
the	descendants		of	Italian	immigrants	to	the	US.	The	show	was	also	an	extreme	success	on	MTV	where	it	first	
aired.		
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Times,	Los	Angeles	Times,	and	CNN.	Years	prior	to	this	show’s	release,	the	concern	about	
the	 representations	 of	 “LA	 Persians”	 in	 line	 with	 existing	 stereotypes142	 about	 their	
flamboyant	consumption,	investment	in	appearances,	abundant	wealth,	and	party‐oriented	
lifestyles	 permeated	 discussions	 that	 concerned	 Iranian	 Americans.	 These	 included	
communications	 via	 web‐based	 ones	 on	 Iranian.com143	 as	 well	 as	 conversations	 face	 to	
face.			
The	 controversy	 around	 the	 plans	 to	 make	 the	 show	 were	 revealing	 of	 how	 contested	
mainstream	representations	of	Iranian	Americans	are	and	how	much	is	at	stake	to	people	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 how	 Iranian	 American	 are/should	 be	 seen	 ‐	 politically,	 morally,	 and	
socially.	144		Some	initial	fears	were	that	a	focus	on	the	lives	of	a	few	prosperous,	young	LA	
socialites145	 would	 cover	 and	 thus	 perpetuate	 the	 problems	 and	 consequences	 of	
racialization	and	discrimination	of	Iranian	Americans	in	the	context	of	post‐9/11	America,	
a	problem	 I	discuss	more	elaborately	 later	 in	 this	 chapter.	Hence,	 the	 concern	 that	 some	
expressed	around	the	show,	Shahs,	was	about	what	one	might	call	a	concern	about	“wealth‐
washing;”	 or	 an	 attempt	 at	 covering	 of	 racial	 difference	 through	 wealthy	 middle‐class	
inclusion.		
																																																								
142	With	the	show’s	release,	these	concerns	were	not	immediately	appeased	by	its	content.	However,	it	was	
interesting	to	see	that	the	show’s	premise	explicitly	framed	a	tension	between	extravagant	lifestyles	and	
family	obligations.	From	Shahdad’s	quote	mentioned	earlier	in	this	section,	and	according	to	recurrent	other	
statements	from	respondents,	the	family	orientation	of	Iranian	Americans	is	another	strong	association	and	
stereotype	that	is	mentioned	as	prevailing	about	Iranian	Americans.	The	show	seems	to	deploy	them	in	
combination,	placing	them	side	by	side	in	tension.		
143 As	a	gauge	for	the	level	of	widespread	attention	for	the	controversy	about	this	show,	I	should	note	that	the	
blog	posting	I	wrote	about	this	issue	received	the	highest	number	of	hits	of	my	other	postings	I	placed	on	
Iranian.com	and	I	was	even	contacted	by	a	journalist	working	for	the	Amserica.gov,	a	news	site	run	by	the	US	
State	Department	that	covered	the	controversy	around	the	show	well	before	its	launch.		
144	Not	only	entertainment	but	the	international	news	coverage	of	Iranians	in	LA	has	also	tended	to	focus	on	
the	great	amounts	of	wealth,	education,	and	entrepreneurship	among	Iranian	Americans	who	migrated	from	
Iran	during	the	80s.	For	one	of	the	most	recent	examples	see	coverage	on	BBC	news	magazine:	Amirani,	
Shoku,	“Tehrangeles:	How	Iranian	Americans	made	part	of	LA	their	own,”	
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine‐19751370	(accessed	29/11/14)	
145	Later	on	in	the	chapter	I	discuss	it	is	precisely	the	economic	inequalities	(lack	of	wealth)	that	this	
“wealthwashing”	in	fact	leads	to	obscuring.  
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The	changing	visibility	of	Iranians	discussed	here	is	shaped	in	particular	by	local/national	
narratives	about	Iranians.	However,	as	mentioned,	there	are	parallels	with	Arab	American	
populations.	 There	 are	 also	 important	 parallels	 to	Brodkin’s	work	 on	 Jewish	 immigrants	
(from	 Europe)	 in	 US,	 which	 argues	 that	 race	 was	 in	 part	 shaped	 by	 the	 kind	 of	 work	
immigrants	 did	 and	 the	 professional	 and	 income	 status	 they	 came	 to	 hold,	 such	 that	
whiteness	 was	 synonymous	 with	 living	 a	 middle‐class	 life	 while	 the	 working‐class	 was	
excluded	 from	white	American‐ness	 (Brodkin,	 1998).	Brodkin	describes	 Jews	 in	America	
(whose	racial	categorization,	much	like	Iranian	Americans,	has	long	been	ambivalent	in	the	
US)	as	being	excluded	from	the	white	side	of	the	race	binary	in	the	US	because	of	the	strong	
association	 of	 Jewishness	 with	 working‐class	 culture	 and	 socialist	 politics	 before	 WWII	
(1998).		
This	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 conjunction	with	Blair’s	 research	 on	 Iranian	American	 name‐
changing	practices,	which	argues	that	 the	higher	 the	 income	and	wealth	status	of	 Iranian	
Americans	around	 the	early	1990s,	 the	 less	 likely	 they	were	 to	change	 their	names	 from	
Iranian	ones	 to	European/American‐sounding	ones	 (Blair,	1991).	This	paints	a	picture	of	
American	 whiteness	 being	 extended	 to	 (upper)	 middle‐class	 immigrants	 while	 being	
denied	to	poorer	and	working‐class	ethnic	groups,	or	parts	of	such	ethnic	groups.146	With	
differentiations	 along	 class	 lines,	 racialization	 is	 thus	 not	 uniformly	 experienced	 by	 all	
Iranian	Americans.	 The	 absence	 of	 access	 to	whiteness	 through	middle‐class	 culture	 can	
mean	racial	covering	in	other	ways	(such	as	name‐changing).		
The	 positioning	 of	 my	 respondents	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 collective	 visibility	 of	 Iranian	
Americans	traces	an	arc	between	past	and	present	racialization	of	Iranians	in	the	US.	It	is	
also	placed	within	shifting	media	spheres	especially	 including	both	television	and	cinema	
representations	 of	 racialized	 Iranian	 Americans.	 Most	 recently,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 Iranian	
Americans	as	a	discrete	ethnic	group	(however	selectively	represented)	in	mass	broadcast	
television	programming	has	reinforced	the	notion	of	an	increasingly	racially	and	ethnically	
																																																								
146	See	also	Maldonado	on	the	racialization	of	labor	(2009).	
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diverse	American	mainstream.	However,	it	has	also	raised	concerns	among	some	about	the	
terms	 on	which	 that	 inclusion	 is	 taking	 (or	 should	 take)	 place.	 I	 have	 laid	 out	 this	 brief	
account	of	 contemporary	 racialization	of	 Iranian	Americans	 in	order	 to	 contextualize	 the	
following	 discussion	 of	 second‐generation	 practices	 of	 internet	 usage,	 and	 to	 help	 to	
explain	the	significance	of	my	respondents’	web	use	to	reconfigure	how	they	are	seen.	
	
Seen	as	different:	appropriating	racialization	
Asa	 and	 her	 older	 brother	 attended	 high	 school	 in	 Beverly	 Hills	when	 they	 first	 arrived	
with	their	parents	in	the	US	as	youngsters	in	the	late	1980s.	She	described	the	experience	
the	 two	had	 upon	moving	 to	 the	 affluent	 LA	 neighbourhood	 after	 her	 family	 left	 Iran	 as	
refugees.147	Asa	spoke	in	particular	about	the	painful	experience	her	brother	 initially	had	
with	 not	 being	 able	 to	 fit	 in.	 “We	 went	 to	 Beverly	 (Hills	 high	 school).	 He	 wasn’t	 good‐
looking.	Although	he’s	very	good	looking,	but	not	in	that	sense	–	you	know,	we’re	Iranian,	
we’re	hairy,	big	noses.”	Asa	described	her	own	social	 and	outgoing	nature	as	part	of	her	
survival	 skills	 in	 that	 socially	 difficult	 time.	 She	 noticed	 that	 her	 brother	 in	 contrast	
experienced	 exclusion	 because	 of	 “looking	 Iranian.”	 She	 described	 her	 own	 strategies	 of	
overcoming	or	deflating	the	negative	effects	of	being	different	by	embracing	her	difference,	
accepting	herself,	 and	using	 it	as	a	source	of	confidence.	This	attitude	carries	over	 to	 the	
increasingly	 public	 persona	 Asa	 has	 more	 recently	 taken	 on.	 To	 her	 young	 fans	 she	 is	
something	 of	 a	 role	 model	 for	 embracing	 one’s	 difference,	 and	 in	 particular	 physical	
particularities.		
Accounts	 of	 exclusion	 based	 on	 physical	 attributes	 were	 recounted	 by	 many	 of	 my	
respondents.	These	tend	to	be	framed	as	childhood	memories	of	discrimination.	An	account	
of	 such	 an	 experience	 appears	 in	 Firouzeh	 Dumas’	 popular	 memoir	 of	 growing	 up	 as	 a	
second	 generation	 Iranian	 American	 in	 Orange	 County,	 California.	 In	 the	 book,	 Funny	 in	
																																																								
147 Asa’s	family	moved	first	from	Iran	to	Hamburg,	Germany	before	they	moved	to	Beverly	Hills.	She	spent	her	
childhood	there	until	the	age	of	11	before	her	family	moved	to	California.  
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Farsi,	 she	 makes	 reference	 to	 the	 painful	 teasing	 she	 experienced	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 her	
classmates	 in	 primary	 school	 for	 the	 shape	 of	 her	 nose.	 The	 account	 is	 part	 of	 an	
idiosyncratic	 and	 humorous	 story	 of	 an	 upbringing	 in	 the	 US	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 the	
child	 of	 immigrant	 parents.148	 In	 one	of	 the	book’s	 later	 chapters,	 “A	Nose	by	Any	Other	
Name,”	Dumas	returns	to	the	nose	issue,	this	time	as	an	adult,	and	presents	it	in	terms	of	a	
national	obsession	of	Iranians	with	noses	and	“nose	jobs.”	This	is	presented	as	an	obsession	
she	 makes	 personal	 efforts	 to	 overcome,	 offering	 a	 story	 about	 the	 importance	 of	
confidence.		
Like	Firouzeh	Dumas,	Asa	incorporates	her	own	personal	experiences	with	discrimination	
and	being	seen	as	different	from	a	young	age	to	help	address	experiences	of	exclusion	on	
the	part	of	today’s	young	people	growing	up	Iranian	in	the	US.	And	like	Dumas,	Asa	engages	
with	her	audience	through	her	own	blog	as	well	as	coverage	by	a	variety	of	different	other	
websites	publicizing	their	creative	work.	Asa	was	featured	in	a	blog	post	on	the	design	blog	
Pinar&Viola,	in	which	she	told	the	story	of	her	experience	of	being	seen	as	different.	In	the	
blog	entry,	Asa	shares	her	memories	of	how	she	felt	growing	up	in	the	“Iranian	Diaspora”:		
Up	until	I	was	a	teenager,	I	lived	with	my	family	in	the	immigrant	ghetto	of	Hamburg	
(before	 German	 unification).	 The	 general	 political	 climate	 in	 Germany	 was	 very	
active	in	the	80s	with	the	lefts	and	German	punks	on	one	side	and	the	neo‐Nazis	and	
skinheads	 on	 the	other.	 As	 immigrants,	 our	 days	were	 filled	with	 the	 struggles	 of	
hatred	 and	 racism,	 and	 thereby	our	 lives	were	 in	 a	 continuous	 state	of	 resistance	
and	uprising…	
A	couple	of	years	after	the	Berlin	Wall	went	down,	the	situation	for	refugees	took	a	
turn	for	the	worse	and	my	parents	decided	it	was	time	to	move	again,	this	time	to	
Los	 Angeles.	 In	 the	 1980s,	 Beverly	 Hills	 had	 become	 an	 affluent	 Mecca	 for	 the	
Iranian	 Diaspora.	 My	 family	 was	 no	 longer	 affluent,	 and	 did	 not	 become	 so	 in	
																																																								
148	The	book	also	describes	the	many	ways	she	and	her	family	stumble	over	being	Iranian	American	as	
newcomers	to	the	US,	and	the	ways	she	sees	her	parents	as	awkward,	embarrassing,	and	atypical	from	the	
young	age	of	seven	and	the	ways	she	negotiates	her	own	Iranian	American‐ness	as	she	grows.	
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America.	I	grew	up	in	the	margins	of	this	society	–	in	the	slums	of	Beverly	Hills,	so	to	
speak...	
The	ASAsin	Manifesto	is	the	outline	of	a	politics	of	identity.	It	is	a	personal	reflection	
on	the	current	state	of	affairs	 in	 the	US	and	 in	 the	world.	Over	 the	past	years,	our	
ability	 to	 think	 critically	 has	 been	 repeatedly	 put	 to	 the	 test.	 In	 the	 aftermath	 of	
violent	strikes	on	the	World	Trade	Center	and	Pentagon,	the	world	is	experiencing	
the	onset	of	a	new	era	of	permanent	war	against	real	and	invented	enemies	of	the	
American	Empire.	The	media	has	bombarded	us	with	propaganda	and	manipulated	
the	 emotions	 of	 the	 people,	 causing	more	 hatred	 and	 perpetuating	 violence...	 My	
politics	are	personal	and	this	is	my	story.	
In	these	quotes	for	the	blog,	Asa	speaks	about	her	youth	being	shaped	by	“racism,”	“living	
in	the	margins,”	and	being	an	“immigrant”	to	an	international	blog	audience.	149	Exclusion	
appears	 a	 constant	 in	 her	 youth	 throughout	 her	 family’s	 moves	 from	 Iran	 to	 Europe	 to	
North	America.	This	is	an	experience	that	she	holds	on	to,	reflects	upon,	and	makes	part	of	
herself	 by	 including	 it	 in	 this	 personal,	 blogged	 “manifesto.”	 From	 the	 vantage	 point	 of	
adulthood,	 Asa’s	 statement	 reflects	 on,	 shares,	 and	 (re)frames	 her	 childhood	 stories	 of	
exclusion.	The	blog	posting	itself	features	a	series	of	posed,	full‐body	color	photographs	of	
Asa	in	different	outfits	and	in	different	settings,	as	well	as	the	embedded	video	of	her	song	
Fesenjoon	and	other	photographs	and	music	videos.	The	multiple	photographic	and	video	
representations	 leave	 a	 clear	 image	 on	 the	 viewer	 of	 the	 young	 woman’s	 physical	
appearance	 in	 a	way	 that	 struck	me	 as	 entirely	 congruent	with	 her	 “offline”	 face‐to‐face	
persona;	 colourful,	 extravagant,	 decorated,	 sensual/erotic,	 confident,	 and	 attractive	with	
her	 long	black	hair	and	brown	skin	complementing	the	bright	colors	around	her,	and	her	
(often	sexualized)	body	is	central	to	these	self‐representations.		
																																																								
149	The	“propaganda”	Asa	mentions	points	to	the	problem	of	racialized	post‐9/11	media	representations.	
However,	both	her	and	Duma’s	experiences	in	(high)	school	are	recollections	from	a	pre‐9/11	childhood.	
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The	text	and	photo	content	she	consistently	posts	on	Instagram	show	or	make	reference	to	
her	body.	And	while	many	of	these	fit	into	glamour	ideals	of	feminine	beauty,	she	often	uses	
her	 Instagram	 descriptions	 to	 frame	 her	 body	 as	 “curvy”	 and	 therefore	 different	 than	
mainstream	beauty	 ideals.150	 She	 also	uses	 iconography	 to	highlight	 her	Middle	Eastern‐
ness,	especially	 in	the	photo	and	video	art	pieces	she	showed	me	and	I	saw	on	blogs	and	
social	media	sites,	often	invoking	images	of	the	hijab,	militancy,	Farsi	script,	hefty	amounts	
of	gold	 jewellery	and	dark	eye	makeup,	and	sexualised	body	parts.	 In	Asa	and	Firouzeh’s	
cases,	 the	claim	to	difference	 is	a	critical	appropriation	of	 the	remembered	experience	of	
being	seen	as	different	by	others	from	a	young	age	and	making	creative	work	and	styling	
themselves	in	part	by	using	that	experience.		
  
	
Figure	6	 Screenshot	 from	 the	blog	posting	 about	Asa	on	 the	Pinar	 and	Viola	blog151	 (posting	 from	
February	8,	2011) 	
																																																								
150 From	her	Instagram	account	in	July	2014:	“skinny	is	not	something	I	strive	to	be.	I’m	happy	with	my	body,”	
Soltan	Rahmati,	Asa,	http://instagram.com/p/qxZ8s0TJSH/	(accessed	29/11/14)	
151 A	blog	by	two	female	artist/designers	based	in	Amsterdam,	which	mainly	showcases	their	own	work	but	
also	the	music	and	art	of	others. 
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Figure	7	Photo	of	a	piece	of	Asa's	work	that	she	showed	me	when	I	visited	her	apartment	and	which	
has	been	posted	and	reposted	to	various	of	her	social	media	profiles	since	
Asa’s	sharing	about	and	claiming	of	difference	seems	effortless,	both	in	person	and	in	the	
blog	posting	 in	 question.	 But	 the	 topic	 of	 racial	 discrimination	was	not	 one	discussed	 as	
openly	by	all	my	respondents.	The	topic	as	experienced	by	young	Iranian	Americans	was	
dealt	 with	 on	 the	 occasion	 of	 a	 roundtable	 discussion	 meeting	 convened	 one	 evening	
among	 a	 group	 of	 second	 generation	 students	 on	 campus	 as	 part	 of	 a	 Iranian	 American	
student	 conference	 called,	 “Knowledge	 is	Power.”	A	wide	 range	of	 experiences	with,	 and	
personal	 approaches	 to,	 everyday	 racial	 discrimination	 were	 recounted	 by	 participants	
who	spoke	in	turn;	some	meeting	one	another	for	the	first	time,	a	few	already	familiar.	At	
one	point,	a	student	spoke	up	to	describe	her	childhood	experience	of	being	placed	 in	an	
English	as	a	Second	Language	(ESL)	class	despite	having	been	born	and	raised	in	the	US.	It	
was	an	experience	 that	 still	 affected	her	 in	college,	 she	 told	us,	 as	 it	made	her	doubt	her	
own	abilities.		
At	the	end	of	the	roundtable	meeting,	Pouneh,	a	long‐time	student	organizer,	lamented	that	
the	discussion	about	discrimination	was	rarely	engaged	among	Iranian	Americans,	despite	
the	energetic	conversation	that	night.	 “I	 loved	this	discussion…	[it’s]	definitely	something	
that,	as	a	community,	we’re	kinda	missing,”	 she	said	 to	 the	group	 in	closing.	Pouneh	also	
bemoaned	 the	 lack	 of	 support	 from	 larger	 sponsors	 (Iranian	American	 organizations)	 in	
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the	coordination	of	meetings	like	this	one	dealing	with	issues	that	ordinary	young	Iranian	
Americans	 are	 faced	with.	 To	 her,	 that	 evening’s	 discussion	 and	 her	 broader	 experience	
indicated	 that	 these	 issues	 were	 evidently	 relevant	 to	 young	 people	 around	 her.	 A	 few	
others	expressed	 this	 same	 lack	among	 Iranian	Americans	around	 them	when	 it	 came	 to	
speaking	 about	 issues	 of	 race	 and	 creating	 spaces	 where	 that	 is	 possible.	 Based	 on	 the	
student	 reactions	 that	night,	 the	 silence	 appears	 to	be	 sustained	by	worries	 that	naming	
discrimination	 explicitly	 leads	 to	 further	 exclusion,	 self‐victimization,	 reinforcement	 of	
racial	categories	and	ways	of	seeing,	and	the	creation	of	angry	and	cantankerous	images	of	
Iranian	Americans	as	a	group.		
Despite	 the	relative	general	reluctance	 to	 talk	about	racism,	 the	stories	shared	that	night	
discussed	experiences	of	being	seen	as	different,	not	because	of	the	immigrant	newcomer’s	
difficulties	with	 language	or	unfamiliarity	with	 customs,	nor	with	being	marked	by	one’s	
accented	 speech,	 nor	 “cultural”	 quirks	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 others,	 nor	 lack	 of	 familiarity	with	
values/norms.	It	was	not	the	kind	of	difference	that	would	dissipate	over	time	through	an	
ambition	 to	 “adapt.”	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 was	 not	 the	 kind	 of	 difference	 that	 the	 first	
generation	might	 deal	with.	 Rather,	while	 those	 conditions	 did	 not	 apply	 to	 the	 cases	 of	
these	young	people,	their	stories	instead	reflected	a	tendency	to	locate	difference	in	one’s	
own	appearance,	look,	and	body,	even	from	a	young	age.	And	this	permanent	difference	is	
generalized	to	the	whole	“community.”		
In	 this	way,	 the	 second	 generation’s	 position	 lays	 bare	 the	 racial	 logic	 underpinning	 the	
exclusion	of	 immigrants	on	the	basis	of	(an	essentialized)	“cultural”	difference.	There	is	a	
similarity	here	to	research	on	Asian	Americans,	which	argued	that	even	into	third	or	fourth	
generation	Japanese	and	Chinese	Americans,	“being	ethnic”	is	a	consistent	expectation	(Min	
&	Kim,	 2000).	However,	 this	 racial	 logic,	 Lentin	 	 and	Titley	 explain,	 has	 never	 separated	
natural	from	the	cultural	differences;	“race	naturalizes	and	classifies	the	cultural	attributes	
of	human	groups,	ordering	those	deemed	inferior	and	superior…”	(2011:	68).	Seen	in	this	
way,	difference	takes	on	a	new	permanence,	one	that	is	grounded	in	markers	that	are	seen	
and	therefore	experienced	as	unchanging	and	fixed	in	the	body.	While	the	construction	of	
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racial	groups	developed	vis	a	vis	class	categories	and	notions	of	middle‐class,	mainstream,	
American‐ness,	racial	discourses	naturalize	difference	as	a	truth.	By	emphasizing	its	bodily	
manifestations,	racial	difference	is	claimed	by	representing	experiences	of	this	difference,	
including	through	blogs,	as	part	of	a	collective	experience	of	growing	up	Iranian	American.		
Web	use	makes	it	possible	for	some	to	blog	about	these	experiences	as	well	as	allowing	the	
author	to	include	visual	representation	of	her	own	racialized	body.	Such	a	use	of	internet	
develops	 alongside	 new	 and	 burgeoning	 social	 spaces	 for	 discussion	 about	 racism	
experienced	by	 young	 Iranian	Americans	 ‐	 and	 naming	 it	 that.	 For	 those	discussed	here,	
these	visual	differences	are	appearances	that	are	managed,	contended	with,	and	reframed.	
While	Firoozeh	Dumas’	writing	also	paid	attention	to	the	embrace	of	difference	and	modes	
of	 being	 seen	while	 growing	 up	 in	 the	 US,	 blog	writing	 and	 social	media	 has	 the	 added	
potential	 of	 adding	 visual	 self‐representations.	 It	 affords	 the	 (re‐)framing	 of	 visual	
representations.	 This	 emphasis	 on	 the	 visual	 has	 consequences	 are	 for	 those	 Iranian	
Americans	 who	 are	 not	 seen	 as	 racially	 different;	 i.e.	 appear	 white	 to	 others.	 In	 the	
following,	 I	 discuss	 the	 various	 approaches	 among	 a	 few	 of	 my	 respondents	 in	 their	
experiences	of	being	seen	as	white	‐‐	against	their	own	desires	‐‐	by	various	parties	in	their	
midst.		
	
Subverting	one’s	whiteness	
Shiva	says	her	aunt	and	other	older	relatives	admire	her	 light	complexion	and	hair	color.	
But	 their	 compliments	 and	 attention	 are	 off‐putting	 to	 her.	 She	 describes	 feeling	
uncomfortable	 being	 appreciated	 for	 attributes	 over	 which	 she	 has	 no	 control.	 And	 she	
expresses	an	uncomfortable	awareness	of	 the	beauty	 ideals	associated	with	whiteness	 in	
such	encounters.	She	associates	these	ideals	with	her	older	relatives	and	their	generation	
and	she	expresses	her	own	dissatisfaction	with	this	veneration	of	whiteness.	Her	comments	
echo	those	of	several	others	from	the	second	generation	who	position	themselves	against	
what	they	see	as	persistent	notions	‐	especially	among	older	Iranian	Americans	‐	of	latent	
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racism	and	aspiration	to	physical	features	of	whiteness.	Shiva’s	experience	is	echoed	in	the	
writing	of	author	Jasmin	Darznik	(child	of	Iranian	mother	and	American	father	who	grew	
up	 in	 Orange	 County)	 on	 Iranian.com,	 when	 she	 shares	 a	 short	 piece	 about	 her	 own	
experiences	with	her	physical	attributes.		
To	 illustrate,	 among	 my	 parents'	 set,	 there	 has	 always	 been	 a	 clearly	 delineated	
hierarchy	 of	 Iranian	 beauty	 that,	 not	 coincidentally,	 takes	 as	 its	 ideal	 typically	
European	 features.	 A	 brief	 list	 of	 such	 coveted	 physical	 attributes	 would	 have	 to	
include	 fair	 skin,	 light	 hair,	 small	 nose,	 slim	physique,	 and	 "colored"	 eyes,	with	 the	
highest	 value	 placed	 on	 blue	 eyes,	 then	 green,	 and	 then	 hazel.	 Rarely	 did	 all	 these	
come	together	in	one	person	(they	certainly	did	not	all	come	together	in	me	for	me	to	
feel	 their	 force),	 but	 they	 didn't	 have	 to.	 A	 set	 of	 blue	 eyes,	 for	 example,	 carried	
unlimited	mileage	 on	 an	 otherwise	 unremarkable	 face.	 One	 of	my	 own	 relatives,	 a	
homely	woman	in	all	other	respects,	had	from	childhood	been	lavishly	praised	for	her	
alabaster	skin.	Now	well	into	middle	age,	she	continues	to	indulge	the	most	supreme	
pride	in	her	farangi‐like	complexion	and	has	taken	to	gazing	approvingly	at	my	very	
similar	pallor.		
I	 see	 only	 ugliness	 in	 all	 this.	While	 I	 can't	 say	 if	 it's	 an	 unconscious	 revolt	 to	 this	
troubling	 hierarchy	 of	 beauty	 (would	 that	 one	 could	 harness	 desire	 into	 calculated	
protest!),	the	fact	is	that	my	own	evolving	aesthetic	favors	the	darker	Middle	Eastern	
and	Mediterranean	type.	
Both	Shiva	and	Jasmin	in	their	own	ways	problematize	the	praise	they	receive	for	having	
some	of	the	physical	attributes	of	whiteness.	And	they	see	this	favouring	of	whiteness	as	an	
“ugly”	practice	associated	more	closely	with	an	older	generation	of	 Iranians.	 Iranian.com,	
with	 its	 broad	 audience,	 is	 used	 by	 Jasmin	 to	 develop	 an	 alternative	 way	 of	 being	 seen	
through	her	writing	–	one	that	opposes	racially	tinted	hierarchies.		
198	
	
	
Figure	1	Jasmin	Darznik's	contribution	on	Iranian.com	from	August	4,	1998,	screenshot	from	January	
2010	
Others	brought	up	how	similar	racial	hierarchies	are	reproduced	more	broadly	 in	the	US,	
implicating	 Iranians	with	 respect	 to	 other	 ethnic	 groups	 they	 live	 and	work	 around.	 For	
instance	Hakkha	 states	 that	 “[Iranian	 Americans]	 have	 an	 easier	 time	 than	 Indians	 even	
though	 Indians	 are	 actually	 even	 further	 up	 on	 the	 professional	 ladder	 in	many	 areas	 ‐	
given	that	so	many	Indian‐origin	immigrants	are	a	predominant	presence	in	Silicon	Valley	
and	their	numbers	in	LA	are	even	larger	than	Iranians.	Still,	they	are	not	looked	upon	in	the	
same	way	 as	 Iranians	 –	 not	 as	 positively.”	Hakkha	 adds,	 “It	 does	make	 a	 difference	 that	
their	 shading	 is	 different.	 Skin	 color	 does	 still	makes	 a	 difference	 everywhere,	 and	 here	
you’ll	 see	 that	 because	 Iranians	 can	more	 often	 look	white,	 they	 are	 seen	 as	more	 equal	
[with	whites]	in	that	hierarchy.”	Hakkha	is	critical	of	the	way	Iranians	may	stand	to	benefit	
unfairly	 in	 the	 US	 based	 on	 their	 racialized	 appearances.	 However,	 it	 was	 common	
knowledge	among	a	number	of	my	respondents	that	such	hierarchies	are	also	perpetuated	
by	 Iranians	 themselves.	 Iranian	 racism	 towards	 African	 Americans	was	 one	 concern	 for	
them.	 The	 self‐awareness	 about	 this	 problem	 among	 some	 Iranian	Americans	was	made	
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evident	 by	 a	 YouTube	 video152	 that	 emerged	 and	 was	 shared	 by	 a	 number	 of	 my	
respondents	in	2012,	as	well	as	a	few	prominent	Iranian	American	public	figures.	The	video	
depicted	a	young,	gossiping	Iranian	American	woman	who	is	sitting	on	a	park	bench	next	to	
a	 young	 black	 man	 about	 whom	 she	 is	 making	 racially	 prejudiced	 comments	 about	 in	
Persian	on	her	cell	phone	to	her	aunt.	She	is	surprised	by	the	man	when	he	starts	speaking	
Persian	to	her,	revealing	that	he	understood	her	conversation	about	him	and	that	he	is	also	
“Persian.”		
	
Figure	8	Screenshot	from	YouTube	video,	"Black	Saffron"	screenshot	from	May,	2012	
Taking	my	respondents’	comments	and	the	emergence	of	these	digital	media	productions	
together,	the	parallels	between	racism	among	Iranian	Americans	(often	attributed	to	older	
relatives)	 follows	 the	 racial	 hierarchies	 at	 work	 within	 wider	 American	 society.	 The	
racialized	beauty	ideals	deployed	by	Shiva’s	older	relatives	to	privilege	certain	attributes	of	
her	physical	appearance	is	mirrored	in	Hakha’s	description	of	a	racial	hierarchy	implicating	
Iranian	Americans	among	other	 immigrant	groups.	Both	relate	critically	 to	 the	aspiration	
towards	 whiteness	 as	 the	 dominant	 and	 desirable	 way	 of	 being.	 And	 theirs	 and	 many	
others’	 comments	 denunciate	 of	 the	 privileged	 position	 that	 comes	 with	 some	 of	 the	
																																																								
152 Rugger Productions, “Black Saffrom,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4mf0eq9101w (accessed 29/11/14) 
200	
	
physical	 attributes	 of	 whiteness.	 This	 indicates	 their	 anti‐racist	 stances,	 but	 basically	
rejects	claims	to	the	privileges	of	whiteness	gained	through	“passing”	for	white.	
This	rejection	of	whiteness	is	particularly	elucidated	in	Justin’s	account.	“My	skin	is	pretty	
light.	 A	 lot	 of	 Iranians	 say	 they	mistake	me	 for	 an	 American,”	 says	 Justin	 in	 one	 of	 the	
opening	shots	of	his	documentary	film,	Warring	Factions.	As	this	voiceover	plays,	Justin	can	
be	seen	pointing	demonstratively	to	the	skin	on	his	upper	arm.	He	is	one	of	several	second	
generation	 Iranian	 Americans	 I	 came	 across	 who	 have	 “mixed”	 backgrounds	 –	 Justin’s	
father	 is	 Iranian,	and	his	mother	 is	white	American.	 In	his	documentary	 film,	 from	which	
the	above	quote	 is	 taken,	his	own	personal	positioning	as	American,	 Iranian,	and	Muslim	
(terms	 he	 applied	 to	 himself	 in	 the	 film’s	 introduction)	 are	 central	 to	 the	 film’s	
investigation	of	Iranians’	and	Americans’	perceptions	of	one	another.	Justin’s	film	does	this	
in	 large	 part	 through	 the	use	 of	 the	 popular	 international	 hip‐hop	 dance	 genre	 called	 b‐
boying	(or	breakdancing/breaking)	which	he	practices,	and	which	features	strongly	in	the	
film	as	he	travels	from	his	home	in	California	to	meet	Iranian	hip	hop	dancers	who	live	in	
Tehran.	As	the	title	suggests,	the	personal	story	that	the	film	tells	is	set	against	the	sombre	
backdrop	of	hostility	between	the	US	and	Iran	(and	the	larger	Muslim	world).		
One	of	 the	 film’s	 scenes	presents	 the	backlash	against	Muslims	and	Middle	Easterners	 in	
the	 US	 after	 9/11.	 This	 is	 portrayed	 as	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 Justin’s	 life.	 It	 depicts	 a	 re‐
enactment	of	the	moment	of	hearing	the	news	of	9/11	within	the	setting	of	an	impassioned	
classroom	 discussion	 in	 which	 he	 sits,	 feeling	 increasingly	 excluded	 by	 the	 comments	
around	him,	 and	 ultimately	walking	 away.	 In	 the	 film,	we	 see	 Justin	 play	with	 his	white	
appearance	 as	 he	 attends	 a	 military	 air	 show	 in	 Flagstaff,	 Arizona.	 He	 interviews	 and	
records	the	sentiments	of	participants	at	the	event	about	American	military	interventions	
in	the	Middle	East,	while	not	revealing	his	identification	as	either	Iranian	or	Muslim	during	
these	 exchanges.	 Like	 some	 other	 Iranian	 Americans	 I	 spoke	 with,	 his	 light	 complexion	
meant	that	Justin	was	categorically	taken	to	be	a	white	American.	Like	many	members	of	
the	 second	generation,	 Justin’s	 speech	and	accent	are	 indistinguishable	 from	others	born	
and	raised	in	the	US.	“Passing”	as	white	takes	little	 if	any	effort.	Yet,	his	film	is	concerned	
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with	–	and	 is	 itself	part	of	–	his	various	efforts	 to	negotiate	his	multiple	and	overlapping	
self‐categorizations	and	allegiances.		
Justin	 sees	 his	 appearance	 as	 affording	 him	 something	 of	 an	 undercover	 status.	 He	
mentions	that	being	seen	with	his	wife	is	the	thing	that	often	gives	him	away.	“She	blows	
my	cover,”	he	says	jokingly.	Justin’s	wife	is	an	Arab	American	young	woman	who	wears	a	
headscarf	 in	accordance	with	her	 Islamic	 faith.	 Justin	 is	clearly	not	bothered	by	his	cover	
being	blown,	as	the	persona	he	cultivates	through	his	blog,	Mashouf	TV,	is	one	whose	life	is	
marked	by	experiences	of	discrimination	at	US	border	checks	because	of	his	travel	history	
to	Iran	and	the	Iranian	side	of	his	family,	this	revealing	both	the	connections	he	has	to	Iran	
and	 his	 practice	 of	 Islam,	 which	 are	 not	 immediately	 visible	 from	 his	 appearance.	 The	
experience	of	arduous	border	checks	is	also	one	that	also	features	in	his	film	and,	as	such,	
explicitly	 complicates	 his	 white	 appearance	 with	 his	 inclusion	 into	 the	 very	 common	
experience	 of	 increased	 or	 additional	 questioning	 in	 airports	 that	 became	 a	 common	
experience	for	Iranian	Americans	in	the	years	after	9/11.		
Justin	chooses	not	 to	be	taken	for	a	white	American,	as	 is	evident	in	the	way	he	presents	
himself	through	his	blog	and	his	film.	He	complicates	his	appearance	by	using	it	to	expose	
prejudices	 or	misconceptions	about	Middle	Easterners,	 even	 including	a	 subtle	 comment	
about	 the	 prejudices	 with	 which	 some	 Iranian	 (Americans)	 have	 about	 Arabs	 and	
associations	with	“dark	skin.”	In	the	film,	he	frames	this	as	a	response	to	the	tendency	of	“a	
lot	of	Iranians”	to	mistake	him	as	being	white.	“Then	I	tell	them	that	their	dark	skin	made	
me	mistake	them	for	Arabs.	That	really	pisses	them	off.”	In	the	theatre	in	Beverly	Hills	at	
the	 film’s	LA	debut,	many	 in	 the	audience	 laughed	out	 loud	 at	 this	 statement,	 and	 in	my	
correspondence	with	him	shortly	afterwards,	Justin	expressed	happiness	at	hearing	people	
laughing	at	just	the	right	moments	in	the	LA	screening.		
Sepideh	expressed	a	similar	attitude	about	being	mistaken	for	being	white	in	her	everyday	
interactions,	 especially	 with	 other	 Iranian	 Americans.	 Sepideh	 often	 has	 to	 explain	 to	
others	that	both	of	her	parents	are	Iranian	by	origin.	She	has	a	fair	complexion,	and	during	
our	conversations,	she	repeatedly	raised	complaints	about	often	being	told	by	others	that	
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she	does	not	 look	 Iranian.	At	one	point,	 Sepideh	 commented	 that	 she	 sometimes	prefers	
communicating	with	other	Iranian	Americans	through	internet	media,	for	instance,	through	
comment	threads	on	websites	or	blogs.	She	has	been	active	in	using	a	variety	of	websites	to	
engage	 with	 other	 Iranian	 Americans,	 and	 has	 noticed	 that	 in	 internet‐mediated	
communications	 where	 she	 represented	 herself	 through	 only	 her	 name	 and	 with	 no	
reflection	of	 her	physical	 appearance,	 others	had	 less	 reason	 to	doubt	 or	undermine	her	
Iranian‐ness,	 as	 her	 a‐typically	 light	 coloring	 and	 physical	 features	 did	 not	 generate	 the	
usual	confusion	or	skepticism.	Sepideh	said	that	this	allowed	her	to	avoid	a	situation	where	
she	had	to	make	an	effort	to	be	seen	as	Iranian	as	a	ground	for	engaging	with	others	from	
that	position.	This	made	her	feel	more	comfortable	and	included.				
Each	 in	 their	 own	way,	 Sepideh	 and	 Justin	 use	 internet	 (combined	with	 other)	media	 to	
challenge	 being	 seen	 as	 white:	 Sepideh	 by	 hiding	 her	 physical	 attributes	 in	 certain	
exchanges,	 and	 Justin	by	pointing	 them	out	 and	 explicitly	 redefining	 them.	 In	 this	 sense,	
avoiding	or	subverting	whiteness,	whether	in	order	to	denounce	its	validity	as	a	basis	for	
privilege,	 or	 as	 a	 source	 of	 exclusion	 from	 Iranian	 American‐ness,	 is	 part	 of	 how	 these	
young	 people	 position	 themselves	 with	 the	 use	 of	 media.	 Internet	 becomes	 a	 part	 of	
personal	 and	 creative	 ways	 of	 presenting	 oneself	 within	 a	 wider	 shift	 towards	 claiming	
racial	difference.	Whether	highlighted,	reframed,	or	hidden,	in	one	way	or	another,	the	way	
racialized	bodies	are	seen	is	central	to	the	ways	in	which	internet	media	become	involved	
in	claiming	difference.		
The	role	of	the	body	and	the	rise	and	development	of	the	web	has	been	discussed	by	some	
in	 terms	 of	 new	 forms	 of	 cyborg	 embodiment	 within	 cybernetic	 paradigms	 of	 tracing	
connections	 between	 the	 biological	 and	 digital	 (Hayles,	 1999).	 Others	 dealing	 with	
“embodiment”	 in	 the	 context	 of	 digital	 media	 have	 emphasized	 the	 “virtual”	 as	 a	
transcendental	 field	 of	 potentiality	 where	 the	 possibilities	 for	 racialized	 bodies	 are	
explored	(Karatzogianni	&	Kuntsman,	2012).	 In	 the	examples	of	 the	uses	of	 	blogs	 I	have	
discussed,	 the	potentialities	of	digital	media	are	 indeed	utilized	 for	self‐representation	of	
racialized	bodies	–	particularly	the	subversion	of	being	seen	as	white	–	in	conjunction	with	
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other	 media.	 While	 engagement	 with	 one’s	 own	 body	 through	 a	 range	 of	 digital	
representations	 (e.g.	 various	written	 form,	 photographic,	 videographic)	 is	 important,	my	
respondents	 seem	 not	 to	 be	 forming	 cyborg	 bodies	 or	 configuring	 racial	 difference	 in	 a	
separate,	virtual	realm.	Rather,		blog	writing,	commenting,	and	other	production	appears	to	
allow	 them	 to	 produce	 self‐representations	 in	 order	 to	 claim	 inclusion	 into	 Iranian‐ness	
and	American‐ness.	As	I	have	described,	whether	seen	as	white	or	non‐white,	the	racialized	
body	is	used	as	a	central	site	to	launch	a	positioning	with	respect	to	whiteness	and	Iranian‐
ness.	 In	 a	 context	 where	 racialization	 is	 beginning	 to	 be	 embraced	 and	 appropriated	
through	representations	of	experiences	of	exclusion,	my	respondents	engage	in	a	nascent	
politics	of	racial	positioning.	This	finds	grounding	in	experiences	that	focus	on	the	body	and	
how	 it	 is	 seen	by	 others,	 finding	 articulation	 in	 budding	 social	 spaces	 like	 a	 blog	 or	 and	
small‐scale	face‐to‐face	discussion	group.		
	
White	but	not	quite		
My	 respondents	 seem	 to	 be	 positioned	 in	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 silence	 of	 the	 post‐race,	
multicultural	 promise	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 permanence	 of	 difference	 located	 in	 the	
body	on	the	other.	 	Some	express	the	desire	not	to	talk	about	racism,	which	is	connected	
with	 fears	 of	 self‐victimizing/weakness.	 Yet	 at	 the	 same	 Iranian	 Americans	 stand	 at	 the	
precipice	 of	 a	 significant	 shift	 towards	 making	 racial	 difference	 an	 important	 basis	 for	
collective	claims	to	inclusion	in	the	US.	This	shift	is	generational,	particularly	because	it	has	
to	 do	 with	 the	 racial	 covering	 or	 whitewashing	 of/by	 generations	 past	 (first‐generation	
Iranian	Americans,	as	well	as	older	generations	of	other	Middle	Eastern	immigrants	to	the	
US).	It	is	under	these	circumstances	that	some	of	my	respondents	represent	themselves	as	
different,	marginalized,	and	racialized	–	whether	through	a	blog	or	a	round‐table	discussion	
among	 fellow	 students/peers.	 By	 mobilizing	 difference	 in	 this	 way,	 they	 ascribe	 racial	
categories	to	themselves.	Though	it	is	also	evident	that	their	mobilization	of	non‐whiteness	
puts	some	in	a	problematic	situation	when	they	do	not	have	experiences	of	being	seen	as	
non‐white.	Rather,	they	express	feeling	excluded	from	Iranian‐ness	to	some	extent	because	
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they	pass	as	white.	In	certain	instances	(including	of	web	usage),	they	try	to	reframe	how	
they	are	seen	in	terms	of	(non‐)whiteness,	Iranian‐ness	and	American‐ness.	
Some	have	warned	that	internet	technologies	cover	racialized	identities	–	and	hence	racial	
inequalities	by	default	–	by	rendering	the	body	invisible	in	internet	communications	(Chon,	
1999).	I	have	argued	here	that	race	is	mediated	through	a	regime	of	looking,	exercised	in	
everyday	 life.	Far	 from	making	this	 regime	disappear	or	 irrelevant,	my	respondents’	web	
usage	 reflects	 their	 broader	 desire	 to	 shape	 the	 ways	 they	 are	 seen	 by	 others.	 Lisa	
Nakamura	 has	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 more	 the	 omission	 of	 the	 language	 of	 race	 as	 part	 of	 a	
neoliberal	 discourse	 of	 racial	 color‐blindness	 (Nakamura,	 2007)	 that	 shapes	 how	
important	race	is	for	internet	users.	In	other	words,	the	importance	of	race	is	not	a	function	
of	any	automatic	bodily	invisibility/anonymity	afforded	by	internet	usage.	In	addition,	she	
stresses	that	visually‐oriented	media	have	supplemented	text	as	internet	technologies	have	
developed,	making	possibilities	for	bodily	representations	fare	more	elaborate.		
I	have	followed	this	observation	and	shown	that		my	respondents’	textual	productions	are	
supplemented	with	digital	photographs	and	video	that	amply	referenced	racialized	Iranian	
American	bodies.	This	allows	young	people	to	reframe	and	shift	racial	categories.	As	shown	
in	 this	 section,	 productions	 like	 blog‐	 or	 website‐postings	 were	 one	 of	 few	 channels	
shedding	 light	 on	 the	 apparently	 under‐addressed	 but	 significant	 experiences	 around	
racialization	 for	 this	 young	 generation.	 These	 young	 people’s	 second‐generation	 status	
means	that	for	them	“being	ethnic”	is	experienced	as	located	largely	in	their	appearance.	As	
part	of	their	adherence	to	anti‐racism	discourses	in	the	US,	they	renounce	the	emulation	of	
whiteness	as	a	privilege	bestowed	through	climbing	racial	hierarchies.	They	draw	attention	
to	how	these	hierarchies	are	at	work	in	the	discrimination	they	experience,	as	well	as	in	the	
subtle	praise	that	some	of	them	receive	for	appearing	to	be	(almost)	white.	In	what	follows	
I	 pay	 further	 attention	 to	 the	 variety	 of	 ways	 my	 respondents	 use	 web	 applications	 to	
position	themselves	with	relation	to	race.	
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Shades	of	difference	
Aryans	
Everybody	 has	 heard	 about	 Prince	 of	 Persia:	 The	 Sands	 of	 Time,	 the	 recent	Walt	
Disney	blockbuster	featuring	Jake	Gyllenhaal	in	the	role	of...a	prince	of	Persia.	That	a	
rather	fair	actor	with	Swedish	and	Ashkenazi	heritage	plays	the	lead	role	in	a	story	
set	 in	 ancient	 Iran	 caused	 a	minor	 controversy.	 Some	 enlightened	 people	 believe	
that	Hollywood	missed	an	opportunity	 to	 transcend	 its	 stereotypical	depictions	of	
non‐Europeans,	particularly	Middle	Easterners,	by	offering	 the	part	 to	a	brownish	
hero.	 Of	 course,	 in	 private	 discussions,	 many	 Iranians,	 always	 prompt	 to	 portray	
themselves	 as	 "Aryans,"	 concurred	 that	Gyllenhaal	 accurately	 embodies	how	 their	
ancestors	must	have	looked,	before	Arabs	invaded	and	imposed	both	their	religion	
and	complexion	at	the	point	of	the	sword.		
So	 far,	nothing	unusual.	What	 is	 surprising	and	alarming,	however,	 is	 that	 serious	
intellectuals	 condoned	 these	 views.	 Asked	 to	 comment	 on	 producer	 Jerry	
Bruckheimer's	declaration	to	The	Times	of	London	that	many	Iranians	were	"blond	
and	 blue‐eyed"	 until	 "the	 Turks	 kinda	 changed	 everything,"	 American‐Iranian	
author	Reza	Aslan	asserted	that,	indeed,	Iranians	were	Aryans.	"If	we	went	back	in	
time	1,700	years	to	the	mythological	era,"	Aslan	said,	"all	 Iranians	would	 look	 like	
Jake	 Gyllenhaal."	 This	 pronouncement	 highlights	 the	 resilience	 of	 what	 I	 call	 the	
"Aryan	syndrome"	in	modern	Iran.	A	historical	detour	is	necessary	to	show	why	it	is	
so	problematic.	
The	 above	 text	 was	 the	 opening	 to	 a	 blog	 posting	 in	 which	 Pouya,	 a	 second	 generation	
blogger	 from	 Orange	 County	 (whose	 site	 is	 visited	 by	 some	 of	 my	 other	 respondents),	
linked	 to	 on	 his	 blog.	 The	 piece	 was	 written	 by	 the	 London	 based	 scholar,	 Reza	 Zia‐
Ebrahimi,	 and	 originally	 posted	 by	 Tehran	 Bureau	 under	 the	 title	 Iranian	 Identity,	 the	
'Aryan	Race,'	and	Jake	Gyllenhaal.	Other	respondents	also	linked	to	the	piece	via	their	own	
Facebook	pages	or	posted	it	to	friends’	pages.	To	those	I	spoke	with,	the	film	constituted	a	
high	profile	case	of	“whitewashing.”	This	 label	was	used	in	coverage	by	Iranian	American	
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bloggers	and	other	(entertainment	news)	channels	with	reference	to	the	choice	to	cast	Jake	
Gyllenhaal	as	the	“Prince	of	Persia.”	The	attention	for	the	film	was	palpable	among	Iranian	
Americans	 in	LA	when,	 in	2009,	an	event	called	 “Dismantling	 the	Axis	of	Evil:	Reforming	
Middle	Eastern	Representations	in	Hollywood,”	co‐hosted	and	sponsored	by	the	Levantine	
Cultural	Center	and	PAAIA,	took	place	in	Downtown	LA.	Before	the	controversy	came	to	full	
public	 light	with	 the	release	of	 the	 film	 in	August	2010,	 the	debate	had	already	begun	 to	
bubble.		
In	 the	 full	 auditorium	 on	 the	 evening	 of	 the	 event,	 Aslan,	 consultant	 on	 the	 Hollywood	
blockbuster,	shared	the	stage	with	Tehranian,	author	of	Whitewashed	(mentioned	above).	
Aslan	 is	 the	 founder	of	BoomGen	Studios,153	 an	online	video	 channel	 that	 targeted	youth	
and	 second	 generation	 Middle	 Easterners,	 The	 event	 breathed	 of	 the	 disquiet	 of	 a	
community	 about	 unjust	 popular	 representations,	 a	 familiar	 concern	 about	 mainstream	
media	and	depictions	of	Iranian	Americans	for	some	of	my	respondents.	This	concern	was	
vividly	sustained	by	the	video	shown	to	the	mostly	Iranian	American	(and	Middle	Eastern	
American)	audience	at	the	event’s	outset:	a	compilation	of	clips	from	Hollywood	films	over	
the	 past	 20	 years	 depicting	 Arabs,	 Iranians,	 and	 Muslims	 as	 backward	 and	 primitive,	
dangerous	terrorists,	wife‐beaters,	and	all‐round	“bad	guys.”154	The	mostly	Middle	Eastern,	
mostly	 middle‐aged	 and	 young	 professional	 audience	 watched	 in	 amazement,	 and	
sometimes	amusement,	at	the	drastic	and	skewed	portrayals.	Despite	the	grim	event	title,	
and	the	obvious	exasperation	of	some	audience	members,	the	tone	of	the	meeting	was	kept	
consistently	light	and	entertaining	by	the	MC,	comedian,	actor,	and	public	figure	within	the	
																																																								
153BoomGen	Studios,	is	a	successful	media	bureau	based	in	New	York	City,	through	which	Aslan’s	
collaboration	took	place	on	the	Prince	of	Persia	project.	The	bureau	is	described	in	an	online	business	profile	
as:	“Continuously	collaborating	with	emerging	and	established	talent,	BoomGen	Studios	functions	as	an	
incubator	for	powerful	ideas	with	mainstream	commercial	potential	–	projects	that	align	with	the	company’s	
mandate	of	creating	media	that	effectively	furthers	the	social	discourse	between	the	“Western	World”	and	the	
“Muslim	World”	while	staying	committed	to	mainstream	commercial	appeal	and	profitability.”	
http://www.indeed.com/cmp/Boomgen‐Studios	(accessed	28/11/14)	
154 The	compilation	was	very	similar	to	the	short	compilation	made	based	on	Sara	Sadat‐Hosseini’s	book	Reel	
Bad	Arabs:	How	Hollywood	Vilifies	a	People.	One	of	the	panellists,	Ahmed	Ahmed,	was	Arab	American	
comedian	who	was	also	active	in	challenging	stereotypes	of	violent	Arabs	in	his	“axis	of	evil”	international	
comedy	tour	which	included	Maz	Jobrani.	
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Iranian	American	community,	Maz	Jobrani,	whose	own	work	routinely	plays	on	the	labels	of	
“terrorist”	and	“evil”	faced	by	Middle	Eastern	Americans.		
The	girls	I	sat	with	in	the	audience	–	one,	a	friend	I	had	arrived	with,	and	two	other	second	
generation	women,	probably	 in	their	20s	who	we	met	that	night	–	began	chatting	around	
me.	They	had	a	burning	question.	They	asked	me	to	put	the	question	to	the	panel	on	all	our	
behalves.	 “Why	 Jake	Gyllenhall?”	 I	 asked	Reza	Aslan.	 “The	girls	 and	 I	 are	wondering	why	
you	support	the	casting	of	this	White	actor,	when	John	and	others	tonight	have	agreed	that	
“Whitewashing”	 is	 hurting,	 not	 helping,	 Iranian	 Americans?”	 John	 Tehranian,	 author	 of	
Whitewashed:	America’s	invisible	Middle	Eastern	Minority,	sat	nodding	on	the	opposite	side	
of	the	panel.		
The	young	women	seemed	only	semi‐satisfied	with	Aslan’s	semi‐serious	response:	first,	he	
offered	an	ambiguously	sardonic	mention	of	the	“well‐known”	axiom	that	Iranians	used	to	
be	blue‐eyed	and	 light‐haired.	Then,	much	more	earnestly	he	proclaimed	that,	ultimately,	
the	monetary	success	of	the	film,	with	its	positive	portrayal	of	a	Persian	hero,	was	the	best	
positive	publicity	that	Iranian	Americans	could	hope	for,	which	is	also	why	he	thought	they	
and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 audience	 should	 support	 it	 (financially)	 by	 seeing	 it	 in	 the	 cinema.	
Speaking	more	casually	 to	some	of	us	after	 the	event	 that	evening	Aslan	referred	 to	how	
“our”	 older	 relatives	 would	 find	 legitimacy	 in	 a	 representation	 of	 an	 ancient	 “Persian”	
character	 as	 appearing	 white	 because	 of	 a	 common	 notion	 among	 them	 of	 Iranians	 as	
Aryan.		
Like	 Pouya	 on	 his	 blog,	 and	 Reza	 Zia‐Ebrihimi	 (the	 author	 of	 the	 original	 piece	 Pouya	
references,	quoted	above),	a	few	of	my	respondents	expressed	disappointment	with	regard	
to	 Aslan’s	 stance.	 They	 disputed	 Aslan’s	 extending	 scholarly	 historical	 credence	 to	what	
was	thought	of	by	several	of	my	respondents	(as	well	as	in	the	excerpt	above)	as	old	wives	
tales.	 For	 people	 like	Pouya	 and	others	 (like	Beeta	 and	Pouneh	who	 also	 referenced	 the	
same	 piece	 of	 Facebook	 and	 brought	 up	 the	 issue	 in	 their	 own	 academic	 and	 activist	
activities),	this	raised	concerns	about	the	perpetuation	of	racist	myths.	This	was	especially	
the	 case	 since	 the	 self‐application	 of	 “Aryan”	 among	 Iranians	 is	 associated	with	 fuelling	
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anti‐Arab	sentiment,155	inter‐ethnic	prejudices,	and	superiority	complexes	around	Persian‐
ness.	The	contentions	 in	 this	example	set	 the	stage	 for	 the	divergences	among	 the	public	
representations;	ones	that	are	endorsed	by	some	second‐generation	Iranian	Americans	and	
disputed	by	others.156		
There	are	similarities	here	to	Franklin’s	discussion	of	how	everyday	internet	usage	among	
Pacific	 Islanders	 gives	 space	 to	 debates	 and	 divides	within	 a	 single	 ethnic/racial	 group.	
These	 “online	 debates,”	 she	 argues,	 end	 up	 developing	 post‐colonial,	 subversive	
subjectivities	 (Marianne	 I.	 Franklin,	 2003)157.	 She	 proposes	 that	 the	 everyday	 self‐
representations	 being	 contested	 are	 as	much	 for	 subjects	 themselves	 as	 for	 the	 general	
public,	 and	 that	 discussions	 tackling	 what	 are	 usually	 sensitive	 issues	 are	 part	 of	 how	
subjects	make	sense	of	and	“define	their	own	identities”	in	between	diaspora	life	and	“back	
home”	 (Marianne	 I.	 Franklin,	 2003).	 I	 see	 a	 similar	 dynamic	 here,	 with	 the	 use	 of	 blog	
posting/linking	to	articles	and	Facebook	sharing	practices	used	as	a	channel	for	extending	
debate	 and	 controversy	 around	 claiming	 race	 and	 difference.	 I	 continue	 in	 the	 following	
with	the	example	of	Reza	Aslan’s	influential	media	endeavours,	connecting	them	with	the	
debates	 I	 saw	within	 the	 second	 generation	 itself.	 These	 divergences	 compound	 and	 cut	
across	 differences	 between	 generations,	 although	 the	 second	 generation	 in	 particular	
seems	 to	 be	 bringing	 these	 debates	 to	 the	 fore	 of	 negotiations	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	
Iranian	American.	As	I	show	in	the	following,	such	debates	are	ongoing	within	the	second	
generation,	 and	 include	 discussions	 around	 class	 inequity,	 American	 cultural	 citizenship,	
and	political	positionings.	
	
																																																								
155	See	also	the	discussion	of	use	and	reframing	Persian	histories	in	Chapter	2	on	heritage.		
156	At	this	junction	I	heed	Maghbouleh’s	(2012)	assertion	–	drawing	on	Zia‐Ebrahimi	(2011)	–	that	it	is	
important	to	acknowledge	that	these	racial	ideologies	existed	in	Iran	before	Iranian	migration	waves	to	the	
U.S,	and	that	thus	racialization	of	Iranians	as	non‐white	began	before	their	arrival	in	the	US,	for	which	she	
draws	on	the	work	of	Farnia	(2011).	
157	She	also	says	that	this	is	done	in	ways	that	are	under	threat	by	dominant	commercial	interests	that	seek	
control	over	internet	media. 
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Whitewashing	and	US	nationhood	
In	 a	 speech	 to	 an	 audience	 of	 approximately	 30	 students	 and	 other	 Iranian	 Americans,	
Zeinab	talked	about	her	experience	with	the	FBI.	She	told	the	emotional	story	of	the	raid	on	
her	home,	and	the	subsequent	arrest	of	her	father	at	the	cultural	center	and	mosque	where	
her	 family	 had	 been	 active	 for	 many	 years	 before	 her	 father’s	 imprisonment.	 Zeinab’s	
father	served	a	total	of	two	and	a	half	years	in	prison	following	his	sentencing	in	April	2008	
on	felony	convictions	of	violation	of	 the	US/Iran	trade	embargo,	 failing	 to	report	 income,	
and	omitting	information	on	his	naturalization	application.	He	was	held	since	August	2007,	
pending	 the	 trial,	 and	was	 ultimately	 released	 in	 January	 2010	with	 plans	 to	 appeal	 his	
conviction	in	order	to	clear	his	name.		
Zeinab’s	description	of	the	event	in	the	room	full	of	students	stressed	that	during	the	trials	
and	 pre‐trial	 hearings,	 accusations	 of	 terrorism	 and	 association	 with	 terrorist	
organizations	had	been	made	by	the	prosecution,	which	she	claimed	were	used	to	keep	her	
father	in	prison	without	bail,	even	though	he	was	never	charged	with	terrorism.	Alongside	
this,	Zeinab	said,	her	father	was	being	held	at	a	Communications	Management	Unit	(CMU)	
located	 in	 Indiana,	 which	 is	 referred	 to	 in	 some	 news	 reports	 as	 a	 “terrorism	 unit”	 and	
“secret	 prison”	 that	 holds	 mostly	 Arab	 and	 Muslim	 inmates	 and	 is	 designed	 to	 limit	
communications	 with	 friends	 and	 family	 through	 strict	 restrictions	 and	 monitoring	 on	
communications	 through	 telephone,	 email,	 and	visits.	This	meant	 that	Zeinab	hardly	saw	
her	father	during	the	time	he	was	held.	
Some	weeks	after	her	speech,	in	a	cafe	not	far	from	the	university	campus,	Zeinab	told	me	
the	gathering	had	been	one	of	the	very	few	chances	she	had	gotten	to	tell	the	story	of	her	
family	and	their	treatment	by	the	FBI.	Zeinab’s	personal	experience	had	not	only	 led	to	a	
strong	fear	of	FBI	surveillance	and	a	sense	of	anger	and	betrayal	directed	at	“America,”	but	
strikingly	it	had	also	led	her	to	feel	disenchanted	with	Iranian	Americans	around	her.	She	
described	a	realization	 that	 Iranian	Americans	around	her	had	been	 less	supportive	 than	
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(non‐Iranian)	American	 leftist	political/media	organizations	 that	had	worked	with	her	 to	
circulate	her	story.	Her	efforts	to	bring	the	case	to	people’s	attention	had	been	numerous,	
and	 her	 work	 in	 and	 out	 of	 court,	 sought	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 racial	 profiling	 and	
mistreatment	used	by	US	government	agencies	in	this	case.	Nevertheless,	while	reflecting	
on	the	worst	moments	of	this	period	in	her	life,	Zeinab	said	her	experience	had	somewhat	
paradoxically	made	her	feel	more	American.		
The	more	American	you	are,	the	more	comfortable	you	feel	to	criticize	America.	It	is	
actually	 very	 first‐generation	 Iranian	 to	 defend	 America	 in	 the	 way	 that	 some	
around	me	have	by	 saying	 it’s	my	 father’s	 fault	 for	 running	a	mosque	 in	America,	
and	 saying	 that	 “this	 is	 not	 an	 Islamic	 country.”	 I	 feel	more	 a	 part	 of	 this	 society	
since	 this	 happened,	 and	 more	 aware	 of	 the	 politics	 behind	 it.	 I	 feel	 more	
responsibility	as	an	American	to	contribute	to	making	America	a	better	place.		I	have	
only	now	started	to	become	active	and	speaking	out,	so	I	can’t	say	much	about	what	
is	 a	 good	 space	 for	me	 to	 express	myself,	 but	 I	 appreciate	 talking	 to	 like‐minded	
people,	and	they	are	more	American…	I	don’t	have	this	with	people	who	have	 just	
come	 from	 Iran	 and	 think	 that	 America	 can	 do	 no	 wrong	 and	 that	 my	 father	
shouldn’t	have	made	a	point	of	being	so	active	anyway.	On	the	contrary,	I	believe	in	
the	 right	 of	 all	 Americans	 to	 express	 themselves,	 and	 in	 the	 freedom	 that	 is	
necessary	 for	 that.	 I	 don’t	 see	 this	belief	 so	much	 in	people	who	have	 come	more	
recently.		
Because	of	the	circumstances	Zeinab	finds	herself	in,	she	feels	her	sense	of	American‐ness	
comes	 with	 the	 responsibility	 to	 contribute	 critically	 to	 American	 politics	 and	 society,	
rather	than	conceal	criticism	of	America	in	order	to	mask	difference.	Zeinab	expresses	her	
American‐ness	 through	 her	 criticisms,	 rather	 than	 defending	 the	 policy	 decisions	 and	
national	 narratives	 emanating	 from	 the	 “war	 on	 terror.”	 Gradually	 and	 somewhat	
reluctantly,	Zeinab	takes	on	the	role	of	a	critical	American	citizen	out	of	the	necessity	of	her	
situation,	putting	her	graduate	engineering	degree	on	hold	for	a	while.	In	so	doing,	Zeinab	
positions	 herself	 against	 both	 the	 US	 “security”	 policies	 that	 so	 negatively	 marked	 her	
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personal	 and	 family	 life,	 and	 the	 first	 generation	 immigrant	 newcomers	 from	 Iran	 who	
acquiesce	 to	 these	 policies.	 .	 This	 is	 a	 function	 of	 her	 own	personal	 experience	with	 her	
father’s	case,	but	it	is	just	as	much	because	of	how	she	is	positioned	as	an	American	due	to	
being	part	of	the	second	generation.	 In	her	discussion	of	postcolonial	race	and	migration,	
Philomena	Essed	describes	 this	as	a	shift	 that	 takes	place	 in	a	 late	stage	of	 the	migration	
process.	“The	feeling	of	‘I	am	in	their	country	and	I’ll	act	like	they	want	me	to’	gives	way	to	
‘what	are	my	rights	and	what	future	do	I	want	for	my	children?’”	(Essed,	1997).158	
Zeinab	says	she	is	aware	of	Iranian	American	organizations	like	PAAIA	and	has	approached	
them	with	her	story.	However,	while	PAAIA	narrates	its	own	genesis	around	the	need	for	a	
collective	voice	in	response	to	post‐9/11	racial	profiling,	it	does	not	get	involved	on	a	case	
by	 case	 basis	 or	 in	 legal	 matters	 like	 this.	 Her	 reaching	 out	 to	 the	 organization	 had	
therefore	born	no	fruit,	and	her	impression	of	PAAIA	is	characterised	by	its	focus	on	public	
affairs,	image,	and	media	representations	rather	than	support	for	those	Iranian	Americans	
struggling	 with	 the	 effects	 of	 alleged	 racial	 profiling.	 Zeinab	 expressed	 severe	
disappointment	 in	 the	 responses	 she	 received	 from	every	 Iranian	American	organization	
she	has	approached,	saying	they	had	all	told	her	that	they	could	not	offer	support	because	
her	(father’s)	case	was	“too	political.”		
																																																								
158 According	to	Essed	this	takes	place	in	the	third	stage	of	migration	of	which	she	says	there	are	several.	The	
first	is	characterized	by	“a	rock‐solid	belief	that	one	will	return:	the	only	question	is	when.”	This	stage	is	
succeeded	by	a	stage	in	which	migrants	start	to	focus	more	on	their	improving	their	position	in	the	new	
country.	And	third	–	the	stage	referred	to	above	–	is	characterized	by	an	increased	interest	to	not	only	
participate	in	the	new	society	but	to	also	take	responsibility	for	it.	“This	is	not	only	true	for	the	ethnic	group	
they	consider	themselves	part	of…	but	also	for	society	as	a	whole,	and	not	only	for	questions	of	ethnic	
relations,	but	also	for	the	environment,	disarmament,	the	neighbourhood,	or	the	position	of	old	people”	
(Essed,	1997).	This	has	parallels	to	the	activities	and	ways	of	thinking	demonstrated	by	several	of	my	
respondents.	While	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	this	third	stage	has	only	started	with	the	second	generation,	
cases	like	Zeinab’s	and	others’	I	met	suggested	to	me	that	second‐generation	members	are	most	optimally	
positioned	to	participate	in	American	society	from	this	vantage	point.	Essed’s	stages	of	migration	highlight	
the	shift	“from	looking	back	to	planning	the	future.”	Halleh	Ghorashi’s	(2002)	work	on	first‐generation	
Iranian	immigrant	women	also	highlights	the	significance	of	this	shift	in	the	dealings	of	migrants	–	though	she	
sees	it	as	less	of	a	uniformly	staged	process	than	a	strategy	of	her	migrant	women	subjects.	The	focus	on	the	
future	that	involves	not	only	participating	in	society	but	contributing	to	the	quality	of	it	–	presumably	in	line	
with	some	societal	ideals	rather	than	an	ethnic	minority	agenda	–	seems	to	be	the	intent	of	my	most	involved	
respondents.	There	are	as	yet	very	few	examples	of	this	in	practice	as	Iranian	American	representative	bodies	
tend	to	be	dedicated	to	(the	votes/contribution	money	of)	their	ethnic	constituencies.		
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So,	Zeinab	started	her	own	website,	calling	it	“Free	Seyed	Mousavi”	after	her	father.	It	gives	
background	 information	 about	 the	 case,	 the	 family’s	 arguments	 and	 perspectives,	 court	
documents,	news	and	media	coverage,	a	petition	of	support	for	visitors	to	sign,	and	collects	
donations	 for	 bail.	 It	 also	 describes	 the	 references	 to	 Seyed	 Mousavi’s	 association	 with	
terrorism	that	the	prosecution	repeatedly	made,	stating:	
We	were	hoping	that	 they	[the	 jury	members]	wouldn’t	be	affected	by	the	paranoia	
that	the	media	has	 inflicted	on	Americans	with	regard	to	Muslims.	All	 in	all,	 though,	
we	do	not	blame	the	jury	members	for	thinking	him	guilty;	the	prosecution	team	did	a	
thorough	 job	 in	 portraying	 Seyed	 Mahmood	 Mousavi	 as	 an	 enemy	 to	 the	 United	
States	and	all	its	citizens.	
Zeinab’s	endeavour	to	use	internet	media	in	the	form	of	starting	a	campaign	website	with	
official	documents	and	personal	details	reflects	the	networks	of	support	she	has	access	to	
among	her	contacts	and	 “the	community”	more	generally;	 and	 in	 some	respects,	 the	 lack	
thereof.	When	I	spoke	with	her,	her	father	was	still	 in	 jail,	and	she	was	disappointed	that	
the	site	was	not	receiving	many	visits.	She	was	looking	for	ways	to	make	it	more	public	and	
recognized.	Although	she	was	disappointed	in	the	website’s	lack	of	impact,	many	attendees	
of	her	father’s	mosque	showed	great	support	during	the	case,	some	reportedly	putting	their	
house	mortgages	up	 to	make	 the	one	million	dollar	bail	 that	was	offered	at	 the	 final	bail	
hearing.	All	in	all,	however,	Zeinab	soon	found	that	technical	and	design	aspects	of	the	site,	
as	well	 as	 her	 disconnection	 from	 larger	media	 outlets,	meant	 that	 her	 site	 struggled	 to	
attract	much	of	an	audience.	
Zeinab’s	direct	experience	with	the	FBI	and	the	US	Federal	judicial	system	described	here	
was	not	 shared	by	many	others	 I	 spoke	with	 and	 represented	 a	 rather	 exceptional	 case.	
However,	stories	of	those	who	have	had	such	encounters	with	the	FBI	circulate	among	my	
respondents,	shaping	their	understandings	of	the	problems	effecting	Iranian	Americans	as	
a	group.	Zeinab’s	experience	places	her	 in	a	particular	position	with	 regard	 to	post‐9/11	
narratives	 of	 American	 nationhood.	 As	 her	 ideas	 about	 America	 changed	 through	 this	
experience,	 she	 became	more	 attuned	 to	 the	American	 far	 left’s	 political	 and	 intellectual	
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tradition	 of	 exposing	 structures	 of	 racism	 in	 America,	 including	 critical	 discourses	 with	
traces	of	US	civil	rights	era	framing	of	citizenship	rights.	Her	website	offers	a	mediated	self‐
representation	 that	 contrasts	 with	 the	 narratives	 through	 which	 the	 largest	 and	 most	
established	 Iranian	 American	 organizations	 represent	 Iranian	 Americans.	 In	 this	 sense,	
Zeinab’s	 use	 of	 her	 web	 page	 is	 interesting	 to	 understand	 alongside	 other,	 more	
mainstream	ways	in	which	second‐generation	Iranian	Americans	are	setting	up	websites	to	
tell	their	own	stories	as	a	racialized	minority	in	the	US.		
For	instance,	few	second‐generation	individuals	or	groups	are	as	influential	as	Reza	Aslan	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 representations	 in	mass	media	productions	 (as	discussed	above	 in	 the	
context	 of	 his	 collaboration	 on	 the	Prince	of	Persia	 film).	 Aslan	 considers	 his	 production	
studio,	BoomGen,	as	a	means	for	changing	“this	country	for	the	better,”	by	allowing	young	
people	to	tell	their	“stories	about	the	Middle	East.”	The	following	quote	was	taken	from	a	
web	video	and	TEDx	talk	he	gave	in	2011.		
In	order	to	understand	each	other	we	have	to	rely	on	our	stories.	It’s	story‐telling	that	
builds	those	relationships.	It’s	about	the	arts,	about	film,	about	music,	about	movies.	
My	 company,	 Boom	 Gen	 Studios,	 helps	 make	 films	 and	 movies	 that	 deal	 with	 the	
stories	coming	out	of	 the	Middle	East	because	we	know	that	 it’s	stories	that	change	
people’s	minds.		
Aslan’s	 project	 to	 represent	 Muslim	 Americans	 (including	 those	 with	 Iranian	 American	
backgrounds)	 is,	at	once,	a	commercial	and	philanthropic	endeavor,	and	presents	itself	 in	
the	form	of	the	Aslan	Media	website.	This	site	is	dedicated	to	addressing	the	exclusion	and	
targeting	 of	 Muslim	 Americans	 in	 the	 US,	 and	 together	 with	 BoomGen	 provides	 various	
forms	of	media	representation	of	the	Muslim	world,	the	Middle	East,	and	its	people	through	
both	news/non‐fiction	genres	as	well	as	more	entertainment‐oriented	productions.	Aslan’s	
emphasis	in	the	talk	referenced	above	is	on	the	“unity	in	diversity”	of	the	American	nation	
and	the	“story”	of	America	as	a	country	of	immigrants.	His	account	sustains	the	narrative	of	
American	nationhood	as	fully	and	invariably	inclusive	of	minority	groups.		
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Aslan	 highlights	 xenophobia	 against	 Muslims	 and	 not	 explicitly	 racial	 difference.	 But	 he	
uses	 examples	 of	 Jewish	 and	 Catholic	 immigrant	minorities	 as	 historical	milestones	 that	
demonstrate	 the	 victory	 of	 American	 inclusion	 of	 difference	 into	 the	 very	 fabric	 of	 the	
nation.	And	although	Aslan	does	not	mention	this,	these	were	immigrant	groups	in	the	US	
that	 were	 also	 historically	 racialized	 as	 non‐white	 and	 eventually	 assimilated	 into	
whiteness,	 and	 not	 simply	 seen	 as	 foreigners	 that	 came	 to	 be	 accepted	 as	 American	
(Brodkin,	 1998;	 Ignatiev,	 1995).	 One	 of	 Aslan’s	 aims	 in	 his	 media	 work	 seems	 to	 be	
conveying	 narratives	 about	 Iranian	 Americans	 alongside	 those	 of	 other	 (historically)	
racialized	minority	groups	and	inherent	to	the	narrative	of	the	American	nation	as	united	
in	the	persistent	and	successful	diversity	of	a	pluralist	multicultural	society.		
Zeinab	 and	 Aslan’s	 projects	 both	 take	 shape	 within	 the	 same	 context	 of	 racialization	 of	
Middle	 Easterners	 and	 Muslims	 in	 the	 US,	 and	 both	 position	 themselves	 as	 voices	 of	
concern	about	discrimination,	particularly	 in	 the	context	of	everyday	 implications	of	 “the	
war	on	terror”	on	American	citizens’	lives.	Both	also	rely	on	the	websites	they	respectively	
set	 up	 to	 get	 a	message	 out,	 each	 according	 to	 their	 own	 objectives.	 The	 two	 initiatives	
come	from	very	different	levels	of	professional,	personal,	emotional	engagement.	They	also	
come	 from	different	degrees	of	 specificity	with	 regard	 to	 the	 issue	of	discrimination	 (i.e.	
Zeinab’s	 case	 pertaining	 to	 her	 direct	 experience	 only,	 and	 Aslan’s	 site	 presenting	 both	
positive	 and	 negative	 stories	 of	many	Muslim	Americans).	 Taken	 together,	 the	 instances	
illustrate	 how	 access	 to	 and	 use	 of	 web	 applications	 alone	 does	 not	 determine	 how	
influential	these	digitally‐told	stories	will	be	within	a	broader	American	media	landscape	in	
which	messages	 about	 Muslim	 Americans	 circulate.	 Their	 web	 use	 as	 part	 of	 their	 self‐
representation	strategies	reflect	the	variety	of	content	production	coming	from	the	second	
generation,	 thus	 conveying	 the	 variety	 of	 positionings	 that	 are	 hosted	 side	 by	 side.	Web	
usage	 increases	 possibilities	 for	 alternative	 self‐representation.	 Yet	 the	 access	 of	 these	
representations	to	audiences	depends	on	the	resources	they	are	backed	with	and	how	far	
they	match	with	existing	narratives	of	the	nation.	
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The	difference	between	Zeinab’s	and	Aslan’s	sites	 illustrates	 that	web	usage	 involves	not	
only	 appropriating	media	 production	 technologies	 but	 also	 other	 economic	 and	 political	
resources.	This	connects	with	the	more	recent	research	on	the	frequently	raised	problem	of	
the	 “digital	divide,”	which	aims	 to	 complicate	 any	 straightforward	notion	of	 a	dichotomy	
between	 “haves	 and	 have‐nots”	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 notions	 of	 “access”	 or	 “inclusion”159	
regarding	internet	technologies.	This	work	argues	instead	that	hierarchies	of	usage	reflect	
various	kinds	of	access	which	are	not	determined	by	hardware	alone	(Selwyn,	2004).	The	
problem	of	exclusion	from	media	production	among	minority	groups	has	been	extensively	
documented	 in	media	 anthropology	 and	 cultural	 studies	with	 a	 focus	 on	 indigenous	 and	
post‐colonial	cases	(Ginsberg,	2003;	Shohat	&	Stam,	2003).	They	show	that	exclusion	from	
(and	 access	 to)	 media	 production	 is	 neither	 straightforward	 nor	 absolute.	 Likewise,	
Zeinab’s	 case	 illustrates	 the	 conjunction	 of	 a	 lack	 in	 technical,	 economic,	 and	 political	
resources.160		
Zeinab’s	 story	 and	 the	wary	 reactions	 to	 it	 that	 she	 recounts	 can	 also	 be	 understood	 in	
terms	 of	 Lentin	 and	 Titley’s	 distinction	 between	 “good	 diversity”	 which	 requires	
celebration	 and	 cultivation,	 and	 “bad	 diversity”	 which	 is	 diverse	 matter	 out	 of	 place	
(2011).161	 That	 is,	 as	 certain	 representations	 of	 Iranian	 American‐ness	 dominate	 others,	
find	 larger	 audiences,	 and	 enjoy	 wider	 resonance	 with	 existing	 narratives	 of	 American‐
ness,	 certain	 self‐representations	are	 relegated	 to	 the	margins,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	both	
reflect	 usage	 of	 public	 web	 pages	 for	 self‐representation.	 The	 different	 technical	
																																																								
159 Debates	around	the	“digital	divide”	originally	revolved	around	the	disparities	between	people’s	access	to	
technologies	in	more	versus	less	developed	countries,	featuring	problems	of	racial	and	economic	inequality,	
but	has	since	come	to	include	discussions	of	disparities	within	countries,	including	developed	countries	
(Selwyn,	2004:	344).	
160	I	return	to	this	point	in	the	following	part	of	this	section	about	the	privileges	of	whitewashing.	
161	According	to	their	account,	the	existence	and	cordoning	off	of	“bad	diversity”	in	practice	“is	integral	to	the	
reworking	of	the	multiculturalist	ontology	after	the	failed	experiment”	(Lentin	&	Titley,	2011).	In	other	
words,	the	significance	of	publicly	defining	what	kind	of	diversity	is	bad	or	unacceptable	is	a	consequence	of	
the	proposition	that	the	multicultural	experiment	has	failed.	This	is	particularly	discussed	with	relation	to	the	
context	of	the	European	Union	where	this	failure	has	been	declared	in	clear	terms	by	heads	of	state	and	
opinion	makers.	I	see	the	relevance	in	the	ways	people	are	positioned	with	relation	to	the	American	nation.	
Good	diversity	accepts	and	promotes	the	narrative	of	the	inclusive	multicultural	nation	and	bad	diversity	is	
that	which	highlights	a	history	of	exclusion	of	successive	new	minorities	and	continues,	in	this	case,	with	
Muslim	and	Middle	Eastern	Americans.		
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capabilities	and	design	components	of	both	sites	reflect	the	respective	resources	that	went	
into	creating	 them.	 In	 this	way,	 these	sites	offer	paths	 to	self‐representation	that	have	as	
their	central	aim	to	inform	and	correct	mainstream	understandings	of	the	role	of	Muslims	
in	 American	 society.	 But	 they	 also	 represent	 more	 and	 less	 dominant	 styles	 of	 self‐
representation,	 while	 also	 representing	 slightly	 different	 positionings	 with	 relation	 to	
American	nationhood.		
That	 is,	 Aslan’s	 approach	 seems	 somewhat	 more	 contiguous	 with	 the	 way	 American	
narratives	 of	 inclusion	have	been	utilized	by	 Iranian	Americans	more	 commonly.	What	 I	
see	 in	 the	 case	of	 the	young	people	 I	 discuss	here	and	elsewhere	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 their	
positioning	 with	 relation	 to	 the	 American	 nation,	 which	 highlights	 the	 limits	 of	
multicultural	inclusion	on	racial	grounds.	In	this	sense,	they	exercise	something	more	akin	
to	the	politics	that	developed	among	American	Jews	(pre‐WWII)	Brodkin’s	account	of	their	
oppositional	forms	of	positioning	as	working	class,	non‐white,	and	non‐mainstream	before	
their	 rising	 middle‐class	 status	 saw	 them	 subsumed	 into	 American	 whiteness	 (Brodkin,	
1998).	 In	 the	 following	 in	move	 on	 to	 discuss	 further	 how	 some	of	my	 respondents	 see	
Iranian	American	aspiration’s	toward	middle‐class	whiteness.		
	
Privileges	of	whitewashing		
Zeinab	told	me	that	Negar	was	one	of	the	few	Iranian	Americans	who	she	could	talk	to	and	
who	 understood	 and	 supported	 her	 circumstances.	 When	 I	 spoke	 to	 Negar,162	 she	
expressed	concern	that	PAAIA’s	approach	to	defining	Iranian	American	difference	did	not	
address	 what	 she	 considered	 one	 of	 the	 most	 pressing	 vulnerabilities	 facing	 Iranian	
Americans;	 namely,	 the	 lack	 of	 legal	 advocacy.	 She	 wondered	 why	 there	 is	 no	 Iranian	
American	equivalent	of	the	organizations	that	Arab	Americans	and	other	“minority	groups”	
have,	noting	that	no	advocacy	groups	exist	in	the	US	for	Iranian	Americans.	She	explained:	
																																																								
162	Negar	preferred	to	remain	anonymous	in	the	context	of	this	topic,	which	is	why	I	chose	not	to	include	any	
details	about	her. 
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So	 whereas	 Latinos	 and	 other	 communities	 have	 community‐based	 organizations	
working	with	them,	we	don’t	have	that.	We’re	seeing	an	emergence	of	organizations	
who	are	interested	in	doing	public	interest	work	on	Iranians	in	the	community	IAAB,	
PAAIA,	but…	their	 focus	 is	not	 to	help	 individuals	and	galvanize	community	energy.	
NIPOC	either,	they	don’t	do	advocacy.	So	let’s	say	I	had	an	immigration	problem	or	the	
FBI	came	and	visited	me.	None	of	 these	organizations	would	be	[ones]	I	could	go	to	
for	 support.	 They’re	more	 cultural	 based	organizations.	 I	 could	 go	 to	 them	and	ask	
them	to	connect	me	if	they	know	anybody.		
In	 the	 United	 States	 there’s	 the	 NAACP.	 They	 have	 a	 legal	 defence	 fund	 on	 legal	
advocacy.	There’s	a	Puerto	Rican	legal	defence	fund,	an	Asian	American	legal	defence	
fund,	every	community	has	these	kinds	of	advocacy	groups.	And	in	addition	to	doing	
individual	advocacy,	they	do	actual	impact	litigation	to	challenge	policy	at	a	political	
level.	These	[Iranian	American]	organizations	lobby,	they	don’t	file	lawsuits.	We	don’t	
have	 advocacy	 groups.	 NIAC	 is	 probably	 the	 closest	 thing	 we	 have	 because	 it	
interfaces	with	 the	 government	 on	 a	 regular	 basis.	 They	 have	 a	 policy	 agenda.	 But	
that’s	it,	as	far	as	I	know.		
The	concern	Negar	expresses	here	is	tied	to	the	troubling	consequences	she	associates	with	
a	 lack	of	 advocacy	 funds	 for	 those	who	 cannot	 afford	 legal	defence	 if	 racially	profiled	by	
government/law	enforcement	agencies.	To	Negar,	this	limits	the	extent	to	which	people	are	
able	to	claim	and	organize	around	difference	in	their	day	to	day	lives.	According	to	her,	not	
being	able	to	afford	legal	defence	if	racially	profiled	by	the	FBI	may	lead	people	to	practice	
racial	covering	out	of	apprehension.	Her	worry	is	that	“whitewash”	will	persist	regardless	
of	 efforts	 invested	 in	 positive	 publicity	 campaigns	 about	 Iranian	 Americans	 by	 large	
organizations	that	focus	on	“cultural	based”	agendas	and	public	relations.	This	is	a	concern	
about	how	socio‐economic	inequalities	and	lack	of	institutionalized	support	limit	people’s	
possibilities	to	openly	present	themselves	as	different.		
In	line	with	her	point	about	the	lack	of	legal	advocacy	provided	to	Iranian	Americans,	Negar	
is	also	concerned	about	 the	way	 large	organizations	 like	PAAIA	reproduce	stereotypes	of	
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Iranian	 Americans	 as	 uniformly	 wealthy,	 highly	 educated,	 and	 a	 “successful”	 immigrant	
group	 in	LA	and	 the	US.	She	 is	not	 the	only	one	who	expresses	 this	worry.	Her	concerns	
raise	the	contention	that	the	organizations	that	a	new	generation	is	inheriting	from	the	first	
generation	 are	 not	 equipped	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 problem	 of	 discrimination	 and	 class	
inequalities	 because	 of	 their	 focus	 on	 “cultural”	 notions	 of	 Iranian‐ness.	 And	 the	 newer	
organizations	 are	 as	 ill‐equipped	 to	 deal	 with	 this	 issue	 because	 of	 their	 focus	 on	
convincing	 the	 public	 that	 Iranians	 are	 a	 model	 “community”	 and	 a	 wealthy	 immigrant	
group.		
Like	Negar,	Pouneh	is	also	under	the	impression	that	Iranian	Americans	around	her	try	to	
emulate	 higher	 class	 positions	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 discrimination.	 She	 states,	 “you’ll	 be	
treated	differently	 if	 you’re	whitewashed…	 Iranians	 are	 the	most	privileged	 [minorities],	
depending	on	how	whitewashed	 they	 are.”	 She	 refers	 to	 the	persistence	of	whitewashed	
Iranian	Americans	 in	her	environment	suggesting	that	some	wilfully	 feign	whiteness	as	a	
strategy	 of	 being	 treated	 with	 more	 privilege	 and	 acceptance	 by	 others.	 	 While	 Negar	
worries	 that	 some	 continue	 to	 whitewash	 themselves	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 economic	 and	
institutional	support	as	mentioned	by	Negar,	Pouneh	reiterates	this	concern	by	recounting	
how	some	to	practice	whitewashing	in	order	to	gain/maintain	a	socially	privileged	status	
compared	to	other	minority	groups.	Whitewashing,	according	to	these	two	accounts,	can	be	
both	a	consequence	of	some	Iranian	Americans’	lower	socio‐economic	status,	and	a	factor	
contributing	to	some	Iranian	American’s	maintenance	of	higher	socio‐economic	status.	 In	
both	cases,	the	role	of	performances	of	class	and	socio‐economic	status	are	connected	with	
emulating	whiteness	and	covering	racial	difference.	And	both	these	young	women	consider	
practices	 of	 whitewashing	 problematic	 and	 unconstructive	 in	 bringing	 to	 light	 the	
problems	of	 racism	that	 Iranian	Americans	 face,	which	 is	why	they	work	to	highlight	 the	
problems	of	racism.	They	do	this	not	by	representing	themselves	as	exceptional	migrants,	
but	by	supporting	 inclusion	of	 Iranian	Americans	 from	all	 socioeconomic	backgrounds	 in	
collective	representations.		
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This	 rejection	 of	 Iranian	Americans	 as	 exceptional	migrants	 also	 appears	 in	 the	 creative	
stylings	of	public	personas	by	some	of	my	respondents.	It	also	usually	is	targeted	against	a	
dominant	image	Iranian	Americans	in	LA	being	associated	with	wealth	(and	thus	a	“model	
minority”	group).	Azad’s	story	is	a	good	example	of	this.	Azad,	a	young	man	in	his	early	20s,	
is	 an	 aspiring	 rap	 musician.	 He	 has	 relied	 heavily	 on	 social	 networking	 sites	 to	 gain	
attention	as	an	artist	in	order	to	pursue	a	career	as	an	artist.	The	following	is	a	statement	
that	 alludes	 to	his	 engagement	with	 Iranian	American‐ness	 and	his	 affinity	with	hip	 hop	
music	and	the	positionings	of	other	racialized	immigrant	groups	in	his	environment	from	
an	early	age.		
Yes	I	grew	up	here	[in	Santa	Monica],	but	the	question	is	how	did	we	live	here?	My	
father	is	legally	blind,	so	we	lived	off	government	money	and	the	friends	I	have	are	
Mexican	 and	Black.	Right?	 [looking	 towards	his	African	American	 friend	who	was	
sitting	next	 to	him].	My	growing	up	experience	was	 really	 a	melting	pot…	 I	didn’t	
really	have	a	lot	of	contact	with	the	Iranian	community	because	I	didn’t	feel	similar	
to	them	economically.	One	time	I	went	to	a	party	with	my	girlfriend.	She	lived	near	
Sabone/Sunset	 and	 had	 invited	me	 to	 a	 house	 party	 in	 Beverly	Hills.	 There	were	
expensive	cars	 lined	up	 in	 the	street	 in	 front	as	 I	arrived.	 I	 felt	 really	out	of	place.	
That’s	something	about	this	generation…	Hiphop	was	an	interest	of	mine	for	some	
time.	I	started	out	with	spoken	word	poetry	and	it	became	rap.	
I	see	the	passion	for	hip	hop	by	Azad	as	giving	a	voice	to	the	experience	of	racialized	and	
class‐based	difference	through	a	particular,	widely	‐recognizable	and	popular	cultural	style.	
That	 this	 genre	 of	 self‐expression	 fits	with	 the	 experiences	 of	 second	 generation	 Iranian	
American	 youth	 may	 have	 to	 do	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 African	 American	 experience	 of	
“race”	in	the	US	as	both	imposed	categorization	and	self‐identification	has	been	important	
not	only	in	its	own	terms,	but	from	the	late	1960s	on	as	a	template	for	identity	claims	of	all	
sorts,	 including	 those	 based	 on	 gender	 and	 sexual	 orientation	 as	 well	 as	 based	 on	
“ethnicity”	and	“race”(Brubaker	&	Coopers,	2000).		
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The	 rise	 in	 popularity	 of	 hip	 hop	 in	 LA	 (and	 the	 particular	 subgenre	 of	 “gangsta	 rap”	 a	
strain	 of	 hip	 hop	 with	 strong	 roots	 in	 Los	 Angeles),	 came	 with	 the	 deindustrialization	
process	that	took	place	in	LA	during	the	1960s	and	1970s	and	the	rise	in	crime	rates	as	a	
result	of	 the	dilapidation	of	 the	Watts	neighbourhood	in	South	Central	LA	(Kelley,	1996).	
This	 fuelled	 an	 increasingly	militarized	 response	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 LAPD	 in	 the	 1980s,	
which	 in	 turn	 led	 to	 gangsta	 rap	 being	 primarily	 directed	 against	 police	 violence,	
domination,	and	discrimination,	as	argued	by	Robin	Kelley	(1996).163	The	development	of	
hip	hop	music	 in	LA	has	a	particular	 trajectory	 that	 is	shaped	by	 the	history	of	 the	city’s	
own	 development.	 The	 remarkable	 popularity	 of	 hip	 hop	 and	 its	 gaining	 prominence	 in	
mainstream	American	pop	culture	in	the	US	since	its	beginnings	signals	what	Cornell	West	
calls	the	“African	Americanization	of	American	culture”(1999).		
It	 is	 argued	 that	 an	 emulation	 of	 class	 downward	 mobility	 by	 some	 represents	 the	
inversion	of	the	rags	to	riches	story	of	African	American	rap	music	(Hess,	2005).	However,	
rather	than	reverse	the	rags	to	riches	narrative	per	se,	the	second	generation	seem	to	use	it	
as	a	vehicle	for	criticism	of	a	perceived	lack	of	inclusion	of	Iranian	Americans	(themselves	
or	others)	who	do	not	fit	into	the	established	and	relatively	positive	stereotypes	of	Iranian	
Americans.	 This	 seems	 to	 be	 especially	 relevant	 when	 young	 people	 cannot	 relate	 to	
Iranian	 American‐ness	 as	 entailing	 a	 life	 of	 privilege.	 The	 racial	 politics	 of	 difference	
expressed	 in	 this	 style	 are	 particularly	 attractive	 because	 of	 the	 “oppositional	 culture”	
(Schneider	&	Crul,	2014;	Thomson	&	Crul,	2007)	attached	to	them	as	has	been	argued	 in	
other	 research	 on	 the	 second	 generation,	 and	 an	 element	 embraced	 by	 some	 of	 my	
respondents.	They	 are	positioned	 through	 certain	 styles,	 in	 this	 case	 subcultural	musical	
styles	through	which	self‐representation	takes	shape.	
While	 adopting	 this	 expressly	non‐white	positioning,	 though,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	note	 the	
similarities	 between	what	 some	of	my	 respondents	 are	 doing	 and	Traber’s	 discussion	of	
																																																								
163	With	the	rise	in	popularity	of	this	musical	genre,	white	rappers	have	taken	the	stage	since	the	80s	and	
through	the	90s	into	the	present	(Hess,	2005).	Kelley	also	notes	a	rise	in	popularity	of	gangsta	rap	among	
white	suburban	consumers	in	the	post‐LA	rebellion	political	climate.	
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how	 American	 middle	 class	 (heterosexual	 male)	 whiteness	 has	 been	 rejected	 through	
various	 forms	 of	 “resistant	 self‐fashioning”	 in	 the	 US	 (e.g.	 punk)	 (2007:	 2).	 Traber’s	
investigation	 of	 American	 culture	 from	 a	 literary	 perspective	 argues	 that	 self‐
marginalization	through	association	with	non‐whiteness	is	taken	up	as	a	demonstration	of	
agency	and	a	drive	to	break	with	the	mainstream.	However,	a	conventional	logic	of	liberal	
individualism	tends	to	be	embraced	when	people	position	themselves	in	oppositional	ways,	
and	according	to	Traber,	this	proves	them	once	again	complicit	with	the	power	formation	
and	 values	 of	 the	 mainstream.	 That	 is,	 oppositional	 stylings	 adopt	 individualized	 self‐
expression,	and	thus	the	challenge	to	liberal	logic	of	individual	consumption	is	channelled	
towards	resistant	styles	rather	than	a	resistance	of	this	mainstream	logic.	The	similarities	
to	 my	 respondents’	 forms	 of	 self‐fashioning	 become	 even	 more	 evident	 in	 my	 later	
discussion	of	the	use	of	hip	hop	music	in	this	chapter.	Here	I	have	tried	to	show	the	racial	
ambivalence	 that	 characterizes	 my	 respondents’	 self‐representations.	 They	 are	 an	
overwhelmingly	middle‐class,	educated	minority	who	can	therefore	sometimes	“pass”	 for	
white,	some	of	whom	reject	whiteness	and	its	embedding	in	American	nationhood.	They	do	
so	 by	 drawing	 upon	 their	 experiences	 of	 racial	 discrimination.	 But	 they	 equally	 position	
themselves	 against	 a	 dominant	 mode	 of	 being	 Iranian	 American‐ness	 that	 they	 see	 as	
highlighting	a	model	minority	status.		
	
Framing	discrimination	
There	 are	 divergences	 within	 the	 second	 generation	 in	 LA	 as	 to	 how	 to	 forge	 new	
narratives	and	public	 representations	 for	 Iranian	Americans	at	a	 time	when	difference	 is	
being	made	explicit.	There	are	contentions	around	how	to	claim	difference	 in	a	 changing	
atmosphere	 in	 which	 Iranian	 Americans	 are	 seen	 as	 de	 facto	Muslims	 and	 racialized	 as	
such.	My	respondents	criticize	other	Iranian	Americans’	practices	of	emulating	whiteness.	
However,	 they	 also	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 sustained	 appeal	 of	 whitewashing	 for	 some,	
especially	in	the	face	of	discrimination	and/or	marginalization.		
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According	 to	 them,	 whiteness	 can	 be	 emulated	 through	 shows	 of	 wealth;	 by	 clinging	 to	
Aryan‐ness;	by	 collectively	presenting	 Iranian	Americans	as	exceptional	migrants;	by	not	
openly	 presenting	 oneself	 as	 Muslim.	 Their	 concern	 is	 that	 such	 practices	 of	 “racial	
covering”	–	to	use	the	term	Tehranian	and	some	others	I	spoke	to	deploy	–	obscure	a	reality	
about	 being	 Iranian	American.	Namely,	 that	 Iranian‐ness	 has	 always	 entailed	 being	 non‐
white.	They	implicitly	acknowledge	that	the	official	social	categories	in	the	US	context	are	
seen	as	having	changed	over	time,	and	that	the	experience	of	migration	to	the	US	in	the	first	
place	has	helped	define	the	boundaries	of	white‐ness	and	non‐whiteness.	Yet,	the	collective	
racial	 non‐whiteness	 of	 Iranian	 Americans	 (whether	 covered	 or	 revealed)	 is	 also	 talked	
about	 as	 something	 that	 simply	 is,	 and	 has	 always	 remained	 the	 same.	 Performances	 of	
whiteness	are	seen	as	having	mitigating	 influences	on	how	Iranians	are	seen	racially,	but	
the	basic	racial	difference	is	claimed	to	be	self‐evidently	and	consistently	present	in	bodies.	
These	people	are	therefore	positioned	closer	to	American	racial/ethnic	minorities	than	the	
white	majority.		
Kazinitz	et	al.	have	reviewed	the	sociological	research	on	the	effects	for	second‐generation	
immigrants	 of	 being	 positioned	 close	 to	 American	 minorities.	 He	 sketches	 a	 paradox	 in	
which,	on	 the	one	hand,	contemporary	second‐generation	 immigrants	keep	strong	ethnic	
networks	 that	 the	 first	 generation	 have	 maintained	 and	 thus	 increase	 their	 upward	
mobility	 while	 not	 “assimilating”	 into	 existing	 racialized	 minority	 groups	 with	 longer	
histories	of	discrimination	and	lower	socio‐economic	status.	On	the	other	hand,	the	second	
generation	may	adopt	an	“oppositional”	or	 “reactive	ethnicity”	 that	brings	 them	closer	 to	
these	existing	racial	minorities,	which	is	thought	to	make	them	“sceptical	of	the	possibility	
of	upward	mobility	and	particularly	about	the	value	of	education”	and	ostensibly	leading	to	
downward	mobility	 (see	 Kasinitz,	 Mollenkopf,	 &	Waters,	 2006:	 8).	 They	 also	 argue	 that	
racial	 similarities	 between	 the	 children	 of	 new	 migrants	 and	 long‐standing	 racialized	
groups	increase	the	second	generation’s	propensity	to	socio‐economic	downward	mobility	
in	 his	 discussion	 of	 the	 intersection	 between	 race,	 class,	 and	 second‐generation	 ethnic	
identity	(Kasinitz	et	al.,	2006).	
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The	 adoption	 of	 certain	 subcultural	 styles	 connects	 my	 respondents	 to	 parts	 of	 other	
racialized	minorities	 in	 the	US	 like	African	Americans,	and	 I	discuss	 the	ways	 the	 Iranian	
American	 second	 generation	 becomes	 part	 of	 a	 pan‐Middle	 Easterners	 racial/ethnic	
identity164	 in	 the	 following	 section.	 Yet	 the	 threat	 of	 downward	 mobility	 appears	 less	
relevant	here.	Rather,	cross‐ethnic	connections	they	draw	are	a	source	of	agency	for	young	
people	 to	 form	 preferred	 representations	 of	 themselves,	 using	 common	 experiences	 of	
exclusion.	Being	a	racialized	minority	in	the	US	allows	my	respondents	certain	possibilities	
for	positioning	 themselves	as	American	citizens,	as	migrants,	 and	 ‘others’	 in	 the	midst	of	
the	American	nation;	a	nation	with	its	own	specific	history	with	racializing	minorities	that	
my	respondents	mobilize.	Yet	as	members	of	this	second	generation	begin	to	publicly	claim	
difference	 in	 terms	 of	 race	 and	 racial	 discrimination,	 they	 also	 experience	 the	 limits	 to	
these	 discourses	 of	 inclusion.	 As	 I	 pointed	 out,	 these	 include	 limitations	 such	 as	 “good”	
versus	 “bad”	 exhibits	 of	 diversity,	 and	 they	 also	mean	 the	 necessary	 adherence	 to	 racial	
categorizations	in	general.165	Additionally,	I	suggested	that	by	adopting	oppositional	styles	
of	 racial	 positioning,	 their	 practices	 feed	 back	 into	 the	 mainstream	 logic	 of	 liberal	
individualism.	 This	 makes	 oppositional	 strategies	 commonplace	 through	 popular	 styles	
while	reinforcing	existing	power	structures.	My	respondents’	modes	of	self‐styling	reflect	
youth	pop	cultural	elements	particularly	suited	to	the	second	generation,	helping	them	to	
further	broader	anti‐racist	positionings.	In	the	following	section	I	elaborate	more	on	what	
the	possibilities	that	web	usages	offer	for	these	self‐stylings.		
Regarding	 the	 role	of	web	usage,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 to	a	 certain	extent	 their	availability	 is	
able	 to	 “enhance	 the	 capacity	 to	 harness	 otherness,”	 as	 has	 been	 argued	 of	 the	 role	 of	
internet	in	migrants’	identity	practices	(Nedelcu,	2012:	1339).	Yet,	there	seem	to	be	various	
shades	of	claiming	otherness.	Certain	ways	of	using	websites	I	discussed	have	been	used	to	
demonstrate	 how	 the	 line	 between	 commercially	 vested	 (and	 increasingly	 mainstream)	
																																																								
164 This	is	very	similar	to	Kasintiz’s	account	of	the	emergence	of	the	identity	of	“Asian	American”	and	“Latino”	
in	the	American	context	among	the	second	generation	of	a	variety	of	different	immigrant	groups	with	
different	experiences	of	migration	(Kasinitz,	2004). 
165	Though	I	discuss	cases	of	those	who	move	to	challenge	such	categories	as	well	in	the	following	section	
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media	representations	and	the	use	of	web	applications	as	an	oppositional	form	is	blurred.	
Websites	afford	both	the	promotion	of	large,	professional	public	relations‐oriented	projects	
and	organizations	with	large	audiences	alongside	under‐resourced	and	far	less	influential	
private	 initiatives	 to	 get	 one’s	 “story	 out.”	 As	 some	 Iranian	 Americans	 slowly	 rise	 to	
positions	 in	 prominent	 media	 production	 circuits,	 new	 inclusions	 and	 exclusions	 are	
created	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 whose	 stories	 are	 told	 and	 who/what	 represents	 Iranian	
Americans.	These	inclusions	and	exclusions	appear	to	be	reflected	in	modes	of	web	usage	
as	well.	 In	 the	 following	 section,	 I	 go	 further	 into	 the	 stylized	elements	of	 various	media	
self‐representations	 by	 my	 respondents,	 with	 particular	 attention	 for	 the	 clear	 rise	 in	
significance	of	the	category	of	“Middle	Eastern	American”	and	the	implications	of	its	use.	
	
	
	
Being	Middle	Eastern	in	America	
Global	subcultures	
In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 9/11,	 a	 program	 of	 special	 registration	 was	 set	 up.	 Bakalian	 and	
Bozorgmehr	(2009)	document	the	measures	and	their	results	in	the	following	way	in	their	
study,	mentioning	the	particular	effects	as	they	were	felt	immediately	after	the	attacks:		
Men	older	than	16	who	were	citizens	of	Iran,	Iraq,	Libya,	Sudan	and	Syria	allegedly	
terrorist‐training	 countries	 who	 had	 entered	 the	 U.S.	 before	 September	 10,	 2002	
and	planned	to	remain	at	 least	until	December	16,	2002	were	required	to	register	
with	 the	 INS	 before	 December	 16,	 2002.	 On	 December	 16,	 2002,	 other	 countries	
were	 added	 to	 the	 list.	 Failure	 to	 report	 to	 the	 INS	 was	 cause	 for	 deportation.	
Ironically,	 many	 people	 who	 obeyed	 the	 order	 were	 deported	 anyway.	 Special	
registration	increased	the	workload	of	an	already	strained	INS	staff.	The	men,	who	
complied	with	 the	 orders,	 complained	 of	 harsh	 treatment	 by	 INS	 staff,	 long	waits	
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without	 access	 to	 food	 or	 water.	 More	 seriously,	 the	 lives	 of	many	 families	were	
disrupted	 as	 husbands	 were	 detained	 and	 deported,	 leaving	 wives	 and	 children	
without	 any	means	 of	 support	 and	 no	 opportunity	 to	 rejoin	 the	men	 unless	 they	
return	to	his	country	of	origin.	Over	80,000	men	had	registered	by	early	May	2003.	
Special	registration	resulted	in	the	arrest	of	several	hundred	Iranians	in	Los	Angeles	
who	 were	 deemed	 in	 violation	 of	 their	 visas.	 This	 order	 created	 unprecedented	
demonstrations	and	protests	from	the	Iranian	American	population	in	Los	Angeles,	
the	largest	such	concentration	in	the	U.S.	Having	designated	the	Islamic	Republic	of	
Iran	part	of	the	“Axis	of	Evil,”	individuals	bearing	Iranian	passports	were	denied	visa	
issuance	and	subjected	to	Special	Registration	even	though	Iranians	had	nothing	to	
do	with	 9/11.	 In	November	 2003,	 almost	 coinciding	with	 the	 first	 anniversary	 of	
Special	Registration,	the	government	reversed	its	decision	of	requesting	men	from	a	
number	of	Arab	and/or	Muslim	countries	to	repeat	this	procedure	annually.	During	
its	implementation,	this	initiative	was	not	effective	in	apprehending	any	terrorists.	
In	LA,	the	phenomenon	of	special	registration	was	repeatedly	invoked	as	part	of	post‐9/11	
profiling	 of	 Iranian	 Americans	 and	 Middle	 Easterners	 in	 the	 US.	 It	 was	 framed	 as	
problematic	by	 its	 critics	because	of	 the	baseless	official	 association	of	 Iranians	with	 the	
perpetration	of	the	attacks	on	the	WTC	and	Pentagon,	and	also	because	of	the	undermining	
of	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 US	 residents	 criminalized	 because	 of	 this	 measure.166	 Among	 other	
things,	the	policy	showed	how	racialized	discrimination	takes	shape	in	gendered	ways	as	it	
implies	 a	 particular	 threat	 posed	 by	 Middle	 Eastern	 men.	 I	 found	 it	 striking	 that	 my	
respondents	were	involved	in	multiple	forms	of	positioning	themselves	against	this	kind	of	
discrimination	via	discursive	practices	of	 forming	connections	with	other	Middle	Eastern	
Americans,	which	I	describe	in	the	following.		
																																																								
166	For	more	work	on	the	impacts	of	Congressional	Bills,	INS	practices,	and	law	enforcement	policies	after	
9/11	on	Middle	Eastern	men	in	the	US	see	review	by	Cainkar,	(2004)	
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Hip	 hop	 artist,	 Omar	 Offendum	 is	 known	 for	 his	 politically	 “conscious”	 lyrics	 that	 draw	
attention	 to	 his	 ‘bi‐cultural’	 background	 as	 a	 Syrian	 American,	 while	 scholar,	 Moustafa	
Bayoumi,	 asks	 the	 question	How	Does	 it	 Feel	 to	 be	a	Problem?	Being	Young	 and	Arab	 in	
America,	 as	 the	 title	 of	 his	 2008	 book,	which	 features	 the	 very	 same	 question	 posed	 by	
W.E.B	Du	Bois	in	an	evocative	piece	on	being	black	in	America	first	published	in	1897	(Du	
Bois,	2007).	These	 two	young	men,	respectively,	performed	and	spoke	at	 the	2011	Camp	
Ayadeh	(Camp	Future),	the	social	and	pedagogical	environment	of	IAAB’s	summer	camp	for	
leadership.	 The	 Americans	 of	 Arab	 background	 that	 were	 invited	 to	 Ayandeh	 position	
themselves,	 use	 their	 work	 to	 take	 a	 stance	 against	 anti‐Muslim	 and	 anti‐Arab	
discrimination	 through	 their	work.	 The	organization’s	 aim	of	 “alliance‐building”	 includes	
alliances	between	Iranian	American	and	Arab	American	youth,	specifically	through	inviting	
prominent	 Arab	 American	 artists	 and	 scholars	 to	 the	 popular	 summer	 youth	 camp	 they	
organized	 called	 Camp	 Ayandeh	 and	 reflects	 the	 commonality	 between	 ways	 of	
experiencing	 racial	 difference	 between	 these	 two	 groups	 of	 Middle	 Eastern	 American	
youth.	 And	 it	 is	 notable	 that	 young	men	 are	 the	 ones	who	 dominate	 this	musical	 genre,	
which	gives	them	a	vehicle	to	speak	to	being	seen	as	“a	problem”.		
This	 is	 evident	 in	 another	 example	on	 Justin’s	 blog,	 in	 a	 short	 video	 trailer	 that	 includes	
Yassin	Alsalman.	He	 is	a	young,	male,	 second	generation	 Iraqi	Canadian	rapper,	 speaking	
about	how	the	hip	hop	music	genre	plays	a	positive	role	in	the	lives	of	people	like	himself.	
He	is	 featured	speaking	in	a	high	quality	video	about	his	book,	Diatribes	of	a	Dying	Tribe.	
Alsalman	 goes	 by	 the	 artist	 name,	 Narcycist,	 and	 makes	 the	 following	 statement	 in	 the	
video.	
It’s	an	example	of	how	hip	hop	has	been	used	to	create	an	 identity	or	help	create	a	
space	for	people	who	feel	underrepresented	or	misrepresented.	Arabs,	in	this	case.167		
The	above	video	is	posted	on	Justin’s	blog,	Mashouf	TV,	which	has	the	by‐line,	“The	online	
adventures	 of	 director	 Justin	 Mashouf”.	 On	 Justin’s	 blog,	 the	 book	 is	 described	 as	 being	
																																																								
167	Mashouf	TV,	“Diatribes	of	a	Dying	Tribe,”	http://mashouf.tv/?p=6	(accessed	1/12/14)	
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“about	 the	 jumbled	 reality	 of	 North	 American	 life.	 The	 destructive	 components	 of	
juxtaposing	 cultures,	 the	 birth	 of	 immigrant	 internationality	 and	 the	 resilient	 art	 that	
comes	 out	 of	 struggle	 and	 oppression.”	 As	 a	 hip	 hop	 dancer,	 Justin	 is	 connected	 with	 a	
network	of	North	American	Muslims	of	Middle	Eastern	descent	 that	 is	based	around	hip	
hop.	 Far	 from	 being	 limited	 hip	 hop	 networks,	 discursive	 connections	 between	 young	
Iranian	 Americans	 and	 other	 Middle	 Eastern	 Americans	 are	 given	 shape	 by	 the	 second	
generation	 in	other	art	 forms	with	 their	public	platforms	 for	speaking	 to	current	societal	
conditions.	Second‐generation	Iranian	American	author,	Porochista	Khakpour,	writes	in	an	
opinion	 piece	 for	 the	 New	 York	 Times	 about	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 “pan‐Middle	 Eastern	
identity,”	one	that	arose	specifically	in	the	wake	of	9/11	when	all	Middle	Easterners	were	
“clumped	together”	according	to	Khakpour.168		
The	 “racialization	of	 religion”	 in	 the	US	 (Joshi,	2006)	 suggests	 that	phenotypical	 features	
that	have	come	to	be	associated	with	a	racial	group	come	to	take	on	religious	connections.	
In	this	case,	boundaries	between	the	categories	of	Muslim	and	Middle	Eastern	Americans169	
seem	 to	 blur	 as	 racialization	 processes	 merge	 groups.	 In	 this	 process,	 the	 category	 of	
Middle	 Eastern	 American	 gains	 currency	 as	 a	 way	 for	 young	 Iranian	 Americans	 to	 see	
themselves	under	these	circumstances,	and	offers	a	basis	for	putting	these	new	boundaries	
into	practice	on	their	own	behalves.	As	Andrew	Shryok	argues,		
the	 fact	 that	 many	 Arab	 Americans	 now	 believe	 anti‐terrorism	 policies	 have	
constituted	 them	 as	 a	 “distinct	 racial	 group”	 says	 a	 great	 deal	 about	 the	 trauma	 of	
9/11,	 the	 experience	 of	 marginalization	 and	 stigma,	 and	 how	 these	 are	 reshaping	
identity	politics	among	Arabs	and	Muslims	 in	the	United	States	(cited	 in	Bakalian	&	
Bozorgmehr,	2009:	99)	
The	 same	 applies	 to	 some	of	my	 respondents	 as	well.	 Justin	 connects	with	 other	Middle	
Eastern	 American	 and	 Muslim	 American	 individuals	 of	 second	 generation	 migrational	
																																																								
168	The	piece	also	appeared	in	the	International	Herald	Tribune	and	the	New	Yorker	
169 This	raises	interesting	questions	about	how	(second	generation)	Jewish	and	Christian	Middle	Eastern	
Americans	experience	the	developments	described	here.  
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backgrounds,	and	embracing	the	hip	hop	genre	is	an	 interesting	vehicle	 for	making	these	
connections.	 He	 blogs	 about	 experiences	 with	 border‐crossing	 impediments	 as	 well	 as	
feature	them	in	his	film,	an	experience	that	was	referred	to	by	other	Iranian	Americans	and	
also	 featured	 as	 the	 main	 theme	 in	 a	 music	 video	 by	 the	 Narcycist	 for	 his	 song,	
P.H.A.T.W.A.170	 Justin	 and	 the	 Narcycist	 also	 identify	 in	 their	 work	 and	 their	 public	
personas	as	Muslim.	Aside	 from	the	narratives	of	border	hindrances,	 some	of	 the	second	
generation	express	concern	about	the	misconceptions	and	aggression	they	sometimes	feel	
from	other	Iranian	Americans	due	to	being	Muslim.		
My	respondents	expressed	being	in	a	particular	position	because	of	their	Iranian‐ness	and	
Muslim‐ness,	 a	 position	 that	 is	 caught	 between	 strong	 negative	 associations	 with	 the	
Islamic	 Republic	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 older	 generation	 who	 have	 had	 direct	 traumatic	
experiences	with	 the	 revolution,	 and	 the	 Islamophobia	 and	 prejudices	 they	 encounter	 in	
contemporary	 America.	 While	 talking	 about	 the	 gap	 between	 those	 who	 have	 come	
recently	 from	 Iran	 and	 those	who	 have	 been	 incorporated	 into	 the	 US	 for	much	 longer,	
Zeinab	pointed	out	the	implications	for	Iranian	Americans’	“ways	of	being	Muslim.”		
I	 think	 [newcomers	 from	 Iran]	 think	 Iranians	 have	 to	 either	 be	Muslim	or	 not	 be	
Muslim.	They	don’t	link	up	with	the	strength	of	others	like	Arabs	and	Pakistanis	and	
Afghans	who	have	been	more	comfortable	with	being	Muslim.	I	wish	there	could	be	
more	relaxed	ways	of	being	Muslim	that	shouldn’t	get	so	much	criticism	from	both	
sides	[both	other	Iranian	Americans	and	Americans].		
The	 alliances	 built	 among	 the	 second	 generation	 along	 lines	 of	 being	Muslim	 or	Middle	
Eastern	 in	 America	 serve	 as	 a	 buffer	 against	 the	 hostility	 that	 sometimes	 comes	 with	
openly	identifying	as	Muslims	among	Iranian	Americans	in	LA.	The	Iranian	diaspora	in	LA	
has	 been	 commonly	 defined	 as	 a	 largely	 secular	 immigrant	 group	 in	 terms	 of	 public	
practice	and	 their	self‐distinctions	 from	the	 Islamic	Republic.	 In	one	 instance,	Saman,	 the	
																																																								
170	The	pronunciation	of	the	title	as	Fatwa	(decree	issued	by	a	Sunni	or	Shia	Islamic	religious	leader)	and	the	
use	of	the	spelling	of	the	slang	word	Phat	(cool)	is	a	play	on	words	at	the	junction	of	language	commonly	used	
in	hip	hop	music	and	language	commonly	associated	in	the	West	with	radical	Islam.		
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second	generation	son	of	the	owner	of	well‐established	Mosque	and	cultural	center	in	LA,	
IMAN,	 stated	 that	Muslim	 Iranian	Americans	he	knew	 felt	more	 like	 a	minority	 religious	
group	than	the	majority	they	were	in	numbers.	He	acknowledges	it	was	sometimes	difficult	
to	be	Muslim	within	a	diaspora	that	has	fled	the	grave	mistreatments	they	experienced	in	
the	 Islamic	 Republic	 of	 Iran.	 Islam	 and	 being	 Muslim	 is	 uniformly	 left	 out	 of	 self‐
representations	 of	 Iranian	 Americans	 in	 large	 public	 organizations.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
(internet	mediated)	self‐representations	of	people	like	Justin	not	only	position	him	against	
border	controls,	but	also	against	specific	associations	 that	other	 Iranian	Americans	 in	his	
environment	use	to	connect	his	Muslim	identity	with	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran.	
This	mobilization	of	hip	hop	styles	is	a	way	to	give	shape	to	being	Muslim,	Middle	Eastern,	
Iranian,	and	American	for	young	men	like	Justin.	As	mentioned	earlier	in	this	chapter,	hip	
hop	 is	 also	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 cross‐connections	 with	 other	 immigrant	 or	 ethnic/racial	
minority	groups	such	as	African	Americans	through	narratives	of	class	mobility.	Not	only	
hip	 hop	 but	 youth	 subcultural,	 musical	 styles	 more	 generally	 have	 a	 history	 of	 being	
embedded	 in	 the	developments	 that	shaped	 the	city	of	LA.	The	punk	music	scene	of	LA’s	
80s	 and	 90s,	 like	 its	 original	 London‐based	 movement,	 adopted	 a	 class	 politics	 out	 of	
distaste	 for	 symptoms	 of	 white	 privilege,	 mostly	 by	 white	 youth.	 It	 was	 a	 politicized	
movement	 that	 subverted	 American	 norms	 of	 social	 inclusion	 by	 rejecting	 upward	
mobility,	 the	 pursuit	 of	 middle	 class	 lifestyles,	 and	 ascription	 to	 the	 American	 dream	
(Traber,	 2007).	 The	 links	 between	 youth	 subcultures	 and	 social	 change	 have	 been	
discussed	as	the	deployment	of	subcultural	capital	(see	Hall	&	Jefferson,	2006).	In	this	case,	
both	hip	hop	and	punk	movements	of	LA	were	a	response	to	the	deindustrialization	of	the	
city	in	the	later	part	of	the	20th	century,	the	dilapidation	of	the	inner	city,	and	the	parallel	
burgeoning	of	suburban	lifestyles.		
As	part	of	their	deployment	of	these	youth	subcultural	styles,	my	respondents	make	use	of	
YouTube	to	post	and	share	music	videos,	write	blogs,	and	make	links	to	others	who	do	the	
same.	The	possibilities	of	writing,	video	production,	and	become	integrated	into	practices	
of	web	usage.	They	mobilize	subcultural	capital	through	practices	of	self‐representation	by	
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highlighting	how	their	lives	are	marked	by	being	seen	as	different	and	using	this	to	position	
themselves.	 Their	 web	 usage	 reflects	 the	 social	 aspects	 of	 creating	 links	 with	 others	
involved	 in	 such	 cultural	 production	 and	 consumption.	 They	 not	 only	 utilize	 subcultural	
forms	that	have	a	widespread	appeal	among	youth,	and	within	LA	as	an	important	centre	
for	hip	hop’s	development,	but	these	same	subcultural	forms	are	a	response	to	the	sphere	
of	global	discourses	of	“the	war	on	terror”	and	international	relations	between	the	US	and	
Iran.	 In	 the	 process,	 these	 self‐representations	 shape	 adherences	 between	 Iranian	
Americans	 and	 other	 Middle	 Eastern	 Americans	 around	 their	 shared	 experiences	 of	
racialization	within,	and	with	relation	to,	the	US.	Here	I	have	shown	how	“new	spheres	of	
co‐operation,”	work	between	second‐generation	Iranians	and	other	racialized	groups	–	to	
use	the	terminology	of	Kasinitz	et	al.	discussing	the	racialized	second	generation	in	the	US.		
[Assimilation]	implies	the	reshufﬂing	of	boundaries	and	the	making	of	connections	
across	boundaries	in	new	and	complex	ways.	If	at	times	this	leads	to	conﬂict,	it	also	
creates	new	spheres	of	co‐operation	(Kasinitz	et	al.,	2006:	9).		
In	this	way	we	can	understand	the	connections	and	cooperation	young	Iranian	Americans	
seek	out	with	other	 racalized	groups	as	being	part	of	 their	 incorporation	 into	American‐
ness.	In	the	following	I	continue	to	discuss	the	overlap	of	gender	and	racialization	from	the	
perspective	of	some	members	of	the	second	generation	women	I	spoke	with.	
	
	
Not	passive	victims:	broader	claims	to	color	
There’s	 quite	 a	 different	 perception	 of	 Middle	 Eastern	 women	 as	 victims,	 as	 the	
oppressed,	 which	 I	 think	 most	 Middle	 Eastern	 women	 can’t	 stand.	 Although,	
especially	in	the	world	of	publishing,	it’s	interesting	how	much	this	image	has	been	
perpetuated.	And	how	much	money	has	even	come	out	of	that	image.	
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Porochista	Khakpour	speaks	here	in	a	video	interview	posted	on	the	website,	Big	Think,	a	
site	 that	 aggregates	 blogs,	 videos	 and	 articles	 featuring	 the	 ideas	 of	 a	 variety	 of	
contemporary	 thinkers,	 professionals,	 authors,	 and	 “experts”	 in	 a	 multimedia	 digital	
format.	In	the	video	interview	she	explains	how	she	has	noticed	that	much	contemporary	
writing	focusing	on	the	Middle	East	places	women	central.	Her	own	novel,	Sons	and	other	
Flammable	Objects,	deals	specifically	with	the	worlds	of	Middle	Eastern	men,	exploring	the	
relationships	of	its	male	protagonists.		
When	was	the	last	time	you	saw	a	book	by	an	Iranian	author	that	did	not	feature	on	its	
cover	 a	 Persian	 carpet,	 pomegranates,	 faux	 Middle	 Eastern	 arabesque	 fonts,	 or	 a	
woman	 in	 some	 sort	 of	 headscarf?	 Big	 publishing	 and	 mainstream	 media	 in	
the	U.S.	seemed	just	as	eager	as	the	Islamic	Republic	to	cast	highly	photogenic	women	
in	veils‐and‐lashings	tearjerkers;	they	relegated	their	writers,	particularly	women,	to	
victim	 ingénues.	 Yes,	 these	 are	 true	 stories,	 but	 only	 one	 type	 of	 story,	 which	 is	
particularly	frustrating	when	so	many	others	remain	untold.	
Porochista’s	 sentiment	 about	 the	 level	 and	 type	 of	 attention	 that	 Middle	 Eastern	 –	 and,	
among	them,	Iranian	American	women	‐	have	garnered	in	recent	years	is	more	widespread.	
Coming	up	against	the	idea	of	Middle	Eastern	women	as	oppressed	victims	is	not	limited	to	
publishing,	 as	 Amitis’	 experience	 as	 an	 artist	 reflects.	 Amitis	 recounted	 a	 first‐hand	
experience	 of	 a	 potential	 (male)	 buyer	 who	 she	 found	 expecting	 to	 see	 a	 similar	 self‐
victimization	in	her	own	pieces.		
He	wanted	my	work	to	go	in	a	certain	direction.	And	it	was	this	direction	I’m	seeing	a	
lot	of	the	women	artists	in	New	York	go	in:	‘I’m	a	woman	artist,	I’m	so	oppressed,	and	
won’t	you	save	me.’	And	it	wasn’t	going	in	that	direction.	And	I’m	starting	to	see	that	
again.	 And	 I’m	 a	 little	 perturbed	 by	 it	 because	 I	 thought	 we	 were	 passed	 that.	 If	
anything,	the	artists	I’ve	met	here	on	the	West	Coast	are	the	ones	trying	to	kick	that	
notion	out	of	the	way.	There’s	been	a	real	active	engagement	of	kicking	that	notion	out	
of	the	way.	So	I’m	a	little	disturbed	by	that.	
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Amitis	 repeatedly	 mentions	 a	 tendency	 among	 audiences	 as	 well	 as	 a	 tendency	 among	
female	artists	themselves	to	portray	women	in	Iran	as	victims	of	their	own	male‐dominated	
society.	As	Amitis	described	it,	 this	was	a	particular	phenomenon	of	the	diaspora	and	not	
the	 Iran‐based	 artists	 she	 had	 contact	 and	 collaboration	 with.	 She	 saw	 this	 as	 being	
encouraged	by	the	audiences	 in	the	US,	whether	 intentionally	or	not.	She	spoke	earnestly	
about	the	problems	this	image	of	Iranian	women	raised	for	her.	
This	 is	 a	 strategy	of	war.	That’s	 one	 thing	 that’s	 very	 important	 to	 recognize…	 that	
this	is	something	people	do	during	a	time	of	war.	It’s	always	to	pit	the	men	against	the	
women.	To	displace	 that	 connection	 that	people	have	with	one	another.	But	also	 to	
fetishize	 the	women	 of	 the	 region.	 The	 combination	 of,	 ‘they’re	 really	 ugly,	 they’re	
really	stupid’;	to	‘they’re	really	beautiful,	exotic,	they	need	to	be	saved’.		
These	 two	 women	 and	 many	 other	 Iranian	 women	 authors	 and	 artists	 are	 engaged	 in	
representing	 themselves	 as	 Middle	 Eastern	 women	 through	 their	 work	 or	 in	 their	
comments	on	their	work	and	that	of	other	women,	and	the	artistic	industries	in	which	they	
work.	Second‐generation	young	women,	professionally	and	politically,	are	in	a	position	to	
tell	 their	 own	 stories	 and	 tell	 them	 publicly	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 relevant	 to	 progressive	
American	audience.	This	is	what	the	work	of	certain	second	generation	women	authors	and	
artists	 shows.	 And	 their	 position	 is	 one	 that	 shows	 a	 clear	 awareness	 of	 a	 trend	 in	
representing	 Middle	 Eastern	 and	 Iranian	 women.	 Amitis	 emphasized	 this	 image	 of	 “the	
Iranian	 woman”	 as	 oppressed	 and	 Other,	 standing	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 role	 of	 American	
society	as	emancipated	and	a	source	of	liberation.	As	Moallem	argues	about	the	aftermath	
of	the	September	11	attacks,	“Islamic	fundamentalism	has	become	a	generic	signifier	used	
constantly	 to	 single	out	 the	Muslim	other,	 in	 its	 irrational,	morally	 inferior,	 and	barbaric	
masculinity,	 and	 its	passive,	victimized,	 and	submissive	 femininity	 (Moallem,	2005:	8).171	
																																																								
171 I	also	observed	a	strong	reaction	by	some	of	my	respondents	to	the	tendency	of	Western	news	press	to	
represent	narratives	about	Iranian	women	in	Iran	as	revolving	around	their	sexuality,	sexual	emancipation,	
extreme	sexual	acts	and	hypersexualized	social	scenes,	especially	in	the	country’s	urban	centers.	This	was	a	
reaction	that	I	noted	more	recently	and	while	it	seem	to	hang	together	with	the	argument	I	make	here,	it	was	
a	more	circumstantial	observation.	
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This	dually	gendered	representation	of	the	Muslim	other	is	challenged	here	by	women,	just	
as	it	discussed	it	being	challenged	by	men	above	in	this	section.		
Amitis	 critically	 mentioned	 the	 acclaim	 such	 orientalising	 representations	 of	 Iranian	
women	 receive	 among	 American	 audiences.	 This	 includes	when	 the	 representations	 are	
created	 by	 Iranian	 women	 artists.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 image	 of	 Iranian	 women	 as	
victimized	somewhat	paradoxically	thrusts	forward	the	careers	of	the	women	who	produce	
these	 images	 of	 their	 lives	 being	 marked	 by	 Islam,	 their	 male‐dominated	 “culture,”	 and	
their	own		subjugation.	Focusing	on	weblogs	by	Iranian	women,	Shakhsari	argues	that	in	a	
time	of	war,	 (Farsi)	 language	 skills	become	particularly	marketable	 and	profitable,	 as	do	
certain	narratives	of	the	Iranian	diaspora;	hence	the	rise	in	these	narratives:		
In	 the	 market	 for	 information	 and	 expertise,	 some	 diasporic	 Iranians	 become	
entrepreneurs	who	participate	in	the	production	and	marketing	of	a	particular	form	
of	knowledge	about	Iran	(Shakhsari,	2011:	np).			
Based	on	her	ethnographic	work	among	bloggers	in	Toronto,	Canada,	Shakhsari	argues	that	
the	dominant	representations	of	“Weblogestan”	are	gendered	by	the	discourse	of	the	“war	
on	 terror.”	 Her	 research	 shows	 how	 women	 bloggers	 negotiate	 their	 subject	 positions	
through	 blogs	while	 also	 being	 subject	 to	 these	 dominant	 representations	 that	 limit	 the	
shapes	 that	 their	agency	 takes,	making	 them	complicit	with	 those	“hegemonic	nationalist	
and	 neoliberal	 discourses”	 (2011).	 Not	 unlike	 Amitis’	 account,	 Porochista	 speaks	 about	
how	 this	 complicity	 of	 women	 artists	 reveals	 itself	 in	 art	 created	 by	 Iranian	 diaspora	
women	as	well.	At	the	annual	IAAB	diaspora	conference	in	November	of	2012,	the	young	
novelist	and	essayist	shone	a	spotlight	on	the	commercialization	of	literary	art,	referring	to	
the	roles	of	publishers	and	agents	whose	market‐oriented	demands	tend	to	interfere	with	
women	writers’	voices.	It	is	in	this	context	that	she	raises	complaints	about	her	novel	being	
repeatedly	called	a	memoir	in	coverage;	about	being	told	by	a	New	York	Times	editor	that	
her	voice	was	her	“brand”	and	that	all	her	writing	must	be	filtered	through	it;	about	reading	
memoirs	by	 successful	 Iranian	diaspora	women	writers	 that	 she	 could	not	 relate	 to.	 She	
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describes	 such	 successful	 works	 as	 together	 forming	 their	 own	 “brand‐hood”	 that	
established	itself	in	the	early	2000s.	These,	according	to	her,	had:		
A	 familiarity	 that	 did	 not	 come	out	 of	my	own	personal	 experience	 but,	 like	 fairy	
tales,	out	of	insta‐classic	storylines,	canned	themes,	stock	characters	and	cardboard	
settings	 that	 I	 had	 already	 ‐	without	 even	 having	 finished	 [reading]	 any	 [of	 these	
memoirs]‐	seen	before.	
In	 this	 talk,	 Porochista	 describes	 her	 work,	 in	 contrast	 to	 these	 successful	 memoirs,	 as	
offering	“a	shade	of	difference	that	seemed	particularly	necessary	in	the	last	decade”	when	
the	 professional	 creative	 work	 of	 Iranian	 American	 women	 became	 subject	 to	 certain	
expectations	regarding	the	representation	of	Iranian	Americans.	She	attributed	the	success	
she	herself	has	enjoyed	to	her	(incidental)	 insistence	on	having	listened	to	what	she	calls	
her	own	“authentic”	voice,	rather	than	the	direction	of	editors	and	publishers.	Women	like	
Porochista	 and	 Amitis	 are	 acutely	 aware	 of	 the	ways	 their	 own	 self‐representations	 are	
shaped	by	such	dynamics	(or,	rather,	resist	precisely	such	shaping).		
Ghorashi’s	 discussion	 of	 Muslim	 women	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 is	 analytically	 illuminating	
here,	as	it	highlights	a	stark	distinction	emerging	between	notions	of	the	“unemancipated	
other”	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 “emancipated	 self,”	 a	 distinction	 she	 argues	 is	 inherent	 to	 the	
recent	and	drastic	increase	in	the	visibility	of	Muslim	women	in	the	West	(Ghorashi,	2010:	
94).172	 The	 complex	 experience	 and	 positioning	 of	 young	women	 I	 spoke	 with	 suggests	
																																																								
172	Along	similar	lines,	in	earlier	work	on	Iranian	refugee	women	in	the	Netherlands,	Ghorashi	writes:	
“Dominant	images	of	femininity	in	Dutch	society	shape	the	perception	of	migrant	women	as	‘the	victimized	
other’.	According	to	these	images,	Dutch	women	are	modern	and	emancipated,	while	Iranian	women—as	
women	from	the	Middle	East—are	seen	as	oppressed	and	traditional.	Such	stereotypical	perceptions	not	only	
disregard	that	in	every	society	some	women	are	‘modern’	or	‘progressive’	while	others	are	‘traditional’	and	
‘conservative’,	but	also	ignores	the	struggle	of	these	Iranian	women	activists	against	traditional	ideas	in	Iran.	
In	this	way,	these	women	face	a	new	burden	they	did	not	expect,	namely	the	dominant	stereotypes	of	Middle	
Eastern	women,	in	which	they	are	seen	as	dependent	and	passive	victims	(van	Baalen	1997;	Lutz	and	Moors	
1989;	Spijkerboer	1994).	This	construction	of	an	‘imagined	other’	can	be	seen	as	part	of	a	process	of	othering	
of	the	Orient,	which	Edward	Said	(1978)	named	‘Orientalism’	(see	also	Jansen	1996;	Lutz	1991;	Spijkerboer	
1999)”	(H.	Ghorashi,	2005)	
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their	awareness	of	and	critical	engagement	with	these	images	of	Iranian	American	women	
as	 racialized	 and	 gendered	 in	 this	 particular	 context	 of	 being	 between	 visibility	 and	
invisibility.	Through	the	media	they	are	versed	and	trained	in	producing,	their	stories	come	
out.	 This	 is	 not	 always,	 primarily	 internet‐based.	 It	 includes	 novels,	 performance	 art,	
interviews,	 opinion	 pieces,	 essays	 and	 more.	 Here	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 some	 of	 my	
respondents	 articulate	 strong	 positions	 against	 gendered	 and	 racialized	 representations	
from	within	their	own	professional	circuits	and	towards	broader	audiences.	As	the	young	
men	 I	 described	 earlier	 taking	 on	 global	 sub	 cultural	 forms	 as	 part	 of	 oppositional	
expressions,	these	women	take	up	critical	intellectual	positions	that	expose	the	racial	and	
gendered	character	of	dominant	representations	of	Iranian	women.	In	the	following,	I	move	
on	 to	a	more	elaborate	discussion	of	how	their	 responses	 in	 the	 form	of	web‐based	 self‐
representations	take	shape	as	some	exercise	a	politics	of	claiming	the	 label	of	“women	of	
color.”	
	
Claiming	and	rejecting	racialization	
Amitis	created	a	fantasy	alter‐ego	for	herself	that	features	repeatedly	in	her	work;	a	woman	
named	 “Sandy	 Sand	 Ninja	 Najib,”	 inspired	 by	 wrestling	 super	 hero	 characters	 and	 the	
eroticization	 of	 “ethnic”	 women,	 the	 Sand	 Ninja	 is	 embodied	 by	 Amitis	 dressing	 up	 in	
revealing	 clothing	or	 in	 a	 state	of	partial	undress,	with	 a	darkly	drawn	 set	of	 connecting	
eyebrows,	heavy	lipstick,	and	gold	jewelry.	Amitis	has	also	set	up	a	profile	for	this	ironically	
fashioned	and	flamboyant	persona,	on	which	some	of	her	Facebook	friends	comment	and	
post	 photographs	 and	 links	 to	 articles,	 addressing	 her	 as	 “Amitis”	 but	 expressing	 their	
adoration	for	“the	Sand	Ninja.”	This	is	part	of	how	Sand	Ninja’s	profile	describes	her:	
Exile,	her	family	debt,	as	well	as	financial	and	language	constraints	keep	her	isolated	
from	her	 homeland,	 people	 and	 culture.	 She	 constructs	 an	 identity	made	 up	 of	 her	
own	melancholic	 recollections	of	her	people	 as	well	 as	a	pan‐“middle	 eastern”	 look	
created	by	Western	projections	and	stereotypes.	
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The	humorous,	tongue‐in‐cheek,	and	provocative	depiction	on	the	profile	page	provides	a	
creative	 space	 for	 deconstructing	 the	 dominant	 images	 and	 narratives	 around	 racialized	
women’s	bodies.	Interestingly,	it	also	plays	on	the	notion	that	exile	can	create	a	caricature	
version	of	a	“culture”	of	the	“homeland,”	which	in	this	case	lends	itself	to	self‐exoticization.	
Amitis	documents	her	use	of	the	Sand	Ninja’s	persona	in	various	locations	in	LA	as	part	of	
her	artwork,	and	then	posts	them	on	the	Facebook	page	she	has	constructed.	Amitis’	self‐
representation	 finds	 its	 way	 to	 internet	 media	 indirectly,	 through	 the	 Sand	 Ninja	 and	
through	her	prior	familiarity	with	Facebook.	This	goes	for	others	as	well,	and	demonstrates	
the	strength	of	convergence	that	internet	media	have	been	associated	with.	This	tendency	
towards	subsuming	other	media	forms	(such	as	photography,	print	editing,	and	film)	into	
its	digitally	networked	applications,	means	that	 internet	media	enter	into	the	practices	of	
producers	like	Amits	without	them	necessarily	making	a	conscious	choice	to	use	internet	in	
their	 work,	 but	 because	 of	 the	 ubiquity	 of	 a	 media	 forum	 like	 Facebook	 to	 represent	 a	
“profile”	of	a	particular	person/persona.		
The	 use	 of	 a	 caricature	 like	 Amitis’	 “Sandy”	 represents	 the	 open	 subversion	 of	 certain	
images	 of	 Iranian	 American	 women.	 It	 is	 critique	 against	 being	 labelled	 and	 limited	 by	
extensive	 attention	 for	 certain	 existing	 narratives.	 The	 aversion	 to	 being	 categorized	 by	
others	is	further	evident	in	the	example	of	Porochista’s	guest	editorship	for	Guernica	web	
magazine	in	2011.173	It	is	where	she	wrote	the	following	as	part	of	the	introduction	of	the	
special	edition	she	put	together	about	the	category	“Iranian	American,”	which	included	the	
work	of	a	host	of	varied	Iranian	American	authors.		
[C]ategorization	and	its	many	cons	had	haunted	me	since	I	came	to	this	country	as	a	
wee	 preschooler.	 With	 looks	 described	 as	 exotic	 at	 best	 and	 a	 hyperethnic	
multisyllabic	 name	 regarded	 as	 unattemptable	 at	 worst,	 I	 was	 coronated	 an	
ambassador	 of	my	particular	 brand	 of	 other	 just	 by	 virtue	 of	 being	 someone	 else’s	
																																																								
173	Khakpour,	Porochista	“The	Others,”	http://www.guernicamag.com/features/khakpour_11_1_11/	
(accessed	28/11/14)	
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first.	 When	 I	 was	 four,	 I	 decided	 to	 be	 a	 writer	precisely	 because	the	 realm	 of	 the	
imagination	freed	me	from	confinement	regarding	how	and	to	whom	I	was	born.			
This	is	part	of	what	I	see	as	a	second	generation‐led	effort	to	create	representations	based	
around	 multifacetedness	 of	 Iranian	 American‐ness.	 Porochista’s	 efforts	 to	 subvert	
categorization	echoes	the	moves	made	by	more	of	my	respondents	towards	challenging	the	
typical	public	appetite	for	certain	representations	of	Iranian	Americans	and	Middle	Eastern	
women	by	diversifying	stories	coming	from	among	Iranian	diaspora.	This	explicit	objective	
of	diversifying	representations	rather	than	claiming	any	single,	alternative	representation	
is	 equally	a	 claim	 to	difference	on	one’s	own	 terms	by	women	who	have	 the	 feeling	 that	
they	are	increasingly	visible	on	others’	terms.		
Another	project	highlighting	 the	multiplicity	among	Iranian	Americans	and	resisting	easy	
categorizations	 is	Document:	second	generation	 Iranian	Americans	 in	Los	Angeles.	 It	was	a	
unique	 initiative	 and	 an	 explicit	 endeavour	 to	 represent	 Iranian	 American‐ness	 in	 an	
innovative	 way.	 Document	 was	 a	 photography	 exhibit	 displaying	 portraits	 of	 second	
generation	Iranian	Americans	by	second	generation	Iranian	Americans.	Amy,	the	curator	of	
the	exhibit,	described	this	project	for	the	public	in	the	following	way	on	the	UCLA	Fowler	
gallery’s	website:	
In	 cultivating	 this	 collaborative	 project,	 I	 wanted	 to	 examine	 documentation	 as	 a	
representational	 process	 by	 offering	 four	 Iranian‐American	 photographers'	
perspectives	on	who	we	are,	stressing	the	importance	of	including	multiple	voices	in	
documenting	our	own	Los	Angeles	communities.	
The	virtual	gallery	was	originally	planned	to	accompany	the	show,	but	this	web	presence	
clearly	held	secondary	status	within	the	project	to	the	physical	exhibition.	This	and	other	
initiatives	 to	 represent	 Iranian	 Americans	 through	 art	 reflect	 a	 desire	 for	 a	 diversity	 of	
voices	 as	 a	 response	 to	 (gendered,	 racial,	 and	 other)	 stereotypes	 of	 Iranian	 Americans.	
Gaining	 collective	 visibility	 has	 meant	 being	 placed	 in	 a	 position	 to	 develop	 self‐
representations	that	ponder	the	boundaries	of	Iranian	American‐ness,	not	for	the	first	time,	
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but	 in	newly	public	ways,	attuned	to	audiences	 that	are	not	 limited	to	 Iranian	Americans	
themselves,	and	through	editoriship	and	curatorships	that	demand	authority	and	expertise	
in	 particular	 areas	 of	 media	 production.	 Document	 is	 an	 example	 of	 a	 production	 that	
acknowledges	racialized	stereotypes	but	goes	beyond	claiming	racial	categories	in	its	self‐
representation	 of	 the	 second	 generation.	 It	 demonstrates	 that	 not	 all	 challenges	 to	 the	
racialization	 of	Middle	 Easterners	 coming	 from	my	 respondents	 are,	 themselves,	 explicit	
mobilizations	 of	 self‐categorizations	 as	 non‐white	 but	 are	 attempts	 at	 humanization	 and	
diversification	 of	 images	 of	 Iranians	 (including	 Muslims,	 half‐white	 Americans,	 men,	
women,	and	children).		
Rather	than	being	relegated	to	the	margins	of	a	diasporic	identity	by	their	subversion,	they	
engage	in	projects	of	self‐description	so	through	their	professional	positions	as	producers	
of	 representations	 through	 various	 media	 forms.	 They	 exhibit	 potentials	 to	 lead	 the	
trajectory	of	Iranian	American‐ness	at	this	 juncture,	doing	so	in	a	way	that	is	not	entirely	
encompassed	by	the	in‐between,	ambivalent	position	that	work	on	the	second	generation	
has	 tended	 to	 emphasize	 (see	 King	 &	 Christou,	 2008).	 As	 Durham	 argues,	 attention	 is	
necessary	 for	 the	 potential	 that	 young	 immigrants	 show	 for	 reading	 media	 texts	
oppositionally,	 or	 against	 the	 grain	 of	 what	 is	 intended	 (Durham,	 2004).	 This	 appears	
relevant	 in	 this	 case	 in	 as	 far	 as	 media	 representations	 are	 engaged	 with	 critically	 by	
members	of	the	second	generation	to	position	themselves.	The	projects	by	young,	second‐
generation	 women	 I	 have	 mentioned	 reflect	 different	 ways	 of	 representing	 Iranian	
American‐ness	 against	 the	 grain	 of	 racialization.	 These	 instances	 show	 less	 ambivalence	
than	a	desire	 to	either	directly	or	 indirectly	 take	on	and	change	dominant	racialized	and	
gendered	representations.		
I	 see	the	 (gendered)	racailization	of	Middle	Eastern	and	Muslim	Americans	as	 the	salient	
context	within	which	my	respondents	use	the	creative	work	of	musical,	literary,	and	other	
artistic	and	cultural	production	to	put	forth	their	own	self‐representations	of	Iranian‐ness.	
It	is	striking	that	on	the	one	hand,	this	includes	modes	of	self‐representation	that	mobilize	
the	 category	 of	 non‐whiteness	 as	 a	 racial	 category	 used	 to	 subvert	 processes	 of	 social	
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exclusion.	On	the	other	hand,	there	are	evidently	also	self‐representations	that	go	beyond	
claiming	non‐whiteness.	These	challenge	the	boundaries	that	define	Iranian	American‐ness	
by	 reflecting	 on	 them.	 The	 tension	 that	 is	 placed	 central	 in	 such	 projects	 as	Document,	
therefore,	 is	 one	 that	 sustains	 the	 significance	 of	 identifying	 explicitly	 as	 “Iranian	
American”	 while	 also	 questioning	 what	 that	 entails	 given	 the	 diversity	 of	 meanings	 the	
label	is	assigned	and	ways	Iranian‐ness	is	practiced	among	the	second	generation	in	LA.		
As	 mentioned,	 web	 applications	 feature	 in	 these	 practices	 of	 representing	 Iranian	
Americans.	Web	applications	incorporate	a	variety	of	existing	media	forms	through	these	
practices,	including	performing	arts,	literature	and	books,	photography	exhibits.	Most	often	
web	applications	serve	as	a	vehicle	for	mediating	already	existing	work	and	events	in	ways	
that	 present	 themselves	 as	 logical	 to	 the	 producers,	 and	 	 their	 kinds	 of	 media	 usage	
primarily	 reflects	 their	 professional	 skills,	 backgrounds,	 and	 resources.	 But	 these	
applications	also	have	particular	statuses	and	purposes.	In	Amitis’	Sand	Ninja	performance,	
Facebook	becomes	part	of	the	public	performance	by	spreading	the	audiences	to	this	social	
media	platform.	While	in	the	case	of	Document,	the	exhibit	is	more	of	a	stand‐alone	event	
with	 the	 web	 exhibit’s	 absence	 apparently	 not	 detracting	 much	 from	 the	 project.	 The	
interest	 in	 using	web	 applications	 extends	 from	 the	 production	 of	 artistic	works	 of	 self‐
description.	In	Amitis’	case,	her	web	usage	affords	thinking	about	her	art	and	her	audiences	
in	new	ways.	Just	a	few	years	before	the	Sand	Ninja’s	appearance	on	Facebook,	Amitis	had	
told	me	 about	 this	 performance	 piece,	 but	 had	 not	 yet	 begun	 using	 Facebook	 as	 part	 of	
performing	 Sandy.	 At	 the	 time,	 she	 doubted	 the	 usefulness	 of	 web	 applications	 for	 her	
work,	mentioning	that	she	worked	with	underprivileged	minority	students	of	art	who	did	
not	all	have	access	to	internet.	Since	then,	the	preponderance	of	Facebook’s	modes	of	self‐
representation	and	self‐fashioning	(i.e.	with	photos,	profile	descriptions	of	oneself)	helped	
to	create	the	performance	of	Sandy	as	a	character	via	a	new	platform.		
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Gendered	Middle	Easterners	
A	 racialized	 category	 of	 “Middle	 Eastern”	 comes	 to	 hold	 increasing	 credence	 for	 my	
respondents.	Some	use	this	as	an	ethnic	category	that	helps	them	participate	 in	what	are	
styled	as	global	youth	subcultures,	participating	in	what	Eva	Lam’s	research	among	youth	
and	digital	media	calls	“global	digital	spaces”	(Lam,	2006).	 I	suggest	 that	global	nature	of	
the	 “war	 on	 terror”	 and	 the	 international	 representations	 of	 Muslims	 and	 Middle	
Easterners	 as	 associated	herewith	 contributes	 to	 this.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 stereotypes	my	
respondents	challenge	are	not	only	racial,	but	gendered.	Paradoxically,	racial	categories	are	
also	mobilized	 and	 reflected	 in	my	 respondents’	 practices	 of	 self‐representation	 through	
oppositional	 styles.	 On	 one	 level,	 this	 effort	 is	 meant	 to	 utilize	 American	 systems	 of	
classification	 for	 purposes	 of	 inclusion	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 minority	 difference.	 It	 also	 goes	
beyond	 that	 into	 styles	 and	 forms	 of	 self‐identification	 among	 young	 people.	 Gendered	
modes	of	representation	are	also	used.	My	women	respondents	tend	to	make	this	a	more	
explicit	 part	 of	 their	 self‐representations	 than	 the	 men.	 The	 recurrent	 goal	 is	 that	 of	
representing	the	diversity	and	multivocality	existing	among	Middle	Easterners	or	Iranians	
and	 opportunities	 are	 sought	 for	 challenging	 and	 complicating	 dominant	
narratives/images.	 In	 doing	 this	 my	 respondents	 seek	 to	 shift	 how	 their	 gendered	 and	
racialized	 (and	 sexualized)	 bodies	 are	 seen	 by	 others,	 as	 well	 as	 shape	 the	 collective	
visibility	 of	 Middle	 Easterners.	 To	 some	 extent	 my	 respondents	 appropriate	 the	 racial	
categories	 that	 have	 been	 applied	 to	 them,	 doing	 so	 as	 a	 form	 of	 resistance	 against	
experiences	of	racism,	sexism,	stereotyping,	and	dehumanizing	representations	(as	well	as	
having	been	previously	 invisible	as	a	minority	group,	as	discussed	earlier).	These	are	the	
circumstances	under	which	the	category	of	Middle	Eastern	as	non‐white	gains	acceptance.	
However,	while	mobilizing	racial	categories	in	a	paradoxical	response	to	racism,	there	are	
also	 cases	of	my	 respondents	using	and	 talking	about	media	productions	 that	 go	beyond	
explicit	 self‐categorizations	 as	 non‐white.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 body	 and	 its	
representation	 in	 various	media	 formats	 is	 central	 to	 the	 experiences	 of	 being	 seen	 and	
seeing	themselves	as	Iranian	American.			
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The	 location	 of	 race	 and	 racial	 difference	 in	 the	 body	 is	 approached	 in	 two	ways	 in	 the	
examples	I	have	given	in	this	section.	On	the	one	hand,	racial	difference	is	seen	as	a	stable	
quality	of	one’s	body.	It	is	a	truth	that	young	people	come	to	see	at	a	young	age	in	moments	
when	 their	 bodies	 are	 a	 source	 of	 derision,	 for	 instance,	 and	 their	 non‐whiteness	 is	
revealed	 to	 them.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 their	 racial	 difference	 comes	 into	 being	 through	 the	
way	they	are	seen,	and	it	changes	according	to	the	visibility	of	their	difference	in	particular	
contexts.	 So	 it	 is	 important	 to	 them	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 production	 of	 media	
representations	 of	 Middle	 Easterners	 though	 without	 this	 category	 being	 applied	 as	 a	
limiting	label.	In	this	way,	they	are	geared	toward	positioning	themselves	within	broad	and	
consolidating	 claims	 to	 non‐whiteness,	 but	 also	 efforts	 that	 thwart	 such	 racial	
categorizations.	
	The	role	of	web	applications	discussed	in	this	section	are	varied	incorporations	of	creative	
productions	 like	 documentary	 film,	 performance	 art,	 and	 literary	 writing	 into	 websites,	
blogs,	and	social	media	applications.	The	gendered	racialization	of	 Iranian	Americans	 (as	
Middle	 Easterners)	 is	 an	 important	 theme	 that	 ties	 these	 productions	 and	 web	 uses	
together.	It	also	shows	that	web	use	among	these	young	people	primarily	reinforces	rather	
than	 effaces	 the	 role	 of	 the	 body	 in	 digital	 representations	 of	 self.	 It	 represents	 a	 re‐
embodiment	of	 Iranian	American‐ness	that	 is	self‐authored.	While	my	respondents’	work	
largely	involves	non‐fictional	genres	and	documentary	style	productions	(as	in	Justin’s	film	
or	the	photography	exhibit,	Document),	it	also	includes	some	humor,	parody,	and	fiction	(as	
in	 Amitis’	 Sand	Ninja	 and	 Porochista’s	 novel).	 These	 productions	 are	 characterized	 by	 a	
focus	on	people’s	own	life	stories,	intimate	experiences,	and	political	stances.	And	the	styles	
they	 give	 these	 are	 according	 to	 the	particular	 genres,	media,	 and	 form	with	which	 they	
have	expertise	and	experience.		
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Conclusion	
In	this	chapter	I	discussed	my	second	generation	respondents’	claims	to	difference	in	the	
context	of	the	racialization	of	Middle	Easterners	and	Muslims	living	in	the	US.	I	did	this	by	
focusing	on	their	practices	of	self‐representation	in	their	broader	media	environments,	and	
paying	special	attention	to	web	use	in	this	regard.	The	current	atmosphere	of	heightened	
visibility	 of	 Iranians	 as	 Middle	 Easterners	 and	 de	 facto	 Muslims	 with	 racialized	 bodies	
shapes	 how	 my	 respondents’	 use	 internet.174	 My	 discussion	 has	 supported	 research	
cautioning	against	assumptions	about	the	disappearing	body	(and	with	it	race	and	gender)	
in	studies	of	internet‐mediated	self‐representation:		
The	Internet	is	certainly	an	infrastructure	and	a	medium	that	seemed	to	many	to	be	
race	 free	 or	 color	 blind	 but	 is	 in	 fact	 imbued	with	 racial	 politics	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	
digital	inequalities	evident	in	its	demographics,	its	political	economy,	and	its	content.	
It	 has	 also	 become	 an	 increasingly	 active	 purveyor	 of	 images	 of	 race	 as	 well	 as	
narratives	about	them	(Nakamura,	2007:	87).	
This	 perspective	 responds	 to	 early	 speculations	 about	 internet	 media	 obliterating	
inequalities	 of	 race	 and	 gender.	 The	 discussion	 in	 this	 chapter	 demonstrated	 how	 my	
respondents	used	internet	as	a	“purveyor	of	images	of	race”	and	“narratives	about	them,”	
primarily	by	engaging	in	production	that	reflected	their	own	personal	experiences,	but	also	
those	 of	 other	 Iranian	 Americans	 in	 their	 environment.	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 they	 claim	
collective	difference	through	various	uses	of	internet	media.		
The	 role	 of	 internet	 is	 less	 one	 of	 changing	 the	 relationship	 of	 identity	 to	 the	 body	 (as	
argued	 by	 some	 digital	 media	 scholars	 ‐	 see	 introduction	 of	 this	 chapter)	 than	 internet	
media	 becoming	 part	 of	my	 respondents’	 projects	 to	 position	 themselves.	 They	 position	
																																																								
174	Understanding	the	way	internet	media	is	involved	in	this	process	has	been	focused	mostly	on	the	use	of	
internet	by	Muslims	(see	the	extensive	work	of	Gary	Bunt	(e.g.	2000,	2003)),	and	ethnic	groups	that	have	very	
different	historical	migration	trajectories	than	Iranians	in	the	US	(e.g.	Brouwer,	2006).	Less	so	has	this	work	
engaged	directly	with	the	notions	of	race	and	racialization	in	increasingly	internet‐mediated	everyday	
circumstances	(for	exceptions	see	Leurs	&	Ponzanesi,	2011;	Leurs,	Midden,	&	Ponzanesi,	2011).	
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themselves	against	elements	of	Islamophobia	that	persistently	question	their	belonging	to	
American‐ness.	And	 those	who	are	Muslim	additionally	are	 confronted	with	 the	 fact	 that	
many	 first‐generation	 Iranian	 Americans	 reject	 Islam	 as	 being	 synonymous	 with	 the	
Islamic	Republic.	My	respondents	position	themselves	through	projects	of	identity	politics.	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 racial	 difference	 becomes	 an	 authentic	 claim	 to	 belonging	 to	 Iranian	
American‐ness	 as	well	 as	 broader	 categories	 of	 non‐whiteness	 because	 of	 its	 undeniable	
presence	 in	 the	 body,	 taking	 narrated	 experiences	 of	 being	 seen	 as	 different	 to	 serve	 as	
testimony.		
On	the	other	hand,	however,	such	appeals	are	complicated	by	the	ambivalence	that	some	
have	 towards	 adopting	 the	 strictures	 that	 accompany	 interpellation.	 For	 some	 of	 my	
second‐generation	 respondents,	 Middle	 Eastern	 American	 is	 a	 fledgling	 racial	 collective	
identification	 that	 grew	 out	 of	 discriminatory	 categorizations	 but	was	 appropriated	 and	
given	 legitimacy.	 However,	 as	 I	 have	 also	 shown,	 there	 are	 differences	 among	 my	
respondents	along	lines	of	gender,	how	they	position	themselves	with	relation	to	American	
nationhood,	issues	of	class	and	socio‐economic	inclusion/exclusion.	Iranian‐American‐ness	
is	 also	 striated	 by	 a	 range	 of	 alliances	 that	 cross‐cut	 it,	 such	 as	 regional	 (pan‐Middle	
Eastern)	 and	 religious	 (Muslim)	 identifications,	 as	 well	 as	 professional/artistic	
identifications.	 There	 are	 many	 cross‐cutting	 shades	 of	 difference	 among	 my	 second‐
generation	respondents’	ways	of	claiming	difference	in	the	context	of	racialization.		
	These	divergences	in	who	is	included	into	the	newly‐appropriated	categories	of	difference	
emerge	 and	 blur	 the	 boundaries	 of	 Iranian	 American‐ness,	 raising	 questions	 about	 who	
speaks	 for	 this	multi‐vocal	 group,	 and	what	 the	 supposed	power	of	difference	actually	 is	
and	for	whom	it	is	working.	There	are	a	variety	of	ways	of	being	seen	as	different,	and	not	
all	of	them	are	celebrated	or	recognized	equally	within	discourses	of	multiculturalism	and	
diversity.	It	is	evident	that	the	way	in	which	Iranian	American	selves	are	styled	in	relation	
to	 notions	 of	 race	 is	 in	 a	 state	 of	 flux.	 In	 tandem,	 the	 character	 of	 racism	 in	 the	US	 also	
undergoes	 constant	 change.	 The	 tendency	 of	 immigrants	 towards	 assimilating	 into	
whiteness	 (not	 only	 Iranians,	 as	 I	 have	 discussed	 above)	 appears	 to	 be	 giving	 way	 to	
244	
	
appeals	to	the	legacy	of	the	civil	rights	movement.	In	tandem	changes	take	place	that	make	
it	 increasing	 difficult	 to	 define	 and	 name	 racism	 in	 the	 so‐called	 post‐racial	 American	
nation	that	has	the	recent	historic	achievement	of	electing	a	black	president.		
As	 racisms	 shift	 and	 change	 alongside	 the	 emergence	 of	 novel	 web	 applications,	 my	
respondents	 include	 these	 new	 media	 formats	 as	 extensions	 of	 their	 projects	 of	 racial	
difference‐claiming.	Positioning	themselves	against	notions	of	whiteness	under	which	they	
feel	they	do	not	belong,	they	subvert	the	persistent	practices	of	whitewashing	that	they	see	
in	 many	 other	 Iranian	 Americans	 (and	 prominent	 organizations)	 and	 the	 self‐
representations	 they	 produce.	 Using	 their	 respective	 platforms	 and	 audiences,	 they	 are	
able	to	promote	narratives	that	claim	difference,	as	much	as	possible,	on	their	own	terms.	
However,	 they	 come	 up	 against	 limits	 such	 as	 official	 frameworks	 for	 minority	 rights	
claims,	 commercially	 viable	 media	 business	 models,	 and	 popularly	 palatable	 historical	
narratives	 of	 the	 multicultural	 American	 nation,	 and	 expressions	 of	 racism	 in	 the	
contemporary	US	context.	Despite	their	agentive	productions,	their	mobilizations	of	racial	
categories	of	difference	are	subject	to	these	limitations,	as	are	their	media	practices	of	self‐
representation.		
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Chapter	4	The	Green	Movement	
	
	
	
Introduction	
The	 hotly	 disputed	 June	 2009	 Presidential	 election	 took	 place	 in	 Iran	 while	 I	 was	 on	
fieldwork	in	LA.	And	in	its	aftermath	the	Twitter	hashtag,	#iranelections,	reached	number	
one	 status	 in	 Twitter’s	 top	 5	 “trending	 topics.”175	 A	 great	 bulk	 of	 text	 and	 images	 being	
distributed	from	and	about	Iran’s	protest	movement	was	produced	and	circulated	after	the	
election	 results	 were	 announced,	 and	 social	 media	 applications	 played	 a	 central	 part	 in	
how	most	of	my	respondents	engaged	with	the	developments	in	Iran	during	this	time	on	a	
day‐to‐day,	and	on	some	days	hourly	basis.	As	I	observed,	social	media	applications	played	
a	role	in	this	event	in	a	variety	of	ways,	and	this	was	reflected	in	the	literature	focusing	on	
the	 developments	 of	 this	 important	 period.	 Firstly	 (and	 of	 clear	 importance	 from	 the	
diaspora	vantage	point	 from	which	 I	 conducted	 fieldwork)	 social	media	had	a	 significant	
part	 in	 news	 coverage	 of	 the	 events.	 As	 el‐Nawawy	 sates	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	 the	
international	news	coverage	of	the	2009	elections,	“the	news	media,	particularly	Internet,	
webcams,	blogs,	and	Twitter,	played	a	critical	role	 in	the	coverage	of	 this	election	and	its	
aftermath”	(El‐Nawawy,	2010:	3).	
Secondly,	 the	 role	 of	 social	media	 for	 those	 in	 the	 Iranian	 diaspora	 held	 significance	 for	
people’s	sense	of	 identification	with	those	in	Iran.	Alexanian	states,	 in	her	examination	of	
“how	Iranians	have	used	social	media	to	connect	to	the	events	in	Iran	as	a	form	of	activism	
and	in	the	performance	of	Iranian	identities,”	that	“the	use	of	social	media	became	central	
																																																								
175	This	status	is	reached	by	a	Twitter	hashtag	when	it	has	the	most	new	tweets	that	include	it	within	the	140	
characters	allowed.	
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to	the	emerging	narrative	about	the	potential	 for	revolution	or	social	change”	(Alexanian,	
2011:	425).	This	was	based	on	her	study	of	Iranians	in	LA	and	Toronto,	which	I	noticed	had	
parallels	to	the	case	of	my	own	respondents,	many	of	whom	used	social	media	intensively	
around	 this	 event,	 and	 talked	 about	 its	 role	 in	 the	 developments.	 Thirdly,	 “the	 internet”	
(including	 social	 media	 applications	 and	 key	 websites	 but	 also	 a	 wider	 range	 of	
technologies	primarily	including	encryption	softwares)	took	on	the	status	of	a	newsworthy	
thing	in	itself.	This	was	the	case	in	coverage	and	analyses	provided	by	a	range	of	broadcast,	
print,	and	internet	media	sources	but	also	the	more	fringe	or	niche	media	such	as	certain	
blogs	and	tech	publications.	That	is,	this	was	not	only	a	time	when	web	applications	were	
used	 intensively	by	my	respondents	 connecting	with	 the	events	 in	 Iran,	but	 it	was	also	a	
time	when	stories	about	internet	came	strongly	to	the	fore.		
This	was	an	event	that	quickly	accrued	an	international	audience,	making	it	a	talking	point	
beyond	Iranian	American	circles,	with	photographs	and	video	 footage	of	young	people	 in	
the	streets	of	Tehran	and	other	cities	reaching	my	respondents’	 televisions	and	radios	as	
well	as	their	computer	screens,	sometimes	live	and	in	real‐time.	The	election	aftermath	and	
the	street	protests	that	ensued	became	a	global	media	event,	and	on	this	global	stage,	what	
came	to	be	known	as	Iran’s	Green	Movement	(Jombesh‐e	Sabz)	was	framed	in	mainstream	
news	coverage176	as	being	intimately	tied	up	with	social	media	platforms’	potentialities	for	
revolutionary	change.177	I	noticed	a	strong	tendency	in	news	reports	towards	referring	to	
the	 role	 of	 social	media	 as	 an	 instigator	 or	 catalyst	 of	 protest,	 usually	 referred	 to	 as	 an	
																																																								
176 Whether	this	focused	on	the	attacks	of	the	Iranian	government	on	internet	usership	(see	for	instance:	the	
Wallstreet	Journal	Evgeny,	Morozov	“The	Digital	Dictatorship,”	
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703983004575073911147404540		(accessed	
29/11/14)	or	PBS:Rezvanieh,	Farvartish,	“Pulling	the	strings	of	the	net:	Iran’s	cyber	army,”	
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/02/pulling‐the‐strings‐of‐the‐net‐irans‐
cyber‐army.html	(accessed	29/11/14))	or	on	the	role	of	internet	in	Iranian	democracy	(see	for	example	BBC:	
Shiels,	Maggie,	“On	Iran’s	virtual	front	line”	http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8186761.stm	(accessed	
29/11/14),	ABC	News:	Setrakian,	Lara,“Iran’s	pres.	candidates	recognize	the	web	as	a	go‐to	to	win”	
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/Mideast/story?id=7605453,	(accessed	29/11/14),	and	the	Washington	
Times,	“Editorial:	Iran’s	Twitter	Revolution,”	http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/irans‐
twitter‐revolution/	 
177	Earlier	moments	like	this	included	the	Moldovan	post‐elections	protests	in	which	social	media	were	also	
thought	to	play	an	important	role.	Though	those	protests	received	a	fraction	of	the	international	press	
coverage	of	Iran’s	Green	Movement	and	“Twitter	revolution”.		
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organizing	tool	for	street	demonstrations,	or	a	space	for	political	dissent	among	Iranians	in	
Iran.	 I	 observed	a	 range	of	perspectives	among	my	respondents	and	others	 I	 spoke	 to	 in	
everyday	settings	during	this	time	about	how	far	democratic	social	change	in	Iran	could	be	
attributed	 to	 social	media	platforms	 like	Facebook	and	Twitter.	At	 the	 same	 time	people	
were	highly	aware	of	the	extent	of	their	own	reliance	on	various	Web	communications	to	
stay	updated.	I	came	to	see	the	commonsense	understandings	about	these	web	applications	
as	powerful	narratives	about	the	significance	of	social	media	under	the	oppressive	Iranian	
regime	and	with	relation	to	how	people	talked	about	and	understood	notions	of	democracy	
and	 freedom.	 In	 the	midst	 of	 these	 narratives	 about	 the	 events	 in	 Iran,	my	 respondents	
were	in	a	situation	that	was	completely	new	to	them;	this	was	the	first	time	in	their	lives	
that	they	felt	they	were	witness	to	major	social	and	political	upheaval	in	Iran,	albeit	from	a	
distance.	
	
Figure	9	Washington	Times	June	2009	headline,	screenshot	from	July	2014	
	
These	factors	laid	fertile	ground	for	the	narrative	of	the	“Twitter	Revolution”	to	take	root	
and	flourish.	Versions	of	the	term	appeared	in	journalistic,	government,	and	commonplace	
accounts	of	the	Iranian	post‐election	period	(not	only	in	mainstream	news	media	like	Time	
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Magazine	 and	 CNN	 but	 at	 the	 time	 the	 phrase	 Twitter	 Revolution	 was	 part	 of	 common	
parlance,	including	in	critique)178.	Basically,	this	narrative	advanced	the	notion	that	social	
media	 (Twitter	 in	 particular)	 had	 been	 responsible	 for	 or	 otherwise	 contributed	 to	 the	
emergence	 of	 this	 pro‐democracy	 movement.	 The	 “Twitter	 Revolution”	 narrative	 was	
propagated,	publicized,	contested,	and	countered	in	various	ways.	This	was	especially	the	
case	during	this	period	of	weeks	during	which	Iran	was	prominently	and	consistently	in	the	
news.	 	 In	 the	previous	 chapters	of	 this	dissertation	 I	presented	discussions	based	on	 the	
use	of	internet	in	thoroughly	unspectacular	contexts	of	everyday	usage,	where	internet	use	
was	woven	indistinguishably	into	the	fabric	of	daily	practices.	I	focus	in	this	chapter	on	my	
LA‐based	respondents’	practices	around	 the	 time	of	 the	rise	of	 the	Green	Movement	as	a	
result	of	the	post‐election	political	turmoil	in	2009	Iran.	In	contrast	to	the	other	chapters,	
this	 period	 is	 marked	 by	 a	 high	 profile	 global	 media	 event,	 one	 in	 which	 digital	 media	
played	a	role	that	seemed	elevated	and	separate	from	the	everyday,	mundane	usage.	
		
	
Figure	10	Headline	on	Huffington	Post	site	from	July	2009,	screenshot	from	July	2014	
																																																								
178 See	for	instance	Guardian	UK	article	from	June	2010:	Weaver,	Matthew,	“Iran’s	Twitter	revolution	was	
exaggerated,	says	editor”	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/09/iran‐twitter‐revolution‐
protests (accessed 29/11/14) 
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Figure	11	June	2010	article	in	Guardian	UK	critically	looking	back	on	"Twitter	Revolution"	narrative,	screenshot	
from	July	2014		
	
The	 “Twitter	 Revolution”	 narrative	 was	 in	 some	 ways	 specific	 to	 Twitter’s	 role	 in	 Iran.	
However,	it	also	reflected	broader,	longer‐running,	and	commonplace	ideas	about	internet	
technologies	defying	oppressive	governments,	creating	interconnections	between	people	in	
distant	 parts	 of	 the	 world,	 and	 signifying	 a	 clear	 break	 with	 older	 media	 forms.	 It	 also	
reflected	 everyday	 stories	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 social	 media	 and	 social	
movements	–	or	in	anthropologist	Gabriella	Coleman’s	terms,	“digital	activism”	(2010).179	I	
became	 interested	 in	 these	 stories	 about	 social	media	 as	 they	 circulated	 in	my	 field	 site	
with	bewildering	intensity	during	the	period	around	the	elections.	
																																																								
179	This	relationship	has	garnered	increasing	scholarly	attention	(see	most	recently:	Cammaerts,	Mattoni,	&	
McCurdy,	2013;	Milan,	2013).	
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I	 highlight	 three	 main	 narratives	 that	 circulated	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 hotly	 disputed	
Presidential	elections	of	2009	and	during	the	protest	movement	that	it	spurred.	These	are	
narratives	 about	 possibilities	 of	 virtually	 “being	 there”	 or	 mediated	 presence,	 the	
possibilities	 for	 “internet	 democracy,”	 and	 social	 media’s	 ability	 to	 go	 beyond	 its	 own	
supposed	 “shallowness.”	 In	 the	 discussion	 of	 each	 of	 these	 narratives,	 an	 opposition	
emerges	 that	 I	 find	 useful	 for	 understanding	 the	 contestations	 over	 social	 media	
applications.	 These	 are:	 social	 media	 as	 channeling	 proximity	 versus	 distance;	 the	 state	
versus	people	as	 the	rightful	users/regulators	of	 social	media	access;	 shallowness	versus	
depth	of	(emotional)	connections	afforded	by	social	media.	Rather	than	dichotomies,	these	
oppositions	 are	 useful	 for	 understanding	 how	 my	 diaspora	 respondents	 feel	
connected/disconnected	 from	 Iran	 through	 their	 use	 of	 web	 applications	 at	 this	 pivotal	
moment.	Underlying	each	of	the	dominant	narratives	discussed	is	the	idea	that	web	usage	
brings	immediacy	(of	presence,	control,	and	emotional	connection).	And	hence,	I	treat	the	
contestation	of	 these	narratives	as	 a	 starting	point	 to	understanding	 the	extent	 to	which	
social	media	applications	bring	immediacy.		
The	 notion	 that	 web	 applications	 enhance	 immediacy	 is	 not	 limited	 only	 to	 news,	
government,	and	lay	narratives	about	the	web.	It	is	also	shared	by	scholars	who	argue	that	
communications	 technologies	 are	 becoming	 increasingly	 able	 to	 simulate	 reality.	 This	
concerns	 the	wider	 issue	of	mediation	 that	media	 scholars	 from	various	disciplines	have	
addressed.	The	 concept	 of	 “remediation”	 is	 relevant	 in	 that	 it	 encompasses	 that	people’s	
media	usage	reflects	a	need	for	experiencing	reality	as	immediate	(i.e.	erasing	the	media),	
while	 also	 acknowledging	 the	 contradictory	 tendency	 for	 this	 experience	 to	 become	
hypermediate	 (i.e.	 for	 the	 user	 to	 become	 highly	 aware	 of	 the	 media	 in	 use)	 (Bolter	 &	
Grusin,	 2000).	As	Bolter	 and	Grusin	 argue,	 these	 two	 tendencies	do	not	 compete	against	
one	another,	but	are	part	of	 the	same	process	of	 remediation	 in	which	new	media	 forms	
take	up	older	ones	(or	vice	versa)	to	create	increasingly	immediate	experiences.	However,	
they	also	argue	that	remediation	brings	people	ever	closer	to	an	experience	of	immediacy	
with	each	new	communications	technological	development.		
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In	 this	 chapter	 I	 delve	 into	 particular	 instances	 of	 usage,	 delving	 into	 how	 people	
implement	 and	 make	 sense	 of	 their	 own	 practices	 involving	 social	 media.	 Rather	 than	
assuming	 that	 these	 applications	 bring	 people	 closer	 to	 democracy,	 the	 truth,	 or	 deep	
meaning,	 I	 try	 to	 understand	 how	 they	 develop	 new	 sensitivities,	 new	 literacies,	 new	
creative	 forms	 of	 expression,	 and	 new	 logics	 of	 media	 usage.	 I	 show	 that	 a	 sense	 of	
immediacy	is	compelling	for	users	in	certain	situations,	and	that	this	primarily	relies	on	the	
aesthetics	of	the	mediated	experience.	But,	 in	other	instances,	people	doubt	the	supposed	
immediacy	 of	 their	web	 use.	 (Greater)	 immediacy	 is	 thus	 not	 simply	 attributable	 to	 the	
newness	of	the	web	applications	my	respondents	use.	In	the	diaspora	connection	with	Iran	
that	my	respondents	experience,	I	explore	the	oscillation	between	experiencing	web	use	as	
bringing	 immediacy	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 giving	 users	 a	 sense	 of	 partial,	 mediated,	 or	
filtered	version	of	events	on	the	other.	I	start	the	next	section	of	this	chapter	by	sketching	
the	 strong	 narrative	 that	was	mobilized	 in	 this	 case,	 and	which	 linked	web	 applications	
with	democratization	in	Iran,	and	its	foreign	policy	implications	that	also	colored	the	news	
coverage	of	the	2009	protests.	
	
	Connecting	with	“the	Iranian	people”	
Internet	and	international	solidarity	
In	the	summer	of	2009,	San	Francisco	computer	programmer,	Austin	Heap,	was	moved	to	
involve	 himself	 in	 the	 Iranian	 Green	movement.	Without	 any	 prior	 knowledge	 about	 or	
interest	in	Iran,	Heap	designed	Haystack,	a	program	which	encrypts	all	online	activity	and	
hides	this	encrypted	data	in	what	looks	like	normal	traffic.	Heap’s	inspiration	was	the	many	
images	he	saw	from	the	protests,	and	his	only	link	to	the	events	was	through	his	internet	
use.	 As	 the	 tech	 site,	 Fast	 Company,	 reported	 in	 2010	 Secretary	 of	 State	 Hillary	 Clinton	
praised	 Haystack	 and	 described	 the	 software	 as	 working	 “in	 the	 interests	 of	 American	
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values	 and	 American	 strategic	 concerns.”180	On	 April	 13th	 2010,	 the	 US	 Treasury	
Department	 gave	Heap	 an	 exemption	 from	US	 sanctions	 to	 distribute	Haystack	legally	 in	
Iran.	This	was	part	of	a	wider	policy	approach	that	saw	a	ban	lifted	on	US	companies	like	
Google	and	Microsoft	to	export	their	products	to	Iran	in	March	of	the	same	year	with	the	
idea	that	this	would	facilitate	the	development	of	Iranian	civil	society.181	However,	for	the	
many	Iranian	citizens	who	were	able	to	access	these	programs	illegally	already,	the	lifting	
of	this	ban	had	little	if	any	effect.		
The	connections	between	the	US	government	and	solidarity	actions	with	Iran	quickly	came	
under	public	scrutiny	in	the	case	of	much‐covered	delay	in	Twitter	maintenance	when	the	
Iran	 protests	 were	 just	 breaking	 out	 in	 June	 2009.	 The	 State	 Department	 was	 widely	
reported	 to	 have	 asked	 the	 private	 company,	 Twitter,	 to	 instate	 a	maintenance	 delay	 so	
that	Iranians	could	continue	to	use	Twitter	at	Iran’s	peak	traffic	hours	(the	company	later	
denied	that	the	State	Department	had	a	hand	in	their	decision	to	delay	maintenance	for	the	
sake	of	Iranians).	Since	its	initiation,	the	Haystack	project	has	fizzled	out	in	relative	silence	
to	 its	 loud	 introduction,	 as	 it	was	 later	 found	 to	 be	 fraught	with	 security	 holes.	 As	 tech‐
commentators	exposed,	the	program	endangered	the	very	people	it	was	meant	to	protect	
by	concealing	their	identities	as	users.182	In	these	instances	of	policy	change	and	action	on	
the	part	of	US	government	agencies	around	the	Iranian	protests,	digital	technologies	were	
central.		
In	 the	case	of	Heap’s	Haystack,	part	of	 the	narrative	about	 internet	was	one	that	saw	the	
Californian	 startup	 being	 entrenched	 in	 the	 ideals	 of	 a	 brave	 new	 world	 in	 which	
technology	was	meant	 to	deeply	 transform	 society.	The	 respective	books	of	Fred	Turner	
																																																								
180	Ungerleider,	Neal,	“How	Haystack	risked	exposing	Iranian	dissidents,”	(accessed	29/11/14)	
http://www.fastcompany.com/1690075/how‐haystack‐risked‐exposing‐iranian‐dissidents.	See	also	the	
report	on	the	endangering	of	Iranian	citizens:	The	Economist,	“Worse	than	useless:	an	American	attempt	to	
help	Iranian	dissidents	backfires,”	http://www.economist.com/node/17043440	(accessed	29/11/14)	
181	Bonn,	C.F.,	“21st	Century	Statecraft,”	
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/05/censorship_iran	(accessed	29/11/14)	
182	Morozov,	Evgeny,	“The	Great	Internet	Freedom	Fraud,”		
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/16/the_great_internet_freedom_fraud?page=0,0	(accessed	
29/11/14)	
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(2010)	and	 John	Markoff	 (2005)on	 the	history	of	what	would	become	California’s	Silicon	
Valley	 have	 been	 influential	 in	 documenting	 the	 intricate	 connections	 between	 the	 San	
Francisco	1960s	and	70s	“counterculture,”	and	the	birth	of	the	first	personal	computers	as	
it	 coincided	 with	 these	 cultural	 developments.	 The	 societally	 transformative	 visions	 for	
computer	 technologies	 have	 culminated	 in	what	 Barbrook	 and	 Cameron	 refer	 to	 as	 “the	
Californian	Ideology.”	This	term	is	used	to	simultaneously	reflect	the	“disciplines	of	market	
economics	and	the	freedoms	of	hippie	artisanship”	for	which	San	Francisco	has	come	to	be	
known;	 a	 rugged	 individualism	 that	 allows	 liberties	 to	 be	 expressed	 within	 the	 free	
marketplace	while	seeking	to	reduce	the	power	of	the	nation‐state	(Barbrook	&	Cameron,	
1996).183	Observing	the	Iranian	uprising	of	2009	from	California,	I	noticed	the	narrative	of	
the	 Californian	 startup	 merge	 with	 the	 narrative	 of	 international	 solidarity	 with	 pro‐
democracy	 protesters	 in	 Iran,	 bringing	 to	 the	 fore	 notions	 of	 a	 technology‐driven	
democratic	 change	 shorthanded	 terms	 like	 “Twitter	 revolution”	 (and	 Facebook	
revolution).184		
This	merging	may	have	been	 facilitated	by	 the	 longer‐running	narrative	cultivated	 in	 the	
mainstream	US	press	about	 Iranians	and	 their	use	of	 internet	media	against	a	 repressive	
government,	which	began	especially	during	the	rise	of	blogging	in	Iran	during	the	first	term	
of	the	George	W.	Bush	administration.	Internet	media’s	connection	to	democratic	change	in	
Iran	 had	 been	 cultivated	 since	 the	 early	 2000s,	 with	 the	 coverage	 of	 Iranian	 dissident	
blogger‐journalists	 being	 driven	 to	 the	 free	 spaces	 of	 the	 internet	 in	 regionally	
disproportionate	 numbers,	 and	 experiencing	 persecution	 for	 their	 online,	 anti‐regime	
endeavours.	 The	 stories	 of	 persecuted	 bloggers	 like	Sina	 Motallebi	and	Hossein	
Derakhshan	were	invoked,	as	was	that	of	Omid	Reza	Mir	Sayafi,	the	first	Iranian	blogger	to	
die	 in	 prison.185	 In	 the	 same	 period,	 the	 Bush	 administration	 pushed	 the	 Iran	 Freedom	
																																																								
183	Bert	Barendrecht	gives	the	following	definition	of	the	California	Ideology:	“a	contradictory	mix	of	the	left’s	
liberal	society	and	the	right’s	liberal	marketplace”	(Barendrecht,	2013).	
184	See	Sreberny	&	Khiabany	(2010)	for	an	overview	and	critique	of	the	Western	media	coverage	of	the	
proposed	“Twitter	Revolution”	phenomenon. 
185	The	blogger	was	reported	to	have	taken	his	own	life	in	Evin	prison	in	early	2009.The	prisoner’s	doctor	
reportedly	stated	that	his	death	was	the	result	of	the	medication	Mir	Sayafi	had	taken	and	the	prison	staff’s	
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Support	Act,	which	was	passed	in	September,	2006.	The	serendipitous	overlap	between	the	
rise	of	the	internet’s	role	in	Iranian	civil	society	and	the	US	regime‐change	agenda	seemed	
to	strengthen	both.	The	Iranian	uprising	and	the	attention	that	Heap’s	project	received186	
was	 a	 novel	 moment	 in	 which	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 discern	 boundaries	 between	 the	
commercial	world	of	the	technological	startup	business,	philanthropic	solidarity	 initiative	
taking	support	action	for	protesters	in	Iran,	and	the	US	government’s	foreign	policy	efforts	
oriented	towards	technology‐based	intervention.	
The	notion	of	personal	technologies	being	the	key	to	freedom	is	not	limited	to	Iran’s	case.	
Turner	argues	that	early	perceptions	about	computers	and	the	internet	were	shaped	 less	
by	the	engineers	and	programmers	who	made	them	and	more	by	an	elite	of	journalists	and	
hippie	ideologues	from	1960s	and	70s	San	Francisco	who	had	the	access	and	influence	to	
write	about	these	new	technologies.	The	narratives	generated	around	internet	at	that	time	
were	 intended	 “to	 create	 the	 cultural	 conditions	 under	 which	 microcomputers	 and	
computer	networks	could	be	imagined	as	tools	of	liberation.”	Given	Turner’s	account,	it	is	
not	 hard	 to	 connect	 narratives	 that	 conjure	 up	 images	 of	 a	 quest	 for	 freedom	 around	
internet	 with	 the	 dominant	 news	 narratives	 about	 the	 Iranian	 uprising.	 This	 fusion	
between	 commerce187	 and	 activist	 solidarity	 is	 reflective	 of	 the	 arguments	 of	 legal	 and	
internet	 scholar,	 Yochai	 Benkler	 (2006).	He	discusses	 internet	 as	 constitutive	 of	modern	
capitalism	 through	 its	 role	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 patterns	 of	 production	 that	 are	 non‐
market	based	but	patterns	of	“social	production	and	exchange.”	In	this	view,	economic	and	
technological	 developments	 blur	 historical	 lines	 of	 demarcation	 between	 commercial	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
refusal	to	provide	Mir	Sayafi	with	the	necessary	medical	attention	immediately	thereafter.	Parsa,	Telma,	Mir‐
Sayafi:	Iranian	blogger’s	writings	bring	him	to	life,”	http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/20/mir‐
sayafi‐iranian‐blogge_n_177553.html	(accessed	29/11/14)	
186	He	was	awarded	the	innovator	of	the	year	award	by	the	Guardian	UK.  
187 My	meaning	with	the	notion	of	commerce	here	refers	not	to	the	business	structures	behind	the	projects	in	
question	per	se,	but	to	the	Californian	start‐up	atmosphere	more	generally.	San	Fransico,	home	to	key	nodes	
in	the	tech	industry	like	silicon	valley	and	mountain	view	have	become	international	symbols	for	successful	
venture	capitalist	models	for	investment	in	technological	development	and	innovation.	These	centers	are	also	
geographically	proximous	to	the	San	Franciscan	symbolic	capitol	of	progressive	activism.	This	combination	is	
what	lends	this	place	its	dual	commercial	and	grassroots/activist	associations	as	a	center	in	the	US	and	
internationally.		
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production,	 public	 sector	 provision,	 and	 community/non‐profit	 sector	 (see	 also	 Flew,	
2008).	 The	 lines	 of	 community	 and	 international	 solidarity	 through	 activist	 networks	
appear	to	cross	those	of	commercial	production,	as	well	as	those	of	foreign	policy	in	ways	
that	are	neither	new,	nor	specific	to	Iran.		
Quoting	a	Forbes	Magazine	journalist,	Sreberny	and	Khiabany	(2010)	write,	“whatever	the	
outcomes	of	the	Iranian	protests…	it	is	already	obvious	these	have	been	good	for	Twitter’s	
business”	(2010:	175).	Software	companies	like	Twitter	and	Facebook	were	indeed	given	a	
great	deal	of	attention	in	the	news	at	this	time.	One	of	the	central	concerns	in	the	coverage	
was	 that	 social	media	 sites	 like	Twitter	 and	Facebook	were	being	 censored,	 or	 that	 they	
were	 playing	 a	 role	 in	 the	 protests188	 (Heap’s	 software	 intervention	 was	 celebrated	 as	
allowing	 users	 to	 access	 Twitter,	which	was	 blocked	 for	many	before	 that.	Whether	 this	
was	 the	main	 purpose	 Iranians	 used	Haystack	 for	 is	 not	 clear).	Within	 this	 news	media	
environment,	 it	 became	difficult	 to	 separate	narratives	 about	 the	possibilities	of	 internet	
technologies	in	general	from	the	attention	for	the	social	media	companies	that	were	at	the	
heart	of	the	stories	about	change	and	possibility	in	Iran.	
The	 blurring	 of	 boundaries	 between	 activist	 solidarity,	 US	 government	 interests,	 and	 a	
conventionally	 commercial	 tech	 sector	was	 seen	 as	 natural	 by	many	 of	my	 respondents,	
and	was	largely	welcomed.	Here	I	have	discussed	an	instance	of	this	blurring	of	sector	and	
power	lines.	In	the	following	I	discuss	similar	merging	in	the	case	of	“digital	diplomacy.”	I	
do	so	to	show	how	this	 is	built	on	 the	same	notion	of	“people‐to‐people”	connection	that	
underpins	 the	 sentiments	 around	Haystack	 as	 I	 described	here.	 I	 illustrate	 further	 in	 the	
following	 how	 the	 slippage	 between	 US	 government	 and	 civil	 solidarity	 efforts	 with	
Iranians	 results	 in	contradictions	between	 the	narrative	of	US	government	 investment	 in	
promoting	 web	 freedom	 in	 Iran,	 alongside	 the	 reality	 that	 the	 outcomes	 of	 this	 same	
foreign	policy	sometimes	undermine	Iranian	activists	activities.	
																																																								
188	Sreberny	and	Khiabany	(2010)	joined	Morozov	(2009)	in	highlighting	the	lack	of	importance	that	Twitter	
in	particular	had	as	a	tool	for	organizing	protests	in	Iran. 
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The	Web	as	a	tool	of	diplomacy	
Digital	technologies	have	a	fast‐expanding	role	in	American	international	diplomacy.	This	is	
evident	 in	 a	 series	 of	 efforts	 by	 the	US	 State	Department	 ‐	 headed	by	 Secretary	of	 State,	
Hillary	Clinton	‐	that	fall	under	the	banner	of	21st	Century	Statecraft,	which	is	thought	to	be	
the	future	of	American	foreign	diplomacy	as	waged	through	“soft	power.”	Clinton’s	foreign	
policy	approach	has	made	the	bold	change	of	placing	digital	technologies	at	the	center	of	US	
diplomacy	and	development	policy,	with	a	range	of	projects	being	unrolled	under	the	ideal	
of	 global	 internet	 freedom.	While	 the	 scope	of	 the	 new	efforts	 is	 broad,	 the	 efforts	were	
presented	 as	 a	 challenge	 to	 Iran	 and	 China	 in	 particular.189	 An	 important	 part	 of	 the	
strategy	behind	 these	 technologically‐oriented	measures	 is	 to	 develop	what	 the	US	 State	
Department	has	called	“people‐to‐people	engagement”	‐	rather	than	engagement	between	
diplomats	alone	‐	when	it	comes	to	citizens	of	countries	with	diplomatic	tensions	with	the	
US.		
An	 example	 of	 such	 engagement	 was	 seen	 with	 the	 launch	 of	 the	 American	 “Virtual	
Embassy”	to	Iran.	Despite	its	invocation	of	the	institutional	form	of	an	embassy,	The	Virtual	
Embassy	 of	 the	 United	 States,	 Tehran,	 Iran	 is	 essentially	 a	website,	 in	 both	 Persian	 and	
English,	 which	 provides	 information	 for	 Iranians	 inside	 Iran,	 and	 outside.	 Aside	 from	
offering	information	about	travel	visas,	studying	abroad	in	the	US,	services	to	US	citizens	in	
Iran,	 and	 news	 and	 political	 analysis,	 the	 homepage	 also	 links	 to	 listed	 descriptions	 of	
Hollywood	 films	 in	 the	 “American	 movies	 corner”	 and	 current	 episodes	 of	 the	 political	
satire	 show	 “Poletik”	 hosted	 by	 well‐known	 diaspora	 Iranian	 television	 satirist,	 Kambiz	
Hosseini.	 The	homepage	 also	 links	 to	 the	 Embassy’s	 social	media	 accounts	 on	 Facebook,	
YouTube,	Twitter,	and	Wordpress,	all	 in	Persian.	The	accounts	have	the	user	ID	“USA	dar	
Farsi”	 (USA	 in	 Persian).	 	 The	 virtual	 embassy	was	 a	 development	 following	 from	 of	 the	
																																																								
189	Ammori,	Marvin,	“Obama’s	Unsung	Tech	Hero,”	http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marvin‐ammori/two‐
years‐in‐obamas‐tech‐_b_813127.html	(accessed	29/11/14)	
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State	 Department’s	 creation	 of	 USAdarFarsi	 Twitter	 account	 and	 Facebook	 page	 that	
encouraged	communication	with	people	inside	Iran.	
	
Figure	12	USAdarFarsi,	screenshot	from	October	2013	
While	the	initiative	has	been	acknowledged	by	Iranian	American	organizations	like	PAAIA	
and	NIAC	as	a	 step	 towards	 filling	a	 communication	gap,	 these	bodies	also	note	 that	 this	
effort	 does	 not	 constitute	 a	 formal	 diplomatic	 mission,	 and	 should	 be	 seen	 more	 a	 as	
platform	 for	 communication	between	 the	US	 government	 and	 the	 Iranian	people.	NIAC’s	
official	statement	reads:	
The	 State	 Department	 says	 they	 “want	 to	 encourage	 travel	 to	 the	 United	 States”	
through	the	effort.		However,	the	website	does	not	replace	services	that	a	brick	and	
mortar	embassy	would	provide,	 such	as	visas—meaning	 Iranians	will	 still	have	 to	
travel	outside	of	the	country	in	order	to	apply	to	visit	the	U.S.	
NIAC	has	also	been	exceedingly	active	in	opposing	US	sanctions	on	Iran	over	the	past	years,	
booking	various	diplomatic	victories	along	the	way.	NIAC	and	other	 individuals	have	also	
drawn	attention	to	the	 fact	 that	since	the	tightening	of	US	sanctions	policy	on	Iran	 in	the	
years	following	2009,	the	increasingly	targeted	and	strict	measures	framed	as	a	source	of	
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pressure	on	the	Iranian	government’s	nuclear	program	also	impact	the	ICT	sector	in	Iran.	
For	 instance,	 in	September	2013,	 the	website	of	politician	and	opposition	party	 leader	at	
the	time	of	the	2009	elections,	Mehdi	Karoubi,	was	shut	down	by	the	Just	Host	service	at	
the	request	of	the	US	Treasury	Department.	The	hosting	services	of	the	US	company	were	
deemed	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 sanctions	 because	 American	 companies	 are	 restricted	 from	
providing	 goods	 and	 serves	 to	 Iranians,	 and	 this	 extends	 to	 offering	 hosting	 services	 to	
websites	with	 the	 domain	 suffix,	 .ir.190	 Parsi	 has	 also	 argued	 that	 U.S.	 sanctions	make	 it	
difficult	 in	many	ways	 for	progressive	civil	society	 in	 Iran	to	use	 internet	 technologies	 to	
flourish	in	their	work	(2010).	
These	 sanctions	 on	 technological	 goods	 and	 services	 have	 also	 been	 documented	 as	
reaching	the	diaspora.	An	earlier	case	of	the	commercial	sanctions	application	was	that	of	
second‐generation	Iranian	American	teenager,	Sahar	Sabet’s	experience	of	being	denied	the	
right	to	purchase	a	iPad		in	an	Apple	store	in	Georgia	in	2012	because	the	store	clerk	had	
heard	her	 speaking	Persian	 to	 a	 relative.	 Sabet’s	 case	 triggered	numerous	other	 cases	of	
denial	of	Apple	products	to	Iranian	American	customers	to	surface	i.e.	cases	of	denial	to	sell	
electronic	 goods	 in	 Santa	 Monica	 and	 Sacramento,	 California.191	 A	 number	 of	 my	
respondents	 expressed	 concern	 about	 these	 reports	 via	 their	 Facebook	 pages,	 raising	
issues	of	racial	and	ethnic	profiling.	In	2013,	the	sanctions	that	interfered	with	the	sale	of	
consumer	 communication	 devices,	 software,	 and	 services	 for	 Iranians	were	 lifted	 by	 the	
Obama	 Administration.	 192	 This	move	 followed	 the	 earlier	 Iranian	 Digital	 Empowerment	
Act	(IDEA),193	which	proposed	the	partial	easing	of	these	sanctions	in	2010	(as	mentioned	
																																																								
190	BBC,	“Iran	social	media	block	removed	by	technical	hitch,”	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology‐
24125340	(accessed	1/12/14)	
191	Abdi,	Jamal,	“Sanctions	and	the	genius	bar,”	http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/opinion/why‐is‐
apple‐discriminating‐against‐iranian‐americans.html?_r=0		(accessed	1/12/14)	
192	NIAC	Staff,	“NIAC	applauds	lifting	communications	sanctions	for	Iranians,”		
http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=9263		(accessed	1/12/14)	
193	According	to	the	Open	Congress	site	that	allows	the	following	legislation	in	Congress,	The	Iranian	Digital	
Empowerment	Act	is	officially	summarized	sating	that:	“the	export	of	the	following	software	and	related	
services	to	Iran	by	U.S.	persons	may	not	be	prohibited	or	restricted: (1) software	and	related	services	that	
allow	private	Iranian	citizens	to	circumvent	online	censorship	and	monitoring	efforts	imposed	by	the	
government	of	Iran	and	(2) software	and	related	services	that	enable	personal	communication	by	the	Iranian	
people.	Excludes	from	such	provisions	the	export	of	such	software	and	related	services	to	the	government	of	
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earlier	 in	 this	 chapter)	 including	 the	 Congressional	 initiative	 to	 correct	 the	 internet	
restrictions	of	US	sanctions.		
NIAC	 was	 one	 of	 the	 main	 Iranian	 American	 organizations	 that	 drew	 attention	 to	 the	
inconsistencies	 between	 the	 US	 internet	 freedom	 policies	 and	 their	 sanctions	measures,	
placing	 their	 policy	 analysis	 in	 a	 wider	 framework	 highlighting	 the	 ineffectiveness	 of	
sanctions	 on	 Iran	 for	 diplomatic	 outcomes.	 In	 line	 with	 this,	 Morozov’s	 commentary	 in	
2011	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	Tunisian	uprising	 is	 relevant.	Amidst	heightened	attention	 for	
social	 media	 in	 that	 case	 he	 raised	 questions	 about	 the	 stark	 contradictions	 concerning	
internet	 freedom	 and	 American	 foreign	 policy	 in	 the	Middle	 East,	 stating	 in	 a	 published	
interview	that,	“You	cannot	say,	‘We	want	to	promote	internet	freedom,’	when	every	single	
other	 branch	 of	 the	 US	 government	wants	 to	 promote	 the	 opposite.”194	The	 central	 idea	
behind	 21st	 Century	 Statecraft	 is	 that	 internet	 access	 is	 important	 for	 “freedom”	 and	
“democracy.”	 However,	 despite	 massive	 speculation,	 without	 extensive	 research	 about	
usage	 inside	 Iran,	 it	 remains	 difficult	 to	 know	 how	 important	 internet	 was	 in	 the	
proceedings	around	the	2009	elections	and	in	which	particular	ways.	While	such	research	
extends	beyond	the	scope	of	this	project	focused	on	the	diaspora,	it	suffices	to	point	out	the	
inconsistencies	between	 the	policy	discourse	of	American	 internet	 freedom	 initiatives	on	
the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 constant	 oscillations	 between	 relative	 diplomatic	 and	 strictly	
militaristic	approaches	to	Iran	on	the	other.	
It	is	nevertheless	noteworthy	that	in	the	2013	Iranian	Presidential	election	campaign	that	
resulted	in	the	electoral	victory	of	progressive	cleric,	Hassan	Rouhani,	the	role	of	internet	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Iran.”	“Digital	Empowerment	Act,”	http://www.opencongress.org/bill/hr4301‐111/show		(accessed	
1/12/14)	
194	Gilson,	Dave,	“The	Tunisia	Twitter	Revolution	that	wasn’t,”	
http://www.motherjones.com/media/2011/01/evgeny‐morozov‐twitter‐tunisia		(accessed	1/12/14).	
Drawing	on	Morozov’s	statement,	it	seems	that	the	US	narrative	on	internet	freedom	in	Iran	seems	isolated	
from	the	rest	of	US	foreign	policy,	treating	internet	as	an	exceptional	and	neutral	issue.	Meanwhile,	the	US	
narrative	on	Iranian	freedom	was	reinterpreted	and	turned	around	by	Iranian	authorities.	The	Iranian	
government	under	Ahmadinejad	had	expressed	repeated	concerns	about	the	interest	the	US	showed	in	
supporting	citizens’	access	web	technologies	to	Iran,	drawing	attention	to	the	funding	of	projects	and	policies	
as	signs	of	foreign	intervention	into	Iran’s	sovereign	affairs	by	way	of	internet. 
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in	 the	 campaign	 was	 relatively	 small.	 This	 has	 since	 also	 led	 to	 recent	 diplomatic	
breakthroughs	 between	 Iran	 and	 the	 US	 that	 are	 unprecedented	 since	 1979.	 Again,	
interestingly,	during	the	election	period	many	social	media	applications	remained	blocked	
in	 Iran	 since	2009,	 and	as	 the	Annenberg	School	 for	Communication	at	 the	University	of	
Pennsylvania’s	2013	report	on	the	work	of	Iranian	journalists	in	Iran	stated:	
Given	 the	 restricted	 access	 to	 online	 media,	 Iran’s	 print	 press	 played	 a	 more	
prominent	role	throughout	the	2013	campaign.	Although	Iran’s	state‐run	broadcast	
media—which	is	managed	by	pro‐regime	loyalists—is	the	dominant	source	of	news	
for	Iranians,	and	the	only	media	that	hosts	presidential	debates,	the	country’s	print	
media	 culture	 is	 remarkably	prolific,	 offering	a	 range	of	 information	and	opinions	
from	across	 Iran’s	political	 spectrum.	 Iran’s	print	press	has	 traditionally	served	as	
not	 only	 important	 campaign	 tools	 for	 candidates—both	 reformists	 and	
conservatives—but	also	 as	 key	 resources	 for	more	diverse	 election	news,	 debates	
and	analyses	for	Iranian	citizens.195	
While	 very	 little	 research	 has	 covered	 the	 political	 role	 of	 internet	 alongside	 and	 in	
comparison	with	 other	media	 in	 Iran,	 insights	 from	 the	work	 of	 Khiabany	 and	 Sreberny	
(Khiabany	 &	 Sreberny,	 2007;	 A.	 Sreberny	 &	 Khiabany,	 2010)	 suggest	 that	 the	 role	 of	
internet	in	Iranian	civil	society	is	best	understood	within	the	historical	context	of	the	press	
in	Iran	and	the	important	role	of	journalists	as	a	key	actors	in	Iranian	civil	society.	The	local	
and	national	press	has	 long	been	an	 important	driving	 force	 for	democratic	participation	
and	in	Iran,	and	internet	usage	by	journalists	in	response	to	the	closing	of	newspapers	and	
other	harassment	by	the	Iranian	government	(A.	Sreberny	&	Khiabany,	2010)	reflects	the	
interrelationship	between	the	use	of	conventional	media	forms	and	internet.	Furthermore,	
the	 continued	 importance	 of	 other	media	 forms	 ‐	 despite	 digital	media’s	 proliferation	 in	
Iran	‐	is	evident	from	key	reports	generated	recently	on	the	situation	regarding	media	and	
information	in	Iran.		
																																																								
195	Facing	Boundaries,	Finding	Freedom:	an	in‐depth	report	on	Iranian	journalists	working	in	Iran	by	Magdalena	
Wodjcieszak,	Amy	Brouillette,	and	Briar	Smith,	Summer	2013	
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Television	 broadcasts	 in	 general	 remain	 the	 most	 important	 source	 of	 information	 for	
those	 sampled	 in	The	 Iran	Media	Program’s	2011‐2012	report	on	media	 consumption	 in	
Iran,	conducted	 in	collaboration	with	the	Annenberg	School	of	Media.	The	report	 focused	
solely	on	Iran,	stating	that	96%	of	those	asked	chose	television	as	the	top	source	for	news,	
following	by	press	(45%)	and	friends	and	family	(38%).196	Internet	was	not	among	the	top	
three	 news	 sources	 that	 people	 listed.	 And	 despite	 the	 official	 illegality	 of	 foreign‐based	
satellite	 television	 consumption	 and	 the	 unofficial	 “jamming”	 of	 signals	 by	 the	 Iranian	
government,	 satellite	 television	 has	 been	 said	 to	 be	 at	 least	 as	 significant	 a	 source	 of	
information	and	entertainment	 for	 those	 inside	 Iran	as	 internet	 is,	 if	not	more	so.	This	 is	
according	 to	 a	 recent	 report	 by	 the	 London‐based	 non‐profit	 organization,	 Small	 Media,	
specifically	detailing	satellite	jamming	in	Iran.197		
The	picture	this	paints	of	media,	 journalism,	and	information	in	Iran	 is	one	of	 internet	as	
fulfilling	 certain	 purposes	 with	 relation	 to	 the	 existing	 institutional	 frameworks	 and	
political	 and	media	 practices	 of	 people.	 It	 also	 reflects	 a	 very	 different	 picture	 than	 the	
popular	“Twitter	revolution”	narrative	of	the	democratization	of	Iran	through	technology‐
driven	 action.	 The	 more	 nuanced	 picture	 of	 internet	 in	 Iran	 also	 complicates	 the	
assumptions	 behind	 “21st	 Century	 Statecraft”	 that	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 breaking	
through	a	technological	divide	(evident	through	selectively	blocked	or	curbed	web	access	
in	 Iran)	 that	 is	willfully	kept	 in	place	by	 the	 Iranian	government	 that	once	bridged	could	
have	 transformative	 effects	 on	 citizens’	 democratic	 participation.	 This	 policy	 approach	
seems	not	to	address	the	idiosyncrasies	of	the	political	and	media	circumstances	that	shape	
usage,	inevitably	compounding	the	simple	technical	blockage.	As	Franklin	states:	
The	emergent	digital	divide	has	various	shades	and	hues.	It	is	not	defined	purely	by	
the	absence	or	presence	of	 Internet	 connections…	 It	 reproduces	the	 long‐standing	
one	 between	 rich	 and	 poor	 worlds,	 former	 colonizers	 and	 their	 former	 colonies,	
																																																								
196	Wojcieszak,	et	al.	“Finding	a	way:	How	Iranians	reach	for	news	and	information,”	
http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/fileLibrary/PDFs/FindingaWay.pdf		(accessed	1/12/14).	
197	Small	Media,	“Satellite	Jamming:	A	War	Over	Airwaves,”	http://issuu.com/smallmedia/docs/satjam 	
(accessed	1/12/14). 
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between	industrialized	and	nonindustrialized	societies.	But	it	is	not	monolithic,	nor	
is	 it	 evenly	 distributed.	 Closing	 the	 divide	 cannot	 be	 done	 in	 a	 culturally	
universalistic	 way	 either,	 for	 how	 and	 what	 constitutes	 it	 is	 a	 sociocultural	 and	
political	 economic	 question	 as	much	 as	 it	 is	 a	 technical	 and	 representational	 one.	
For	 some,	 it	 is	 a	 question	 of	 what,	 if	 any	 equipment;	 for	 others,	 the	 degree	 and	
capacity	of	transmission	networks;	for	others,	relative	skill	and	access	to	computers,	
cables,	 and	 software	 that	 are	mutually	 compatible	 and/or	 related	 to	 actual	 needs	
and	social	fabrics	(Franklin,	2004:	224).	
If	 the	 digital	 divide	 is	 not	 only	 a	 technological	 issue	 but	 a	 political	 and	 social	 one,	 then	
internet	freedom	in	Iran	is	not	a	simple	matter	of	access	to	internet	technologies.	It	is	then	
a	 matter	 of	 freedom	 to	 publish	 content	 uncensored,	 and	 freedom	 to	 use	 the	 particular	
applications	and	platforms	that	are	of	most	immediate	use	and	relevance	to	their	needs	and	
lives.	For	instance,	the	extreme	popularity	of	the	photo	sharing	site	Orkut	has	been	noted	in	
reports	on	Iranian	internet	usage	to	be	outstanding.198	Aided	by	its	previous	popularity,	the	
site	 was	 used	 during	 the	 protests	 in	 2009	 to	 spread	 photos	 of	 the	 protests	 and	 street	
violence	 through	 the	 uploading	 of	 photos	 from	 mobile	 devices	 to	 user	 accounts.	 This	
extreme	popularity	is	difficult	to	explain	solely	on	the	basis	of	the	technical	attributes	of	the	
program	or	the	government	lenience	in	its	control	(controls	which	are	already	consistently	
circumvented	by	many	through	the	use	of	proxies).	 Internet’s	role	 in	 Iranian	civil	society	
seems	 to	 rely	 as	 much	 on	 the	 particularities	 of	 what	 makes	 a	 certain	 web	 application	
popular	 to	 use	 as	 on	 the	 technological	 access	 to	 and	 fluency	 that	 users	 have	 with	 the	
application.199	
																																																								
198	“A	2005	study	of	a	popular	multinational	online	community	called	Orkut	reported	that	the	site	listed	11.4	
million	users.	Of	that	number,	Iranians	made	up	about	340,000,	the	third	most	common	nationality	on	the	
list”(Carafano,	n.d.).	This	report	references	the	work	of	Hazir	Rahmandad	et	al.,	"Iranians	on	Orkut:	Trends	
and	Characteristics,"	Iranian	Studies	Group	at	MIT,	January	2006,	pp.	1‐2.	
199	Alongside	Orkut,	Akhavan	(2013)	discusses	the	social	media	site,	Friendfeed,	as	being	somewhat	uniquely	
popular	in	Iran,	while	also	noting	the	relative	lack	of	attention	for	this	popularity	in	international	news	and	
scholarship	that	prefers	to	focus	on	the	role	of	other	social	media	sites	inside	Iran	such	as	Facebook	and	
Twitter.	This	further	suggests	that	the	coverage	of	the	movement	was	largely	influenced	by	the	applications	
that	were	already	popular	and	recognizable	in	the	US	and	the	West	more	generally.	
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In	 Iran,	 certain	 sites	 are	 indeed	 blocked	 and	 the	 range	 of	 blocked	 sites	 changes	 with	
political	circumstances	and	leadership	in	the	country.	However,	as	I	have	argued	here,	a	US	
foreign	policy	approach	that	imposes	sanctions	in	order	to	force	greater	“internet	freedom”	
in	the	foreign	policy	interest	of	greater	“democratization”	of	Iran	seems	flawed	in	various	
respects.	I	have	shown	how	the	assumptions	behind	this	policy	narrative	frame	the	web	as	
a	 single	entity	and	an	unmediated	channel	between	Iranians	 in	 Iran	and	citizens	outside.	
This	 relies	 in	 part	 on	 certain	 foreign	 policy	 discourses	 that	 are	 worth	 discussing	 in	 the	
following,	 paying	 attention	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 internet	 in	 Iran	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	
foreign	powers.	
	
American	foreign	policy	perceptions	of	Iranian	internet	
	
Discourses	about	internet	(freedom)	and	Iranian	citizens	are	the	mainstay	of	much	of	the	
journalism	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 reformist/green	 movement,	 along	 with	 the	 news	
media’s	 coverage	of	 Iranian	 religious	 leaders	 in	 the	 context	of	nuclear	 concerns	 in	many	
Western	 countries.	 At	 times,	 these	 discourses	 come	 to	 overlap	 when	 the	 anti‐nuclear	
sanctions	 that	 effect	 the	 Iranian	 population	 are	 framed	 within	 the	 same	 discourse	 as	
freedom	 for	 Iranian	 people	 from	 their	 regime	 that	 internet	 freedom	 consistently	 is	
(Bajoghli,	2012).	In	addition,	the	Iranian	“blogosphere”	is	a	consistent	topic	of	international	
attention	and	scholarly	research	(Alexanian,	2011;	Amir‐Ebrahimi,	2004;	Doostdar,	2004;	
Kelly	 &	 Etling,	 2008;	 Rahimi,	 2011;	 Sreberny	 &	 Khiabany,	 2010)	 Amir‐Ebrahimi,	 as	 is	
“Electronic	Iran”	more	broadly	(Akhavan,	2013).		
Scholarly	 work	 on	 internet	 media	 usage	 inside	 Iran	 typically	 focuses	 on	 blogging,	 often	
referring	 to	 the	 potential	 (or	 lack	 thereof)	 for	 social,	 cultural,	 and	 political	 dissents	
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(see	Batouli	2004)200	 or	 ‘cyber‐dissidence’	 (Rahimi,	 2003,	 2011)	 for	 challenging	 Iran’s	
Islamic	regime,	and	for	minorities	and	women	to	access	the	public	sphere	(Amir‐Ebrahimi,	
2004).	 The	 theme	 of	 transgression	 via	 internet	 is	 also	 evident	 in	 Doostdar’s	 unique	
ethnography	 of	 Persian	 language	 blogs	 within	 the	 Iranian	 context	 sees	 these	 as	 an	
emergent	 speech	 genre	 (2004).	 He	 discusses	 how	 different	 groups	 come	 to	 discursively	
frame	 this	 internet	 practice	 as	 “vulgar”	 in	 weblog‐based	 debates;	 both	 in	 	 the	 sense	 of	
Islamic	 morality,	 and	 with	 respect	 to	 its	 allegedly	 perverse	 effects	 on	 Persian	
language(2004).	 And	 the	 blurring	 of	 boundaries	 between	 public	 and	 private	 spaces	
through	internet	media	usage	by	Iranians	has	been	a	theme	in	much	research,	including	the	
diaspora	(M.	Graham	&	Khosravi,	1997).	In	contrast,	research	has	largely	left	the	ways	the	
government	 uses	 the	 same	 digital	 media	 under‐researched.	 Nikki	 Akhavan’s	 important	
work	on	 the	 relationship	of	 the	 Iranian	government	 to	digital	media	has	shown	 that	 two	
relatively	 separate	branches	of	a	policy	are	 in	effect,	which	means	 that	both	surveillance	
and	control	on	the	one	hand,	and	use	for	production	on	the	other	are	in	effect	in	Iran.		
Outside	 Iran	 there	 is	also	a	 significant	number	of	bloggers	who	are	considered	 to	have	a	
role	 within	 the	 Persian	 blogosphere,	 and	 who	 blog	 predominantly	 in	 Persian	(Kelly	 &	
Etling,	 2008).	 The	 research	 on	 internet	 and	 Iranian	 diaspora	 has	 also	 focused	 on	 first‐
generation	or	has	been	non‐specific	with	regard	to	generation	(J.	A.	Alexanian,	2011;	van	
den	Bos,	2006).	The	growth	of	studies	on	LA	Iranians	also	reflects	an	increase	in	“cultural”	
organization	 in	 contrast	 with	 long‐distance	 Iranian	 politics,	 as	 anything	 “political”	 was	
deemed	divisive	 and	 even	dangerous	because	of	 its	 associations	with	 the	 Iranian	 regime	
and	 political	 landscape	 (Ghorashi,	 2004;	 Shahidian,	 2000;	 van	 den	Bos,	 2006).	 However,	
this	 is	 increasingly	 displaced	 by	 more	 explicitly	 politically	 oriented	 organizations	 that	
define	 “politics”	 in	 terms	 of	 US	 party	 and	 electoral	 politics	 and	 encourage	 new	 forms	 of	
participation	in	the	US	(see	Bakalian	&	Bozorgmehr,	2009;	Motlagh,	2008;	Ghorashi,	2007).	
Alongside	this	there	is	a	context	of	increased	diaspora	political	engagement	with	Iran,	not	
																																																								
200	Batouli,	Ali.	2004.	“The	free	Internet:	An	Instrument	of	Control”.	Boothe	Prize	for	Excellence	in	Writing,	
Stanford	University,	Spring	2004.	http://bootheprize.stanford.edu/0405/boothe0405.pdf	(accessed	
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within	 the	 framework	 of	 old	 political	 factionalisms	 but	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 “civil	
society”	 and	 “human	 rights.”	 Internet	 becomes	 an	 important	 part	 of	 this	 in	 the	way	 it	 is	
publicly	promoted	and	covered,	and	also	 in	 the	way	 it	 is	practiced	 through	 transnational	
diaspora	networks	(Ghorashi	&	Boersma,	2009).		
When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	web	use	of	 the	 Iranian	diaspora,	 the	 second	generation’s	practices	
have	 largely	 been	 unstudied	 (for	 exceptions	 see	 Alexanian,	 2011;	McAuliffe,	 2007a).	 My	
research	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 internet	 practices	 of	 second	 generation	 diaspora	 as	 also	
worthy	 of	 in‐depth	 social	 scientific	 and	 specifically	 ethnographic	 investigation.	 These	
young	people	are	now	coming	of	age	with	internet	as	an	inextricable	part	of	their	day‐to‐
day	 lives.	 These	 developments	 give	 shape	 to	 the	 field	 in	which	my	 respondents	 position	
themselves.	 As	 I	 argue,	 their	 politics	 of	 belonging	 involves	 navigating	 boundaries	 and	
modes	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 while	 making	 appeals	 to	 their	 legitimacy	 as	 political	
actors	amidst	various	social	forces.	The	use	of	internet	by	these	respondents	is	a	reflection	
of	their	individual	and	collective	practices	of	becoming	engaged	in	political	spheres	that	are	
neither	limited	to	long‐distance	commitments	to	Iran	nor	national	civic	engagement	in	the	
US	but	which	 also	 include	 inter‐ethnic,	 religious,	 class‐based,	 regional	 solidarities,	which	
are	also	mobilized	to	make	local‐	and	national‐level	claims	to	rights	and	resources.	
I	 argue	 that	 the	ways	 internet	 technologies	 are	used	by	my	 respondents	 reflect	 complex	
practices	that	include	a	much	broader	picture	than	the	use	of	internet	as	a	political	tool,	i.e.	
in	 Iran	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 dissidence	or	 in	 the	diaspora	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 long‐distance	 repatriation.	
Rather,	as	the	ethnographic	material	shows,	uses	of	internet	among	my	respondents	cover	
a	 range	 of	 applications	 that	 have	 to	 do	 with	 their	 ways	 of	 being	 Iranian	 American,	 but	
which	expand	the	notion	of	 internet	as	a	(diasporic)	political	 tool.	 In	 the	 following	 I	shift	
from	discussing	the	larger	narratives	and	the	assumptions	behind	them	to	discussing	how	
my	 respondents	 and	 others	 in	 the	 field	 talked	 about	 web	 applications	 in	 the	 context	 of	
making	connections	to	the	events	in	Iran.		
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Mediating	connections	to	Iran	
On	 September	 8th,	 2009	 the	 panel	 discussion,	 “New	Politics,	New	Media,”	 commenced	 in	
front	 of	 a	 full	 house	 at	 the	 USC’s	 Annenberg	 School	 of	 Journalism.	 Iranian	 American,	
Mahasti	 Afshar	 ‐	 alongside	 her	 co‐panelists,	 Mike	 Shuster	 and	 Roger	 Cohen	 ‐	 began	 the	
debate.	 The	 event	 was	 convened	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 lively	 public	 discussions	 (prior	 and	
following),	which	examined	the	role	of	“New	Media”/“Social	Media,”	Twitter,	and	Facebook	
as	they	featured	in	the	uprisings	in	Iranian	cities	during	the	summer	of	2009.	Mike	Shuster	
was	 an	 award‐winning	 diplomatic	 correspondent	 for	 National	 Public	 Radio	 News	 who	
travelled	 frequently	 to	 Iran	 and	 covered	 the	Middle	 Eastern	 conflict	 in	 his	 work.	 Roger	
Cohen	 was	 a	 British‐born	 journalist	 and	 author	 with	 regular	 columns	 in	 the	 New	 York	
Times	 and	 International	 Herald	 Tribune,	 among	 which	 his	 writing	 as	 a	 correspondent	
based	in	Iran.	Mahasti	Afshar	was	an	Iranian	American	observer	based	in	LA	who	had	lived	
in	 the	 US	 for	 decades.	 She	 had	 directed	 various	 heritage	 conservation	 foundations	 and	
endowments,	and	held	a	PhD	in	Sanskrit	and	Indo‐European	Oral	Literature	and	Mythology	
from	Harvard	University.201	Cohen	was	one	of	very	few	reporters	writing	from	Iran	during	
the	 June	2009	Presidential	Elections	and	 the	street‐protest	aftermath.	His	gripping	piece,	
“Iran’s	Day	 of	 Anguish,”	 in	 the	New	York	Times	 in	 June,	 2009	 garnered	 attention	 in	 this	
period	among	my	Iranian	American	respondents	and	other	Iranian	Americans	in	LA.	
In	the	discussion,	it	was	revealing	to	hear	how	the	role	of	digital	media	was	given	meaning	
by	Afshar	in	the	context	of	the	Iranian	revolution	of	1979.	During	her	opening	statement,	
Afshar	 highlighted	 the	 constitutive	 role	 of	 new	 media	 in	 the	 “Green	 Movement”	 in	
comparison	to	that	other	historical	people’s	uprising:		
In	 1979,	 Khomeini	 disseminated	 tapes	 secretly.	 In	 2009	 the	 opposition	 used	 cell	
phone	and	online	media.	The	difference	between	those	two	media	uses	actually	spells	
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the	difference	between	the	essence	of	these	two	movements.	In	‘79	one	message	was	
preconceived	 and	 disseminated	 secretly	 through	 mosques	 and	 bazaars.	 In	 ‘09	 a	
message	evolved	in	real	time	through	accidental	leaders	and	regular	people	having	a	
conversation.	 The	 open	 friendly	 social	 media	 represented	 the	 democracy	 people	
wanted.	The	tapes	in	79	were	about	one	charismatic	 leader	that	dictated	a	message.	
End	of	conversation,	beginning	of	dictatorship.	
The	 comparison	 between	 Iran	 of	 1979	 and	 2009	 garnered	 much	 analysis	 during	 this	
period.	And	in	the	aftermath,	scholars	of	big	and	small	media	continued	this	probing.	Media	
scholar,	Annabelle	Sreberny,	states	that	seen	in	historical	continuity	with	the	“small	media”	
of	 ’79	 (leaflets	 and	 cassette	 tapes	 that	 were	 highly	 consequential	 in	 the	 revolution)	
“internet	has	just	become	the	newest	site	of	contestation	and	the	latest	set	of	technologies	
to	offer	an	alternative	mode	of	communications	 to	 those	directly	controlled	by	 the	state”	
(A.	Sreberny	&	Khiabany,	2010).	Naficy202	has	argued	regarding	 the	post‐election	 Iranian	
protests	 that,	 “be	 they	old	or	new,	mass	media	are	not	 in	and	of	 themselves	sufficient	 to	
create	revolutions.”	He	has	emphasized	that	the	tragic	failure	of	the	movement	to	achieve	
its	 goals	 suggests	 that	 contemporary	 Iran	 lacks	 the	 political,	 economic,	 and	 social	
conditions	that	increase	the	probability	of	revolution,	rather	than	any	media	technologies.	
While	 Naficy’s	 and	 other	 scholarly	 work	 comparing	 ’79	 and	 ’09	 seeks	 to	 historically	
contextualize	the	recent	events	while	pointing	out	the	unique	affordances,	Afshar’s	above	
comparison	 seems	 to	 attribute	 certain	 inherent	 democratic	 qualities	 to	 the	media	 forms	
used	by	people	in	’09	in	contrast	to	‘79,	extrapolating	those	qualities	to	the	character	of	the	
respective	movements.	In	this	view,	mobile	phones,	internet	media,	the	demands	of	the	’09	
demonstrators,	 and	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 movement	 itself	 are	 seen	 together	 as	
representative	of	democratic	qualities.		
This	 instance	 reflects	 the	 basic	 narrative	 about	 internet	 and	 democracy	 in	 Iran	 that	
undergirded	 much	 of	 the	 US	 international	 diplomacy	 language	 I	 described	 earlier.	 And	
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most	 of	 my	 second‐generation	 respondents	 were	 exposed	 to	 these	 telling	 abstractions	
about	 internet’s	 democratic	 capabilities.	 Like	 Afsar	 many	 of	 them	 expressed	 a	 feverish	
interest	in	following	the	news	and	updates	at	this	time.	Arash,	for	instance,	told	me	about	
sources	they	consulted	such	as	The	New	York	Times’	blog,	The	Lede	and	Andrew	Sullivan’s	
blog	for	The	Atlantic	called	Daily	Dish;	sources	he	consulted	during	the	days	following	the	
much‐disputed	vote	in	Iran.	The	photo	blog	Tehran	24,	the	popular	site	Tehran	Bureau,	and	
the	cultural	blog	Tehran	Avenue	were	all	English	 language	sites	that	posted	content	from	
inside	 Iran	during	 this	period,	 and	which	my	 respondents	 either	 talked	about	visiting	or	
posted	 things	 from	 on	 their	 Facebook	 and/or	 Twitter	 accounts.	 For	 Arash,	 such	 sources	
offered	the	trusted	and	in‐depth	coverage	he	was	looking	for.	And	for	many,	social	media	
site,	Facebook,	was	a	hub	for	information	around	this	time	when	so	many	of	their	Facebook	
friends	 were	 posting	 about	 the	 same	 topics	 concerning	 Iran.	 While	 many	 exchanged	
comments	and	shared	each	other’s	videos,	the	events	being	discussed	were	also	a	source	of	
“unfriending”	during	this	time,	as	Pouneh	explained	to	me	on	the	basis	of	her	own	verbal	
altercations	with	 Ahmadinejad	 supporters.	 Facebook	 took	 on	 a	 particular	 quality	 during	
this	 time,	 as	many	 of	my	 respondents	 consistently	 posted	 a	 slew	 of	 articles,	 videos,	 and	
photographs	 about	 the	 political	 situation	 around	 the	 elections.	 Hakha	 explained	 that	 he	
sensed	that	some	of	his	 friends	might	not	have	 the	same	 interest	he	did	 in	 the	events	he	
posted	about,	but	said	 those	 friends	could	 “hide”	him	 if	 they	wished	not	 to	 see	his	posts.	
Some	were	wary	about	the	appearance	of	their	fervent	sharing	practices	about	Iran	during	
this	 time.	 But	 Hakha	 and	 others	 said	 they	 received	 supportive	 messages	 from	 friends	
thanking	them	for	the	 information.	Because	of	these	social	exchanges	and	considerations,	
my	respondents’	use	of	Facebook	was	very	different	from	but	closely	connected	with	their	
use	of	websites	for	staying/becoming	informed.		
Another	 way	 Facebook	 was	 important	 to	 my	 respondents	 during	 this	 time	 was	 for	 the	
organizing	of	events.	Facebook	was	the	central	way	my	respondents	would	find	out	about	
art	 shows,	 vigils,	 protests,	 and	 other	 events	 organized	 in	 solidarity	 with	 the	 voters	 and	
protesters	 in	 Iran.	Facebook	seemed	far	more	 important	 than	a	site	 like	Kodoom.com	for	
my	respondents.	The	 latter	 is	a	site	 that	posts	all	events	of	 interest	 to	 Iranian	Americans	
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around	the	whole	country,	and	tended	to	be	up	to	date	on	many	of	the	events	happening	in	
LA,	 also	 during	 this	 period.	 Yet,	 staying	 up	 to	 date	 with	 events	 during	 this	 period	 was	
primarily	done	through	Facebook.	The	intense	use	of	Facebook	also	came	with	a	downside.	
The	 application’s	 unique	 characteristics	 were	 turned	 around	 due	 to	 stories	 circulating	
about	the	ability	of	Iranian	officials	to	track	the	social	media	usage	of	Iranians	outside	Iran.	
Those	of	my	respondents	who	made	relatively	regular	trips	to	Iran	became	worried.		
Beeta	told	me	about	her	concerns	based	on	rumors	she	had	heard	about	Iranian	diaspora	
who	 had	 traveled	 to	 Tehran	 over	 the	 summer	 being	 asked	 by	 officials	 in	 the	 airport	 to	
reveal	 their	Facebook	profiles	and	passwords.	Pouneh	also	told	me	that	she	was	deleting	
the	 local	 events	 she	 had	 attended	 and	 took	 down	 some	 of	 her	 posts	 against	 the	 Iranian	
government	 as	 a	 result	 of	 these	 accounts.	 Just	 days	 earlier	 she	 had	 used	 Facebook	 to	
mobilize	 people	 around	her	 travel	 communally	with	busses	 to	 a	 local	 voting	 station,	 but	
now	her	activities	on	the	site	had	become	a	negative	connection	to	the	events	 in	Iran	–	a	
worry	that	had	neither	burdened	her	nor	led	her	to	take	such	measures	in	the	past.	I	also	
heard	 stories	 from	my	 respondents	 about	 others	who	 had	 started	 up	 a	 “fake”	 Facebook	
profile	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 thwarting	 these	 alleged	 government	 efforts.	 Because	 of	 the	
profile	 format	 that	 accrues	 information	 over	 time	 about	 the	 user’s	 practices/content	
production,	Facebook	became	(in	contrast	to	visited	websites)	a	source	of	uncertainty	and	
concern	with	regard	to	the	surveillance	capabilities	of	the	Iranian	government	for	some.			
This	 emphasized	 the	 shifting	 relationship	 between	 these	 young	 people	 and	 the	 Iranian	
state,	and	the	role	of	 internet	 therein.	This	change	towards	apprehension	of	social	media	
mirrored	the	turnaround	that	had	happened	with	the	elections.	The	hopes	and	involvement	
in	the	Iranian	elections	on	the	part	of	some	of	my	respondents,	like	Pouneh	and	Beeta	who	
had	 cast	 their	 votes	 for	 reformist	 candidates	 in	 the	 election,	 changed	 to	 disappointment	
and	 dismay	 about	 the	 Iranian	 electoral	 system	 and	 about	 the	 consistent	 reaction	 to	 the	
disputation	 of	 the	 results	 at	 the	 highest	 levels	 of	 Iranian	 government.	 These	 second‐
generation	voters’	use	of	Facebook	to	organize	involvement	in	the	electoral	system	from	LA	
transformed	 into	 resentment	 towards	 the	 Iranian	 state	 apparatus.	 In	 her	 research	 on	
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internet	 and	 diaspora	 politics,	 Bernal	 suggests	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 research	 on	 the	 Eritrean	
diaspora’s	 engagement	with	political	web	postings	 that	 internet	 is	not	 simply	 facilitating	
communications	 that	 pre‐existed	 internet,	 but	 that	 it	 is	 “making	 possible	 new	 kinds	 of	
communicative	spaces	and	practices.”	Bernal	argues	that	“new	ways	of	practicing	Eritrean	
politics”	develops	through	websites	that	engaged	with	news	and	analysis	inside	Eritrea.	My	
respondents’	 engagement	 suggests	 that	 social	 media	 was	 used	 for	 local	 (not	 only	
translocal/transnational)	political	mobilization,	but	also	that	the	positioning	of	the	subject	
and	 (the	 changes	 in)	 their	 relationship	 with	 the	 Iranian	 government	 is	 important	 for	
whether	communicative	spaces	are	opened	up	through	digital	media.	That	is,	while	young	
people	like	Pouneh	and	Beeta	felt	included	as	part	of	a	unified	Iranian	polity	during	election	
time,	this	was	subject	to	change	according	to	the	key	political	shifts	thereafter.		
Their	motivations	for,	and	types	of,	internet	usage	changed	with	these	circumstances,	even	
as	the	technological	possibilities	they	have	access	to	remain	unchanged.	So	while	spaces	for	
political	 exchange	 were	 opened	 up	 via	 social	 media,	 the	 situation	 reflected	 Sokefeld’s	
(2006)	 discussion	 of	 diaspora	 political	 participation.	 He	 argues	 that	 social	 movement	
theory	is	useful	for	understanding	how	members	of	the	diaspora	are	formed	through	their	
political	involvement.		
As	identities	become	politically	effective	only	when	they	are	employed	and	endorsed	
by	 a	 certain	 number	 of	 people,	we	 have	 to	 ask	 how	 these	 people	 are	mobilized	 for	
such	 an	 identity,	 how	 they	 are	 made	 to	 accept	 and	 assume	 it.	 Rather	 than	 being	
regarded	as	something	that	from	the	outset	provides	continuity	and	fixed	structures	
for	 social	 life,	 as	 in	primordial	 approaches,	 identity	becomes	an	 issue	of	movement	
and	mobilization	[emphasis	original]	(Sokefeld,	2006:	266).		
In	 line	with	 Sokefeld’s	 argument,	 it	 appears	 that	 rather	 than	 social	media	 opening	 up	 a	
transnational	space	for	being	part	of	a	unified	and	transnational	Iranian	nation,	particular	
developments	connect	people	through	action	and	consciousness	to	Iran,	such	that	they	are	
moved	 to	 assume	 Iranian‐ness.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 political	 and	 emotional	 engagement	 in	
response	to	social	and	political	movement.	And	it	is	the	mediation	of	the	updates	from	Iran	
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that	mobilize	 their	 feelings.	 This	mobilization	 also	 hinges	 on	 the	 positioning	 of	 those	 in	
question.	For	instance,	while	many	of	my	respondents	did	not	see	themselves	as	part	of	the	
movement	 in	 Iran,	 they	positioned	 themselves	 in	 solidarity.	 It	 is	 from	 this	 vantage	point	
that	 they	used	 their	 social	media	profiles	 to	express	a	 connection	with	 those	 in	 Iran	and	
become	 part	 of	 peer	 groups	 that	 moved	 one	 another	 to	 a	 sense	 of	 togetherness	 and	
connection	to	Iran	through	their	social	media	profiles.		
This	 could	 be	 seen	 through	 the	 symbols	 they	 shared.	 The	 first	 three	 images	 below	 are	
examples	of	pictures	that	most	of	my	respondents	changed	their	Facebook	profile	photo	to.	
The	line	of	images	following	those	contains	two	typical	photos	of	street	protests	in	Iran	that	
included	the	same	slogans	and	even	form/design/color	in	the	Facebook	photos.	The	image	
on	the	bottom	left	is	a	screenshot	from	the	Facebook	page	of	Tehran	Bureau	that	was	giving	
regular	 updates	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 protests	 via	 their	 page.	 The	 bottom	 right	 image	 is	 a	
photograph	I	took	at	one	of	the	street	protests	in	Los	Angeles	organized	by	young	Iranian	
American	students.	These	images	together	show	how	elements	of	the	message’s	style	and	
form,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 content,	 were	 transferred	 between	 embodied	 street	 gatherings	 and	
demonstrations	 in	 distant	 locations	 as	 well	 as	 instances	 of	 web‐based	 self‐presentation	
with	 very	 little	 change	 between	 media.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 even	 though	 the	 positioning	 is	
subtly	 differentiated	with	 the	 slogan	 “where	 is	 their	 vote”	 that	 some	 of	my	 respondents	
used	who	did	not	have	Iranian	passports.	And	the	protests	in	West	LA	were	characterized	
mostly	 by	 remaining	 stationary	 at	 one	 familiar	 location	where	 protests	 often	 take	 place	
nearby	a	main	road,	rather	than	the	meeting	in	public	squares	and	staging	marches	as	was	
the	case	in	Iran.	The	commonalities	shared	between	the	solidarity	actions	and	their	target	
for	 solidarity	 in	 both	 style	 and	 content	 of	 the	 central	 messages	was	 clear	 despite	 these	
differences.		
This	reflects	the	ways	in	which	people	became	politically	and	affectively	mobilized	as	part	
of	the	diaspora.	This	is	what	Baubock	describes	as	being	part	of	transnational	politics	that	
diaspora	 wage	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 “homeland”	 (Baubock,	 2009).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 my	 second‐
generation	respondents	partaking	in	these	activities,	many	for	the	first	time	in	their	lives,	is	
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a	 forging	of	new	connections	to	an	envisaged	“homeland.”	Their	 internet	news	and	social	
media	use	mediated	their	political	engagement	with	the	political	process	within	the	Iranian	
nation‐state,	and	also	became	an	important	way	for	them	to	understanding	of	events.	Their	
Iranian‐ness	was	mobilized	 in	 this	 context,	 as	 they	were	 implicated	 as	 participants	 in	 a	
national	democracy.	Though	their	activities	also	included	organizing	locally,	shifting	sense	
of	citizenship	–	from	the	formal	to	the	emotional.	
	
Figure	13	Collection	of	images	from	online	and	offline	during	the	protests.	Top	3	are	Facebook	profile	photos	of	
respondents,	second	row	photos	shared	on	social	media	by	respondents	and	their	friends,	bottom	left	screen	shot	
from	Tehran	Bureau	Facebook	page	I	took	in	June	2009,	bottom	right	photo	I	took	at	a	rally	in	Westwood	in	June	
2009.	
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The	 period	 around	 the	 Iranian	 elections	 made	 explicit	 a	 certain	 sense	 of	 commonality	
between	my	respondents	and	“the	people	of	Iran.”	It	did	so	in	a	way	that	had	not	happened	
before	 and	 that	 involved	 the	 intense	 usage	 of	 social	 media.	 The	 unfiltered,	 unscreened,	
unmediated	quality	of	these	connections	to	“the	people”	was	an	important	element	of	how	
media	messages	were	perceived	and	treated	by	some	during	this	period.	This	included	both	
media	 narratives	 and	 my	 respondents	 expressing	 their	 connections	 with	 the	 Iranian	
context.	This	quality	of	social	in	particular	in	the	case	of	the	Iran	protest	movement	of	2009	
is	 something	 Morozov	 touches	 in	 his	 observations	 about	 the	 role	 of	 digital	 media	 in	
reporting	and	journalism	during	events.	In	a	discussion	of	the	implications	of	social	media	
usage	for	the	role	of	traditional	foreign	correspondents,	Morozov	sardonically	suggests	that	
many	 saw	 Twitter	 as	 giving	 Western	 audiences	 the	 possibility	 of	 “finally	 unshackling	
ourselves	 from	 the	 inherent	 biases	 of	 cigar‐smoking	 and	 Martini‐sipping	 white	 men”	
(Morozov,	2009).	According	to	this	assumption,	media	seem	to	promise	more	direct	access	
to	 this	 distant	 pro‐democracy	movement	 by	 virtue	 of	 relying	 on	 user‐generated	 content	
from	participants	in	the	events	themselves.	Morozov	(2009)	challenges	this	assumption	by	
arguing	that	social	media	also	distorted	the	messages	of	this	movement.	He	draws	attention	
to	how	misleading	news	reports	(like	Andrew	Sullivan’s	mentioned	above)	were	at	first	left	
uncorrected,	 and	 were	 amplified	 by	 key	 members	 of	 the	 Western	 press	 to	 emphasize	
narratives	about	the	role	of	social	media	in	a	pro‐democracy	movement.	Indeed,	as	I	have	
argued,	 narratives	 about	 internet	 and	 democratization	 that	 rely	 on	 understandings	 of	
internet	 as	 a	 neutral	 and	 relatively	 “free”	 means	 of	 communication.	 It	 is	 and	 therefore	
sometimes	seen	as	something	of	an	immediate	channel	between	those	inside	and	outside	
Iran.	
However,	a	great	many	of	my	respondents’	practices	of	sharing	video	and	textual	material	
via	 social	 media	 applications	 reflected	 their	 reliance	 on	 various	 media	 formats	 besides	
internet	 for	 constructing	a	picture	of	 the	 events	 in	 Iran.	 Social	media	appeared	 to	play	a	
particular	 role	 among	 these.	As	Manoukian	points	out	 in	 the	 case	of	 Iran	 and	 the	 role	of	
digital	media	during	the	2009	uprisings,	the	coverage	of	the	events	by	protesters	through	
social	 media	 has	 not	 only	 created	 a	 space	 for	 expressing	 dissatisfaction	 and	 discussing	
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dissent.	 	 It	has	 also	played	an	 important	 role	 in	 reporting	 the	events	 to	wider	 audiences	
(Manoukian,	2010).	This	(self‐)reporting	role	has	shaped	how	the	movement	is	perceived	
by	the	outside	world.	And	as	Manoukian	argues	in	addition,	social	media	representations	of	
the	 movement	 are	 essential	 to	 how	 this	 movement	 is	 made	 “real”	 for	 these	 audiences	
through	mediation.		
[M]ediation	penetrates	current	 forms	of	political	action	to	 the	extent	 that	relevance	
and	 even	 “reality”	 are	 measured	 by	 the	 media	 traces	 actions	 leave.	 Photographs,	
videos,	 and	 blogged	 testimonies	 are	 what	 made	 the	 protests	 real,	 especially	 for	
distant	spectators	(Manoukian,	2010).		
If	social	media	contribute	to	the	“reality”	of	the	protest	movement,	I	would	emphasize	that	
this	relies	in	part	on	the	feature	of	social	media	being	seen	as	“the	people’s”	media	(being	
seen	as	 a	 contributing	 factor	 to	 grass‐roots,	popular,	 and	participatory	democracy).	Both	
the	experience	of	my	respondents	as	having	access	 to	certain	moments	of	unfiltered	and	
immediate	 information	 about	 the	 events	 in	 Iran,	 and	 the	 policy	 narrative	 about	 internet	
and	 democratization	 both	 reinforce	 this	 notion	 of	 internet	 offering	 access	 to	 (the	
perspective	of)	“the	people.”	I	see	a	relation	here	to	the	notion	of	“the	street”	as	defined	by	
Hirschkind	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	 the	 role	 of	 blogs	 and	 other	 digital	 media	 in	 Egypt.	
Hirschkind	 discusses	 how	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 political	 repression	 by	 state	 Egyptian	 forces,	
social	media	applications	offer	unique	analogies	of	“the	street,”	doing	this	through	the	use	
of	 new	 language	 forms	 and	 video	 styles.	 This	 has	 similarities	with	 Doostdar’s	 argument	
about	 the	 emergent	 (speech)	 genre	 of	 blogging	 (2004),	 which	 also	 analyzes	 the	
implications	of	the	use	of	colloquial	as	opposed	to	formal	language	in	(digital)	written	form,	
which	 transgresses	 the	 conventions	 of	 formal	 written	 and	 is	 similarly	 deemed	 “vulgar.”	
Doostar203	 mentions	 his	 respondents	 finding	 this	 genre	 a	 more	 “authentic”	 mode	 of	
expression,	while	Hirschkind	(2010)	argues	 that	blogging	 in	Egypt	represents	not	simply	
																																																								
203	While	both	Hirschkind’s	and	Doostdar’s	research	focus	on	blogs	in	Egypt/Iran	highlights	the	different	
ways	in	which	blog	writing	as	a	genre	produces	consequences	in	the	national	contexts	in	question,	I	am	
concerned	more	here	with	the	transnational	representations	of	a	movement	that	social	media	mediate.	The	
implications	inside	the	Iranian	context	lie	outside	the	scope	of	this	research.		
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an	 “authentic	 voice	 of	 the	 people.”	 He	 argues	 that	 this	 style	 is	 effective	 because	 it	
distinguishes	 itself	 both	 from	 an	 authoritarian	 government	 discourse	 and	 from	 the	
pedagogical	styles	of	persuasion	of	Islamic	political	parties	through	“written	colloquial.”		
Furthermore,	he	argues	that	the	blogging	genre	cultivates	and	objectifies	“the	experience	of	
a	violated	national	subject”	through	a	variegated	montage	of	video	representations	of	acts	
of	 state	 repression	 (Hirschkind,	 2010).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 social	 media	 covering	 the	 Iranian	
protests,	a	similar	sort	of	montage	was	collectively	created	for	diaspora	audiences	among	
others	with	the	help	of	social	media	sites.	I	discuss	this	in	the	final	section	of	this	chapter.	
These	 sites	 seem	 to	 offer	 an	 aesthetic	 that	 presents	 an	 “authentic”	 version	 of	 social	 and	
political	 dynamics	 and	 developments	 compared	 to	 other	 available	 mediations	 of	 these	
events	(in	particular,	television	news	broadcasts).	While	the	blogs	of	US‐based	news	outlets	
were	important	for	background	and	analysis,	the	video	footage,	photographs,	and	evocative	
Tweets	 shared	 via	 social	 media	 (sometime	 Tweets	 were	 shared	 on	 Facebook	 in	 cross‐
media	 sharing)	were	 the	 source	of	 affective	mobilization.	Naficy204	 calls	 the	digital	 video	
production	of	 Iran’s	Green	Movement	an	“embodied	production	mode”	that	results	 in	the	
“raw	 footage	 of	 affect.”	 The	 aesthetics	 of	 this	 digital	 corpus,	 built	 by	 varied	 independent	
producers,	 creates	 the	 sensation	 of	 a	 “real”	 connection	 with	 a	 pro‐democracy	 people’s	
movement	as	experienced	by	participants	in	Iran,	including	important	affective	elements	of	
this.	 It	 also	 objectifies	 the	 people’s	 movement	 in	 Iran	 for	 engaged,	 distant	 audiences,	
including	my	diaspora	respondents.		
Social	media’s	mediation	 of	 the	movement,	 therefore,	 affectively	mobilizes	 transnational	
sentiments	 of	 Iranian‐ness	 through	 reifying	 “the	 Iranian	 people”	 though	 representations	
scarcely	seen	in	American	media	–	especially	as	producers205	–	thus	creating	a	rupture	in	
style	and	content	from	conventional	messages.	The	discourses	of	 internet	democracy	and	
																																																								
204	Keynote	Speech	by	Dr.	Hamid	Naficy	at	Iranian	Alliances	Across	Borders	Annual	Conference,	November	
2012.	
205	A	unique	exception	to	this	trend	(Asghar	Farhadi’s	2012	Academy	Award	for	Best	Foreign	Film	for	his	film,	
A	Separation),	and	the	overwhelmingly	positive	response	among	so	many	my	respondents	to	this	even	
confirms	the	scarcity	I	mention,	despite	Iranian	cinema	being	a	general	exception	in	international	media	
representations	of	and	by	of	Iranians.	
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digital	diplomacy	rely	for	their	public	resonance	with	international	audiences	in	part	on	the	
construction	of	such	evocative	imaginaries	of	societies	in	the	throes	of	democratic	struggle,	
a	 message	 delivered	wrapped	 in	 the	 aesthetics	 of	 internet.	 Rather	 than	 being	 a	 neutral	
faculty	 of	 internet	 media,	 the	 democratic	 qualities	 with	 which	 the	 transnational	 use	 of	
social	media	applications	are	imbued	in	this	context	of	protest	rely	at	least	 in	part	on	the	
aesthetic	qualities	of	how	social	media	are	experienced	as	immediate,	offering	direct	access	
to	 events	 on	 the	 proverbial	 ground.	 In	 the	 following	 I	 delve	 into	 a	 debate	 that	 unfolded	
among	 actors	 in	 my	 field	 location	 about	 the	 ability	 of	 internet	 to	 –	 similarly	 to	 the	
discussion	around	“democracy”	and	“freedom”	–	mediate	the	experience	of	being	present	at	
the	place	of	time	of	the	events	in	Iran.	
	
Presence	through	web	connections		
“Being	there”	and	the	rise	of	the	Green	Movement	
Returning	 to	 the	 panel	 discussion,	 the	 role	 of	 the	web	 application,	 Twitter,	 during	 these	
developments	 in	 Iran	 was	 central	 to	 the	 discussion	 that	 day,	 especially	 with	 the	 hotly	
contested	 term,	 “Twitter	 Revolution.”	 Cohen	 cautioned	 that	 the	 role	 of	 internet	 media	
applications	 like	 Twitter	 should	 not	 be	 overstated.	 His	 concern	 was	 mainly	 that	 public	
debate	avoid	giving	the	impression	to	people	that	“social	media”	could	be	taken	to	replace	
conventional	journalistic	textual	forms,	and	the	model	of	journalistic	correspondence	from	
the	actual	site	of	the	news	event.	He	called	attention	to	what	internet	media	were	not	able	
to	mediate.	And	his	stance	on	the	panel	that	day	was	consolidated	by	a	quote	he	read	from	
his	own	column	in	the	New	York	Times,	published	on	July	5th,	2009.	He	later	also	used	the	
same	quote	in	a	column	that	was	published	in	the	Times	on	September	9th,	2009,	about	this	
event	itself.	The	quote	read:	
To	be	a	journalist	is	to	bear	witness.	The	rest	is	no	more	than	ornamentation.	To	bear	
witness	 means	 being	 there	—	 and	 that’s	 not	 free.	 No	 search	 engine	 gives	 you	 the	
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smell	 of	 a	 crime,	 the	 tremor	 in	 the	 air,	 the	 eyes	 that	 smolder,	 or	 the	 cadence	 of	 a	
scream.		
The	panel	 that	day	and	 the	discussions	 that	ensued	around	 it	 implicitly	became	a	debate	
among	journalists,	editors,	activists,	and	bloggers	over	what	the	narrative	about	the	role	of	
internet	should	be	regarding	the	events	in	Iran.	Cohen	mentioned	an	attack	on	his	earlier	
statements	 by	 Arianna	 Huffington,	 director	 of	 influential	 and	 progressive	 aggregate	
blog/site,	the	Huffington	Post.	In	his	September	2009	column,	Cohen	had	said	that	Iranians	
had,	themselves,	“borne	witness”	to	the	crackdowns	on	street	protesters	and	other	dissents	
through	 social	 media,	 and	 that	 this	 act	 required	 physical	 presence	 which	 had	 a	 price,	
“sometimes	 even	 the	 ultimate	 price.”	Huffington’s	 statement	 in	 response	 had	 been:	 “The	
truth	is,	you	don’t	have	to	‘be	there’	to	bear	witness.	And	you	can	be	there	and	fail	to	bear	
witness.”	She	had	also	controversially	stated	in	a	speech	that	the	Iranian	uprising	“would	
not	have	happened	without	Twitter.”	The	debate	seemed	to	become	increasingly	polarized	
between	 the	 internet	 boosters	 and	 those	 emphasizing	 the	 role	 of	 the	 people	 (including	
journalists)	“on	the	ground.”		
At	the	same	panel	discussion,	Mahasti	Afshar	gave	her	account	as	someone	who	had	been	
heavily	 using	 digital	 media	 and	 social	 media	 sites	 in	 particular	 to	 stay	 updated	 on	 the	
developments	 in	 Iran	 while	 based	 in	 LA.	 She	 contended	 that	 the	 engagement	 of	 the	
diaspora	with	the	events	and	people	in	Iran	had	changed	in	comparison	to	before	the	rise	
of	 social	 media.	 She	 mentioned	 the	 involvement	 of	 many	 in	 international	 information	
exchange	and	support	and	those	who	had	helped	internet	users	inside	Iran	trying	to	access	
internet	 by	 offering	 connections	 to	 proxies.	 Among	many	 I	 spoke	with	 during	 this	 time,	
including	the	second	generation,	there	was	a	sense	of	sharing	a	common	national	fate	with	
those	protesting	 inside	 Iran.	 In	Afshar’s	 estimation,	 this	 sense	 of	 closeness	 to	 the	 events	
and	the	people	at	this	time	was	largely	due	to	the	information	reaching	them	via	internet	
and	via	social	media	applications	 in	particular.	Some	second‐generation	commentators	at	
this	time	also	highlighted	the	way	people	(not	only	Iranians)	could	help	the	protesters	 in	
Iran.	Cyrus,	a	second‐generation	Iranian	American	and	tech	journalist	published	an	article	
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in	TB	on	June	17th,	entitled:	How	Geeks	(and	non‐Geeks)	Can	Help	Iranians	Online,	detailing	
a	list	of	measures	involving	internet	technologies	in	various	ways	(even	peripherally	tech‐
related	ways,	like	making	donations	to	internet	access	projects	like	Tor).	
Despite	the	sense	of	proximity	some	expressed,	it	was	remarkable	that	for	others	there	was	
also	a	strong	sense	of	both	physical	and	mental	distance	felt.	This	was	a	distance	many	of	
them	 expressed	 the	 desire	 to	 overcome.	 A	 few	 of	 my	 second‐generation	 respondents	
mentioned	 their	 parents’	 comments	 about	 wanting	 to	 be	 back	 in	 Iran	 during	 this	 time	
because	the	stories	from	the	street	protests	reminded	them	of	experiences	of	participating	
in	 the	 early	 days	 of	 the	 Iranian	 revolution	 from	 the	 1970s	 that	 included	massive	 street	
protests	and	a	 sense	of	a	 common	goal.206	Some	of	my	respondents	who	 themselves	had	
little	to	no	living	memory	of	the	early	period	of	the	revolution	nevertheless	also	expressed	
an	unfulfilled	desire	to	“be	there”	at	this	historic	time.	In	addition,	recent	student	migrants	
from	 Iran	 I	 spoke	 with	 expressed	 their	 sense	 of	 distance	 from	 their	 compatriots	
participating	 in	protests	 that	 they,	 themselves,	would	certainly	have	been	attending	side‐
by‐side	with	 them	had	 they	been	 in	 Iran.	 In	 a	 conversation	 I	 had	with	Beeta	during	 this	
period,	I	asked	about	whether	the	connection	she	felt	with	people	in	Iran	had	strengthened	
because	of	the	protests	and	her	following	them.	She	said.	“No.	It	only	reaffirmed	it,	but	it’s	
not	 like	 I	 felt	 it	 deeper,	 because	 I	 [already]	 felt	 it	 so	deeply	 before.”	 In	 this	 conversation	
Beeta	also	brought	up	her	feelings	about	the	killing	of	Neda	Agha	Soltan,	a	young	woman	
whose	 death	 during	 the	 protests	 was	 caught	 on	 a	 mobile	 device	 and	 circulated	
internationally	via	internet,	turning	her	posthumously	into	an	iconic	figure	for	the	protests.	
Beeta	stated:	
I	 feel	really	close	to	that	[the	event	of	Neda’s	death]	because	I	was	really	stressed,	
especially	since	she	was	young.	But	there	are	people	here	who	take	it	way	too	far.	All	
these	“I	Am	Neda”	posters,	and	“I	Am	Neda”	bracelets.	I’m	like,	no,	you	are	not	Neda.	
You	were	sitting	 in	your	home,	safe,	 in	 the	US.	You’re	not	Neda.	Your	cousins	may	
																																																								
206	Though	most	of	their	parents	had	moved	to	the	US	already	at	the	start	of	the	revolution	
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potentially	be	Neda,	or	you	may	potentially	turn	into	Neda	when	you	go	to	Iran,	but	
you’re	not	Neda.	Stop	acting	like,	toham	enghad	shoja‐I	[you’re	as	brave];	like	you’re	
in	the	streets.	That	made	me	really	mad.	
Despite	her	deeply	felt	connection	to	those	inside	Iran,	and	despite	her	active	following	of	
the	events	in	the	country	via	various	internet	news	and	social	media	networks,	the	distance	
of	diaspora	 is	nevertheless	very	 real	 for	Beeta.	Her	use	of	 internet	did	not	make	her	 feel	
closer	to	Iran	and	people	there,	but	reinforced	her	positioning	as	someone	who	stands	in	
solidarity	with	the	movement	there	rather	than	being	part	of	it.	Moreover,	it	angers	her	to	
see	others	ignoring	the	differences	between	life	outside	Iran	and	those	who	are	physically	
partaking	in	the	protests.	For	her,	a	shared	Iranian‐ness	does	not	overcome	the	awareness	
of	a	lived	distance.	Beeta	went	on	to	say	that	even	if	she	were	present	in	the	street	protests,	
her	participation	would	be	different	 than	 those	 for	whom	 this	 election’s	 outcome	effects	
the	 freedoms	of	everyday	 life.	She	expresses	a	sense	of	being	removed	not	only	 from	the	
locale	of	protest,	but	also	the	social	and	political	context	in	which	these	events	take	shape	
and	the	longer‐term	circumstances	they	shape.		
Understanding	Beeta’s	account	leads	me	to	see	the	closeness	of	the	diaspora	to	Iran	–	that	
which	Afshar	and	others	also	described	–	as	having	less	to	do	with	a	sense	of	proximity	and	
more	to	do	with	a	sense	of	collective	simultaneity.	Levitt	and	Glick‐Schiller	have	called	for	
the	 importance	 of	 theorizing	 simultaneity	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 transnational	migrants	 and	 the	
ways	their	daily	rhythms	and	activities	that	correspond	to	life	and	practices	across	borders	
and	space.	They	acknowledge	the	processional	nature	of	transnational	migrant	life,	with	its	
ebbs	and	flows	“in	response	to	particular	incidents	and	crises,”	also	specifically	mentioning,	
for	instance,	election	cycles.		
Studying	 migrant	 practices	 longitudinally	 reveals	 that	 in	 moments	 of	 crisis	 or	
opportunity,	 even	 those	 who	 have	 never	 identified	 or	 participated	 transnationally,	
but	 who	 are	 embedded	 in	 transnational	 social	 fields,	 may	 become	 mobilized	 into	
action	(Levitt	&	Glick	Schiller,	2004:	192).	
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Such	a	heightened	sense	of	simultaneity	strongly	characterized	the	experiences	of	many	of	
my	 respondents	 during	 this	 tumultuous	 period,	 including	 members	 of	 the	 second	
generation	who	had	 previously	 had	 little	 involvement.	 And	 in	 fact	 it	 took	 shape	with	 an	
intensity	that	was	not	the	case	before	or	after	this	period.	It	was	perhaps	most	intense	in	
the	 lives	 of	 those	 for	 whom	 staying	 up‐to‐date	 about	 the	 Iranian	 political	 scene	 was	 a		
professional	preoccupation	as	well	as	an	emotional	one.	Golnoush,	Editor	in	Chief	of	news	
website	Tehran	Bureau	and	one	of	my	respondents,	was	one	of	 these	people.	 In	a	 report	
published	by	NPR	on	June	29th,	Golnoush’s	experience	was	described	in	the	following	way:	
In	 the	 past	 week,	 Niknejad	 has	 barely	 left	 her	 computer.	 She	 is	 completely	
disconnected	from	the	suburban	reality	on	the	other	side	of	her	living	room	window.	
"It's	like	a	screen	to	me.	It's	like	maybe	a	picture	on	the	wall.	What's	happening	here	
doesn't	engage	me	anymore."	Then	pointing	to	her	laptop	screen,	Niknejad	says,	"to	
me	—	that's	what's real right	now."	
The	investment	in	following	the	events	via	social		media	sites	during	the	early	phases	of	the	
post‐election	 chaos	 was	 strongly	 evident	 from	 the	 internet	 practices	 of	 several	 of	 my	
respondents	 during	 this	 time.	 As	 Golnoush	 explains,	 at	 some	 point	 she	 started	 sharing	
information	via	social	media	sites	Facebook	and	Twitter	because	of	 the	constant	updates	
that	 she	did	not	have	 time	 to	process	 comprehensively	 (see	 screenshot	below	 from	 June	
13th,	a	day	after	the	elections).	The	below	screenshots	show	TB’s	page	sharing	information	
received	 from	 trusted	 sources	 inside	 Iran.207	 The	 evocative	 reports	 convey	 the	 sense	 of	
emergency	associated	with	 first‐hand	updates	about	beatings	and	arrests.	Another	of	 the	
images	 shows	a	 screenshot	 of	 someone’s	Twitter	profile	who	 is	 tweeting	 from	 Iran.	This	
was	 one	 of	 the	 English	 language	 Twitter	 users	 who	 my	 second‐generation	 respondent,	
Sepideh,	was	following	and	who	went	by	the	Twitter	handle,	“mahdi.”	After	posting	regular	
tweets	until	three	o’clock	in	the	morning	in	Iran,	mahdi	announces	that	he	is	going	to	sleep	
and	makes	an	appeal	to	his	followers	to	“Please	keep	#IranElection	trending	topic	on	top,”	
																																																								
207	It	is	noteworthy	that	these	reports	also	include	the	status	of	internet	connections	and	access	to	sites	like	
Facebook,	suggesting	the	significance	of	these	sites	in	communicating	information	beyond	press	controls.	
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which	was	something	some	of	my	respondents	tried	to	help	to	do	by	sharing	information	
coming	 from	 the	 scene	 of	 events	 and	using	 the	 hashtag,	#IranElection	 as	well	 as	 related	
hashtags.		
Mahdi’s	call	was	indicative	of	how	closely	many	in	the	diaspora	were	following	the	events,	
many	staying	online	until	late	at	night	and	returning	online	again	early	in	the	morning.	The	
English	language	postings	contributed	to	keeping	the	Iranian	election	trending.	The	reports	
on	Twitter	started	to	significantly	slow	down	in	the	middle	of	the	night,	Tehran	time.	This	
sense	of	following	Tehran	time	enhanced	the	sense	of	simultaneity	despite	the	9	hour	time	
difference	from	LA.	Beeta’s	status	update	on	Facebook	on	June	14th	(also	below)	states	that	
she	 “has	 an	 intense	headache	 that	 pounds	 harder	 every	 time	 she	 reads	 the	 news”	 about	
Iran.	This	physically	embodied	sense	of	empathy	that	ties	my	respondents’	lives	to	those	of	
people	in	Iran	reinforces	a	sense	of	simultaneity	in	the	heated	circumstances.		
	
Figure	14	Screenshot	from	Twitter.	Tehran	Bureau's	account	updating	minute	to	minute,	June	2009	
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Figure	15	Tehran	Bureau	Facebook	page	from	June		2009	
	
	
Figure	16	Updates	on	TB	Facebook	page	about	circumstances	(with	police)	in	parts	of	the	city	in	Tehran	and	
plans	for	upcoming	protest	June	2009	
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Figure	17	Plea	from	key	Tweeter	for	other	users	to	keep	hashtag	#IranElection	a	trending	topic	on	Twitter,	June	
2009	
	
	
Figure	18	Popular	Tweeter	announcing	taking	a	break	for	sleep,	June	2009	
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Figure	19	Popular	Tweeter	announcing	going	offline	to	avoid	police	home	satellite	dish	inspections,	June	2009	
	
Figure	20	Beeta's	status	update	on	Facebook	and	response	from	a	friend,	June	2009	
Additionally,	 my	 own	 experience	 following	 the	 followers	 of	 these	 events	 online	 was	
inevitably	also	shaped	by	the	intensity	of	the	developments.	It	seemed	this	was	suddenly	so	
close	 and	 such	 an	 urgent	 part	 of	 everyday	 life	 in	 LA	 despite	 the	 obvious	 geographical	
distance.	I	found	the	notion	of	 living	in	the	“headspace”	of	Iran	very	pertinent	during	this	
time	–	an	expression	one	of	my	respondents	had	once	used	to	speak	about	being	in	a	place	
while	 staying	 up	 to	 date	 about	 another	 via	 regular	 internet	 news.	 Internet	 news	 outlets	
came	 to	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 forming	 a	 “transnational	 imaginary”	 that	 Horst	 and	
Panagakos	 take	 from	 Sarah	Mahler’s	 work	 on	 transnational	 telephone	 use	 and	 apply	 to	
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internet.	As	Mahler	argues	about	poor	lines	of	transnational	communication,	the	imaginary	
is	created	as	much	through	what	is	not	conveyed	via	media	as	by	what	is.	In	this	period	a	
great	deal	of	digital	media	content	was	conveyed,	and	therefore	this	 imaginary	came	into	
sharp	 relief,	 became	 urgent,	 and	 lived	 as	 immersive	 by	 a	 large	 number	 of	 people	 in	 the	
diaspora	all	at	once	and	together.	With	attention	to	what	was	left	out,	I	noted	that	some	of	
my	respondents	were	keenly	aware	of	the	particular	news	filters	through	which	they	were	
coming	to	know	information	about	Iran	during	this	period	and	what	these	were	omitting.		
Pardis	was	a	young	woman	who	came	back	from	Iran	to	her	home	in	LA	during	what	had	
been	a	vacation	that	had	begun	before	the	momentous	election.	Speaking	with	me	after	her	
return	 to	 LA	 days	 prior,	 she	 mentioned	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 news	 media	
environment	inside	Iran	versus	what	she	experienced	upon	return	to	LA.		
I	was	 in	Tehran.	And	I	was	also	in	some	area	of	shomal	(the	north)	for	a	while.	And	
then	we	went	to	Garmsar	which	was	the	total	opposite	of	all	the	stuff	you	see	on	the	
TV.	They	were	dancing	in	the	streets	when	Ahmadinejad	was	elected	and	even	before	
the	 election	 there	were	 so	many	 people,	 young	 people	 of	my	 age,	 older	 people,	 so	
many	people	advocating	 for	Ahmadinejad.	And	the	TV	and	media	here	doesn’t	even	
show	that.	And	if	I	wasn’t	in	Iran	I	wouldn’t	even	believe	that.	And	if	I	didn’t	go	to	Iran	
I	would	have	been	one	of	those	people	on	the	streets	protesting	for	us	to	have	foreign	
intervention	and	for	America	to	go	and	help	Iran	and	do	this	and	that.	But	when	you	
go	 there	 and	 see	 that	 these	 people	 don’t	 really	 want	 a	 revolution,	 maybe	 not	 yet	
anyway,	you’re	not	going	to	go	stand	on	the	side	of	the	street	with	those	people	here	
because	 you	 know	 that	 those	 people	 there	 don’t	 really	want	 that	 yet.	 If	 I	wouldn’t	
have	gone	to	Iran,	I	wouldn’t	have	known	that.	I	would	have	just	gone	on	whatever	I	
see	on	TV,	I	wouldn’t	have	really	delved	deeper	to	find	a	better	answer,	because	CNN	
and	all	these	TV	outlets	were	showing	what	they	showed.	And	I	think	a	lot	of	people	
don’t	 really	use	 their	 resources	 to	 really	delve	deeper.	Only	because	 I	went	 to	 Iran,	
during	this	time,	when	I	came	back	I	have	a	different	outlook	on	that.	Maybe	in	that	
way	my	image	changed,	because	I	thought	whenever	there	would	arise	a	chance	for	a	
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revolution	 to	 come	 about	 and	 kick	 this	 regime	 out,	 I	 thought	 everybody	would	 be	
united	and	everybody	would	want	 it.	even	 in	 Iran	and	outside.	 I	 thought	everybody	
would	want	it.	But	that’s	really	not	the	case.	It’s	really	not	the	case.		
Justin	was	another	person	who	actively	 supported	 the	green	movement,	but	also	viewed	
the	mainstream	news	coverage	 in	 the	US	as	 reflecting	double	 standards	and	mainstream	
American	political	agendas	with	regard	to	the	Middle	East.		
I	 think	media	images	of	Muslims	have	improved	very	little	since	the	aftermath	of	9‐
11.	 Even	 though	 coverage	 of	 Iranian	 protesters	may	 seem	 like	 an	 improvement	 of	
representation	 of	Muslims,	 coverage	 of	 crackdowns	 of	 Iranian	 protesters	 has	 been	
completely	disproportionate	with	 coverage	of	 the	 recent	deaths	of	Palestinians	 and	
victims	of	US	drone	attacks	in	Pakistan	to	name	a	few.		It	seems	the	media	only	gives	
legitimacy	to	struggles	in	the	Muslim	world	that	oppose	US	targeted	regimes.	
In	 both	 these	 cases,	 the	 social	 media	 and	 broader	 internet	 usage	 that	 shaped	 the	
experiences	 of	 my	 respondents	 so	 strongly	 during	 this	 time	 was	 accompanied	 by	 their	
exposure	 to	 convention	media	 (state	media	 and	 corporate	news)	 inside	 Iran	and	 the	US.	
What	 I	 gathered	 from	 these	 instances	 was	 how	 transnational	 imaginaries	 were	 indeed	
formed	through	internet.	But	these	were	not	separate	from	or	seen	as	more	important	than	
the	 imaginaries	 formed	 through	 my	 respondents’	 experiences	 in	 their	 wider	 (media)	
environment.	 There	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 emotional	 closeness	 that	 comes	 with	 forming	 a	 vivid	
imaginary	about	Iran	through	various	 images	and	messages,	 including	internet.	However,	
as	 the	 responses	 of	 some	 illustrate,	 these	 young	 people	 also	 show	 awareness	 of	 the	
mediation	 through	 which	 their	 emotional	 sense	 of	 proximity	 to	 Iranians	 inside	 Iran	 is	
fashioned,	 giving	 them	 the	 idea	 that	 the	media	 representations	 are	 slightly	 distorted	 or	
colored	by	 the	media	 forms	 themselves.	My	respondents	 feel	emotionally	 invested	 in	 the	
events	in	Iran,	and	this	brings	a	sense	of	immediacy,	intimacy,	and	closeness.	But	there	is	
also	 a	 distance	 –	 politically,	 geographically,	 and	 socially	 –	 felt	 by	 these	 young	 diaspora	
actors	between	themselves	and	those	in	Iran	which	is	greater	for	them	due	to	being	a	part	
of	a	generation	that	is	aware	of	their	physical	but	also	mental	disconnect	with	that	context.	
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And	while	there	is	an	intense	sentiment	of	sharing	a	common	fortune	with	those	Iranians	
across	 borders,	 the	 place	 where	 one’s	 everyday	 life	 is	 lived	 means	 it	 still	 matters	
profoundly	whether	one	 is	“there”	or	not.	This	duality	raises	a	 tension.	That	 is,	 there	 is	a	
sense	of	immediacy	and	intimacy	that	connects	my	respondents	to	a	transnational	Iranian	
nation	through	their	media	usage,	but	there	is	also	a	lack	of	immediacy	due	to	the	apparent	
failures	 of	 a	 technologically	 mediated	 telepresence	 to	 deliver	 a	 substitute	 for	 physical	
presence.	I	explore	this	tension	further	in	the	following	parts	of	this	section,	looking	closely	
at	narratives	about	the	extent	to	which	web	usage	overcomes	various	kinds	of	distance.	 I	
do	this	by	focusing	on	examples	from	web	journalism	productions,	which	I	showed	here	to	
be	 a	 central	 source	of	 information	 about	 Iran	 for	my	 respondents	 at	 this	 time.	 I	 hope	 to	
develop	 the	 argument	 that	moments	 of	 immediacy	 rise	 and	 fade	 as	my	 respondents	 act	
within	this	environment	during	 this	key	period	In	these	moments	people	have	a	sense	of	
“being	 there”	 –	 as	 though	 physical	 presence	would	be	 the	 same.	 But	 these	moments	 are	
fleeting,	 and	 doubts	 quickly	 set	 in	 as	 the	 developments	 become	 more	 complicated	 and	
audiences	diversify	their	media	usage.		
	
Distances	and	bridges	
Tehran	 Bureau	 was	 named	 the	 first	 “Virtual	 Bureau”	 on	 Iran,	 as	 it	 was	 not	 located	 in	
Tehran	itself,	but	was	set	up	by	Golnoush	Niknejad	based	in	New	York	and	has	individuals	
writing	 from	 inside	 Iran,	 sometimes	 under	 pseudonyms,	 sometimes	 under	 their	 real	
names.	 A	 second‐generation	 Iranian	 American	 who	 grew	 up	 in	 the	 LA	 area	 and	 is	 a	
graduate	of	Colombia	University’s	School	of	 Journalism,	Golnoush	points	out	how	Tehran	
Bureau’s	 status	 of	 being	 located	 outside	 Iran	 but	 operating	 in	 part	 inside	 the	 country	 is	
new,	uncertain,	and	experimental.		
I	 stay	 up	 at	 night	 wondering	 whether	 what	 we’re	 doing	 is	 legal.	 We	 want	 to	 be	
credible	and	have	good	connections.	Good,	so	that	we	should	be	able	to	get	a	quote	
from	people	about	something	important	when	it	happens.	The	problem	is	that	when	I	
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wanted	 to	get	credentials	 for	our	correspondent	 in	 Iran,	 they	 told	me	 that	we	were	
not	 registered	anywhere	under	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 any	 laws	because	of	 the	 fact	 that	
our	agency	was	online.	They	didn’t	see	us	as	a	legitimate	agency	because	of	our	online	
publishing	rather	 than	print	publishing.	But	despite	 this,	one	of	our	correspondents	
says	 that	he	want	 to	go	 to	 Iran	and	write	 for	us	even	 though	there	may	perhaps	be	
problems	with	Ershad	[Ministry	of	Culture	and	Islamic	Guidance].		
What	 surprises	 me	 at	 times	 is	 that	 sometimes	 people	 think	 certain	 things	 are	 not	
controversial.	 There	 is	 one	 woman	 who	 often	 tells	 me	 that	 to	 her	 writing	 about	
certain	 things	 is	 fine,	 even	 when	 I	 think	 it	 might	 be	 problematic.	 She	 was	 writing	
about	 certain	 taboo	 topics	 that	 I	 thought	 serious	 enough	 to	mention	 to	 her	 that	 it	
might	cause	problems	for	her	being	in	Iran.	But	she	said	it	was	okay	and	didn’t	see	it	
as	a	big	deal.	Another	correspondent	wanted	 to	know	whether	 it’s	dangerous	 to	be	
doing	certain	reports,	but	I	have	to	just	tell	him	that	I	don’t	know	how	dangerous	it	
will	be	because	these	things	are	up	in	the	air	right	now.	
Golnoush’s	 account	 recognizes	 the	 barriers	 and	 boundaries	 of	 operating	 transnationally	
between	Iran	and	the	US.	It	represents	much	more	than	a	free	flow	of	unedited	information	
directly	from	“the	ground”	through	“new	media”	to	outside	audiences.	Rather,	it	represents	
a	 committed	 engagement	 with	 legal	 and	 socio‐political	 restrictions	 on	 one	 side	 of	 the	
border,	 and	 an	 engagement	 with	 policy	 frameworks	 and	 standards	 of	 journalistic	
credibility	 on	 the	 other.	 	 This	 engagement	 and	 its	 formal	 ambiguities	 is	 what	 keeps	
Golnoush	up	at	night	as	it	has	consequences	for	her	work	and	for	the	correspondents	inside	
Iran	who	contribute	to	TB.	Her	trust	relationship	with	correspondents	and	her	relationship	
with	Iranian	government	agencies	impinges	upon	her	life	as	an	editor	and	journalist	based	
in	the	US.		
It	is	also	interesting	that	these	strictures	shift	when	she	moves,	depending	on	the	country	
where	she	is	located.	This	was	apparent	from	her	statements	on	the	panel,	“Production	of	
Diasporic	Media:	Entertainment	&	 Journalism”	at	 the	2012	annual	Conference	on	 Iranian	
Diaspora	organized	by	IAAB	at	the	UCLA	campus	in	LA.	She	mentions	that,	having	moved	
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for	a	while	to	Abu	Dhabi	and	Dubai	in	order	to	cover	the	elections,	that	“the	censorship	was	
amazing	there,”	while	trying	to	cover	Iran.	“The	closer	you	got	to	Iran,	the	harder	it	was	to	
cover	 it,”	 Golnoush	 said	 of	 doing	 2009	 election	 coverage.	 The	 landscape	 of	 controls	 is	
therefore	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 the	 journalistic	 production	 of	 someone	 like	 Golnoush,	
despite	operating	outside	 Iran.	While	 she	 is	able	 to	publish	 stories	digitally	 from	outside	
the	country	with	relative	freedom	from	direct	government	reprisal,	the	locations	she	is	in	
and	her	connections	to	those	physically	located	inside	the	country	bring	their	own	forms	of	
control	and	concern.	Rather	than	being	immune	to	state	influence	because	of	the	“virtual”	
status	 of	 TB,	 Golnoush	 and	 the	 journalists	 that	 work	 for	 TB	 are	 subjected	 to	 the	
consequences	of	censorship.	As	she	was	quoted	as	saying	in	an	NPR	report	written	about	
her	and	TB	and	published	during	the	height	of	events	on	June	29th,	"Oh,	I	have	nightmares	
every	 night,	 and	 I	 wake	 up	 several	 times	 just	 kind	 of	 gasping	 for	 air.	 I	 hope	 people	 are	
OK."208		
Golnoush’s	 concerns	 are	 hardly	 unfounded.	 The	 consequences	 for	 Iranian	 American	
journalists	working	 for	American	publications	and	making	visits	 to	 Iran	were	made	clear	
during	this	period	by	the	cases	of	Roxana	Saberi,	an	Iranian	American	journalist	who	has	
been	a	contributor	for	NPR,	BBC,	and	other	outlets,	and	who	was	arrested	before	the	2009	
elections	 and	 imprisoned	 for	 a	 duration	 of	 approximately	 five	 months	 on	 charges	 of	
espionage	 (released	 in	 the	 run‐up	 to	 the	 elections)	 before	 going	 on	 hunger	 strike	 and	
garnering	a	great	deal	of	international	support	and	pressure	on	the	Iranian	government209.	
Maziar	Bahari,	an	Iranian	American	reporter	 for	Newsweek,	was	 then	also	detained	after	
the	elections	during	his	visit	to	Iran	in	2009.	He	was	held	in	solitary	confinement,	tortured,	
interrogated,	 and	 forced	 to	 give	 a	 false	 confession	 before	 being	 released	 after	
approximately	4	months.	He	was	also	held	on	(multiple)	charges	of	espionage.	TB	also	did	
coverage	of	Saberi	and	Bahari’s	detentions	and	 the	aftermath	thereof	as	well	as	by	other	
																																																								
208	Smith,	Tovia,	“Tehran	Bureau:	Live	from	Massachusetts”		
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105929814	(accessed	1/12/14).	
209	Including	from	human	rights	organizations	like	Amnesty,	the	US	government,	various	high	profile	news	
editors	and	journalistic	organizations.  
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international	 press.	 During	 this	 time,	 the	 attack	 on	 TB	 was	 a	 digital	 one	 targeting	 the	
website.	The	site	experienced	an	attack	by	an	unknown	source	at	a	time	when	its	reporting	
was	particularly	 important	 to	 international	audiences	and	events	were	escalating	 in	 Iran.	
This	can	be	attributed	to	its	significant	reporting	from	inside	the	country	and	analysis	for	
English	speaking	news	audiences.	This	was	responded	to	by	TB	with	a	call	for	Ddos	attack	
on	regime	websites	(see	below).		
The	detention	of	 the	 journalists	mentioned	 and	others	 suggests	 that	 their	 presence	 is	 of	
consequence	 to	 the	 type	 of	 coverage	 events	 inside	 Iran	 receive	 from	 the	 international	
Western	press.	Reporters	Without	Borders	stated	that	as	of	June	20,	the	government	had	
arrested	 at	 least	 24	 reporters,	 and	 Iran’s	 asking	 of	 foreign	 journalists	 to	 leave	 and	
restricting	visas	usually	 issued	to	journalists	outside	the	country	indicated	a	wider	policy	
that	saw	foreign	journalism	as	a	direct	threat	during	the	aftermath	of	the	election.	The	fact	
that	 these	 individuals’	 safety	 and	 freedom	 curbed	 so	 that	 they	 cease	 their	 activities	
suggests	 that	 there	 is	 some	 specific	 value	 to	 physically	 “being	 there”	 and	 having	
correspondents	in	Iran.	Therefore,	this	model	apparently	offers	something	that	relying	on	
citizen	journalism	and	crowd	sourced	information	does	not.	Golnoush	explains	her	position	
with	regard	to	journalistic	controls	from	a	distance	in	the	following	way.		
Whether	we	live	here	or	in	Iran,	we’re	always	subjecting	ourselves	to	some	kind	of	
censorship.	It	comes	in	many	forms	–	we’re	all	familiar	with	it.	And	I	got	tired	of	us	
all	speaking	in	code	to	each	other	so	that	we’re	not	rude	to	this	person,	or	we	don’t	
get	someone	killed	back	there,	or	so	we	can	still	continue	to	go	back	to	Iran.	So	I	see	
my	 being	 here	 and	 not	 going	 back	 to	 Iran	 as	 actually	 an	 advantage	 and	 not	 a	
disadvantage.	And	by	creating	a	window	onto	Iran,	in	a	way	we’re	giving	it	a	frame	
and	a	focus	that	we	don’t	get	here.	And	when	you’re	in	Iran,	you	don’t	know	how	the	
world	is	seeing	you;	you	don’t	know	in	what	language	to	speak	to	them.		
This	 positioning	 reflects	 Golnoush’s	 complex	 relationship	 with	 mobility,	 information,	
borders/boundaries,	 and	 transnational	 migration	 –	 one	 that	 is	 experienced	 by	 other	
bloggers/journalists	 in	 the	 Iranian	 diaspora	 as	 well.	 By	 resigning	 herself	 to	 travel	
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constraints	that	prevent	her	from	entering	Iran,	Golnoush	sees	not	only	an	advantage	with	
regard	to	her	own	safety,	but	also	an	advantage	in	the	freedom	she	has	in	the	content	of	her	
work	as	a	 journalist	covering	Iran.	 In	addition,	her	embedding	within	the	American	news	
landscape	 and	 its	 most	 high	 profile	 institutions	 brings	 weight	 and	 relevance	 to	 the	
reporting	TB	does.	Her	 situation	 is	 nonetheless	 a	 trade‐off	between	her	 communications	
and	her	physical	mobility.	
	
Figure	21	From	TB	Facebook	page,	June	2009	
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The	privilege	of	being	able	to	consume	information	from	a	distance	via	internet	therefore	
relies	on	the	work	of	those	who	subject	themselves	to	the	limitations	and	sometimes	
punishments	that	come	with	offering	others	a	sense	of	proximity	without	physically	“being	
there.”	For	some,	journalistic	websites	help	bridge	distances	with	information	access,	even	
as	distances	and	borders	exert	themselves	on	the	actors	that	produce	these	sites.	
Bakardjieva’s	work	on	internet	technologies	helps	to	understand	how	absences	and	
presence	is	manipulated	with	the	help	of	the	notion	of	amplification/reduction	
(Bakardjieva,	2005).	This	means	that	technological	mediation	involves	the	reduction	of	
some	aspects	of	the	mediated	object	while	amplifying	others.	For	example,	as	Bakardjieva	
describes,	“the	person	experienced	through	the	telephone	is	brought	to	me	across	a	great	
distance	[amplification]	at	the	expense	of	being	reduced	to	a	voice	[reduction]”	(2005:	60).	
In	the	case	of	internet	in	Golnoush’s	TB	website,	like	much	of	the	social	media	usage	that	
the	project	was	integrated	with,	internet	amplifies	the	reports	for	audiences	outside	the	
country	on	the	events	in	Iran.	Golnoush	answers	a	question	about	how	important	web	use	
is	to	the	work	she	does	by	saying,	“Immensely…	we	wouldn’t	be	able	to	do	what	we’re	
doing	at	all	without	Internet.”	Her	work	both	circumvents	political	and	geographical	
boundaries/distances	while	also	bringing	them	into	sharp	relief;210	web	applications	help	
information	and	news	stories	to	cross	geo‐political	borders	while	the	controls	they	
circumvent	are	exerted	upon	the	correspondents.	This	is	also	an	illustration	of	the	
following	quote	from	migration	scholars	Basch	et	al.	that	highlight	the	(un)bounded‐ness	of	
transnational	communications.		
Much	like	transnational	migrants,	information	and	communication	technologies	can	
be	bounded	by	national	laws	that	govern	their	usage	yet	at	the	same	time	they	also	
																																																								
210	This	has	to	do	with	the	physical	infrastructure	of	internet	that	relies	on	geographical	topography	to	
facilitate	the	laying	of	fibre	optic	cables	stretching	long,	underwater	distances.	The	reason	why	Iran	can	keep	
a	stronghold	on	internet	access	to	the	extent	that	it	does	is	partly	possible	simply	because	of	the	way	the	
physical	infrastructure	is	set	up:	there	are	a	few	entry‐points	that	can	be	put	under	pressure.	This	is	in	
contrast	to	a	country	like	the	US	that	has	many	more	points	of	entry,	making	it	more	difficult	to	control	access	
in	a	centralized	way	(see	The	Net	of	Elsewhere).		
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remain	‘unbounded’	as	they	are	appropriated	to	suit	a	variety	of	aims	(Basch,	
Schiller,	&	Blanc,	1994	cited	in	Panagakos	&	Horst,	2006:	113).	
Golnoush’s	editorial	and	journalistic	work	is	made	possible	by	particular	affordances	of	her	
use	of	a	website	for	news	publishing,	but	come	at	the	price	of	uncertainty	and	limited‐/im‐
mobility.	The	particular	affordances	that	appear	through	her	usage	include	staying	out	of	
reach	of	attacks	by	the	Iranian	authorities	in	ways	that	other	established	news	agencies	
with	employed	correspondents	were	not	able	to	do.	In	the	following	I	discuss	further	how	
key	figures	like	Golnoush	and	their	use	of	web	applications	at	this	time	bridged	distances	in	
certain	ways	that	were	unique	to	the	intersection	between	their	positioning	and	their	use	
of	journalistic	web	publishing	and	editing.		
	
Transnational	cultural	translation	
As	the	weeks	passed,	the	protests	died	down,	and	the	analysis	of	the	events	and	the	back‐
stage	politics	within	the	Islamic	Republic	came	to	the	fore.	The	Green	Movement	seemed	to	
enter	a	different	stage,	and	as	international	mainstream	broadcast	attention	shifted	to	
other	events.	Twitter	and	Facebook	feeds	of	my	respondents	quieted	down	regarding	the	
developments	and	emphasis	moved	to	analysis,	reflection,	and	the	next	steps.	The	
following	is	an	excerpt	from	field	research	blog	I	was	writing	at	the	time	from	a	piece	I	
posted	some	months	on.	It	was	entitled	“Translating	a	Movement”:	
A	few	days	ago,	blogger	Omid	Memarian	told	me	a	story	about	the	day	after	the	June	
elections	this	year.	As	someone	who	knows	pretty	much	all	the	major	news	agencies’	
Iran	correspondents,	he	called	one	of	these	colleagues	(based	in	the	US)	and	started	
talking	animatedly	about	his	analysis	of	 the	events.	The	 journalist	on	 the	other	end	
sounded	confused.	He	listened	but	didn’t	have	much	to	say.	Forty	Eight	hours	passed.	
It	was	 only	 then	 that	 the	 journalist	 friend	 started	 to	 feel	 he	 had	 grasped	what	 had	
happened	after	the	elections,	how,	and	why,	and	called	Omid	back.	Omid	said	his	own	
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lack	 of	 time‐lag	was	due	 to	 his	 close	 embedding	 in	 the	political	 context	 of	 Iran.	He	
explained	 that	 blogs	 like	 his	 own,	 which	 provided	 immediate	 English	 language	
commentary	on	the	events	in	Iran	from	a	real	insider’s	perspective,	fulfilled	a	unique	
role	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 election	 turmoil.	 They	 were	 the	 translators.	
	
Many	young	second	generation	Iranians	I’ve	been	talking	to	are	aware	of	this	need	for	
translation.	And	English	language	blogs	and	websites	are	where	several	of	them	look	
to	find	it.	But	it	happens	offline	too.	Nothing	exemplified	this	for	me	more	than	when	
we	rounded	up	a	bunch	of	friends,	first	and	second	generation	students,	and	went	to	
watch	 Khamenei’s	 fateful	 post‐election	 speech	 together	 in	Westwood.	 The	 running	
commentary	of	the	meanings	behind	the	“leader’s”	words	was	for	the	benefit	of	those	
second	generation	kids	who	were	deeply	 interested	–	enough	to	be	there	that	night	
till	 3	 in	 the	 morning	 –	 but	 would	 have	 been	 lost	 without	 translation.		
	
The	political	actions	and	stances	of	these	second	generation	kids	show	awareness	of	
their	own	distance	from	the	complexities	of	the	developments	in	Iran.	But	this	doesn’t	
mean	they’re	passive.	Student	organizers	I	spoke	with	were	clear	about	their	support	
for	and	solidarity	with	 the	demonstrators	of	 the	green	movement	 in	 Iran...	 It	seems	
the	important	links	between	them	are	sources	closely	entrenched	in	both	the	Iranian	
and	diaspora	contexts	‐	the	virtual	bureaus	and	journalistic	blogs	of	those	first	(and	
some	 1.5)	 generation	 individuals	 who	 have	 gained	 status	 as	 translators	 for	 this	
movement.211	
The	YouTube	videos	 that	 took	hold	of	 the	 emotions	of	 so	many	of	 the	onlookers	outside	
Iran	were	 slowly	 replaced	 by	 the	more	 subtle	 analyses	 of	 the	 political	 intricacies	 of	 the	
changing	situation	in	Iranian	politics	and	the	key/emerging	players	at	the	time.	The	videos	
of	 street	 protests	 filmed	 by	 participants	 or	 “citizen	 journalists”	 were	 the	 initial	 media	
																																																								
211 Alinejad,Donya,	“Translating	a	movement,”	http://donya‐onlocation.blogspot.nl/2009/11/translating‐
movement.html	(accessed	1/12/14) 
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products	that	drew	the	attention	of	international	press	and	audiences	worldwide	and	what	
they	 showed	 was	 generally	 very	 dramatic	 and	 spectacular	 images	 from	 the	 scenes	 of	
protest	and	the	responding	crackdown	in	Tehran	streets	–	including	a	great	deal	of	violence	
against	 the	 bodies	 of	 protesters	 and	 the	 often	 surreptitious	 capturing	 of	 this	 in	 amateur	
video	 recordings.	 These	 videos	 mobilized	 strong	 emotions.	 In	 part	 this	 was	 due	 to	 the	
immediacy	conveyed	by	the	amateur	style	(often	shot	from	street	level	within	the	protests	
or	people’s	apartment	buildings	with	their	commentary	to	one	another),	the	often	dramatic	
urgency	of	the	subject	matter,	and	the	fact	that	these	visual	accounts	constituted	a	sea	of	
footage	uploaded	and	shared	via	social	media	applications	during	this	period.	This	sense	of	
immediacy	 via	 the	digital	 audio‐visual	 recordings	 also	 came	 from	of	 the	 lack	of	 need	 for	
translation.	 It	 seemed	 to	 reveal	 the	 nature	 of	 what	 was	 happening	 with	 unmistakable	
clarity.	 There	 was	 a	 veneration	 of	 those	 who	 were	 doing	 this	 journalism,	 and	 their	
integration	with	their	mobile,	networked	electronics	devices	that	were	allowing	them	to	do	
so.	One	of	the	most	popular	political	cartoons	that	circulated	on	Facebook	at	this	time	was	
the	one	below:		
	
Figure	22	Widely	circulated	political	cartoon	highlighting	role	of	social	media	in	the	movement,	captured	in	June	
2009	
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This	 cartoon	was	 also	 referenced	 by	Mahasti	 Afshar	 in	 her	 talk	 on	 the	 panel	mentioned	
earlier.	She	commented	at	the	time	that,	“the	green	movement	tagline	has	become	‘you	are	
the	media’.”	 The	 narrative	 that	 people	 are,	 themselves,	 the	media	 in	 this	 context	 was	 a	
recurrent	element	of	the	mainstream	coverage	of	the	events	in	the	press	that	most	of	those	
in	LA	had	access	to.	This	seemed	also	to	contribute	to	the	sense	of	immediacy	around	the	
coverage	 –	 the	 notion	 that	 people	 were	 acting	 as	 conveyers	 of	 their	 own	 situation.	 The	
videos	also	started	to	become	more	diverse	in	content	as	the	actions	did	–	they	included	the	
night	actions	between	the	daytime	street	protest	moments.		
However,	 for	 some,	 these	 videos	 revealed	 as	 much	 as	 they	 concealed.	 Namely,	 as	 the	
protests	 were	 increasingly	 deterred	 ‐	 precisely	 by	 this	 concerted	 violent	 crackdown	 by	
authorities	‐	less	of	these	protest	images	were	produced	and	the	attention	for	these	videos	
dropped	 as	 less	 visually‐spectacular	 dynamics	 such	 as	 backroom	 deals,	 parliamentary	
politics,	 divergences	 within	 various	 government	 agencies	 about	 the	 developments	 and	
other	 ambiguities	 became	 more	 important	 for	 understanding	 the	 events.	 Amitis	 was	
skeptical	of	the	kind	of	news	that	the	video	footage	of	street	protests	was	able	to	highlight.	
She	said:	
Online,	when	 you	 see	 stuff	 it’s	 decontextualized.	And	people	 are	 drawn	 to	 certain	
images;	hyper‐exaggerated	images,	not	the	mundane;	not	the	day	to	day.	But	those	
[the	latter]	are	the	things	that	are	creating	change.		
This	 concern	 by	 Amitis	 reflects	 her	 awareness	 of	 the	 particular	 affordances	 of	 web	
applications	like	YouTube	and	Twitter		(with	their	focus	on	the	visual	and	on	instantaneity	
and	brevity)	and	how	these	may	 limit	 the	access	she	and	others	outside	 Iran	have	 to	 the	
developments.	 Amitis	 was	 not	 alone	 in	 her	 skepticism	 of	 how	 social	media	 applications	
were	mediating	 the	 events.	 Some	of	my	 respondents	 started	 commenting	 that	 their	own	
and	 their	 friends’	Facebook	 feeds	had	become	 “echo‐chambers”	 that	 lacked	much	critical	
analysis,	 reflection,	 or	 accurate	 and	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 what	 was	 going	 on.	 One	
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second‐generation	young	woman	commented	that	her	university	department	mailing	 list,	
in	fact,	was	a	more	fruitful	space	for	thinking	about	the	events	than	Facebook	during	this	
period.				
Regarding	 understanding	 the	 events	 and	 their	 implications,	 I	 found	 at	 the	 time	 that	 ‐	 as	
mentioned	in	the	blog	post	I	wrote	then	–	the	role	of	translators	quickly	became	important	
in	 the	 midst	 of	 these	 events.	 Omid	 Memarian	 was	 one	 of	 TB’s	 contributors	 and	 an	
influential	political	journalist/blogger	on	Iran	living	in	the	diaspora	whom	I	also	mentioned	
in	my	 blog	 post	 included	 above.	 He	 elaborated	 during	 this	 period	 on	 the	 importance	 of	
interpreting	the	events	in	Iran	for	international	audiences,	emphasizing	the	importance	of	
longer‐term	cultural	knowledge	both	in	the	US	and	Iran.		
For	someone	 like	me	who	is	deeply	 involved	in	 internal	politics	it	was	not	hard	to	
understand	the	politics	of	society	and	the	result.	I	wrote	something	like	a	manual	for	
the	Huffington	Post.	The	next	day	I	called	a	friend	and	I	wanted	a	quote	and	he	was	
shocked	 to	 listen	 to	my	 analysis	 for	 what	 happened.	 It	 took	 42	 hours	 for	 him	 to	
understand.	 The	 Islamic	 republic	 has	 a	 very	 strong	 and	 influential	 propaganda	
machine	 and	 the	 state	 media	 is	 a	 part	 of	 that.	 It’s	 hard	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	
government’s	 narrative.	 Many	 foreign	 journalists,	 I	 am	 friends	 with	 most	 of	 the	
people	who	cover	 Iran,	 from	The	Guardian	etc.,	 they	 [struggle	with]	how	to	verify	
their	interpretation	of	the	events.	They	have	to	be	able	to	understand,	and	many	of	
them	are	in	touch	with	people	like	me	to	understand	the	complexity.	
Omid	 equally	 stressed	 the	 lack	 of	 accurate	 information	 that	 Iranians	 have	 about	 life,	
politics,	 and	 the	media	 in	 the	US,	 saying	 that	 “the	ones”	 like	himself	 “who	are	writing	 in	
Farsi	 and	English	have	a	 change	 to	bridge	both	 sides.”	 In	 their	own	ways	and	with	 their	
own	 projects	 heavily	 relying	 on	 aspects	 of	 digital	 journalism,	 people	 like	 Golnoush	 and	
Omid	 are	 the	 bridges,	 the	 translators,	 the	 trusted	 nodes,	 and	 the	 interpreters	 for	
transnational	 audiences,	 shaping	 the	 conversations	 on	 either	 side	 of	 the	 borders	 they	
traverse	 and	 straddle	 in	 their	 work.	 The	 second	 generation	 had	 been	 drawn	 into	 the	
developments	 through	happenings	 that	needed	no	 translation.	And	 the	engagement	with	
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largely	visual	media	forms,	produced	from	the	vantage	point	of	Tehran’s	street	protesters,	
seemed	the	perfect	way	to	convey	these.	However,	the	sense	of	immediacy	soon	faded	for	
many	of	them.		
This	became	clear	during	a	late	night	I	spent	with	watching	the	Iranian	Supreme	Leader’s	
televised	 speech	with	 some	 first	 and	 some	 second‐generation	 young	 people	 in	 a	 café	 in	
Westwood	that	I	also	mentioned	in	my	blog	posting.	Watching	the	television	mounted	on	
the	wall	on	the	terrace	of	the	café,	members	of	the	second	generation	quickly	realized	they	
required	 translation,	not	only	 linguistic,	but	 contextual	and	sub‐textual	 translation	of	 the	
historical	and	political	dynamics	 in	which	 this	hopeful	movement	 took	shape.	That	night,	
the	 first	generation	 translators	were	active	vehicles	of	 the	message	 for	 the	others.	These	
translators	were	not	only	linguistic	interpreters	for	the	second	generation,	but	also	cultural	
decoders.212		Translators	could	also	be	those	inside	Iran,	family	members	or	trusted	contact	
that	would	relay	developments	aurally	as	in	a	familiar	way	instead	of	 in	the	written	form	
that	 most	 internet	 news	 articles	 that	 much	 Persian	 language	 news	 coverage	 took.	 The	
importance	of	trust	during	this	period	shaped	people’s	ways	of	obtaining	information	from	
outside	the	country,	both	through	internet	and	other	means.	 	Mahdis,	for	instance,	posted	
the	following	on	Facebook	on	June	15th:		
@GEsfandiari	 ‐	 People	 shouting	 in	 Tehran	 now	 on	 rooftops	 "We	 Don't	 Want	 a	
Midget	 Dictator"	 [ostensibly	 referring	 to	 Ahmadinejad]	 Heard	 it	 myself	 over	 the	
phone"	(you	can't	kill	our	humor).	
Others	 also	 used	 social	 media	 updates	 to	 relay	 the	 contact	 they	 had	 via	 trusted	 family	
members	 in	 Iran	about	over	 the	phone.	The	trust	connections	with	those	inside	 Iran	that	
had	 already	 been	 built	 were	 maintained	 habitually	 over	 the	 telephone	 in	 this	 crisis	
situation	where	there	was	a	premium	on	getting	trusted	information	quickly.	This	can	be	
																																																								
212	It	was	significant	that	the	relationship	between	the	first	and	second‐generation	students	I	had	most	
contact	with	became	both	more	pronounced	during	this	time,	as	well	as	polarized	and	fraught	with	
disagreement,	especially,	about	the	role	the	US	should	take.	Alongside	my	observations	in	this	direction,	
Beeta,	one	of	my	respondents	also	confirmed	this	at	the	time.		
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seen	as	the	workings	of	what	Gershon	calls	“media	ideologies”	(2010),	which	are	basically	
the	 ideas	 people	 have	 about	 the	 media	 they	 use	 that	 in	 turn	 shape	 how	 they	 use	 it	
(Gershon,	 2011).	 This	 means	 that	 using	 the	 telephone	 to	 get	 reliable	 information	 from	
loved	ones	or	people	one	knows	in	this	situation	rather	than	via	through	an	avid	Twitter	
user	 they	 do	 not	 know	 suggests	 that	 the	meaning	 people	 give	 to	 different	media	 at	 this	
crucial	time	also	shapes	the	way	they	use	media	and	understand	the	messages	conveyed.	In	
a	 situation	when	 risks	 and	hindrances	associated	with	using	 internet	due	 to	 connections	
being	blocked	and	dissidents	suffering	repression	encouraged,	those	I	spoke	with	turned	to	
the	phone	at	times	as	an	imperfect	but	more	trusted	alternative	–	which	for	some	yielded	
information	 that	 was	 then	 shared	 via	 social	 media	 with	 their	 contacts.	 This	 same	
combination	of	phone	and	social	media	usage	showed	that	social	media	(and	not	phones)	
was	 apparently	 the	 most	 effective	 way	 to	 spread	 the	 information	 gained	 among	 one’s	
network	outside	the	country.		
Twitspam	also	set	up	a	Web	page	titled	“Fake	Iran	election	Tweeters”	during	this	period.	
The	page	listed	“possible	fakes	accounts	and	may	have	connections	to	the	Iranian	Security	
apparatus.”	The	site	added:		
This	post	will	be	updated	as	 fake	accounts	are	received.	For	those	questioning	the	
information	 here,	 we	 place	 accounts	 here	 that	 a)	 post	 multiple	 comments	 of	 the	
same	 sort	 (i.e.,	 spam)	and	b)	 accounts	 that	are	obviously	 trying	 to	 entrap	Twitter	
users	who	are	 tweeting	 from	 Iran	or	 c)	 those	who	obviously	 are	 trying	 to	 spread	
misinformation.	If	we	aren’t	100%	sure	we	will	put	in	it	the	‘Suspected’	list.		
In	 addition	 to	 the	 ostensibly	 fake	 accounts,	 lists	 of	 the	 Twitter	 handles	 of	 a	 number	 of	
apparently	 trustworthy	 users	 inside	 Iran	 were	 circulated.	 These	 were	 passed	 along	 by	
those	who	 had	 no	 knowledge	 of	 the	 posts	 of	 Twitter	 users	 inside	 Iran	 before	 this	 time,	
including	some	of	my	respondents	who	had	not	used	Twitter	before	the	election	turmoil.	
These	 lists	of	Twitter	users	were	also	shared	on	Facebook	given	 that	many	had	different	
(larger)	 networks	 on	 Facebook	 than	 Twitter	 (especially	 new	 users).	 The	 image	 below	
shows	part	of	one	of	these	lists	as	shared	on	Facebook.	This	was	one	of	the	ways	in	which	
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people	 developed	 new	 media	 literacies	 through	 the	 circulating	 of	 knowledge	 about	
(un)trustworthy	 sources.	 In	 this	 instance,	 the	question	of	who	 to	 trust	 and	what	 to	base	
that	 on	 was	 central	 to	 the	 internet/social	 media	 practices	 of	 my	 respondents.	 In	 the	
following	section	I	bring	together	some	of	the	main	points	of	this	section	in	an	attempt	to	
show	 how	 the	 narrative/debate	 around	 the	 possibilities	 of	 presence/proximity	 to	 the	
events	and	people	in	Iran	through	internet	media	was	refracted	through	counter‐narratives	
about	and	usage	of	internet	by	my	respondents.		
	
Figure	23	Facebook	users	posting	popular	and	trusted	Twitter	accounts	for	others	to	follow,	June	2009	
	
This	 has	 implications	 for	 the	 development	 of	 web	 applications	 specifically	 meant	 for	
Iranians	to	use.	The	foremost	and	rather	unique	example	of	this	is	Balatarin.com.	This	site	
was	evidently	highly	useful	in	Iran	during	the	Iranian	post‐election	period	but	also	beyond	
that	period.	Balatarin	was	created	by	Mehdi	Yahyanejad	before	the	2009	election.	Mehdi	is	
an	 Iranian	 American	 living	 in	 LA	 and	 working	 at	 the	 USC	 School	 of	 Engineering.	 As	
Balatarin’s	 example	 of	 international	 solidarity	 shows,	 a	 successful	 technical	 application	
facilitated	 by	 actors	 outside	 Iran	 relies	 on	 knowledge	 of	 the	 particular	 needs	 of	 people	
inside	 Iran	 (in	 this	 case,	 a	 news	 aggregator	 with	 a	 rating	 system).	 Furthermore,	 Mehdi	
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points	to	how	the	uses	that	people	put	applications	to	can	be	instructive	for	those	on	the	
programming	side.	Mehdi	gave	a	talk	on	the	USC	campus	to	an	auditorium	of	mostly	Iranian	
American	 graduate	 students	 in	 2009,	 in	which	he	 referred	 to	 his	 interest	 in	 increasingly	
“localizing”	 the	 possibilities	 of	 internet	 technology.	 Just	 as	 Balatarin	 was	 a	 site	 directed	
specifically	 to	 Iranians,	Mehdi	was	 interested	 in	developing	programs	 that	 facilitated	 the	
even	further	localized	consumption	of	news.	Noting	that	people	blog	about	issues	that	are	
relevant	to	their	immediate	environment,	he	was	interested	in	developing	ways	to	organize	
this	 information	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 user’s	 location	 through	 a	 web‐based,	 mobile	
application.		
To	illustrate	the	value	of	this,	he	used	an	example	he	had	heard	about	in	the	context	of	the	
Iran	protests.	He	described	the	case	of	a	protester	who	wrote	an	account	of	being	attacked	
with	 police	 violence	 during	 a	 peaceful	 protest.	 The	 post	 was	 placed	 on	 Balatarin	 and	
became	 popular.	 Following	 this,	 the	 discussion	 thread	 under	 the	 post	was	 joined	 by	 the	
police	officer	who	had	committed	the	violence	described	in	the	post.	(amazing,	what	did	he	
say?)	The	discussion	that	ensued	gained	extreme	popularity	and	heated	attention	by	users.	
Mehdi	used	this	example	to	 illustrate	how	the	particular	 investment	 in	 local	events	drew	
people	to	want	to	use	 internet	applications	along	those	same	local	 lines,	especially	under	
such	contested	circumstances	as	were	underway	in	Iran	at	the	time.	The	local,	national,	and	
linguistic	 barriers	 to	use	of	Balatarin	were	 further	demonstrated	by	 the	 clear	disconnect	
between	 the	 original	 site	 and	 its	 English	 version.	 After	 its	 immense	 success	 in	 Iran,	 the	
Balatarin	team	and	volunteers	began	to	translate	content	to	English	and	set	up	an	English	
version	of	 the	 site.	However,	 this	 did	 not	 do	nearly	 as	well,	 failing	 to	 garner	but	 a	 small	
fraction	of	 the	usage	of	 the	Farsi	 language	original	and	posting	a	 small	proportion	of	 the	
amount	of	content.		
My	 second‐generation	 respondents	 shared	 the	 Balatarin	 site	 on	 social	 media,	 and	 they	
knew	of	 and	heard	about	 its	 success.	But	most	were	not	users	of	 the	 site	because	of	 the	
language	 barrier	 and,	 as	 some	 told	 me	 during	 the	 time	 that	 their	 speed	 of	 reading	 in	
Persian	was	 too	 slow	 for	 their	passionate	 interest	 in	 the	 reports	 from	 the	events,	 events	
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they	otherwise	heard	 about	 almost	 as	 they	happened,	 demanding	 a	 fast‐paced,	 real‐time	
mode	of	staying	up	to	date	with	changing	information,	such	as	established	English	language	
news	 sources	 that	were	 regularly	 updated	 via	 “liveblogging”	 stints.	 This	 can	 be	 taken	 to	
illustrate	the	limits	of	what	linguistic	translation	can	do	to	bridge	divides	of	transnational	
digital	 communication,	 as	 the	 focus	 on	 locational	 technologies	 in	 the	 design	 of	 new	
applications	 reflects	 the	 sustained	 relevance	 of	 locally–oriented	 internet	 communication.	
The	example	of	Mehdi,	Balatarin,	and	the	mostly	diaspora	users	of	the	site	on	the	surface	
present	 a	 successful	 practical	 model	 for	 how	 the	 “people‐to‐people	 diplomacy”	 idea	 is	
assumed	 to	 work	 with	 the	 help	 of	 internet.	 However,	 this	 instance	 also	 reveals	 the	
importance	of	Balatarin’s	embedding	in	the	news	landscape	in	Iran	during	this	important	
time,	thanks	to	its	popular	user	base	built	beforehand.	Furthermore,	 it	also	reveals	socio‐
linguistic	boundaries	and	how	these	are	reflected	in	technical	issues.		
The	assumptions	behind	the	US’	people‐to‐people	approaches	to	state	diplomacy	therefore	
neutralize	the	meaning	of	“internet	freedom”	by	reducing	it	to	a	technological	principle	and	
in	so	doing	depoliticize	internet	control.	This	is	how	the	directive	of	“internet	freedom”	for	
Iran	 comes	 to	 operate	 as	 an	 apparently	 exceptional	 mode	 of	 US	 diplomacy,	 dissociated	
from	 the	 otherwise	 often‐hostile	 policy	 stances.	 It	 serves	 the	 narrative	 that	 internet	
represents	 an	 essentially	 an	 unmediated	 form	 of	 communication	 between	 people	 in	 the	
West	and	those	living	under	repressive	regimes.	This	obscures	the	accepted	understanding	
among	 internet	 researchers	 that	 internet	 is	 subject	 to	 power	 structures	 like	 any	
communications	media	and	its	built	infrastructure	is	(Flew,	2008).	While	Hilary	Clinton	has	
acknowledged	 that	 internet	 is	 a	 “tool”	 that	 can	 be	 used	 towards	 positive	 or	 detrimental	
ends	in	society	and	has	no	necessary	effect	on	democratic	freedoms,	there	is	still	a	strong	
assumption	 in	 policy	 and	 discourse	 that	 freedom	 of	 information	 relies	 on	 “internet	
freedom.213	 Bridging	 the	 digital	 divide	 and	 notions	 of	 internet	 freedom	 are	 often	
																																																								
213	In	the	case	of	the	US’	21st	Century	Statecraft,	this	issue	came	under	particular	scrutiny	around	the	US	State	
Department’s	harsh	reaction	to	the	Wikileaks	operations	of	leaking	secret	government	documents.	There	was	
also	a	good	deal	of	attention	around	this	time	for	the	hacktivist	network,	The	Pirates	Bay,	and	the	work	they	
were	doing	toward	helping	people	in	Iran	to	secure	access	to	internet.	This	was	a	dispersed	group	that	some	
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internationally	 seen	 and	 publicly	 presented	 as	 a	 neutral	 agenda.	 Yet	 adapting	 Franklin’s	
statements	 on	 digital	 divides:	 closing	 the	 divide	 cannot	 be	 done	 in	 a	 politically	
universalistic	 way	 as	 it	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 technical	 and	 representational	 divide.	 What	
constitutes	it	is	also	sociocultural	and	political	economic.		
Nevertheless,	narratives	of	people‐to‐people	diplomacy	 through	digital	media	enjoy	wide	
public	 appeal,	 and	 so	 government	 diplomacy	 and	 citizen	 solidarity	 appear	 to	 merge	 to	
some	 extent	 under	 21st	 Century	 Statecraft,214	 However,	 I	 showed	 how	 the	 influential	
Iranian	American	organizations	 like	NIAC	respond	 to	 the	 “virtual”	diplomacy	by	pointing	
out	 that	 it	 cannot	 replace	 real	 and	 genuine	 diplomacy,	 and	 orient	 their	 lobbying	 actions	
accordingly.	As	 the	sanctions	have	been	 tightened	until	2013,	 there	have	been	 increasing	
calls	 from	 high	 profile	 Iranian	 Americans	 bolstering	 the	 official	 advocacy	 to	 stop	 the	
sanctions	on	Iran	(in	particular	on	essential	medicines)	on	both	political	and	humanitarian	
grounds.	This	has	included	web‐based	campaigning	around	this	issue;	an	activity	that	has	
engaged	 some	 of	 my	 respondents	 and	 their	 social	 media	 usage	 as	 well.215	 Here	 I	 have	
discussed	 the	 contradictions	 between	 the	 US	 foreign	 policy	 narrative	 of	 bringing	 web	
access	to	Iran	as	a	means	to	fostering	democracy	and	the	complex	socio‐technical	nature	of	
barriers	to	transnational	web	connections.		
	
The	mediation	of	presence	
The	 period	 of	 the	 Green	 uprising	 was	 generally	 marked	 by	 questions	 of	 physical	
distance/proximity	 between	 those	 inside	 Iran	 and	 those	 in	 the	 diaspora.	 Could	 those	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
of	my	first‐generation	engineering	graduate	student	contacts	in	LA	also	worked	with	during	this	period.	
While	the	attention	for	their	targeting	of	the	Iranian	government	at	the	time	was	largely	positive,	Pirate’s	Bay	
is	also	an	entity	that	has	come	under	repeated	public	and	official	scrutiny	for	using	similar	strategies	against	
other	targets.	
214	This	is	also	despite	the	possible	negative	ramifications	that	people‐to‐people	diplomacy	may	have	on	
diplomatic	negotiations	and	relations	between	governments,	as	governments	appealing	to	citizens	of	another	
country	directly	historically	(in	the	case	of	the	US	and	Iran	in	particular)	precludes	diplomatic	exchange	
between	Heads	of	State.		
215	This	phenomenon’s	notable	rise	is	more	recent	than	my	fieldwork	
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outside	the	country	understand	what	was	going	on	inside	and	to	what	extent?	How	could	
the	 barriers	 imposed	 by	 the	 government	 controls	 and	 the	 distance	 of	 geography	 be	
overcome	without	physical	 travel?	How	to	get	 trustworthy	 information?	 Internet	became	
deeply	 intertwined	 in	 these	questions	as	narratives	emerged	that	suggested	that	 internet	
communications	could	circumvent	or	defy	borders	and	distances.	These	narratives	related	
to	the	question	of	presence	and	whether	or	not	presence	could	be	mediated.	In	this	section,	
I	 discussed	 some	 examples	 of	 how	 respondents	 talked	 about	 their	 own	 sense	 of	
presence/absence	with	 relation	 to	 the	elections	and	uprising	 in	 Iran,	 and	how	 their	web	
uses	 played	 a	 part	 in	 their	 experiences.216	 Saskia	 Sassen	 states	 the	 following	 in	 her	
discussion	of	digital/non‐digital	assemblages:”	
Hypermobility	 and	 “dematerialization”	 are	 usually	 seen	 as	 mere	 functions,	 or	
capabilities,	 of	 the	 new	 technologies.	 This	 understanding	 ignores	 the	 fact	 that	 it	
takes	multiple	material	conditions	to	achieve	this	outcome.	Once	we	recognize	that	
hypermobility	 had	 to	 be	 produced	 (emphasis	 original)…	 we	 introduce	 nondigital	
variables	in	our	analysis	of	the	digital	(Sassen,	2006:	344).	
This	 statement	 calls	 attention	 to	 what	 makes	 the	 “hypermobility”	 of	 media	 messages	
possible.	In	this	case	I	argue	it	is	the	producers	(and	translators,	as	I	have	called	them)	that	
act	as	mediating	bridges,	and	the	material	conditions	they	operate	 in.	Sassen’s	analysis	 is	
further	 relevant	 to	 the	 mediation	 of	 presence	 because	 it	 acknowledges	 the	 filtered	
partiality	of	this	mediation.	She	writes:	
Representing	such	an	object	as	hypermobile	is,	then,	a	partial	representation	since	it	
includes	 only	 some	 of	 the	 components	 of	 that	 object,	 that	 is,	 those	 that	 can	 be	
digitized	at	a	given	time.	Much	of	what	is	liquefied	and	circulates	in	digital	networks	
																																																								
216	This	discussion	of	“being	there”	also	relates	to	discussions	of	internet’s	abilities	to	offer	realism.	
Manovich’s	1995	essay	on	digital	photography	discusses	the	question	of	the	realism	of	mediation	with	
increasingly	advanced	technologies,	addressing	the	question	as	one	about	aesthetics.	He	doubts	that	there	
will	come	a	level	in	technological	advancement	at	which	the	level	of	realism	in	digital	representations	
satisfies	criteria	of	actual	presence	http://www.egs.edu/faculty/lev‐manovich/articles/paradoxes‐of‐digital‐
photography/	Manovich,	Lev,	“Paradoxes	of	digital	photography,”	(accessed	1/12/14)	 
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and	 is	 marked	 by	 hypermobility	 is	 only	 one	 component	 of	 a	 larger	 entity	 that	
remains	physical	in	some	of	its	components	(Sassen,	2006:	345).	
Her	 remarks	 recognize	 that	 the	 object	 of	mediation	 is	 not	made	 redundant	 because	 it	 is	
digitally	 mediated.	 Rather	 it	 retains	 its	 “distinct	 irreducible	 character.”	 In	 other	 words,	
social	media	mediates	the	events	in	a	way	that	seems	to	capture	only	certain	parts	of	the	
experience	of	physical	presence,	as	others	are	omitted.	As	I	have	discussed	with	regard	to	
my	respondents’	ideas	about	“being	there,”	people	tend	to	be	aware	of	the	partiality	of	the	
media	messages	they	engage	with	through	social	media,	and	negotiate	which	content	they	
trust	through	emergent	media	literacies.		
The	election	dispute,	the	house	arrest	of	the	main	opposition	candidates,	the	reshuffling	of	
power	among	key	and	peripheral	political	 figures,	and	President	Obama’s	 response	were	
all	moments	and	developments	that	shaped	the	direction	and	progression	of	events	around	
this	 period,	 and	 tended	 not	 to	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 live‐Tweeting	 and	 flikr.com	 posts,	 but	
rather	 the	measured	 political	 journalism	 by	 bloggers,	 correspondents,	 and	 analysts.	 The	
functions	 of	 Twitter	 and	 Facebook	 shifted	 from	 retweeting	 evocative	 statements	 from	
those	 involved	 in	the	protests	 to	sharing	 links	 to	analysis	pieces.	However,	during	events	
like	the	statement	of	the	Supreme	Leader	and	the	mass	funeral	processions	for	the	victims	
of	 the	 violent	 crackdown	 there	were	upsurges	 in	 the	 sharing	of	 videos,	 photos,	 and	 live‐
Tweeted	messages	again.	These	oscillations	 in	media	usage	reflect	 the	 “sociobiographical	
situation	 and	 immediate	 situation	 at	 hand”	 as	 Bakardjieva	 puts	 it	 (2005:	 66).	 As	 this	
situation	 changed,	 people	 traded	 in	 one	 form	 of	 media	 amplification	 for	 another	 in	
accordance	with	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 events,	 and	 the	ways	 they	 could	 be	 best	 conveyed	 to	
audiences	through	the	digital	means	at	hand.	It	is	within	this	changing	situation	that	people	
developed	 new	 social	 media	 literacies.	 These	 were	 shaped	 and	 limited	 by	 their	 own	
previous	experience	with	certain	social	media	applications,	and	by	pre‐existing	trust‐based	
social	relationships.	
While	many	of	my	 respondents	 saw	 the	developments	 in	 Iran	 as	 a	 time	 to	 connect	with	
being	Iranian	through	a	political	identity,	this	did	not	equate	to	a	sense	of	(tele‐)presence	
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as	part	of	the	events	through	web	applications.	This	was	evident	in	the	language	denoting	
those	“inside”	and	“outside”	Iran.	When	TB’s	Farsi	speaking	audiences	inside	Iran	comment	
in	Farsi	on	English	language	articles	posted	on	their	Facebook	page;	when	protesters	carry	
English	language	sign	boards	in	the	street	demonstration;	when	a	Twitter	user	inside	Iran	
thanks	 those	 outside	 for	 helping	maintain	 access	 to	 internet	 through	proxies	 (see	 below	
screenshot	taken	on	June	22nd),	it	shows	how	cognizant	these	actors	inside	Iran	are	of	the	
fact	 that	 international	 audiences	 are	 watching	 and	 supporting	 them	 from	 a	 (digitally	
mediated)	distance,	which	has	the	potential	of	shaping	the	movement	itself.		
	
Figure	24	Acknowledgement	of	Twitter	users	outside	Iran	by	a	popular	live	Tweeter,	June	2009	
	
My	respondents	use	various	web	applications	to	connect	with	the	events	in	Iran,	alongside	
other	media.	While	there	are	narratives	circulating	that	social	media	allow	for	presence	of	
distant	 actors	 or	 witnesses	 in	 Iran,	 my	 respondents	 point	 to	 limitations	 to	 what	 these	
particular	applications	can	mediate.	These	limits	depend	on	preexisting	trust	and	intimacy,	
as	well	as	the	familiarity	with	the	media	form	(e.g.	television,	telephone,	or	social	media)	or	
application	 (e.g.	Facebook,	Twitter,	 group	email	 list)	being	used.	Nevertheless,	 the	use	of	
social	media	in	this	context	seems	to	bring	my	respondents	closer	to	the	events	in	Iran,	as	
well	 as	 bringing	 them	 a	 sense	 of	 greater	 understanding	 about	 the	 events,	 for	 instance,	
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through	online	discussions	and	social	media	sharing	practices.	I	discuss	this	further	in	the	
following	with	regard	to	particular	applications.		
	
Social	media	use	and	deep	meaning	
Facebook	feeds	
As	 mentioned	 in	 above	 examples,	 political	 and	 humanitarian	 issues	 concerning	 the	
situation	 in	 Iran	 at	 this	 time	 became	 an	 important	 strain	 in	 many	 of	 my	 respondents’	
Facebook	 profile	 pages	 and	news	 feeds.	 For	many,	 it	 became	 a	 serious	 and	 urgent	 news	
space,	which	was	a	change	from	the	dominant	apolitical	and	casual	social	media	fare	that	
characterized	 their	 experience	 during	 this	 period.	 For	 Beeta,	 this	 changed	 her	 Facebook	
experience	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	was	difficult	 for	her	 to	 go	back	 to	 the	way	 she	had	used	
Facebook	before.	As	the	events	in	Iran	subsided	and	her	use	of	Facebook	began	to	go	back	
to	normal,	she	considered	deleting	her	account	as	the	platform	seemed	too	shallow	to	her.	
For	 her	 and	many	 others,	 Facebook	 had	 temporarily	 changed	 from	 a	 frivolous	 space	 for	
everyday	 socializing	 to	 a	 serious	 one.	 But	 soon	 the	 effects	 of	 that	 change	 dissipated	 and	
Beeta	was	not	the	only	one	who	began	to	reflect	on	her	use	of	Facebook	after	this	period.	
Because	there	was	no	clear	cutoff	point,	however,	 the	effects	carried	on	in	different	ways	
after	the	height	of	the	events	in	Iran.	Hakha	talks	about	the	extent	to	which	his	Facebook	
usage	became	more	politicized	in	general	because	of	the	influence	of	the	Iranian	uprising.	
Some	months	after	the	elections,	this	is	how	he	responded	to	one	of	my	questions	about	his	
Facebook	feed	having	become	more	politicized	in	general.		
No.	Well…	at	some	 level,	yes.	Because	American	politics	has	been	really	vibrant	 in	
the	last	year	because	of	the	presidential	election	and	Obama	and	these	things	going	
on.	But	not	anywhere	the	same	intensity	[as	the	Iran	coverage	on	Facebook]...	Every	
single	video	is	so	dramatic	‐	you	can	just	go	to	my	Facebook	page	‐	it’s	up	and	down.	
Since	then	things	have	calmed	down	at	some	level.	But	they’re	punctuated	by	spikes	
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on	certain	days.	I	still	look	everywhere	for	things	that	are	useful	and	repetitive	and	
actually	show	what’s	going	on	back	home.	Just	because	people	aren’t	in	the	street	it	
doesn’t	 mean	 things	 aren’t	 happening	 within	 the	 clerical	 leadership	 or	 the	
maneuvers	 by	 the	 government.	 So	 those	 are	 things	 I	 still	 share	 in	 case	 there’s	
anyone	in	my	Facebook	community	who’s	interested.	So	I	actually	get	comments.		
The	American	presidential	election	the	previous	year,	and	the	sporadic	upsurges	in	street	
protests	in	Iran	since	were	cause	for	Hakha’s	Facebook	feed	to	oscillate	between	issues	of	
political	 urgency/importance	 to	 him	 and	 matters	 that	 fit	 in	 more	 smoothly	 with	 the	
majority	 of	 his	 friends’	more	 innocuous	 posts.	 Hakha	 also	mentioned	 how	 active	 he	 still	
remains,	 telling	 me	 he	 that	 he	 collects	 things	 from	 Twitter	 and	 different	 websites	 and	
posting	links	to	this	content	“so	that	it	becomes	viral,	and	also	for	it	to	be	resonant,”	at	least	
among	his	over	one	thousand	Facebook	friends.	He	also	mentioned	how	his	Facebook	feed	
merged	with	 other	 (social	media)	 platforms	 and	outlets	 for	 news	 in	 this	 time.	He	 talked	
about	the	peak	of	the	events	and	his	engagement	with	news:	
Blogs	also.	 I	was	 feeding	 for	anything.	 Just	 through	Google	news	and	Google	blogs	
you	can	go	a	lot	of	places.	Through	Iran	News	Digest.	Some	of	the	Facebook	pages	of	
people	–	political	people.	The	comments	on	news	articles.	The	comments	refer	you	
to	 another	 place.	 I	 just	 kept	 following	 it.	 Takes	 you	 all	 over.	 I	 spent	 a	 lot	 of	 time	
doing	that.		
Hakha’s	 and	others’	 experiences	 around	 their	 use	of	 Facebook	during	 this	 time	 reflected	
the	integration	of	their	Facebook	into	other	digital	news	consumption	and	vice	versa.	His	
comments	and	practices	signal	 the	emerging	significance	of	 the	role	of	 intermediary	sites	
that	do	roundups,	selections,	and	sharing	of	content	from	other	sites,	referring	to	them	as	
“all	 the	 kinds	 of	 websites	 that	 have	 sprung	 up	 where	 they	 collect	 news	 articles.”	 He	
followed	this	with:	“and	YouTube	of	course.	I	use	that	to	pass	the	news	back	and	forth.”	Not	
only	 blogs	 but	 other	 social	media	 sites	 are	 an	 integrated	 part	 of	 the	 news	 consumption	
process,	with	 the	 added	 aspect	 of	 production	 through	 the	dissemination	of	 sharing.	 This	
production	is	something	Hakha	invests	in	when	writing	status	updates	(either	to	go	along	
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with	 the	 external	 content	 he	 links	 to	 or	 just	 as	 a	 post)	 on	 Facebook.	 He	 notes	 the	
implications	of	that	when	he	sees	his	Facebook	friends	passing	along	the	short	texts	he	has	
written.	He	appreciates	 that	people	are	 listening	and	spreading	 the	word.	These	kinds	of	
reactions	seem	to	keep	Hakha	invested	in	the	task	of	informing	others	about	what	is	going	
on	in	Iran,	and	taking	Facebook	seriously	as	a	meaningful	space	through	which	to	do	that.	
His	observations	are	part	of	why	he	keeps	expressing	himself	emotionally	and	politically	
through	Facebook	about	this	issue.		
This	 deeper	 investment	 contrasts	 with	 the	 relative	 lightheartedness	 that	 many	 of	 my	
respondents	 associated	 with	 Facebook	 both	 before	 and	 after	 this	 time,	 as	 evident	 from	
Beeta’s	position	above.	However,	implicitly	and	explicitly,	these	people	acknowledged	that	
the	frivolous	basis	for	having	accrued	social	media	contacts	or	“friends”	over	time	was	the	
reason	why	Facebook	played	such	a	significant	role	for	them	during	this	period	as	well.	The	
latter	was	perhaps	demonstrated	most	clearly	in	Beeta’s	attempts	to	use	Twitter	during	the	
height	of	the	“Twitter	Revolution.”	Namely,	she	told	me	about	her	attempts	to	start	using	
Twitter	once	having	heard	a	lot	about	its	importance	for	Iranians	on	the	news.	She	started	
an	account	and	started	“following”	the	main	Twitter	handles	reported	via	blogs	and	other	
sources	circulating	at	the	time.	However,	she	soon	neglected	the	account,	saying	its	use	felt	
strange	and	unfamiliar	to	her,	especially	since	she	had	no	connections	(followers/follows	of	
others)	prior	to	the	attention	for	Twitter	in	the	context	of	the	events	of	Iran.217	
Social	media	were	used	feverishly	by	most	of	those	I	spoke	to	during	this	period,	and	many	
like	Hakha	and	Beeta	were	part	of	a	wider,	 interactive	audience	that	was	moved	by	what	
they	were	seeing	and	hearing	coming	out	of	and	about	Iran.	However,	some	also	expressed	
feeling	something	lacking	in	their	use	of	Facebook	around	the	protests.	Facebook	was	also	
a	space	that	came	to	be	seen	as	an	echo	chamber	by	some,	because	of	the	strong	circulation	
of	many	 of	 the	 same	 videos	 and	 articles,	 accompanied	 by	 similar	 personal	 commentary.	
																																																								
217	Nevertheless,	seeing	Beeta	again	in	2012,	I	noted	that	she	had	since	become	an	avid	user	of	Twitter,	live	
tweeting	the	IAAB	conference	we	both	attended	in	November	of	that	year.	Her	comfort	and	fluency	with	
Twitter	at	that	time	was	a	stark	contrast	with	the	awkward	and	uncomfortable	start	she	has	talked	to	me	
about	two	years	earlier.	
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Some	 came	 to	 find	 the	 space	 of	 Facebook	 news	 feeds	 limited	 in	 the	 views	 and	 depth	 of	
analysis	available.	As	 is	visible	 in	 the	 following	 interaction	between	 three	 female	 friends,	
Facebook	was	used	 to	 talk	 raise	 the	 issue	of	 the	 kind	 of	 coverage	 and	 views	were	being	
circulated	on	Facebook.		
	
Figure	25	Facebook	conversation	among	my	respondents	during	post‐election	turmoil	in	June	2009	
Hakha’s	 comment	 about	 this	 function	 of	 Facebook	 seemed	 to	 confirm	 the	 impression	 of	
Facebook	as	something	of	a	one‐way	medium	in	the	way	he	used	it.		
I	have	a	point	of	view.	 In	general	 the	articles	or	blogs	 I	would	post	are	 the	ones	 I	
thought	were	right	on.	They	reflected	my	own	internal	opinions.	I	wasn’t	engaging	
in:	hey	you	guys,	what	do	you	think	of	this	idea?	I	don’t	do	that.	I’m	a	propagandist.		
Hakha’s	embrace	of	this	aspect	of	Facebook	in	his	usage	at	the	time	meant	that	the	meaning	
he	gave	 the	broadcasting	aspect	of	Facebook	more	eminence	 than	 the	aspects	 facilitating	
in‐depth	 discussion.	 Nasrin’s	 impression	 of	 Facebook	 as	 lacking	 the	 depth	 of	 nuanced	
discussion	 led	 her	 to	 look	 to	 other	 (web‐based)	 forums	 for	 discussion.	 There	 seemed,	
therefore	 to	be	a	desire	among	my	second‐generation	respondents	 to	 find	 in	Facebook	a	
meaningful	 space	 to	 share	 and	 develop	 one’s	 experience	 of	 the	 events	 in	 Iran	 from	 a	
distance.	However,	there	also	seems	to	be	clear	admission	that	this	space	is	not	normally	
made	 for	 creating	 such	 an	 experience.	 In	 addition,	 Pouya	 cautioned	 overlooking	 the	
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significance	of	the	mobilizations	by	the	government	in	the	months	after	the	protests,	as	he	
observed	that	there	were	still	so	many	people	–	perhaps	a	majority	of	the	population	–	that	
were	not	only	supporters	of	 the	Islamic	Regime	but	of	Ahmadinejad.	He	shared	videos	of	
these	mass	street	gatherings	in	support	of	the	Islamic	establishment	on	his	Facebook	page	
as	 a	 way	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 what	 was	 left	 out	 of	 the	 coverage	 of	 the	 post‐election	
movement	by	the	Western	media	and	the	“citizen	journalists”	whose	videos	went	viral	on	
social	 media.	 In	 one	 way	 or	 another,	 these	 three	 people	 engage	 with	 the	 notion	 that	
Facebook	 to	 some	 extent	 lacks	 the	 capacity/is	 not	 meant	 to	mediate	 the	 depths	 of	 this	
issue.		
Miller’s	 discussion	 of	 Facebook	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 tendency	 to	 think	 that	 “Facebook	
represents	 a	 new	mode	 of	 superficiality,	 or	 ‘shallows’”	 because	 of	 its	 “relentless	 fixation	
with	the	present”	(Miller,	2011).	While	Miller	discusses	the	necessity	to	take	seriously	even	
(perhaps	 especially)	 the	mundane	 uses	 and	meanings	 around	 Facebook,	 these	 examples	
suggest	 that	the	sensational	and	the	mundane	uses	of	Facebook	rely	on	one	another.	The	
building	 of	 social	 networks	 through	mundane	 sociality	bolsters	 the	 efficacy	of	 individual	
political	 broadcasting	 in	 a	 crisis	 situation.	 It	 also	 appears	 here	 that	 the	 familiarity	 with	
Facebook	as	a	space	for	social	trivialness	shapes	how	people	engage	with	it	as	a	platform	
for	news	and	discussion	during	an	exceptional	period	of	 time	about	a	serious	and	urgent	
topic.	The	mundane	and	 the	exceptional	are	 tied	 together	 in	how	people	make	Facebook	
more	than	a	shallow	space.		
It	 is	not	only	 the	content	of	 the	discussions	and	the	 format	of	discussion	on	social	media	
sites	that	shapes	these	ideas	about	shallowness	or	depth.	It	is	also	the	simple	fact	that	they	
are	mediated	by	 internet.	 Indeed,	questions	about	 “the	shallows”	of	 social	media	overlap	
with	longer‐running	debates	about	“virtual	communities”	and	what	kinds	of	interpersonal	
connections	 they	 create	 (see	 Wellman	 &	 Haythornthwaite,	 2002).	 However,	 it	 must	 be	
acknowledged	 that	 while	 some	 expressed	 disappointment	 in	 the	 shallowness	 of	 the	
discussions	and	content	shared	on	Facebook	at	certain	moments	during	their	engagements	
with	 the	 developments	 in	 Iran,	 Nasrin’s	 comments	 above	 suggest	 that	more	meaningful	
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discussion	 is	 also	 found	 through	 other	 digitally	 mediated	 spaces	 such	 as	 an	 academic	
department	mailing	 list.	 Furthermore,	 during	 this	 time,	many	 of	my	 respondents	 started	
coming	together	more	often	as	well	in	face‐to‐face	gatherings.	There,	the	information	they	
had	exchanged	or	gained	from	social	media	and	other	internet	sites	would	then	be	shared	
and	 talked	about	 in	person.	This	was	especially	a	 time	when	 first	and	second‐generation	
peers	inhabited	the	same	spaces	and	events,	interacting	about	common	interest	in	the	fate	
of	those	in	Iran.	In	this	way,	my	second‐generation	respondents	showed	signs	of	building	
on	 the	 information	 they	 obtained	 through	 social	 media	 and	 their	 network	 of	 Facebook	
friends,	 whether	 through	 raising	 this	 in	 digitally‐mediated	 or	 face‐to‐face	 spaces.	 Here	 I	
have	 tried	to	show	how	Facebook	 is	used	and	understood	as	both	a	 frivolous	medium	as	
well	as	a	platform	that	can	mediate	deep	connections	with	others.	In	the	following	I	further	
discuss	typical	uses	of	social	media	more	generally	around	this	period	of	the	2009	elections	
in	Iran.	I	analyze	how	deeply	meaningful	ways	of	being	Iranian	American	in	solidarity	with	
the	 protesters	 in	 Iran	 are	 developed,	 and	 in	 particular	 how	 these	 draw	 from	 practices	
based	in	(sometimes	humorously	intended)	genres	of	remixing	web‐based	content.		
	
YouTube	Remixes		
Watching	 the	many	 YouTube	 videos	 from	 the	 Iran	 events,	 I	 noticed	 that	 as	 the	 original	
protest	footage	circulated	online	it	quickly	became	adapted,	built‐upon,	and	developed	into	
what	can	be	called	a	genre	of	 its	own.	 Interactive	multimedia	audio‐visual	montages	of	a	
popular	protest	movement	were	circulated	to	a	wide	audience	while	these	events	were	still	
in	the	process	of	unfolding.	In	these	productions,	protest	footage	that	was	combined	with	a	
soundtrack,	 and	 sometimes	 with	 photographic	 stills.	 These	 mash‐up	 video	 products	
seemed	designed	to	not	only	mobilize	networks	of	emotional	empathy,	but	the	process	of	
their	 production	 itself	 allowed	 many	 people	 to	 express	 their	 emotional	 reactions	 while	
adding	value	through	their	creative	alterations.	Practices	of	video	adaptation	were	evident	
even	 the	 simplest	 act	 of	 adding	 a	 personal	 subscript	 to	 the	 footage	 shared	 on	 a	 “social	
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media”	 platform	 by	 taking	 up	 Facebook’s	 standard	 invitation	 (at	 the	 time)	 to	 “say	
something	about	this	link.”		
I	see	these	video	montages	as	part	of	a	broader	remix	culture	that	entered	the	practices	of	
many	Youtube	users	since	 the	site’s	 inception.	Namely,	 the	creation	of	 remixed	materials	
from	previous	Youtube	videos	to	create	tributes	or	parodies	with	their	own	spin	and	post	
them	 to	 the	 same	 site	 is	 a	 result	 of	 this	 familiar	 practice	 being	 ingrained	 within	 the	
interactive	practices	that	users	engaged	in	through	this	“social	networking	site”	via	videos.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 videos	 of	 the	 Iranian	 uprising,	 videos	 that	 are	 repeatedly	 used	 in	 these	
practices	 of	 montage	 and	 collage	 appear	 to	 be	 ones	 that	 have	 the	 greatest	 impact	 on	
viewers,	are	taken	on	by	mainstream	media	channels,	and	in	the	process	“go	viral.”	These	
were	 the	 same	 types	 of	 videos	 from	 which	 Beeta	 had	 learned	 the	 lyrics	 to	 Yaare	
Dabestani,218	the	unofficial	anthem	of	the	movement	that	was	sang	at	gatherings	in	LA	as	
well	around	this	time.		
The	video	of	 the	young	woman,	Neda	Agha	Soltan,	who	was	 shot	and	killed	on	a	Tehran	
street	at	the	site	near	to	a	protest	gathering	was	perhaps	the	most	exemplary	instance	of	
this	phenomenon	of	a	web	video	“going	viral”	and	being	subject	to	remixes	in	the	process.	
However,	 these	 collages	were	not	 only	 created	with	web	 video	 facilities.	 They	were	 also	
present	 in	 the	 images	 people	 printed	 and	 displayed	 on	 placards	 at	 demonstrations.	 One	
such	 placard	 placed	 Neda	 her	 in	 a	 printed	 collage	 of	 other	 protest	 scenes	 of	 violence	
against	 young,	 unarmed	protesters	 and	 photographs	 of	 beaten,	 bruised	bodies.	 This	was	
evidently	 intended	 to	 invoke	 the	 solidarity	 of	 LA	 protesters	with	 the	 green	movement’s	
fallen	 and	 battered	 victims.	 The	 image	 of	 Neda’s	 bloodied,	 lifeless	 face	was	 taken	 up	 by	
countless	news	media	outlets.	LA‐based	and	other	Iranian	musicians	and	artists	wrote	and	
produced	songs	 in	her	honor	as	well	as	 in	solidarity	with	the	movement.	The	role	of	 this	
particular	“viral	video”	was	highly	significant	in	the	cycle	of	media	production	that	included	
a	vast	array	of	professional	and	non‐professional	media	producers.		
																																																								
218	I	discussed	this	in	a	previous	chapter.		
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This	 was	 not	 the	 first	 time	 I	 had	 seen	 a	 video	 circulate	 with	 popularity	 among	 my	
respondents.	 The	 differences	 and	 similarities	 with	 another	 video	 that	 several	 of	 my	
respondents	had	either	 shown	me,	or	 referred	 to	 in	passing,	or	otherwise	 spoken	about,	
came	 to	 mind.	 This	 was	 the	 simple	 video	 of	 a	 first	 generation,	 middle	 aged	 Iranian	
American	man	and	Marriott	Hotel	employee	sincerely	singing	a	self‐composed	song	called	
“I	 love	you,	America”	 in	English	with	a	strong	Persian	accent	and	a	melody	 that	sounded	
recognizably	traditionally	Iranian,	for	the	camera	of	the	amateur	home‐movie	maker.	The	
stark	contrasts	with	the	video	of	Neda	were	clear	with	regard	to	content,	the	place	it	was	
taken,	 the	 context	 in	 which	 it	 had	 become	 popular,	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 popularity,	 and	 the	
general	message.	However,	the	commonality	was	that	collages	and	montages,	the	remixed	
versions	of	both	these	videos	emerged	on	YouTube	after	their	original	posting.	Instead	of	
the	tributes	and	homages	paid	to	the	video	depicting	a	young	woman’s	death,	the	musical	
performance	of	a	disarming	character	drew	comedic	parodies,	similarly	made	by	those	who	
had	seen	 the	original	 and	were	 referencing	 it	 in	various	ways.	This	practice	of	 sampling,	
remixing,	 or	 otherwise	 referencing	 an	 already‐popular	 original	 product	 signified	
participation	in	a	much	broader	practice	associated	with	YouTube	videos.	While	YouTube	
has	a	comment	section	in	which	people	can	express	their	thoughts	about	a	video	on	the	site	
textually,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 common	 tendency	 to	 express	 commentary	 on	 other	 YouTube	
videos	through	the	practice	of	producing	and	uploading	a	new	video.		
This	 form	 of	 interactive,	 consumption‐/production‐oriented	 commentary	 on	 popular	
videos	was	 not	 limited	 to	 only	 those	who	 uploaded	 a	 spin‐off	 video	 (a	 small	 number	 of	
people	relatively	speaking),	but	also	other	cultural	and	media	references	to	the	original.	As	
such,	I	saw	it	leading	to	quite	some	engagement	by	some	of	my	respondents.	In	the	case	of	
the	unassumingly	humorous	video	of	 the	singing	man,	 so	many	of	 the	second‐generation	
individuals	 I	 spoke	with	had	seen	 the	video	 that	 it	had	become	 the	premise	of	 jokes	and	
impersonations	 among	 friends	 (sometimes	 with	 friends’	 name	 being	 exchanged	 for	
“America”).	The	singer	was	also	declared	“Iranian	of	the	day”	on	popular	hub,	Iranian.com,	
with	the	video	posted	on	the	homepage.	A	second‐generation	friend	to	whom	I	showed	the	
video	said	 it	was	all	about	 the	genuineness	of	 the	singer	 ‐	 the	 fact	 that	he	 represents	his	
315	
	
own,	 very	 particular,	 and	 very	 candid	 way	 of	 being	 both	 Iranian	 and	 American	 at	 the	
same.	In	her	view,	the	way	the	second	generation	engaged	with	the	video	was	particular,	as	
they	might	find	it	 funny	because	of	the	strong	Iranian	accent	that	would	be	the	source	of	
some	 ridicule	 among	 those	 born	 and	 raise	 in	 the	 US.	 But	 she	 also	 though	 they	 would	
consider	it	endearing,	because	the	character	of	the	man	was	so	familiar	as	to	be	imagined	
as	one	of	their	older,	first‐generation	relatives.	For	this	reason,	she	was	annoyed	at	some	of	
the	spinoff,	parody	videos	that	purely	made	fun	of	the	original.	She	also	acknowledged	that	
this	 was	 just	 another	 facet	 of	 what	 internet	 media	 brought:	 remixes	 that	 one	 did	 not	
appreciate	and	could	not	relate	to.		
This	practice	of	remixing	evokes	what	has	been	called	the	“DJ”	in	the	context	of	producing	
content	 on	 the	 web.	 Arguing	 for	 digital	 media’s	 capacity	 to	 make	 users	 into	 DJs,	 media	
theorist	Lev	Manovic	emphasizes	 the	 importance	of	 the	 collage‐/montage‐making	 role	of	
digital	media.219	In	this	perspective,	the	potential	of	remixing	of	elements	of	media	in	a	new	
way	 is	what	 creates	 an	 “aesthetics	of	new	media,”	based	on	 riffing	 and	 spinning	existing	
content.	Indeed,	from	what	I	observed,	such	remixing	and/or	aggregating	of	digital	content	
through	 the	 process	 of	 partial	 digital	 reproduction	was	 an	 important	 part	 of	 how	 social	
media	applications		were	used	to	communicate	(about)	the	events	in	Iran	at	this	time	from	
the	 diaspora	 vantage	 point.	 New	 genres	 of	 digital	 production	 build	 on	 older,	 familiar	
practices	 of	making	 collages	 of	 printed	 images	 and	watching	musical	montages	 in	 films.	
Furthermore,	 digital	 images	 and	 sound	 transferred	 to	 other	 settings	 and	 forms	 of	
communications	(e.g.	as	printed	photographs	on	protest	placards).	Hence,	a	fluid	transition	
emerges	between	the	digital	audio‐visual	content	in	a	raw	video	of	the	events	in	Iran	that	
goes	viral,	 to	a	musical	montage	using	elements	of	that	and	other	footage,	to	other	media	
forms	 such	 as	 printed	 photos	 displayed	 in	 a	 politically	 and	 emotionally	 charged	 use	 of	
public	 space	 in	 LA.	 This	 range	 of	 digital	 and	 non‐digital	 media	 forms	 is	 used	 to	
communicate	 not	 only	 what	 is	 going	 on	 in	 Iran,	 but	 also	 how	 it	 should	 be	 received	 by	
																																																								
219	Manovich,	Lev,	“Post‐Media	Aesthetics,”	http://manovich.net/index.php/projects/post‐media‐aesthetics	
(accessed	1/12/14).		 	
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audiences	 in	 LA;	 the	 music,	 the	 chants,	 and	 the	 repetition	 of	 the	 same/similar	 content	
together	indicate	to	audiences	that	they	should	feel	moved	about	this	event.		
In	 the	 case	 of	 Neda’s	 death	 the	 circulating	 images	 contributed	 to	 making	 her	 an	 iconic	
figure	and	widely	recognizable	reference	point	 for	 the	 issue.	The	 important	role	of	social	
media	in	the	formation	of	shared	reference	points	around	Iranian‐ness	was	not	limited	to	
the	 events	 of	 mid‐2009.	 In	 fact,	 the	 use	 of	 digital	 media	 also	 produced	 modes	 of	 being	
Iranian	American	 for	my	 respondents,	precisely	 through	 the	 circulation	of	messages	 that	
made	reference	to	common	knowledge	or	experiences	regarding	being	Iranian.	In	the	case	
of	 the	Neda	 images,	 this	 visual	 reference	point	was	 a	 broadly	 framed	one,	mobilizing	 an	
international	sentiment	of	outrage	through	the	personification	of	a	peaceful	yet	oppressed	
movement	and	generation	of	youth	 in	 Iran.	Outside	 the	context	of	 these	dramatic	events,	
my	 respondents	 used	 social	media	 to	 invoke	 common	 reference	points	 for	being	 Iranian	
that	 mobilized	 very	 different	 emotions	 among	 differently‐defined	 audiences	 of	 Iranians.	
However,	the	mechanism	of	using	social	media	to	create	common	reference	points	around	
which	Iranian	American‐ness	was	situationally	defined	by	my	respondents	was	similar	to	
the	 dramatic	 case	 of	Neda’s	 filmed	 death.	 In	 the	 following,	 I	 discuss	 the	 development	 of	
such	points	of	reference	in	ways	specific	to	the	use	of	particular	social	media	applications	
by	my	respondents	in	certain	cases.	
	
Tags	and	memes	
At	the	height	of	the	Iran	protests	and	beyond,	Twitter	was	considered	by	a	great	deal	of	the	
Western	 journalistic	 coverage	 as	 “the	 medium	 of	 the	 movement.”220	 However,	 as	 some	
observers	noticed	at	 the	 time	as	well,	 this	 likely	had	more	 to	do	with	Western	audiences	
that	 collected	 information	 about	 Iran	 from	 Twitter	 than	 about	 the	 organization	 of	 the	
movement	 itself.	 The	 use	 of	 Twitter	 was	 already	 deeply	 embedded	 into	 the	 standard	
																																																								
220	Grossman,	Lev,	“Iran	Protests:	Twitter,	the	medium	of	the	movement.”	
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html	(accessed	1/12/14)	
317	
	
practices	of	journalists	in	the	US;	unlike	Facebook,	Twitter	users	by	design	broadcast	their	
content	 to	 the	 public	 (in	 the	 sense	 that	 anyone	 with	 an	 account	 can	 access	 and	 follow	
Tweets	 rather	 than	 only	 “friends”	 confirmed	 by	 the	 user	 being	 able	 to	 see	 and	 follow	
updates).	The	role	of	the	hashtag,	#Iranelections,	 in	coverage	of	the	event	was	significant	
because	it	was	the	in	the	top	5	trending	tags	on	Twitter	for	many	days.	This	hashtag,	along	
with	a	few	others,	were	the	channels	through	which	many	people	in	my	field	site,	including	
journalists,	 followed	 the	 story.	 On	 news	 programs,	 screenshots	 of	 Twitter	 pages	 and	
Tweets	 were	 broadcast	 on	 television	 to	 prime‐time	 TV	 audiences.	 And	 news	 articles	
referenced	certain	Twitter	users	tweeting	from	Iran	as	well.			
The	 process	 that	 took	 place	 was	 one	 in	 which	 relatively	 few	 users	 from	 Iran	 tweeted	
messages	 from	 their	 locations,	 while	 those	 outside	 the	 country	 with	 relatively	 greater	
access	 to	 Twitter	 and	 internet	 technologies	 helped	 bring	 the	 story	 to	 the	 attention	 of	
broader	 audiences	 through	 retweeting/reposting.	 It	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 isolate	 the	 role	 of	 the	
diaspora	 in	 this	process.	And	 indeed,	 this	was	 a	 time	when	discussions	 arose	 among	my	
respondents	 both	 via	 social	 media	 and	 elsewhere,	 about	 what	 the	 role	 of	 diaspora	 –	
themselves	–	could/should	be	 in	this	situation.	 It	was	clear	that	some	of	my	respondents	
saw	 it	 as	 their	 responsibility	 to	 keep	 international	 attention	 on	 the	 events	 in	 Iran,	
conceiving	of	international	audiences	as	a	potential	deterrent	for	the	Iranian	government’s	
further	brutalization	of	protesters.	Some	of	my	respondents	explicitly	called	for	this	goal;	it	
was	made	explicit	also	in	the	example	in	the	 introduction	where	Mahdis	calls	 for	keeping	
the	Iran	election	hashtag	trending	by	combining	it	with	the	news	of	Michael	Jackson’s	death	
when	 the	 latter	 news	 event	 introduced	 a	 turnaround	 in	 the	 top	 trending	 of	 the	 Iranian	
election	 protests.221	 This	 practice	 reflected	 fluency	 with	 the	 logic	 behind	 Twitter.	 It	
suggests	support	for	Wasik’s	claim	(pertaining	to	virals)	that:	
																																																								
221	The	Michael	Jackson	“tag”	was	not	limited	to	Twitter	but	also	pervaded	Facebook	as	a	“meme”.	Taken	from	
the	Facebook	Memology	blog	entry	that	covered	the	Top	Status	Trends	of	2009	under	the	heading	“celebrity	
deaths”:	“No	celebrity	death	had	as	immediate	of	an	impact	on	status	updates	as	Michael	Jackson's.	Mentions	
of	his	name	were	10,000	times	higher	on	June	25,	the	day	he	died,	than	the	previous	day,	and	no	other	
unexpected	news	event	can	compare	to	the	burst	we	saw	on	that	day.	Despite	the	huge	impact	of	this	story,	
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If	there	is	one	attribute	of	today’s	consumers,	whether	of	products	or	of	media,	that	
differentiates	 them	 from	 their	 forebears	 of	 even	 twenty	 years	 ago,	 it	 is	 this:	 they	
acutely	 aware	 of	 how	media	narratives	 themselves	 operate,	 and	 of	 how	 their	 own	
behavior	 fits	 into	 these	 narratives,	 that	 their	 awareness	 feeds	 back	 almost	
immediately	into	their	consumption	itself	(emphasis	original)	(Wasik,	2009:	3).	
It	was	also	an	illustration	of	how	an	attempt	was	made	by	some	to	use	this	 logic	towards	
the	 goal	 of	 helping	 Iran.	 It	 was	 interesting	 that	 Mahdis’	 cross‐platform	 practice	 used	
Facebook	sharing	among	her	“friends”	as	a	means	of	promoting	a	hashtag	on	Twitter,	thus	
seeking	to	use	her	strong	Facebook	connectivity	to	bolster	a	Twitter‐based	action.	Rather	
than	seeing	 this	as	part	of	 a	 linear	 shift	 towards	a	 certain	media	 logic	 ‐	 as	mediatization	
approaches	would	have	it	‐	this	can	be	understood	as	people’s	usage	being	shaped	by	the	
norms	of	usage	inscribed	into	the	platform	itself,	but	at	the	same	time	a	slight	distortion	of	
the	 inscribed	usage	by	acknowledging	 the	 intended	use	and	 looking	 for	a	way	 to	work	 it	
into	 the	 pressing	 purpose	 at	 hand.222	 This	 is	 how	 	 van	 Dijck	 has	 argued	 social	 media	
platforms	like	Facebook		shape	usage	while	also	leaving	room	for	users	to	twist	around	the	
inscribed	usages	(van	Dijck,	2013).	
This	practice	reveals	that	someone	like	Mahdis	‐	who	actively	posted	in	an	effort	to	try	to	
keep	#Iranelections	trending	and	called	upon	others	to	do	the	same	–	can	use	a	hashtag	to	
mobilize	a	collectivity	to	contribute	to	the	shared	goal	of	keeping	the	tag	trending.	It	also	
reflects	the	propensity	of	the	content	of	a	hashtag	like	#Iranelections	to	being	molded	and	
developed	by	 users	 external	 to	 the	 events	 in	 Iran,	 although	 evidently	 deeply	 invested	 in	
those	events.	It	can	be	said	that	the	diaspora	and	international	audiences	took	over	the	Iran	
election	hashtag,	shaping	its	accumulative	content	through	their	own	Twitter	practices.	For	
my	 respondents,	 social	 media	 sharing	 was	 one	 of	 very	 few	 ways	 of	 coming	 to	 feel	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
mentions	of	his	name	lasted	only	about	a	week,	with	a	resurgence	during	his	memorial	12	days	later.”	Posted	
December	21,	2009	https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/facebook‐memology‐top‐status‐trends‐of‐
2009/215076352130	(accessed	1/12/14).	
222	See	also	work	on	tagging	and	“folksonomies”	by	Geismar	that	highlights	the	interactive,	user‐oriented,	and	
participative	notions	around	tagging	practices	within	the	context	of	the	public’s	engagement	with	museum	
collections	(Geismar,	2013)	
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connection	 to	 Iran	 as	 well	 as	 expressing	 support	 for	 the	 movement.	 This	 intention	 of	
awareness‐raising/informing	was	the	driving	force	behind	some	of	my	respondents’	social	
media	 practices.	 Some	 of	 them	 came	 to	 be	 seen	 among	 their	 non‐Iranian	 friends	 as	
authorities	on	the	issue,	or	at	least	nodes	for	the	latest	information.	And	by	seeing	friends	
share	 the	 same	 videos,	 and	 doing	 the	 same	 themselves,	 social	 media	 sharing	 practices	
incorporated	the	repetition,	awareness	of	commonality,	and	emotional	investment.	I	would	
argue	 that	 this	 ushered	 in	 a	 sense	 of	 togetherness	 between	my	 respondents	 who	 were	
connected	with	one	another	via	social	media	like	Facebook	and	Twitter,	but	also	between	
them	 and	 the	 many	 others	 they	 did	 not	 know	 who	 were	 participating	 in	 very	 similar	
sharing	practices	for	the	same	issue.		
Through	the	use	of	these	social	media	applications,	some	of	my	respondents	became	active	
producers	 of	 content	 through	 simple	 acts	 of	 sharing	 and	 posting.	 According	 to	 Green’s	
reading	of	Miller’s	theory	of	consumption	(2010),	these	practices	are	part	of	how	subjects	
create	themselves.	Instead	of	mass	goods	being	consumed	to	create	the	self,	the	spreading	
of	Twitter	messages	reflects	how	use	of	social	media	creates	the	self	 through	production.	
Using	 this	 perspective	 to	 understand	 how	 hashtags	were	 used	 to	manipulate	 the	media	
attention	this	issue	received	on	Twitter	and	beyond,	I	would	argue	that	Twitter’s	hashtag	
function	 is	 specifically	 taken	 up	 in	 a	 context	 of	 long‐distance	 investment	 in	 the	
development	of	this	major	political	event.		
We	fashion	our	identities	in	part	according	to	whether	or	not	we	go	online	and	what	
we	go	online	to	do	(Green,	2010:	8).	
Hashtagging	on	Twitter	was	in	this	case	a	practice	of	being	Iranian.	Tagging	was	one	of	the	
ways	 the	 events	 in	 Iran	 came	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 part	 of	 a	 single	 and	 somewhat	 coherent	
phenomenon	 by	 distant	 audiences.	 Many	 of	 my	 respondents	 shared	 their	 personal,	
emotional,	and	formal	connections	with	Iran	through	the	process	of	expressing	solidarity	
on	social	media.	During	this	time,	it	became	expected	to	use	social	media	to	express	oneself	
and	where	one	stood	regarding	the	messages	coming	out	of	Iran.	Those	who	did	not	share	
videos,	 like	Shiva,	did	so	 in	a	very	different	context	 than	only	days	prior	 to	 the	elections.	
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Her	decision	was	 intentional	rather	than	a	sign	of	passivity;	Shiva’s	 lack	of	sharing	about	
Iran	in	an	atmosphere	where	the	news	was	dominated	by	the	story,	expressed	her	position	
on	Iranian	politics	as	an	Iranian.	She	considered	herself	a	Muslim,	supported	Ahmadinejad	
and	saw	the	representation	of	him	and	his	administration	by	Western	news	media	as	unfair	
demonization.	 During	 this	 period,	 the	 Facebook	 pages	 of	 Shiva	 and	 many	 others	 I	 was	
connected	with	through	the	site	were	a	signboard	for	where	one	stood	on	the	crisis	in	Iran.	
People	differentiated	themselves	on	the	basis	of	their	ideas	about	the	demands,	ideological	
viewpoints,	or	developments	as	they	happened	in	the	protests.	It	was	clear	that	most	of	my	
contacts	from	the	field	defined	and	clarified	their	position	about	the	conflict	in	one	way	or	
another	 through	 social	 media.	 Even	 the	 subtlest	 practice	 of	 sharing	 a	 video	 showing	
protesters	 calling	 for	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Islamic	 Republic	 rather	 than	 simply	 protest	 footage	
with	slogans	calling	for	a	recount	or	otherwise	focusing	on	the	electoral	process	alone	was	
a	 pregnant	 statement	 of	 one’s	 (potential)	 position/analysis	 regarding	 the	 future	 of	 Iran.	
And	the	dominant	position	was	one	of	support	for	the	protests.	 It	 is	hard	to	tell,	with	our	
limited	 scholarly	 knowledge	 about	 viral	 politics	 at	 this	 point,	 how	 much	 responsibility	
social	media	can	be	given	for	defining	this	dominant	narrative	 in	the	West.	Postill	argues	
that	 the	“viral	age”	 is	marked	by	 the	shaping	of	political	agendas	by	viral	content,	basing	
this	 on	 the	 case	 of	 viral	 politics	 in	 the	 Spanish	 Indignado	 movement	 (Postill,	 2013).	
However,	 the	 role	of	mass	broadcast	media	 in	propagating	a	Western	political	 agenda	 in	
support	of	the	street	protests	in	Iran	against	the	Islamic	government	cannot	be	understated	
in	this	particular	case.		
Amidst	the	mass	of	video	sharing	on	Facebook,	there	were	subtle	self‐differentiations	that	
allowed	people	to	use	a	body	of	videos,	photos,	and	other	content	to	design	a	fast‐changing	
profile	page	that	expressed	something	about	their	connection	to	and	position	regarding	the	
events	in	Iran.	For	people	like	Mahdis	Iranian‐ness	became	a	highly	visible	part	of	her	self	
during	this	period.	Similar	to	the	YouTube	remixes,	situating	this	practice	within	a	broader	
context	of	the	more	mundane	practices	of	social	media	usage	I	observed,	it	is	evident	that	
being	Iranian	American	shifted	boundaries	significantly	during	this	period.	Namely,	while	
the	 relevant	 Twitter	 hashtags	 were	 promoted	 to	 actively	 engage	 a	 wide	 audience	 of	
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“friends”	 and	 “followers”	 on	 social	media,	 the	use	of	memes	on	 certain	Facebook	groups	
had	the	effect	of	narrowing	down	the	audience	to	other	Iranian	Americans,	and	specifically	
the	 second	 generation.	 The	 Facebook	 “community”	 Iranian	Memes	 and	 the	 page	 Persian	
Memes.223		The	latter	is	a	page	that	I	found	through	observing	the	Facebook	practices	of	a	
couple	of	my	respondents.		
	
	
Figure	26	Examples	of	memes	from	Facebook	pages	I	encountered	through	my	respondents,	saved	October	2013	
	
																																																								
223	And	more	recently	the	emergence	of	the	Facebook	page,	Persian	Vines,	has	added	short	video	content	to	
this	previously	still‐image	based	production	of	humorous	references	to	being	Iranian.	This	page	combines	the	
app,	Vine	(which	allows	the	user	to	make	a	six	second	long	video	and	post	it	to	their	profile,	which	can	be	
linked	to	that	of	other	users)	with	a	Facebook	page	that	can	collect	the	equivalent	of	members	who	subscribe	
to	receiving	the	new	posts	in	their	Facebook	feeds.		
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Persian	memes	contains	humorous	and	straightforward	appeals	to	the	idiosyncrasies	of	the	
shared	experiences	of	being	a	young	Iranian	American.	These	experiences	give	clues	as	to	
how	young	people	position	themselves	with	relation	to	others	(Iranians	and	non‐Iranians)	
via	reference	to	common	misconceptions,	stereotypes,	common	behavior/customs.	In	this	
way,	 tags	 and	 memes	 become	 seamlessly	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 register	 of	 being	 Iranian	
American	practiced	by	my	respondents,	which	relies	on	the	access	to	insider	status	through	
unspoken	mutual	understandings.224	The	use	of	 tags	on	Twitter	and	memes	on	Facebook	
that	 I	 observed225	 reveal	 two	 things	 that	 at	 first	 seem	 conflicting.	 While	 these	 digital	
products	are	very	much	a	part	of	the	production	of	selves	through	the	use	of	social	media,	
the	 identity	 of	 the	 producer	 of	 the	 original	 content	 being	 shared	 and	
reshared/retweeted/repeatedly	tagged	(whether	in	the	form	of	a	photo	on	Facebook	as	in	
the	above	examples,	or	in	the	form	of	a	hashtag	on	Twitter),	is	both	obscured	and	evidently	
unimportant.	In	other	words,	the	significance	of	the	signature	disappears	in	the	process	of	
repeated	 reproduction	 as	 the	meme	 develops.	 This	 is	 what	 Dovey	 et.	 al.	 (2003)	 call	 the	
“fundamental	 condition	 of	 digitality”	 when	 quoting	 philosopher	 and	 media/cultural	
theorist,	Pierre	Levy’s	1997	work,	The	Aesthetics	of	Cyberspace:			
The	 established	 differences	 between	 author	 and	 reader,	 performer	 and	 spectator,	
creator	 and	 interpreter	 become	 blurred	 and	 give	 way	 to	 a	 reading	 writing	
continuum	that	extends	 from	the	designers	of	 the	technology	and	networks	 to	 the	
final	 recipients,	 each	 one	 contributing	 to	 the	 activity	 of	 the	 other	 –	 the	
disappearance	of	the	signature	(2003:	19).		
While	 tags	 were	 used	 to	 push	 broad	 attention	 to	 an	 issue	 that	 was	 given	 shared	
importance,	memes	were	used	to	create	sense	of	commonality	with	boundaries	defined	by	
tacit	 insider	 knowledge.	 These	 two	 practices	 put	 Iranian	 American‐ness	 into	 practice	 in	
																																																								
224	Particular	supposed	mutual	understandings	can	be	contested	with	regard	to	whether	or	not	they	form	a	
legitimate	part	of	Iranian	American‐ness,	as	in	the	case	of	the	MLIP	example	discussed	earlier	where	there	is	a	
possibility	to	challenge	the	“Persian”‐ness	of	others	on	the	platform.	However,	there	is	nevertheless	still	an	
entry‐level	understanding	that	the	category	of	“Persian”‐ness	is	being	referenced	and	collectively	defined	by	
those	who	belong	to	it.		
225	My	fieldwork	was	carried	out	at	a	time	when	Facebook	had	not	yet	introduced	hashtags	
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ways	that	are	shaped	by	the	technical	design	of	social	media	platforms	being	used.	This	was	
also	 shaped	 by	 the	 familiar	 conventions	 around	 the	 deployment	 of	 hashtags	 and	memes	
that	 were	 already	 established	 at	 the	 time,	 and	 which	 in	 turn	 give	 rise	 to	 the	 kinds	 of	
sociality	produced	through	these	social	media	sites.	Like	practices	of	remixing	on	YouTube,	
these	 practices	 were	 deployed	 at	 the	 height	 of	 a	 serious	 political	 event	 while	 having	
previously	been	taken	up	and	cultivated	in	the	context	of	relatively	frivolous	usage.		
The	 creation	 of	 memes	 and	 hashtags	 is	 not	 the	 only	 way	 my	 respondents	 engaged	 in	
circuits	 of	 insider	 humor.	 As	 I	 have	 described	 in	 other	 chapters,	 experiences	 of	 Iranian	
American‐ness	are	cross‐referenced	through	various	mediated	communications.	However,	
it	 is	 interesting	 that	 social	media	 seem	 to	 offer	 specific,	 institutionalized	 forms	 of	 doing	
this.	 It	 is	 also	 interesting	 when	 second	 generation	 web‐producers	 use	 this	 insider‐
referencing	 as	 a	 way	 to	 form	 specifically	 second‐generation	 Iranian	 American	 digitally	
mediated	spaces,	like	the	My	Life	is	Persian	(MLIP)	website.	This	was	set	up	by	a	second‐
generation	young	man	who	told	me	created	the	site	“just	for	fun”	and	invited	his	friends	to	
join.	Signing	in	for	an	account	not	only	means	a	user	is	able	to	post	content	describing	what	
makes	 their	 lives	 “Persian,”	 but	 it	 also	 allows	 them	 to	 either	 support	 or	 dispute	 other	
people’s	posts	on	the	site	with	the	respective	options:	“Areh!	Your	life	is	Persian”	and	“Nah	
baba!	Your	 life	 is	not	Persian.”	The	 site	 (like	 the	 individual	posts)	 is	 also	 linked	 to	 social	
media	sites	Facebook	and	Twitter.		
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Figure	27		From	the	site	MLIP,	www.mylifeispersian.net,	screenshot	October	2013	
	
MLIP	 is	 unique	 for	 its	 being	 created	 specifically	 for	 sharing	 these	 kinds	 of	 experiences	
among	the	second	generation.	The	creation	of	such	a	specific	space	bolsters	my	discussion	
of	 practices	 described	 in	 previous	 chapters	 and	 sections,	 which	 showed	 how	 my	
respondents	 are	 active	 in	 selecting,	 curating,	 and	 bringing	 together	 various	 elements	 of	
digital	 and	 non‐digital	 material	 and	 content	 in	 order	 to	 create	 and	 produce	 Iranian	
American‐ness	on	their	own	terms	and	within	a	given	editorial	frame.	MLIP	is	interesting	
as	 it	 invites	 the	 unique	 production	 of	 content	 around	 a	 predefined	 position.	 While	 it	
includes	a	harmony	of	different	voices	that	give	content	and	contours	to	second‐generation	
Iranian	American‐ness,	it	is	also	made	coherent	through	a	strong	central	theme.	This	brings	
together	 the	 everyday	 reporting	 of	 microblogging	 like	 Twitter	 with	 the	 non‐ritualized,	
everyday	experiences	of	being	Iranian	American.	This	illuminates	my	respondents’	ways	of	
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being	 Iranian	 American	 as	 much	 as	 it	 illuminates	 something	 that	 is	 far	 more	 widely	
resonant	about	internet	usage	that	links	to	the	point	I	made	in	the	previous	section	about	
the	internet	user	as	a	DJ.	As	Gideon	Lewis‐Kraus	writing	for	Harper’s	Magazine	stated:		
The	 promise	 of	 the	 Internet‐as‐Alexandria	 is	 more	 than	 the	 rolling	 plenitude	 of	
information.	 It’s	 the	 ability	 of	 individuals	 to	 choreograph	 that	 information	 in	
idiosyncratic	ways,	 the	hope	 that	 individuals	might	 feel	 invited	by	 the	 gravitational	
pull	of	a	broad	and	open	commons	to	‘rip,	mix,	and	burn’	—	to	curate.226		
Concurrently,	Manovich227	has	situated	the	rise	of	digital	media	within	the	longer	trend	in	
electronic	art	production	toward	seeing	selection	of	existing	content	as	a	form	of	creation.	
Like	the	YouTube	video	montages,	the	material	on	MLIP	is	volunteered	and	intended	to	pay	
tribute	to	common	reference	points	(whether	as	satire	or	homage).	Remixes	are	like	inside‐
jokes	 in	that	they	at	once	share	aspects	of	 internet	practices	that	are	also	used	as	part	of	
fan‐culture,	parody‐making,	and	other	activities	generally	considered	to	be	the	shallow	side	
of	 internet.	Nevertheless,	 these	same	 forms	of	citation	and	experience‐sharing,	as	well	as	
investment	 in	 production	 and	 commentary,	 arguably	 create	 a	 feeling	 of	 commonality	
among	users.		
	
Deep	and	superficial	meanings	
So	far	I	have	foregrounded	one	narrative	about	social	media	in	the	transnational	context	of	
the	 green	movement.	Namely,	 social	media	platforms	 turning	 into	 serious	 and	politically	
significant	media	 spaces	 from	 the	 frivolity	 that	many	 otherwise	 associated	 them	with.	 I	
have	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 both	 these	 characteristics	 that	 came	 together	 to	 lend	 social	media	
usage	the	significance	it	gained	for	my	respondents	in	LA	during	the	2009	protests	in	Iran.	
																																																								
226	Gideon	Lewis‐Kraus,	“A	World	in	Three	Aisles:	Browsing	the	Post‐Digital	Library”	Harpers	314:	no.	1884	
(May	2007):	56.	
227	Manovich,	Lev,	“The	Aesthetics	of	Virtual	Worlds:	Report	from	Los	Angeles,”	
http://manovich.net/index.php/projects/the‐aesthetics‐of‐virtual‐worlds	(accessed	1/12/14)		
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My	 respondents	 show	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 shallow	 nature	 of	 Facebook	 and	 Twitter	
when	 they	 speak	 about	 their	 own	 internet	 usage.	However,	 I	 have	 also	 shown	 here	 that	
their	practices	reveal	elements	of	their	deeply	felt	and	changing	engagement	with	Iranian	
American‐ness.	The	affordances	of	digital	communications	technologies	and	Web	2.0	social	
media	 platforms	 in	 particular	 are	 important	 here,	 as	 they	 lend	 themselves	 to	 the	
manipulation,	editing,	mixing,	and	remixing	of	digital	content,	as	well	as	the	reproduction	
of	this	content	through	“sharing”,	“posting”,	and	“tweeting.”	
	However,	 it	 is	 problematic	 to	 attribute	 these	 practices	 simply	 to	 the	 capacities	 that	
internet	has	 for	 “interactivity.”	Manovich	 (2002)	has	highlighted	 the	 shortcomings	of	 the	
term	“interactive”	by	pointing	to	the	inherent	interactive	relationships	between	texts	and	
people	 through	 interpretations	 of	 meaning.	 However,	 the	 difference	 is	 that	 with	 digital	
media,	the	relation	between	a	relatively	static	text	and	a	dynamic	sphere	of	interpretations	
is	 complicated	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 text	 is	as	dynamic	as	 the	 interpretations	 (Lister	et	al.,	
2003).	 Lister,	 Dovey,	 Giddings,	 Grant,	 and	 Kelley	 call	 upon	 the	 work	 of	 others	 such	 as	
Woolgar	to	advance	the	notion	of	“configuration”	in	place	of	“interactivity.”228		
So	 whereas	 the	 term	 “interaction”	 implies	 a	 two‐way	 communication,	
“configuration”	 suggests	 a	 two‐way	 mutually	 constitutive	 process	 through	 which	
both	user	 and	 software	are	dynamically	 engaged	 in	 refashioning	one	another	 in	 a	
feedback	loop	(Lister	et	al.,	2003:	24)	
In	other	words,	as	we	configure	 the	media	we	use,	 these	also	configure	us	as	users.	This	
goes	beyond	a	notion	of	mediated	interaction	between	users.	A	straightforward	example	is	
that	of	people	using	a	hashtag	as	part	of	their	practices	of	self‐expression/representation,	
while	 also	 contributing	 to	 the	 cumulative	 fate	 of	 that	 hashtag	 (e.g.	 whether	 it	 ends	 up	
trending	or	not).	I	show	in	this	section	that	as	users	of	various	social	media	platforms	my	
respondents	 come	 to	 see	 themselves	 as	 part	 of	 various	 collectives.	 This	 need	 not	 be	
experienced	in	the	form	of	sensing	moments	of	immersion	in	the	physical	environment	of	
																																																								
228	Their	references	to	Latour’s	Actor	Network	Theory	underpin	this	perspective.		
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Iran.	 Rather	 the	 sense	 of	 being	 part	 of	 a	 collective	 of	 Iranians	 around	 the	 world,	 or	 of	
audiences	with	 an	 investment	 in	 the	 fate	 of	 “the	 Iranian	 people,”	 or	 of	 a	 set	 of	 second‐
generation	 Iranian	Americans	who	understand	 the	 same	 jokes,	 each	mean	 cognitive	 and	
affective	engagements	with	others.		
The	deeper	meanings	that	social	media	usage	seems	to	take	on	rely	on	gaining	a	sense	of	
inclusion,	 connection,	 and/or	 belonging	 among	 others.	 Configuration	 happens	 not	 only	
with	 respect	 to	 technological	 systems	 but	 also	 political	 and	 cultural	 systems	 such	 as	
citizenship	and/or	work	(Lister	et	al.,	2003).	I	would	argue	based	in	this	case,	that	Iranian	
American‐ness	 is	 configured	 in	 relation	 to	 subjects’	 engagements	with	 the	 various	 social	
media	 practices	 and	 new	 genres	 of	 writing	 and	 video‐making	 that	 have	 become	
increasingly	 recognizable	 elements	 of	 web	 usage.	 Hence,	 these	 practices	 draw	 on	wider	
conventions	 of	 internet	 usage	 that	 are	 not	 specific	 to	 Iranian	 Americans.	 Yet	 what	
specifically	 characterizes	 second‐generation	 Iranian	 American	 self‐making	 processes	 is	
evident	in	the	particular	transitions	between	insider‐oriented	and	outsider‐oriented	ways	
of	being	Iranian	American.		
What	Parker	and	Song	call	“a	specifically	second	generation	form	of	‘social	capital’”	in	the	
context	 of	 their	 research	 on	 internet	 interactions	 is	 relevant	 here.	 Looking	 at	 second‐
generation	 Chinese	 in	 the	 UK,	 they	 argue	 that	 the	 intra‐ethnic	 bonds	 that	 young	 people	
develop	 on	 internet	 chat	 forums	 combine	with	 the	 connections	 they	 form	 to	 people	 and	
institutions	 outside	 the	 ethnic	 group,	 and	 those	 in	 power.	 They	 see	 these	 three	 kinds	 of	
connections	 as	 producing	 a	 combination	 of	 forms	 of	 social	 capital.	 By	 focusing	 on	 my	
respondents’	engagement	with	the	Iranian	Green	Movement,	 I	have	shown	in	this	section	
how	my	 respondents	 deploy	 styles	 of	 internet	 usage	 that	 are	 conventional	 among	 social	
media	 users	 more	 generally	 in	 order	 to	 effectively	 enter	 the	 public	 discussion	 about	 a	
specifically	 Iranian	 movement.	 Placing	 these	 practices	 in	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 my	
respondents’	more	mundane	and	“shallow”	social	media	usage,	I	argue	along	similar	lines	
to	Parker	and	Song	that	the	insider‐oriented	cultivation	of	second‐generation	Iranian‐ness	
(through	 references	 to	 common	 experiences	 and	 tacit	 knowledge	 on	 social	 media)	 is	
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combined	with	 outward‐looking	 connections	 to	 non‐Iranian	 audiences	 rather	 than	 being	
limited	to	intra‐ethnic	bonds.		
For	some,	the	emergence	of	the	green	movement	was	a	major	instigation	for	this	transition.	
This	event	that	put	some	of	my	respondents	in	new	relation	to	their	friends/contacts	as	it	
drew	solidarity	from	their	non‐Iranian	peers.	Some	were	seen	as	authority	on	the	relevant	
news	topic	of	 Iran	for	the	first	 time	and	being	Iranian	at	a	moment	when	a	relatable	and	
“cool”	movement	was	underway	on	the	global	media	stage.	Linking	to	institutions	of	power	
through	trying	to	push	for	continued	mainstream	news	coverage	from	the	US	was	also	one	
of	 the	 goals	 of	 (mediated)	 public	 participation	 by	 some	 respondents.	 I	 argue	 that	 my	
respondents’	social	media	usages	concerning	the	movement	are	as	much	a	practice	of	being	
Iranian	 by	 amplifying	 and	 connecting	 to	 the	 events	 in	 Iran	 as	 they	 are	 a	 practice	 of	
connecting	with	American	friends,	audiences,	and	institutions	to	raise	nuanced	awareness.		
In	addition	to	this	point	about	the	production	of	social	capital	by	the	second	generation,	I	
also	 make	 a	 point	 about	 the	 modes	 of	 social	 media	 usage	 in	 the	 dramatic	 versus	 the	
mundane	contexts	of	being	Iranian	American.	The	genres	and	conventions	of	social	media	
usage	 reflect	 consistency	 across	 these	 contexts,	 and	 so	 social	 media	 usage	 seems	 to	
oscillate	 between	 humorous,	 light,	 and	 frivolous	 content	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	
communications	about	a	grave	and	historic	development	on	the	other.	What	they	seem	to	
have	in	common	is	that	the	deeper	meanings	and	sense	of	connection	they	bring	about	in	
users	rely	on	the	aesthetic	aspects	of	new	media	that	make	things	“real.”	As	my	discussion	
of	the	examples	in	the	chapter	have	shown,	this	is	what	makes	the	intimacy	of	an	emotional	
connection	deeply‐felt,	what	gives	weight	to	the	trust	in	the	representation	of	a	people,	and	
gives	more	profound	meaning	to	what	is	otherwise	seen	as	a	space	for	superficiality.		
Manovich	 states	 that	 every	 technology	 in	 its	 new	 stage	 is	 accompanied	 by	 ideological	
tropes,	and	gives	the	following	examples,	among	others.		
[N]ew	technology	will	allow	for	“better	democracy,”	 it	will	give	us	better	access	to	
the	 “real”	 (by	 offering	more	 immediacy	 and/or	 the	 possibility	 to	 “represent	what	
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before	could	not	be	represented”),	it	will	contribute	to	the	“erosion	of	moral	values,”	
it	 will	 destroy	 the	 “natural	 relationship	 between	 humans	 and	 the	 world”	 by	
“eliminating	distance”	(Manovich,	2003:	19).	
As	is	evident	from	the	examples	he	gives,	Manovich	draws	attention	to	the	duality	of	these	
tropes	for	both	deteriorating	and	strengthening	connections.	Similarly,	the	depth/shallows	
notion	 about	 social	 media	 that	 circulated	 in	 my	 field	 site	 reflected	 two	 conflicting	 but	
coexisting	ideas	about	and	uses	of	social	media.	Manovich	suggests	that	ideological	tropes	
are	accompanied	by	 “aesthetic	strategies”	such	as	 filmic	 techniques	 for	representing	 “the	
real”	developed	 in	1990s	cinema	 in	order	 to	create	a	sense	of	 “immediacy”	(2003).	What	
brings	 user/producers	 a	 sense	 of	 deeper	 connection	with	what	 being	mediated	 through	
these	social	media	applications	is	not	so	much	the	use	of	web	applications	per	se.	It	is	the	
aesthetic	strategies229	deployed	by	producers	and	perceived	by	users	 that	give	people	an	
experience	of	immediacy	when	engaging	with	the	web	content	in	question.	Such	aesthetic	
strategies	explain	how	the	mediated	representations	of	Iran’s	Green	Movement	are	read	by	
the	 diaspora	 audience	 members	 I	 spoke	 with.	 The	 video	 montages	 (made	 out	 of	 raw	
footage	set	to	music)	offer	an	affective	framing	that	makes	them	moving	and	iconic	for	this	
distant	audience	of	diaspora	users,	and	 thus	more	 than	simply	 informative	documents	of	
the	 street	 protests.	 The	 “raw	 footage	 effect”	 is	 an	 important	 one	when	 it	 comes	 to	 both	
videos	of	the	street	protests,	other	citizen	actions,	and	acts	of	violence,	but	also	in	the	case	
of	the	endearing,	middle‐aged	“Iranian	of	the	day”	singing	in	a	non‐descript	room	of	his	co‐
workers.	 However,	 as	 I	 have	 shown,	 which	 aesthetic	 devices	 are	 used	 depends	 on	 the	
application	in	question.	Different	from	the	forthright	feel	of	the	amateur	YouTube	moving	
images,	 the	meme	photos	 and	 the	Twitter	 hashtags	 about	 Iran	 and	being	 “Persian”	 have	
their	own	conventions	and	ways	of	being	compelling	to	audiences	–	whether	through	self‐
referential	humor	about	 Iranian‐ness	 in	day	 to	day	situations,	or	by	drawing	attention	to	
the	gravity	of	the	political	situation	in	Iran	at	a	key	moment	as	a	“trending	topic.”	While	the	
																																																								
229	Although	I	would	see	it	more	as	a	device	than	a	strategy	as	the	latter	seems	to	imply	more	intentionality	on	
the	part	of	the	producer	than	seems	evident	to	me.	
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extensive	work	of	scholars	 like	 Jose	van	Dijck	(2013)	has	explored	 the	various	particular	
potentialities	 of	 use	 that	 are	 programmed	 into	 the	 same	 social	 media	 platforms	 I	 have	
discussed	instances	of	 in	this	chapter,	 I	have	complimented	that	approach	by	focusing	on	
the	actual	uses	that	my	respondents	put	these	platforms	to	in	a	particular	situation.		
	
Conclusion	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 took	 the	 period	 shortly	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 2009	 Iranian	 Presidential	
elections	 and	 the	months	 that	 followed	 as	 a	 focal	 point.	 This	 chapter	 looks	 at	 narratives	
that	emerged	around	web	applications	at	this	time.	Policy	and	media	discourses	tended	to	
see	“the	internet”	as	an	entity,	and	“social	media”	as	a	very	important	“tool,”	and	seemed	to	
be	 contiguous	with	 longer‐running	 ideological	 narratives	 about	 networked	 technologies,	
democracy,	 and	 freedom.	Looking	at	my	 respondents’	practices	of	web	usage	during	 this	
period	and	how	they	make	sense	of	it	within	the	context	of	their	wider	web	usage,	shows	
how	 narratives	 about	 “internet”	 and	 “social	 media”	 during	 this	 time	 are	 limited	 despite	
their	 prevalence.	 I	 zoom	 in	 on	 this	 event/period	 not	 only	 because	 of	 its	 significance	 in	
Iranian	and	regional	political	history,	but	also	because	from	the	vantage	point	of	my	field	
site,	this	event	placed	social	media	in	a	new	light.	It	made	social	media	a	hyper‐visible	part	
of	 the	 Green	 Movement.	 And	 this	 was	 a	 break	 with	 the	 self‐evidence	 and	 invisibility	 of	
social	media	in	the	ways	that	many	of	my	respondents	tended	to	see	their	own	day	to	day	
usage.	It	was	a	period	in	which	both	I	and	my	respondents	came	to	see	the	role	of	internet	
in	a	new	way,	and	this	had	important	implications	for	understanding	its	role	in	the	lives	of	
my	second‐generation	respondents	and	their	ways	of	being	Iranian	American.		
The	transnational	connections	being	made	with	Iran	were	part	of	the	formation	of	Iranian‐
ness	of	my	respondents.	I	showed	that	particular	genres	of	media	usage	have	the	power	to	
mediate	deeply	felt	connections	precisely	because	their	meanings	and	usage	have	become	
second	nature	with	the	everyday	practices	that	come	with	participating	in	web	practices.	
Their	 affordances	 have	 largely	 already	 been	 established,	 such	 that	 the	 “opportunities	 or	
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constraints	that	the	nature	of	a	media	technology	places	before	us”	(Lister	et	al.,	2003:	16)	
is	relatively	clear	well	before	it	is	put	into	use	during	a	time	of	crisis.	However,	they	do	not	
seem	to	be	static	or	uniform	across	applications.	Rather,	particular	web	applications	come	
with	their	own	affordances	that	become	apparent	through	my	respondents’	usage	of	them.	
And	moreover,	new	 fluencies	 in	how	to	 read	certain	sources	or	content	as	 “trustworthy”	
are	 quickly	 adapted	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 and	 contacts,	 including	 those	
developed	 through	 face‐to‐face	 or	 otherwise	 mediated	 social	 interactions.	 Questions	 of	
what	 to	 trust	 are	 discussed	 publicly	 and	 privately	 as	 well	 as	 formally	 debated	 by	 users	
themselves.	Established	genres	 from	both	digital	 and	non‐digital	media	are	put	 to	use	 in	
new	ways.		
This	global	media	event	invoked	a	progressive	and	pro‐democracy	Iranian	nation	through	
the	objectification	of	protest	actions,	drawing	on	discourses	of	universal	human	rights	and	
characterized	 by	 images	 of	 English	 language	 slogans,	 young	 women’s	 faces,	 and	
representations	of	state	violence	and	oppression.	This	objectification	of	the	event	and	the	
movement	for	diaspora	audiences,	however,	was	questioned	and	contested	as	a	function	of	
interpretations	of	both	the	political	circumstances	and	of	the	particular	media	applications	
being	used	 (web	as	well	 as	 other	media	 forms	 such	 as	 telephone	 calls	 and	24hour	 cable	
television	 news).	 The	 movement	 that	 came	 into	 being	 for	 my	 respondents	 through	
transnational	mediation	was	 shaped	 in	 that	mediation	 and	 the	 process	 of	 interpretation	
that	came	with	my	respondents	use	of	web	applications	to	engage	with	that	movement	in	
their	various	ways.		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 some	 of	my	 respondents	 were	 also	 instrumental	 in	 shaping	 how	 this	
movement	 was	 transnationally	 mediated	 in	 their	 capacity	 as	 web	 media	 users	 and	
producers.	 Key	 actors	 or	 “cultural	 translators”	 (some	 even	 part	 of	 the	 second	
generation)230	conveyed	interpretations	of	the	social	and	political	intricacies	of	the	Iranian	
context	 for	 diaspora	 audiences,	 including	 especially	 those	 of	 my	 second‐generation	
																																																								
230 Especially	relatively	young	figures	of	the	first	generation	and	those	on	the	precipice	of	first	and	second	
generation	with	professional	journalistic	aptitudes. 
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respondents	 who	 relied	 on	 these	 translations.	 For	 my	 respondents,	 the	 process	 of	
navigating	both	the	media	environment	during	 this	period	was	integral	 to	the	practice	of	
navigating	a	complex	landscape	of	social	and	political	meanings	between	the	circumstances	
in	Iran	and	their	own	context	in	LA.	That	is,	making	sense	of	this	movement	and	negotiating	
their	own	positioning	with	relation	to	these	events	relied	inexorably	on	their	practices	of	
making	sense	of	their	media	environment.		
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Conclusion	
	
	
	
The	 central	 question	 I	 have	 addressed	 in	 this	 book	 is	 how	people	 fashion	ways	 of	 being	
Iranian	American	in	this	case,	through	their	lives	as	second‐generation	migrant	web	users.	
This	 in‐depth	 investigation	 has	 potential	 implications	 both	 for	 broader	 issues	 of	 how	
migrant	 selves	are	 formed	with	 the	help	of	web	media,	and	 for	understanding	role	 these	
media	forms	in	such	formations	of	the	self.	The	ethnography	I	conducted	helped	me	delve	
into	 particularities	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 a	 set	 of	 Iranian	 Americans	 of	 the	 second	 generation,	
whom	 I	 befriended	 and	 otherwise	made	 contact	with	 in	 LA	 during	 fieldwork	 among	 the	
Iranian	American	community	there.	This	approach	was	important	because	it	allowed	me	to	
focus	 in	 the	 first	 place	 on	 the	 usage	 practices	 of	 people,	 utilizing	 this	 as	 window	 to	
understanding	what	it	means	for	people	to	access	the	multifarious	phenomenon	called	the	
internet.	By	looking	at	usage	practices	(mainly	of	Web	2.0	applications),	particular	qualities	
of	 internet	 become	 observable	 within	 the	 socio‐economic,	 political,	 and	 geographic	
contexts	 in	 which	 it	 is	 taken	 up.	 Hence,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 show	 what	 certain	 digital	
communications	 technologies	 mean	 to	 people	 and	 what	 they	 do	 with	 them,	 as	 well	 as	
shedding	light	on	the	potentialities	of	the	technologies	themselves.	In	each	of	the	chapters,	I	
built	my	 argument	 around	 a	 salient	 theme	 that	 emerged	 during	my	 fieldwork,	 each	 one	
concerning	a	different	facet	of	Iranian	American	identification	and	belonging.		
In	Chapter	1	on	formations	of	home,	I	discussed	how	my	respondents	use	web	applications	
as	part	of	their	practices	of	being	at	home.	I	focused	on	their	ways	of	dwelling	in	and	being	
mobile	between	particular	 important	places	 (in	 the	city	of	LA,	 the	parental	house,	and	 in	
Iran).	 I	 argued	 that	 place	 is	 more	 important	 for	 home	 formation	 than	 has	 been	
acknowledged	by	diaspora	research	so	 far,	 and	 I	argue	 that	 second	generation	members’	
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use	of	web	applications	informs	new	ways	of	making	diaspora	homes	with	relation	to	place.	
And	even	though	the	analysis	did	not	privilege	the	use	of	locative	and	mobile	applications,	
this	argument	seems	to	be	increasingly	corroborated	with	the	recent	expansion	of	locative	
networked	technologies	and	mobile	devices,	and	the	growing	scholarly	attention	for	these	
developments.			
My	respondents’	ways	of	bestowing	certain	places	with	meaning	as	loci	of	home	referred	to	
but	 also	 expanded	 upon	 locations	 of	 home	 according	 to	 members	 of	 their	 parents’	
generation.	 This	 reflects	 how	 exploring	 ways	 of	 being	 at	 home	 is	 an	 essential	 part	 of	
understanding	belonging	among	second‐generation	 Iranian	Americans.	 I	 showed	how	my	
second‐generation	 respondents’	 practices	 included	 uses	 of	 internet	 that	 reflected	
particular	styles	of	being	at	home	as	Iranian	Americans.	Among	these	were	blogging	return	
travel	 experiences,	 social	 media	 use	 in	 urban	 food	 culture,	 and	 mobile	 applications	 for	
staying	 in	 touch	 with	 family	 members.	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 technical	 possibilities	 and	 the	
genres	of	production	typical	to	particular	(web)	media	forms	shape	the	styles	in	question.	
Additionally,	 I	 showed	how	the	places	my	respondents	 inhabited	also	shape	 these	styles.	
These	 places	 influence	 the	 possibilities	 of	 how	 home	 is	 formed	 in	 emplaced	 social	
relationships.		
In	 Chapter	 2	 I	 discussed	my	 respondents’	 use	 of	web	 applications	 for	 engaging	with	 the	
past.	There	I	showed	how	the	link	with	an	Iranian	past	is	forged	specifically	by	my	second‐
generation	 respondents.	 I	 did	 this	 by	 focusing	 on	 my	 respondents’	 practices	 of	
remembering,	 which	 also	 include	 a	 variety	 of	 media	 practices.	 I	 tried	 to	 show	 how	
connections	with	the	past	are	framed	as	given,	and	appealed	to	as	an	unchanging	source	of	
belonging.	 This	 reflects	 certain	 similarities	 between	 my	 second‐generation	 respondents	
and	discussions	of	exile	 longing	and	 invocations	of	 the	past.	Through	these	remembering	
practices,	 my	 respondents	 position	 themselves	 in	 line	 with	 their	 parents’	 generation	 at	
certain	moments,	while	at	other	moments	they	distance	themselves	from	ways	of	engaging	
with	the	past	that	they	explicitly	associate	with	the	older	generation	of	Iranian	Americans	
around	them.	They	take	up	elements	of	longer‐running	exile	discourses	while	also	situating	
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remembering	Iranian	pasts	more	within	the	realm	and	attention	of	American	 institutions	
and	audiences	than	was	previously	the	case.		
My	 respondents	 make	 use	 of	 particular	 capabilities	 of	 web	 applications	 (like	 digital	
archives	of	artefacts	and	music	and	the	use	of	social	media	in	traditional	practices)	in	order	
to	claim	continuity	with	the	Iranian	past	(as	well	as	elements	of	the	American	past)	through	
certain	 shared	 styles,	 thus	 making	 the	 Iranian	 past	 their	 own.	 They	 develop	 collective	
sentiments	through	their	representations	and	experiences	of	the	past	via	the	mediation	of	
various	 of	 its	 elements.	 Hence,	 their	 engagement	 with	 the	 past	 is	 shaped	 by	 the	 media	
capabilities	of	web	applications,	but	it	is	also	shaped	by	the	affordances	of	physical	objects	
such	as	historical	artifacts	that	mediate	the	past	in	particular	ways.	While	digital	media	and	
internet	 in	particular	are	given	an	 integral	role	to	play	 in	certain	(ritual,	educational,	and	
personal)	 practices	 of	 remembering,	 they	 are	 evidently	 also	 limited	 in	 what	 they	 can	
mediate.	 And	 this	 is	when	other	material	 forms	 that	have	been	more	 reliably/effectively	
appropriated	into	the	work	of	remembering	take	over	(e.g.	books,	stones,	altars).	Studying	
how	 this	might	 change	 over	 time	 in	 the	 future	 –	 as	 these	 practices	 change	 and	 develop	
alongside	technologies	–	is	relevant	for	understanding	the	dynamic	ways	in	which	the	past	
is	made	constantly	made	accessible	for	people	in	the	present.		
Chapter	 3	 was	 dedicated	 to	 a	 discussion	 of	 my	 respondents’	 ways	 of	 dealing	 with	 the	
racialization	of	 Iranian	Americans.	 In	a	context	of	high	visibility	of	 Iranian	Americans	(as	
Middle	 Eastern	 Americans),	 my	 respondents	 show	 ways	 of	 appropriating	 this	 visibility,	
using	 emerging,	 oppositional	 categories	 of	 difference	 within	 discourses	 of	 multicultural	
inclusion.	The	issue	of	race	has	only	very	recently	started	to	be	the	focus	of	scholarship	on	
Iranian	diaspora.	Concentrating	on	their	practices	of	racial	self‐representation,	I	show	how	
my	 respondents	 use	 applications	 like	 blogs,	 websites,	 and	 social	 media	 profiles	 to	 start	
public	debate	and	show	alternative	perspectives,	using	oppositional	styles	do	to	so.	I	argue	
that	 these	 uses	 are	 extensions	 of	 other	 spaces	 for	 self‐expression	 about	 racial	
inclusion/exclusion,	 such	 as	 print	 media	 outlets	 and	 (face‐to‐face)	 art	 and	 discussion	
spaces.	 Furthermore,	 their	 role	 in	 the	 public	 debate	 is	 limited,	 especially	 when	 seen	 in	
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comparison	 to	 the	mainstream	 racialized	 representations	 of	 this	 group	 (in	mass	media)	
that	they	are	out	to	change.	In	this	way,	self‐representation	strategies	are	caught	between	
lacking	 the	 power	 to	 change	 dominant	 narratives	 outright	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 on	 the	
other	hand	 being	 keenly	 aware	 of	 the	 problems	with	 claiming	 a	 “model	minority”	 status	
that	 risks	being	used	 to	 legitimate	discrimination	against	other	migrants	groups	and	 less	
“successful”	Iranian	Americans.	
These	 young	 people’s	 positioning,	 I	 argue,	 signals	 an	 acknowledgement	 and	 clear	 break	
from	 the	 older	 generation’s	 ways	 of	 organizing	 Iranian	 American‐ness	 in	 ways	 that	
eschewed	racial	difference.	It	also	shows	how	digital	capabilities	for	representing	race	and	
the	racialized	body	are	taken	up,	which	supports	research	arguing	against	the	 impending	
redundancy	 of	 race	 and	 gender	 differences	 due	 to	web	 communications.	 Additionally,	 it	
shows	how	 the	broader	media	 environment	offers	possibilities	 for	 self‐representation	 as	
well	as	places	limits	on	this;	namely,	the	limitations	on	the	types	of	difference	that	can	be	
claimed	 in	 response	 to	 the	 dominant	 racializing	 discourse.	 These	 parameters	 are	 also	
designated	by	the	institutional	spaces	made	available	to	racial	identity	politics	struggles	in	
the	US,	including	spaces	of	media	representation.		
Finally,	 in	 Chapter	 4	 I	 discussed	 my	 respondents’	 web	 practices	 around	 the	 rise	 of	 the	
Green	Movement	in	Iran.	I	focused	firstly	on	the	wider	framing	of	the	global	media	event,	
including	 the	 framing	 of	 the	 role	 of	 social	 media	 in	 the	 news	 coverage	 of	 the	 protest	
movement.	I	then	moved	on	to	analyzing	my	respondents’	practices	around	this	period	in	
the	wider	context	of	their	web	use.	I	argued	that	my	respondents’	social	media	use	and	the	
wider	 significance	 of	 social	media	 in	mediating	 the	 protests	 shaped	 how	 the	movement	
came	into	being	for	the	diaspora	and	other	international	audiences.	Furthermore,	the	use	of	
innovative	 news	websites	 by	 certain	 key	 actors	 –	 among	 them	members	 of	 the	 second‐
generation	 –	 influenced	 the	 international	 journalistic	 coverage	 of	 the	 movement.	 I	
discussed	how	my	respondents	made	sense	of	the	media	environment	and	its	logics	during	
this	period,	as	they	engaged	in	practices	specific	to	certain	genres	of	social	media	web	use.	I	
argued	that	my	respondents’	web	use	draws	them	into	ways	of	seeing	themselves	as	part	of	
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an	Iranian	diaspora	through	their	complex	media	environment	and	the	way	they	position	
their	Iranian	American	selves	within	it.		
In	each	of	these	chapters	I	elaborated	on	the	specific	affordances	that	came	with	the	use	of	
particular	 web	 applications	 or	 ways	 of	 accessing	 the	 internet.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 I	 also	
showed	how	the	circumstances	in	each	case	also	afforded	a	particular	set	of	possibilities	for	
self‐formation.	 This	 means	 that	 while	 the	 media	 environment	 was	 constraining	 and	
facilitating	 of	 certain	 forms	 of	 communication,	 this	 environment	 also	 includes	 places,	
things,	 bodies,	 social	 movements/political	 landscapes,	 and	 other	 parameters	 that	 offer	
their	 own	 constraints	 and	 possibilities.	 And	 as	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 show,	 these	 also	mediate	
selves	 in	the	process	of	becoming	Iranian	American.	This	 furthers	a	perspective	that	sees	
media	and	the	environments	they	are	used	in	as	mutually	shaping	one	another.	Yet	it	also	
suggests	that	not	only	the	media	forms	offer	certain	affordances,	but	that	the	environments	
in	which	media	are	used	sometimes	seem	to	offer	some	unlikely	possibilities	for	mediation	
themselves	–	such	that	bodies	or	places	become	media	–	which	(re)emphasizes	questions	
of	how	to	understand	what	counts	as	media,	and	the	relationship	between	media	and	their	
environments.		
This	 research	 had	 the	 aim	 of	 including	 a	 range	 of	 media	 practices	 relevant	 to	 the	 key	
questions.	 Although	 the	 motive	 was	 to	 address	 the	 lack	 of	 prior	 in‐depth	 ethnographic	
research	 on	 this	 group	 and	 its	 internet	 use,	 the	 broad	 scope	 of	 the	 project	 was	 also	 its	
limitation	in	a	way.	It	became	clear	to	me	that	any	one	of	the	many	web	applications	that	
have	 featured	 in	my	ethnographic	analysis	and	which	 I	encountered	 in	 the	 field	could	be	
made	the	basis	of	further	inquiry	into	usage	practices	in	this	case.	Indeed,	new	applications	
emerged	and	were	adopted	by	my	respondents	during	and	after	the	time	I	conducted	this	
fieldwork	at	a	rate	that	would	constantly	require	fresh	bouts	of	field	investigation	in	order	
to	 stay	 completely	up	 to	date.	 Furthermore,	 the	 focus	on	 a	minority	of	 a	minority	 of	 the	
second	 generation	 of	 Iranian	 Americans	 in	 LA	 meant	 that	 it	 may	 not	 be	 possible	 to	
extrapolate	what	 I	have	 found	here	 regarding	 the	 Iranian	diasporic	 second	generation	 to	
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the	wider	whole,	 so	 further	 comparative	work	 is	 necessary	 towards	 this	 end.	 This	work	
lays	a	basis	for	future	comparative	insights	about	Iranian	diaspora	and	media	forms.		
Focusing	 on	 the	 everyday	 lives	 of	 my	 respondents	 showed	 not	 only	 how	 their	 web	
practices	 are	 embedded	 within	 the	 wider,	 overlapping	 social	 fields	 of	 their	 lives.	 More	
specifically,	it	also	helped	reveal	how	these	practices	are	part	of	processes	of	migrant	self‐
formation	that	are	not	only	oriented	towards	long‐distance	homelands,	but	also	very	much	
a	 part	 of	 the	 country	 where	 they	 live	 and	 the	 many	 facets	 of	 life	 that	 they	 style	 for	
themselves	 in	 that	particular	 context.	Much	work	on	migrants’	 practices	of	 accessing	 the	
internet	 focuses	 on	 border‐crossing	 communications	 and	 frames	 the	 migrants	 on	 the	
internet	as	the	quintessence	of	the	modern	world	of	mobility	and	technology.	 	However,	I	
have	 tried	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	 much	 more	 varied	 range	 of	 applications,	 purposes,	 and	
motivations	 for	accessing	 the	 internet	 than	such	a	 framing	allows.	 I	have	 taken	seriously	
the	many	ways	in	which	my	respondents’	web	usage	is	indiscernible	from	the	ways	many	
(non‐migrant)	others	use	 internet,	as	 they	take	their	meaning	from	precisely	 these	wider	
modes	 of	 use	 as	 well	 as	 the	 logics	 imputed	 to	 them	 through	 the	 possibilities	 of	 the	
platforms	 they	 use.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 there	 is	 nothing	 particular	 about	 how	 my	
respondents	use	internet,	just	that	their	modes	of	use	are	not	entirely	attributable	to	their	
being	Iranian	American	or	migrants.		
I	 have	 shown	 that	 my	 respondents	 display	 various	 emerging	 ways	 of	 claiming	 and	
appropriating	otherness.	These	sometimes	set	 them	apart	 from	their	parents’	generation,	
and	other	 times	 align	 them	with	 longer	 ancestries	 that	 include	 their	 families,	 immediate	
and	 distant,	 and	 also	 situate	 them	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 varied	 environments	 they	 find	
themselves	in	as	Americans.	I	believe	I	have	shown	that	these	claims	are	integral	to	ways	of	
finding	and	sensing	belonging,	rather	than	a	separate,	 instrumental	move	for	recognition.	
They	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 part	 of	 a	 Gramscian	war	 of	 position,	which	 is	 a	 process	 that	
penetrates	 their	 everyday	 practices	 of	 forming	 and	 being	 themselves.	 This	 stresses	 the	
need	within	diaspora	studies	 to	pay	attention	 to	how	transnational	modes	of	positioning	
towards	the	country	of	“settlement”	and	“origin”	are	intertwined	with	one	another,	in	this	
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case	 strengthening	 one	 another	 through	 long‐distance	 belonging	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	
identity	political	assertions	on	the	other.		
These	 modes	 of	 positioning	 seek	 to	 co‐define	 the	 terms	 on	 which	 inclusion	 happens.	
However	they	also	do	this	within	limits,	and	either	implicitly	or	explicitly	draw	attention	to	
the	limits	and	contradictions	of	narratives	of	the	color‐blind	American	nation	of	migrants,	
the	 American	 Dream	 of	 material	 prosperity,	 America	 as	 open	 to	 multicultural	 (multi‐
religious)	 difference/pluralism,	 and	 America	 as	 part	 of	 the	 gender‐
emancipated/emancipating	 West.	 This	 came	 to	 the	 fore	 via	 my	 respondents’	 diverse	
activities	of	artistic	production	and	expression,	political	organizing	and	identification,	and	
other	 modes	 of	 self‐styling.	 They	 tended	 to	 embrace	 inclusion	 (e.g.	 non‐white)	 while	
highlighting	 cultural	difference	of	being	 Iranian	 in	America	as	well	 as	 the	 internal	 (class,	
gender,	etc.)	diversities	among	Iranian	Americans	themselves.	Due	to	these	particular	ways	
of	giving	shape	to	Iranian	American‐ness,	I	suggested	that	the	second	generation	of	Iranian	
Americans	 contains	 the	 elements	 for	 significant	 shifts	 in	migrant	 strategies	 for	 inclusion	
and	transnational	identification	compared	to	the	first	generation.		
While	 based	 on	 the	 case	 of	 the	 children	 of	 Iranian	migrants	 in	 LA,	 this	 contribution	 has	
potential	implications	for	research	on	internet	and	migrant	identities	more	broadly.	I	have	
used	this	case	to	connect	to	wider	debates	on	mediation	and	the	formation	and	selves,	and	
how	 this	 is	 changing	 with	 the	 rise,	 development,	 adaptation,	 and	 application	 of	 new	
communications	 technologies.	 I	have	argued	 that	 these	young	people’s	web	practices	are	
not	 so	 much	 the	 driving	 force	 behind	 how	 they	 live	 through	 multiple	 different	 social	
spheres.	 Rather,	 such	 spheres	 exert	 themselves	 upon	 these	 young	 people	 in	 a	 variety	 of	
settings	and	socio‐political	 circumstances.	Yet,	 their	web	uses	 can	overall	be	 said	 to	play	
important	roles	in	facilitating	modes	of	positioning,	imbuing	them	with	certain	styles	that	
not	only	appeal	 to	but	also	 form	this	generation	as	 Iranian	Americans.	 In	 this	 research,	 I	
began	from	a	starting	point	and	assumption	that	selves	are	made	real	 for	people	through	
processes	of	mediation.	And	I	argued	that	the	role	of	internet	in	migrant’s	lives	is	how	their	
web	 usage	 becomes	 incorporated	 into	 their	 practices	 of	 self‐styling,	 and	 how	 the	
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materiality	of	(and	produced	by)	these	media	forms	brings	about	particular	ways	of	being	
oneself.		
That	 is,	 shared	 ways	 of	 developing	 attachments	 to	 places,	 of	 remembering	 the	 past,	 of	
seeing/representing	 bodies,	 and	 relating	 to	 an	 uprising	 from	 afar	 are	 shaped	 by	 the	
materiality	of	particular	media	forms	(including	different	elements	web	applications)	used	
as	well	 as	 the	materiality	 of	 the	 products	 they	 help	make	 (e.g.	 online	 videos,	 blog	 posts,	
etc.).	These	shape	the	practices,	literacies,	fluencies,	and	strategies	that	people	use	to	stay	
in	touch,	organizing,	and	expressing	themselves.	Shared	ways	of	identifying	also	rely	on	the	
styles	 of	 cultural	 practices.	 These	 styles	 are	 a	 testament	 to	 the	 particularities	 of	
overlapping	and	multiple	ways	of	being	Iranian	American,	while	also	showing	intersections	
with	other	identifications.	I	have	tried	to	show	that	taken	together	the	media	and	cultural	
practices	 evident	 in	 this	 case	 bring	 about	 a	 sense	 of	 belonging	 that	 has	 come	 to	 rely	 as	
much	on	older	media	forms	and	preexisting	cultural	styles	of	being	Iranian	American	as	on	
this	new	generation’s	styles	and	their	digital	media	uses.		
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